US-RUSSIA RELATIONS – FAULT LINES AND POINTS OF CONTACT (2021)

The key logic running through the entire study is that Russia views the current period (up to 2024) as a transitional phase for reassessing its status within the international system — from the risk of losing its ‘superpower’ status to an attempt to establish itself as a separate ‘pole’ or ‘balancing power’.

Within this logic, the Russian Federation’s behaviour has three interrelated strands:

1. Preserving what has been achieved (status + spheres of influence)

The Russian Federation does not plan to change its behaviour; on the contrary, it is attempting to force the West to accept the facts already on the ground (spheres of influence, conflicts, positions) as the new norm.

2. Undermining the West’s consolidated position

The main tool is the shift from multilateral alliances to bilateral pragmatic agreements based on “interests > values”, which allows the West to deal with each actor separately and weaken its unity.

3. Shaping a new architecture (multipolarity)

Russia is promoting a model in which there are many ‘poles’, and it is one of them, even without the resources of a classic superpower. To this end:

• it utilises participation in global processes (the UN, arms control);

• it maintains its partnership with China;

• it is engaged in a struggle for influence in the post-Soviet space.

Key contradiction (core of the analysis) – Russia simultaneously:

• acknowledges its weaknesses (sanctions, lack of like-minded allies, risk of diminished status),

• yet attempts to politically compensate for this by changing the rules of the game, rather than by changing its own behaviour.

Strategic conclusion: Russia’s strategy is not an attempt to integrate into the existing order, but an attempt to legitimise its own actions by changing the order itself:

• from ‘rules and values’ → to ‘interests and agreements’;

• from ‘a united West’ → to ‘a set of separate centres of power’;

• from ‘accountability for actions’ → to ‘bargaining for their recognition’.

In this model, Ukraine is explicitly defined as a key element in the struggle for spheres of influence, rather than as an independent actor, which confirms that for the Russian Federation, the post-Soviet space remains a critical arena for the implementation of this strategy

Introduction
Objectives, timeframes, tasks and instruments.

• Tools – diplomacy, engagement, sanctions.
Diplomacy.
• Overcoming diplomatic isolation.
Engagement:
• Arms control.
• Global issues.
• Regional issues:
– The wider world.
– Neighbouring countries (including Ukraine). Developing new approaches.
Sanctions and ways to overcome them.
• The problem of overcoming and circumventing sanctions
• Proposals from the Russian side

Directions: European and Chinese.
• The European dimension
• The Chinese dimension

Implications for Ukraine in the context of resolving the Ukrainian conflict.

Introduction

Russian experts note that during Donald Trump’s four years in the White House, relations between the US and Russia continued to deteriorate in virtually all areas, particularly regarding arms control, diplomatic contacts, cooperation on acute regional issues, and so on.

For the Russian side, following the recent election, the question also remains open as to whether Joe Biden’s presidency will last a full four years, or whether he will leave the White House before the end of his first term for one reason or another. At the same time, experts note that neither under Joe Biden nor under Kamala Harris should one expect another ‘reset’ of bilateral relations.

The Kremlin therefore tends to view this period of the US presidency as an interim phase in the establishment of new relations. New, precisely because Russia seeks to preserve the gains it has made and has no intention of altering its behaviour on the international stage, whilst the collective West continues to punish and isolate Russia for this. Consequently, Moscow faces a challenge: Russia must build a new model of relations with the collective West in which these achievements are accepted and consolidated.

Moscow is persistently promoting the argument that significant progress in relations between the two countries can only occur after the 2024 presidential elections (the completion of the ‘transfer of power’ in Russia, elections in the US, the EU, Ukraine, etc.). This proposal is argued on the grounds that, to move beyond confrontation, a ‘reset’ of power is needed in both the Russian Federation and the US (‘new generations of political leaders will replace the outgoing “old guard” in Washington and Moscow’) and the establishment of a new world order.

We have previously written in detail about the Russian vision of a model for building a new world order here: Russia’s proposals for discussing the terms of building a new world order with the EU and conclusions for Ukraine. Part 2. Project-based (issue-based) multilateralism or the ad hoc multilateralism format.

Having emphasised the importance of preserving the Russian Federation’s status as a ‘superpower’ and its ‘spheres of influence’, Moscow acknowledges the possibility of Russia’s status being downgraded in the future to that of a ‘regional power’. There is an attempt, through the distortion of cause-and-effect relationships, to define and consolidate ‘Russia’s special path’ — a special new status as a ‘balancing power’, whilst retaining the option of ‘spheres of influence’.

In the transition to the status of a ‘regional power’, Russia will face serious problems and competition for its ‘influence’ in the international arena within ‘its former spheres of influence’, such as the post-Soviet space and, above all, Ukraine.

Moscow will no longer be able to justify its behaviour towards the countries of the post-Soviet space (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, etc.) by claiming its sole right to ‘protect its spheres of influence’; this will be interpreted as outright aggression against neighbouring states and a violation of international law.

In other words, having lost its status as a ‘superpower’, Russia seeks to retain the right to remain a ‘pole’. Russia’s task boils down to overcoming the consolidated position of the collective West by creating a multitude of separate, independent ‘poles’ and interacting with each of them individually.

Russia is facing significant, even insurmountable, problems in every area upon which its former multilateralism was based: institutions, values, and states. In particular, regarding ‘Values’ (which presupposes a shared set of values among participants), the Russian Federation lacks a distinct ‘system of shared values’ — as an alternative to that which exists in democratic countries and is recognised globally — and has no allies who share these values and defend them.

Russia has chosen a path of violating the fundamental principles of international values, calling such actions a ‘special path’ — this is a distortion of concepts, an attempt to force the countries of the post-Soviet space to become its allies. Hence Russia’s direct aggression against Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.

Moscow’s main message to the West is that Russia proposes a shift away from a consolidated position (the international framework of alliances) towards the establishment of bilateral pragmatic cooperation based solely on a convergence of interests, rather than values.

Precisely because Biden’s election does not entirely fit the standard Russian narrative describing the dynamics of development and the directions of change in the contemporary international system, Russia believes that the West’s renewed consolidation, even it be partial and temporary, calls into question the validity of the thesis regarding the advent of a multipolar (polycentric) world order — at least in the near future.

In other words, Moscow also allows for the preservation of the old world order whilst Russia retains its former status as a ‘superpower’ or is recognised as a separate ‘pole’, believing that talk of shared Western values is merely a manifestation of the usual Western hypocrisy.

At the same time, a potential failure of the newly elected president in domestic and/or foreign policy would be perceived by many in Moscow as ‘evidence of the final decline of both the United States and the West as a whole’, opening up new opportunities for Russia to argue in favour of the necessary transition to a multipolar world order.

Goals, timelines, tasks and instruments.

The Russian side believes that the existing political divisions in the United States (between Democrats in the White House and Republicans on Capitol Hill, between ‘centrists’ and ‘progressives’ within the Democratic Party) will complicate the pursuit of any consistent and long-term US policy towards Russia, and will limit the possibility of signing any agreements with Moscow that require ratification by the US Congress.

At the same time, the broad anti-Russian consensus in Washington is likely to remain stable in the coming years, regardless of any possible gestures of goodwill from the Russian side.

The Joe Biden administration views Russia not as a long-term strategic challenge, but as a situational yet significant obstacle preventing it from focusing on more important foreign policy priorities.

However, according to Russian experts, it is impossible to ignore Russia, given the active role Moscow is attempting to play in world politics and the efforts Russia is making to counter the US and the West as a whole.

The Russian side also believes that an additional complication for the resumption of a full-fledged dialogue between Washington and Moscow lies in the fact that the Biden administration, by all accounts, will seek quick foreign policy victories to demonstrate its presumed professional superiority over the Trump administration.

Relations with Russia offer little hope of quick, even symbolic, victories — negotiations on issues of key importance to both sides will be complex and protracted, and their results (if any) are likely to be very modest.

This situation could only change in the event of significant political shifts in one or both countries, which are not anticipated in the near future.

The Russian side believes that, at this stage, the US should not set itself the immediate goal of regime change in the Russian Federation. Such a change is viewed as a natural prospect for the country’s internal development. Therefore, in order to satisfy these demands of the Collective West (regime change) and to control internal processes within the country itself, a so-called ‘transition of power’ has begun in Russia, which is due to be completed by 2024.

This period is viewed by Russia itself as a ‘transition period’ both in terms of internal changes and in terms of a ‘transition period’ on the international stage: either retaining the status of a ‘superpower’, or transitioning to the new status of a so-called ‘balancing power’ (pole) whilst attempting to retain all the options of a ‘superpower’.   

Let us consider the main areas in which Russia will face challenges in the coming period (in simplified terms).

As can be seen from the table, using the same tools, Russia may attempt to achieve various goals and objectives in the coming period, whilst preserving the results it has already achieved. To do this, it is necessary to create the opportunity for their ‘unfreezing’ and full implementation.

Tools

Using the same tools, Russia may attempt to achieve various goals and objectives in the coming period, whilst preserving the results it has already achieved. To do this, it is necessary to create the possibility of ‘unfreezing’ them and fully implementing them.

Diplomacy.

On the one hand, Russia believes that Joe Biden understands the importance of maintaining a broad range of diplomatic contacts with Moscow better than Donald Trump, and hopes that the new president might agree to end the ongoing ‘diplomatic war’ between the United States and Russia.

On the other hand, there is an understanding in Russia that Moscow’s proposals are unlikely to lead to a significant deepening of cooperation in bilateral relations, and that their purpose will be merely to manage the ongoing confrontation more effectively.

To overcome this confrontation and ‘diplomatic isolation’, Russia is sending signals in the form of proposals regarding the possibility of further cooperation between Russia and the US.

It is anticipated that a US-Russian summit may not take place at all in 2021 — according to experts, the personal relationship between the American and Russian leaders leaves much to be desired. The first face-to-face meeting between the two presidents may take place ‘on the sidelines’ of one of the major multilateral summits (G20, APEC, etc.) and will likely focus on specific pressing issues.

Since the ‘top-down’ model of US-Russian relations is unlikely to work in the near future, the Russian side is raising the issue of the need to apply the reverse principle — ‘bottom-up’ — which could already be tested in certain areas by the Biden administration.

Consequently, the Russian side is proposing to the US administration the creation and operation of a special working group on Russia.

The Kremlin expects that Joe Biden’s reluctance to personally negotiate with the Russian leader will mean that the new US president will be prepared to delegate more responsibility within his team to experts on Russian affairs. This, in turn, according to the Russian side, will help ensure that US policy towards Russia is, on the whole, more stable, realistic and predictable.

Let us highlight the key issues of interest to Moscow that are proposed for consideration by such a special team:

• Unblocking the work of the Russian embassy in Washington;

• resuming work on improving US visa issuance procedures;

• the resumption, on a reciprocal basis, of the activities of Russian and American consulates that were closed during the Trump administration.

• the unfreezing of certain diplomatic, military and expert channels of interaction between the two countries (under the pretext of reducing the risks of unintended escalation and uncontrolled confrontation).

In return for concessions on the above issues, which are important to the Kremlin, the Russian side is, in turn, prepared to make concessions on other issues of interest to the American side (in Moscow’s view):

• as part of efforts to boost US soft power — expanding government programmes that encourage Russian-American cooperation at the civil society level, as well as educational programmes for Russian citizens;

• expanding opportunities for science diplomacy (provided that scientific contacts between the two countries are not artificially restricted on national security grounds);

• opportunities for positive US-Russian diplomatic engagement within multilateral frameworks: the UN Security Council, the G20, APEC, the OSCE, the Arctic Council and other international forums at global and regional levels.

Russian experts emphasised that achieving results in future ‘negotiations’ between Russia and the US on ‘overcoming diplomatic isolation’ will require significant effort and ‘Moscow’s ability to master the art of a new type of multilateral diplomacy, which will gradually take shape in the post-crisis world’.

This suggests that the time has come for Russia to adopt a more flexible strategy and tactics regarding the organisation of negotiation processes on the international stage.

Engagement:

There is a view that it has become popular in Washington to describe the Biden administration’s immediate international challenges as the ‘3Cs’ — coronavirus, climate and China.

According to Russian experts, on none of these priority issues can Moscow act either as an active partner of the US or as a major obstacle to the new administration achieving its goals.

However, it is important for Russia to remain on the US’s agenda in order to achieve its own objectives. Otherwise, Russia risks being left in isolation.

It is therefore of the utmost importance for Moscow that the Biden administration constantly faces the Russian factor across all key areas of its policy.

The reasoning goes as follows: if Washington fails to isolate Moscow, this means that US-Russian dialogue, in one form or another and at one level or another, will have to continue, even if expectations from this dialogue on both sides remain fairly modest.

Indeed, the Russian side is sending signals that the Biden administration will not be able to ignore Moscow in its foreign policy, citing the following arguments:

• Russia is not only a nuclear superpower, the only country in the world capable of destroying the United States many times over.

• It also has unique capabilities to project its military power far beyond its national borders.

• Russia remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council with veto power.

• It is also a member of the G20, APEC, BRICS, the SCO and other important multilateral organisations.

• It is a major player in many global markets – oil and gas, modern weaponry, foodstuffs, and so on.

• Russia has a wide network of partners in virtually all regions of the world, including those of strategic importance to the US.

Russian experts also believe that Joe Biden’s strategy towards Russia will be largely determined by the steps Russia may take regarding the new administration in the near future. There is a view in the US that the Kremlin will ‘test the mettle’ of the new administration through a series of bold, even provocative moves.

The Biden administration is expected to be prepared to give a firm rebuff to Moscow’s ‘provocations’. If there are no such ‘provocations’, additional opportunities for limited US-Russian dialogue will arise.

Arms control

Bilateral arms control (the extension of New START) is essential for Russia to confirm its status as a ‘superpower’ and its associated capabilities, one of which lies in the division of ‘spheres of influence’.

For the Russian Federation, this is a key issue. It is linked to Russia’s future positioning on the international stage and the shaping of all other aspects of its relations.

Russia is more interested in maintaining bilateral arms control than the United States.

Russia’s objective boils down to trying to persuade the Biden administration to agree to terms favourable to the Kremlin:

• ‘saving’ the New START Treaty by agreeing to extend it for five years or a shorter period without additional conditions;

• to make “certain attempts to preserve de facto” certain provisions of the INF Treaty — for example, through an agreement with Russia not to deploy nuclear warheads on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles.

Russia is also keen to persuade the Americans to abandon certain decisions of the previous administration — for example, the programme to develop sea-based cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, low-yield warheads which, during the Trump era, were deployed on Trident II submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), promising in return similar restraint on the Russian side.

As Russian experts emphasise, any bilateral Russian-American agreements outside the framework of START-3 will be the subject of tough negotiations — given that the differences between the parties are fundamental in nature and do not lend themselves to easy solutions.

One option for preserving and consolidating Russia’s status as a ‘superpower’ is for Moscow to consider adopting a declaration (bilateral or within the framework of the ‘nuclear five’) on the inadmissibility of nuclear war and the impossibility of victory in it.

Such an official statement, according to Russian experts, could be seen as proof that Russia and the US recognise their responsibility for preventing a nuclear catastrophe, reducing the nuclear threat and strengthening strategic stability.

Experts believe that holding the NPT Review Conference in 2021 provides Russia with such an opportunity, as the idea of such a commitment will receive broad international support, and the Biden administration will find it difficult to ignore it.

However, the Russian side is also forced to acknowledge that it will not be possible to reach practical agreements on limiting the technological arms race in the near future.

Global issues

The Russian side believes that the most likely points of convergence with the US may lie in the following issues on the global international agenda:

• Climate;

• Specialised multilateral formats;

• The Arctic;

• Space;

• Counter-terrorism.

Let’s look at them in more detail in the table (simplified):

As can be seen from the above, experts believe that the Arctic is the most promising area for Russia in terms of establishing relations with the US during the ‘transition period’.

Regional issues

Russian experts believe that the change of administration in Washington will bring about certain adjustments to US strategy towards various regions of the world, both in the Far Abroad and the Near Abroad.

The Far Abroad

Russia expects a tougher stance on Moscow’s destabilising actions in unstable regions of the Far Abroad, particularly in North Africa and the Middle East.

As can be seen from the table, Russia sees certain prospects for influencing processes in regions far abroad and, accordingly, sees prospects for potential opportunities for Russian-American cooperation (‘liquid assets’):

• Iran;

• Israeli-Palestinian settlement;

• Filling the regional ‘power vacuum’ (Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia);

• Afghanistan;

• North Korea;

• South Caucasus (Karabakh).

But regarding the regions that Moscow seeks to regard as zones of ‘its influence’ (Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Syria, Iraq, Libya) Russia is in no hurry to voice its forecasts and proposals, regarding this as a ‘bargaining chip’ to be used on its own terms with America, depending on what results Moscow can achieve in other ‘liquid assets’, with the biggest stakes being placed on Afghanistan and North Korea.

Neighbouring countries (including Ukraine)

Russian experts suggest that a hallmark of the Biden administration will be increased support for states in the ‘near abroad’ that oppose Moscow, primarily Ukraine, as well as Georgia and Moldova.

According to experts, this support is likely to include the expansion of military-technical cooperation and lobbying for closer ties between these countries and NATO, which would have a significant negative impact on US-Russian relations. At the same time, it is believed that the Biden administration is unlikely to return to the idea of the rapid integration of Ukraine or Georgia into the North Atlantic Alliance.

As for US actions regarding Russia’s ally, Belarus, Russian experts believe that Joe Biden will show greater willingness to support the political opposition in Belarus if Alexander Lukashenko’s position becomes increasingly precarious.

Moscow’s main concerns boil down to the possibility that America might provide significant economic, financial and other assistance to neighbouring states that oppose Moscow.

It is therefore very much in Russia’s interests if the new administration’s efforts are primarily focused on addressing domestic issues in the US and on China. This would prevent the Biden administration from implementing a large-scale ‘Marshall Plan’ for Ukraine or other post-Soviet states.

In that case, practical American cooperation will focus on the US’s traditional agenda regarding post-Soviet countries — promoting democratisation, combating corruption, cooperating in the fight against terrorism, and supporting the ‘European vector’ in foreign policy — that is, in areas where Moscow can both counter such processes and exert its influence within those countries through pro-Russian forces present there.

More likely, in the view of Russian experts, are attempts by the White House to shift the main burden of countering Russia in Eastern Europe onto its European allies as part of a broader effort to ‘redistribute the burden of defending the West’.

Russia expects such attempts to fail, as there is growing frustration in Europe over how Ukraine is implementing its programme of socio-economic reforms, whilst there is considerable scepticism regarding Georgia and Moldova. Moreover, the European Union is currently facing significant financial difficulties, which prevent a sharp increase in funding for the ‘Eastern Partnership’ countries.

Russia’s development of new approaches in the Near Abroad.

It is also worth noting that there is an ongoing debate in Russia regarding future strategy and tactics towards the post-Soviet states in light of the changes in Russia’s status that are taking place.

In Russia, it was customary to view the independence of post-Soviet states from the perspective of ‘formal sovereignty’, which for Moscow did not mean the same thing as ‘real sovereignty’. Experts note that Russian policy is gradually undergoing a process of ‘ ’ – the development of new approaches based on ‘optimising ambitions’ – a policy of ‘strategic restraint’.

Russian experts raise the question that Moscow’s goal — ‘to recreate the Soviet empire’ — must undergo changes due to the emergence of a fundamentally new historical situation. In their words, ‘the discussion is no longer about an empire in the classical sense, but about determining which parts of the empire’s legacy are worthy of Russia’s efforts and resources, and which are not: which corners of the post-Soviet space are necessary, and which can in fact be safely set adrift or ceded to those who lay claim to them – the West’.

Russia’s ruling circles understand that sooner or later the transformations taking place in the post-Soviet Eurasian states neighbouring Russia will also engulf Russian society.

Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council N. Patrushev has identified the main threat to the future of Russian statehood. It lies “in the generational shift in post-Soviet states, which is taking place under the ideological influence of the West”, citing the processes in Georgia and Ukraine as examples.  Meanwhile, events in Belarus have led to a consensus among Russian experts regarding the need to shift the focus of Russian policy from engaging exclusively with the ruling elites to working with all sections of the population, including the opposition.

In essence, a contest is taking place in the post-Soviet space between the value systems of Russia and the West, in which Moscow is beginning to lose. A unifying system of values plays the most important role in shaping a multilateral world order. It forms the basis for the unification of countries into alliances and the formation of a consolidated position for such alliances.

Moscow is urged to rethink the concept of ‘alliance relations’ in the post-Soviet space. Experts believe that Russia must abandon the outdated notion that a ‘great power’ is obliged to have allies. The argument is put forward that ‘a great power – a member of the global nuclear “club” – cannot have allies’. Instead, it is proposed to focus efforts on creating ‘a flexible system of partnerships that ensures the protection and promotion of national interests’.

As noted earlier, Russia bases its main argument for the need to shift the world order towards multipolarity – thereby losing its ‘superpower’ status – on a ‘shift away from shared values towards a convergence of interests’, including at the regional level.

Russian experts expect that even if the US takes more active steps in the Near Abroad, such as more substantial engagement with the governments of these countries and more vigorous use of soft diplomacy and information warfare, it will still not succeed in significantly strengthening Western influence. Relations between Russia and the West in this region are viewed not in terms of a balance of power, but a balance of weaknesses.

The Russian side sees its objectives not as intensifying confrontation or rivalry, but as creating conditions and forming counterbalances within these post-Soviet states that would lead to a shift in the West’s attitude towards them to ‘indifferent’ or ‘negative’, a reduction in its interest in this region, and in some cases, as Moscow hopes, the West might agree to accept Russian leadership there.

Russia’s approaches are dominated by a combination of situational tactical calculations. The long-term component, however, is determined by two key factors: the imperative of survival for the political regime that has taken shape in Russia, and the confrontation with the West.

Russia will continue to fight for ‘spheres of influence’ in the post-Soviet space, identifying priority territories (which include Ukraine), but perhaps using other, more covert methods that are less likely to irritate the West as a whole. For example, by means of a tool such as ‘cognitive warfare’ (warfare of meanings).

Sanctions and overcoming them

The confrontation with the West is significantly complicated for Russia by the economic sanctions imposed on it as punishment for violating international norms and laws.

Sanctions are a significant obstacle for Moscow both in maintaining its status as a ‘superpower’ and the opportunities associated with it, and in limiting its ability to position Russia as a ‘pole’ in shaping a new world order and attracting allies and partners to its side.

Overcoming sanctions whilst preserving previous achievements is one of Russia’s key tasks during the ‘transition period’ in building relations with the US.

The task for Moscow is complicated by the fact that US sanctions policy has two mechanisms of influence: the US sanctions themselves, and secondary sanctions, which effectively make them international.

Sanctions against Russia

According to Russian experts, the main uncertainty lies in whether the new administration will be content to continue the policy set out by the Obama and Trump administrations, or whether it will attempt to take the sanctions policy to a qualitatively different, higher level. Experts believe that such a qualitative intensification of US policy would create significant new risks to the stability of both the global financial and economic system as a whole and the US economy in particular.

It is also unclear to what extent turning Russia into a second Iran or a second North Korea serves US interests. The only thing that could force the new US president’s administration to take on heightened risks, according to Russian experts, is a new acute crisis in Washington’s relations with Moscow, similar to the 2014 crisis, which is categorically not in the Kremlin’s interests during the ‘transition period’. It is therefore in Russia’s interests to prevent such a crisis.

Russian experts also predict that sanctions will remain one of the main tools of US policy towards Moscow, as well as towards other opponents (and, if necessary, even against allies) of the US on the international stage.

It is anticipated that the total number of anti-Russian sanctions will only increase, as will the number of entities to which these sanctions apply, which once again confirms that Russia has no intention of rectifying its destructive behaviour on the international stage.

In recent years, Washington has developed a certain algorithm for the development of its sanctions strategy, which, according to experts, is unlikely to undergo significant changes in the coming years.

Firstly, as before, the aim will be not so much to influence specific aspects of Russian foreign or domestic policy as to ‘punish’ Russia for certain actions.

• The effectiveness of sanctions will be judged not by specific changes in Russia’s behaviour, but by the ‘deterrence’ of even more undesirable actions on Russia’s part.

Secondly, as before, the aim will be to move towards ‘targeted sanctions’ that would hit the Russian political leadership and associated Russian business groups as hard as possible.

• The sanctions policy will, among other things, aim to provoke divisions within the Russian economic and political elite, which are expected to play a role in the future transition from the current political system to a ‘post-Putin’ one.

• There may be an expansion of the list of targets for ‘targeted sanctions’ — for example, restrictions on Russian oligarchs could be extended to their family members and immediate business associates.

Thirdly, the Biden administration, like its predecessors, will seek to free itself from congressional oversight of its sanctions policy, pre-empting potential legislative measures with its own decisions.

• Sanctions experts assume that the executive branch is generally capable of applying sanctions more professionally and effectively than the legislative branch.

The problem of circumventing and evading sanctions

The biggest challenge for Russia is putting an end to the circumvention of sanctions.

It is predicted that the US will take measures to block any opportunities to circumvent sanctions as much as possible, regardless of who attempts to do so.

According to experts, the Biden administration will enhance the effectiveness of monitoring both American and foreign companies that may be suspected of violating the sanctions regime.

A significant problem for Russia is that this primarily concerns restrictions on the supply of modern technologies to Russia in the information and communications and energy sectors, as well as restrictions on financial transactions with Russia.

And if such supplies were planned through the creation of schemes to circumvent sanctions, such schemes and instruments will now come under even closer scrutiny from Washington, and their implementation could have even more serious consequences both for the Russian Federation itself and for other participants in such schemes.

Proposals from the Russian side

Russia’s objective is not even to attempt to lift the sanctions or create mechanisms to circumvent them, but rather to persuade the US to soften its sanctions policy or to try to introduce adjustments that give Russia room for manoeuvre.

Thus, the Russian side is putting forward proposals to use its partners to influence the possibility of increasing the flexibility of US sanctions (including the possibility of the prompt lifting or modification of some of them), as well as to minimise differences on sanctions between the US and its European partners (as exemplified by ‘Nord Stream 2’).

It is also proposed to integrate sanctions more consistently into the overall context of US policy towards Russia, and to formulate clearly and unambiguously the conditions under which sanctions may be lifted.

The Russian side insists that the West’s sanctions policy should be based not so much on the principle of ‘punishment’ for actions already committed by Moscow, but rather on the principle of ‘prevention’ — the threat of sanctions should serve as a deterrent against undesirable behaviour by Russia.

Presumably, Russia would like to propose a scheme to the West whereby the West must first send a signal as to what the Russian Federation must not do and exactly how Moscow might be punished for it, and only then, if the Kremlin does not change its intentions or fails to convince the West of the legitimacy of such intentions, impose these sanctions as punishment.

In this way, Russia intends to create for itself a mechanism of ‘the right to choose’ whether to commit certain violations against certain countries, knowing the cost in advance and thus being able to prepare and minimise its losses.

This stance by Moscow opens up new prospects for it in building its relations with other players in the international arena. Russia can consciously choose in which direction to strengthen or reduce its influence and intervention to advance bilateral interests, without taking destructive action against the parties concerned or undermining the West’s consolidated position.

Directions: European and Chinese.

Moscow’s main message to the collective West is that Russia proposes moving away from a consolidated position (the international format of alliances) towards building pragmatic bilateral cooperation based solely on a convergence of interests, rather than values.

In other words, having lost its status as a ‘superpower’, Russia seeks to retain the right to remain a ‘pole’. Russia’s task boils down to overcoming the collective West’s consolidated position by creating a multitude of separate, independent ‘poles’ and interacting with each of them individually.

Russia therefore pays particular attention to two dimensions – the European and the Chinese – which, in its view, are set to develop into such independent ‘poles’.

The European dimension

Within the EU, there are two main trends regarding the definition of Europe’s place in the global order:

• EU strategic autonomy (France) – model: US–EU – more advantageous for Russia as well.

• Euro-Atlantic unity (Germany) – model: US/EU.

The EU’s strategic autonomy, promoted by the French side, is more advantageous for Russia, as it envisages the EU becoming a separate ‘pole’ with which Russia could build independent relations. And although the drive to achieve the EU’s ‘strategic autonomy’ remains on the agenda in Brussels, there is still no common understanding of this task in Europe.

The Russian side assumes that Joe Biden’s first foreign policy task will be to restore trusting partnerships with leading European countries:

• within the framework of NATO – preparing for and holding the first NATO summit with the new US president;

• ensuring the possible synchronisation of American and European plans for economic recovery following the pandemic;

At the same time, attempts will be made to avoid a further deterioration in transatlantic economic relations, if not in the form of a comprehensive trade and investment agreement, then at least in the form of a limited agreement between the US and the EU on trade in industrial goods.

Russian experts note that possible shifts in transatlantic relations towards Euro-Atlantic unity may also influence Russian foreign policy.

Although it is anticipated that the change of administration in the White House will most likely reduce, though not eliminate, the EU’s interest in normalising relations with Russia, Joe Biden will proceed on the basis that a general confrontation with Russia must once again become one of the most important means of strengthening the transatlantic partnership.

Thus, the new president’s victory, on the one hand, significantly restricts the room for manoeuvre for Russian foreign policy in its European dimension. It is noted that the desire to ensure the most favourable conditions for the resumption of transatlantic dialogue is offset by a noticeable negative trend in German-Russian and Franco-Russian relations, which emerged in the second half of 2020.

On the other hand, the Russian side expresses hope that the numerous political, economic and strategic differences between the US and Europe will not disappear under the Biden administration.

Experts suggest that his administration will not only change its rhetoric towards the EU and show greater flexibility in transatlantic trade negotiations, but will also listen to Europeans’ views on a number of regional and global issues important to them, which may provide Russia with certain opportunities to exert influence.

Above all, the Russian side is concerned about possible changes in US influence on Europe in two areas – the EU’s sanctions policy and the functioning of the Russia-NATO Council.

The Russian side hopes that the US’s restoration of ties with Europe in certain areas will curb the impulses emanating from Washington that are destructive to the Russian Federation, and that Biden will take a more cautious approach to sanctions against European companies involved in the implementation of ‘Nord Stream 2’, although the US will not abandon attempts to halt this project in one way or another.

At the same time, there are fears in Russia that one cannot rule out the possibility that leading European countries, given the prolonged deterioration of their relations with Moscow, will be more willing to support US sanctions against Russia.

In Moscow, it is believed that the Biden administration’s arrival in power may open up certain limited opportunities for the resumption of dialogue between Russia and NATO. In Russia, it is assumed that only the US can change the EU’s consolidated position on this issue: US influence could help ‘overcome the resistance’ of anti-Russian forces in Europe (Poland, the Baltic states), which oppose the resumption of professional contacts between military personnel within the framework of the Russia–NATO Council.

However, Moscow acknowledges that, at this stage, the Russia–NATO Council will, even under the most favourable circumstances, remain merely a forum for the exchange of information and cannot yet serve as a platform for full-scale cooperation.

Russia considers the main task during the transition period to be the possibility of redistributing ‘spheres of influence’ among the allies of the Euro-Atlantic Alliance (US/EU), which should gradually elevate the EU to the status of a separate ‘pole’, less dependent on US influence, with which Russia hopes to establish separate relations in the future.

Thus, Russia hopes that a certain general agreement will be reached between the US and the European Union, under which, within the framework of transatlantic cooperation, interaction with Moscow, as well as with the capitals of ‘shared neighbourhood’ countries, would be considered a conditional ‘zone of responsibility’ for the EU, on the pretext that this would free up American resources and attention for leadership in other areas, primarily in China.

The Chinese dimension

it would be more advantageous to shift America’s main focus to China, but on condition that Russia’s strategic partnership with China is maintained.

China’s ‘margin for manoeuvre’ and capabilities in a confrontation with the US are significantly greater than Russia’s, whilst Russia currently needs a ‘breathing space’ and a reduction in pressure from the collective West to further implement its plans.

Russian experts have good reason to fear that, for the American establishment, Russia is a far more convenient ‘enemy’ than China. The argument put forward is that a full-scale confrontation with China would cost the US dearly — through a reduction in bilateral trade, the disruption of established global technology supply chains, a sharp rise in military spending, and so on.

An American-Russian confrontation, however, would be far less costly, given the low level of economic and technological interdependence between the two countries, as well as Moscow’s lesser willingness to engage in an expensive military contest with Washington.

The Russian side also notes that, to date, the vast majority of American experts on Russia hold an extremely negative view of Moscow, whereas most American experts on China tend to show sympathy or at least understanding towards the Middle Kingdom.

However, in the Russian view, US-China relations will remain complex and predominantly competitive. In some areas, such as human rights issues in China or technological competition with Beijing, the Biden administration can be expected to take an even tougher line than Trump.

Under current conditions, US policy towards Beijing and Moscow will, in the view of Russian experts, most likely remain within the framework of a ‘dual containment’ strategy, with possible tactical nuances regarding each side.

The Russian side therefore assumes that the Biden administration will, one way or another, attempt to undermine the Russian-Chinese strategic partnership. According to experts, in theory, it could pursue a course of reconciliation with either Russia or China in order to focus on combating the remaining rival — and this is the main threat to Moscow.

Experts believe that Moscow’s efforts should be directed primarily at reassuring Russia of its commitment to its strategic partner — China. Indeed, the Russian side is rushing to send signals to China that ‘the United States simply has nothing to offer Moscow that could outweigh the value of its strategic partnership with Beijing — be it in the economic, political or military-technical spheres. Moreover, the political establishment in Washington will not allow Joe Biden to enter into such an agreement.”

Accordingly, Moscow expects similar assurances from China that it is impossible to sever China’s ties with Russia. As a supporting argument for Beijing, the Russian side puts forward the proposition that ‘Beijing needs Moscow regardless of the current state of Sino-American relations’.

Russia very much hopes that, if necessary, the Chinese leadership will be able to act as an arbiter or a balancing force between Moscow and Washington in exchange for similar actions on Russia’s part should the need arise.

The second most significant threat to Moscow is that, in order to reduce the costs of the ‘dual containment’ strategy, the US administration will make vigorous efforts to engage American allies and partners in Europe and East Asia.

The Russian side believes that the Biden administration will also seek to strengthen its ties with China’s rivals in Asia, particularly with India. This course poses serious potential challenges to the continuation of the strategic partnership between Moscow and Delhi, as well as to Russia’s cooperation with other key partners in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

These two threats — a possible cooling of relations with China and other key Russian partners in the Pacific and Indian Ocean regions due to the strengthening of US influence in these regions — could significantly complicate the realisation of Moscow’s main long-term goals: the formation of a new model of the world order (multipolarity, polycentricity) in terms of preserving the Russian Federation’s right to form a separate ‘pole’ (the so-called ‘balancing power’ status with ‘superpower’ options and the right to recognised ‘spheres of influence’).

Conclusion

Thus, Russian experts identify and assess a number of issues concerning US–Russia relations under the new administration, taking into account Russia’s interests during this transitional phase (until 2024):

1. Russia in American priorities.

2. Internal constraints.

3. General approaches to Russia.

4. Anti-Russian sanctions.

5. Arms control.

6. Regional issues.

7. Global issues.

8. The European dimension.

9. The Chinese dimension.

10. Diplomacy.

The table below provides a brief summary of all the issues discussed earlier, along with assessments, forecasts and proposals from Russian experts regarding future developments and Russia’s potential actions on the international stage, both over the next four years and in the long term.

In conclusion, Moscow sets out its main long-term priority, which it describes as a strategic challenge for Russia’s foreign policy: changing the model of the world order.

Russia hopes that Moscow’s involvement in resolving common international problems — such as the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the escalation of regional conflicts, the acceleration of technological progress in the military sphere, resource shortages, the consequences of natural and man-made disasters, growing migration flows and many others – will give the Kremlin the opportunity to convince America that Russia and the US will be able to ‘interact productively with one another within the framework of ad hoc multilateral coalitions centred on specific problems and challenges’.

The Russian side emphasises that it would be overly optimistic to hope for the stabilisation of the international system within the next four to five years.

According to Russian experts, there is no reason to believe that by the end of the current political cycles in the US and Russia, a stable bipolar or multipolar balance of power will emerge in world politics, along with a general agreement on rules of the game acceptable to all and consensus among the main players in world politics regarding the desired future world order.

Thus, Russia seeks to overcome the West’s consolidated position and dismantle the former coalitions formed on the basis of shared values among their participants, in which the United States played the leading role and exerted the greatest influence.

Therefore, the Russian side proposes instead a different model of the world order, in which ‘coalitions will bear little resemblance to the rigid military-political alliances of the 20th century; they will not be based on clear hierarchies of participants or the leading role of a permanent hegemon. Many of them will function as multilateral public-private partnerships. And, of course, they will operate in an environment of pluralism of values among participants’ — situational alliances, in which the main criterion is proposed to be a shift away from shared values towards a convergence of interests.

In this way, Russia is attempting to create demand in the international arena for a large number of separate, independent ‘poles’, one of which it aspires to become.

Conclusions for Ukraine in the context of resolving the Ukrainian conflict.

As can be seen from the above, the Russian side intends to take a pause in the implementation of its aggressive actions on the international stage during the ‘transition period’. Any confrontation with the collective West at this stage is extremely disadvantageous for Moscow.

It can therefore be assumed that at this stage, the Russian Federation will attempt to ‘freeze’ all acute conflict issues until conditions more favourable to it are created or arise. This applies both to Ukraine as a whole and to the Ukrainian conflict.

It is difficult for Russia to establish relations with the collective West according to the ‘blueprints’ of the former world order due to the West’s consolidated position, based on alliances founded on shared values, which Moscow has violated through the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the ORDLO in Ukraine.

Russia seeks to change the rules of the game by proposing a new model of the world order to the collective West, in which the leading role in forming alliances is to be played not by shared values, but solely by situational interests. Moscow seeks to defragment the international arena — to create a multitude of separate and independent ‘poles’, one of which is to be Russia itself.

Russia seeks to achieve its objectives and preserve the results it has attained through a range of tools, such as diplomacy (overcoming diplomatic isolation), engagement with global and regional issues, overcoming sanctions and their consequences, and so on.

At this stage in the development of relations with the US, in light of the presidential election held there—which Moscow regards as ‘transitional’ (until 2024)—Russia faces several tasks regarding the use of these tools to create more favourable conditions for the implementation of its plans concerning Ukraine.

What should Ukraine pay attention to, particularly in the context of such Russian plans, and what actions could be taken?

As noted above, the Kremlin’s main challenge lies in overcoming the ‘shared values’ – there is a clash between the value systems of Russia and the West across the post-Soviet space.

Therefore, in addition to Ukraine needing to seek greater support from the collective West, closer cooperation with NATO, expanded collaboration and promotion of democratisation, the fight against corruption, cooperation in countering terrorism, and support for a ‘European vector’ in foreign policy, — our country must not only more actively counter new methods and instruments of Russian influence, such as ‘cognitive warfare’ (war of meanings), but also, where possible, seize the initiative and turn it against Russia.

For example, we should make more active use of the argument that the Russian side is putting forward to the collective West: ‘Whereas the demand for freedom previously dominated the global political agenda, in the future it will be replaced by the demand for justice’. The demand for ‘justice’ (resolving the conflict on Ukrainian terms) in the Ukrainian conflict is significantly higher than the demand for ‘peace at any cost’ (resolving the conflict on Russian terms).

It is also necessary to continue maintaining a high level of media coverage of both the Ukrainian conflict itself and Russia’s involvement in it, so that the issue of a just resolution to the Ukrainian conflict remains a priority on the international agenda.

It should also be borne in mind that sanctions will remain one of the main instruments of US policy towards both Moscow and other opponents (and, if necessary, even against allies) of the US on the international stage.

The biggest challenge for Russia is preventing the circumvention of sanctions. It is predicted that the US will take measures to block any opportunities to circumvent sanctions as much as possible, regardless of who attempts to do so.

We have written in more detail previously about Russia’s plans to create tools for circumventing sanctions.

Exposing or preventing the implementation of such schemes makes it difficult for Russia to carry out its plans.

At the international level – ‘The Syrian Round Dance’. ‘THE SYRIAN ROUND DANCE’ Part 1. Introduction. How Russia trades with Syria without falling foul of sanctions. https://geo-analytics.com.ua/ukraina-okupirovannye-territorii/sirijskij-horovod-chast-1-vvedenie-kak-rossii-torgovat-s-siriej-i-ne-popast-pod-sankcii/

By linking Russia, Syria, Crimea, the ‘DPR/LPR’, South Ossetia and Abkhazia into a single chain, we obtain a perfectly viable economic scheme that allows Russia to circumvent sanctions in Syria and create conditions for all the territories listed above to generate income.

At the regional level – a ‘free trade zone via the ORDLO’. Russia’s scenarios for lifting or circumventing sanctions: global and regional levels. https://geo-analytics.com.ua/ukraina-okupirovannye-territorii/scenarii-rossii-po-otmene-ili-obhodu-sankcij-globalnyj-i-regionalnyj-urovni/

Regional level (Ukrainian conflict):

Political track:

• Lifting (removal) of sanctions by the collective West if Russia ‘proves’ its non-involvement in the conflict. Resolution of the conflict on Moscow’s terms or a deep ‘freeze’.

Economic track:

• Creation of a ‘sanctions circumvention mechanism’ by the collective West via the Free Trade Area (ORDLO) whilst the political track is frozen.

The Covid factor:

• Russia may seek to have Ukraine lift its own sanctions against the Russian Federation, following the example of the Italian scenario, which could be adapted for Ukraine — ‘aid in exchange for lifting sanctions’.

Russia’s scenarios for escaping sanctions in the Ukrainian issue and the consequences for the collective West https://geo-analytics.com.ua/ukraina-okupirovannye-territorii/scenarii-rossii-po-vyhodu-iz-pod-sankcij-v-ukrainskom-voprose-i-posledstviya-dlya-kollektivnogo-zapada/

By assisting the Kremlin in creating a ‘sanctions circumvention tool’ (the ORDLO Free Trade Area), even if guided by good intentions regarding the possibility of improving the humanitarian situation in ORDLO, the collective West must understand that in doing so it is not resolving the Ukrainian conflict, but may only exacerbate it further.

Such a ‘sanctions circumvention tool’ gives Russia the opportunity to continue its destabilising activities across the international arena more actively and aggressively.

And we must clearly understand the consequences of such decisions not only today, but also what this may lead to in the future, not only in Ukraine but also for the collective West as a whole.

Russia’s proposals for discussing the terms of a new world order with the EU and implications for Ukraine. Part 4. Implications for Ukraine. https://geo-analytics.com.ua/ukraina-okupirovannye-territorii/predlozheniya-rossii-dlya-es-obsuzhdenij-uslovij-v-postroenii-novogo-miroporyadka-i-vyvody-dlya-ukrainy-chast-4/

• Objective: To replace Europe’s direct contacts with the Russian Federation via the Eurasian Economic Union.

• Division of spheres of influence in Ukraine between the Russian Federation and the EU.

• The status of a ‘balancing alliance’ for the EU (‘pole’).

The status of a ‘balancing alliance’ for the EU (‘pole’) is viewed by Russia from the perspective of embedding within it such a fundamental premise as a departure from global allied relations and a transition to a policy of solely bilateral relations on a mutually beneficial basis, without political obligations towards allies or partners.

One of the mutually beneficial projects in this area is considered to be the cooperation between the EU and the EAEU, which effectively provides both the EU and the Russian Federation with a means of circumventing sanctions—including US sanctions—and logistically links Europe—via Ukraine, the territories of the ORDLO, and Russia—with Asia and China.

Russia will therefore do everything in its power to persuade its European partners, primarily Germany and France, to change both their own stance on the Ukrainian conflict and agree to a division of ‘spheres of influence’ within Ukraine with Russia, as well as to change Ukraine’s position so that it agrees to recognise this.

As a result, the Ukrainian conflict will not be resolved but will be frozen even more deeply; however, Russia will gain time to prepare for further actions to restore its full influence in Ukraine and the opportunity for economic cooperation with the EU and other countries, bypassing sanctions, primarily those imposed by the US. This could significantly strengthen Russia’s position, both politically and economically, on the international stage.

Russia cannot implement such sanctions-evasion tools, nor resolve the Ukrainian issue, without the support or approval of its Western partners. As noted earlier, to do so, Moscow must overcome the consolidated position of the collective West.

At a time when the general confrontation with Russia is set to once again become one of the most important means of strengthening the transatlantic partnership, any attempts by Ukraine or certain forces within Ukraine to establish relations with Russia or make concessions to Moscow that are disadvantageous to the country will be viewed negatively by the US and the EU, which could lead to a weakening of their support.

Ukraine also has additional opportunities to convey its position within the Normandy Format to increase pressure on Russia from its participants, by capitalising on the negative dynamics in German-Russian and French-Russian relations that emerged in the second half of 2020, against the backdrop of these countries’ desire to ensure the most favourable conditions for the resumption of transatlantic dialogue.

In Russia, there are fears that one cannot rule out the possibility that leading European countries, given the prolonged deterioration of their relations with Moscow, will agree to show greater willingness to support US sanctions against Russia. Ukraine may also contribute to this.

Ukraine must also take into account a possible realignment of responsibilities within the ‘spheres of influence’ of the collective West and bear in mind that Russia will actively engage with Europeans to achieve outcomes favourable to Moscow, including in the Ukrainian conflict.

Thus, Russia hopes that a certain general agreement will be reached between the US and the EU, which would provide that, within the framework of transatlantic cooperation, interaction with Moscow, as well as with the capitals of the ‘shared neighbourhood’ countries, will be considered a conditional ‘zone of responsibility’ for the EU, on the pretext that this will free up American resources and leadership attention for other areas, primarily China.

We have written in more detail here about possible further compromise proposals from Russia to the EU and their implications for Ukraine:

The Ukrainian question as the main challenge in shaping future relations between Russia and the EU. https://geo-analytics.com.ua/ukraina-okupirovannye-territorii/ukrainskij-vopros-kak-osnovnoj-vyzov-v-postroenii-otnoshenij-v-budushhem-mezhdu-rossiej-i-es/

Russia’s task: to present a compromise scenario for resolving the Ukrainian conflict, broken down into several stages of implementation.

Stage one:

• neutralising US influence: depriving the US of the ability to influence the process of resolving the Ukrainian conflict and its participants (the EU, Ukraine), minimising US interest in the conflict, and redirecting US attention to other areas, such as China;

• to freeze the conflict until the election of a new Ukrainian president;

• maximise the intensity of the conflict resolution debate within Ukrainian society until the election of a new Ukrainian president;

Stage Two: To resolve the conflict, the Russian Federation envisages a complete reset of all actors:

• to increase the EU’s interest in resolving the Ukrainian issue, thereby securing a diplomatic victory for the EU in its confrontation with the US following the election of the new European Commission;

• the election of a new Ukrainian president who is prepared to accept ‘peace on any terms’ in the conflict, in order to defuse the toxicity of the issue within Ukrainian society;

• also, a temporary factor (a few years) in Russia is important for resolving the West’s main grievances regarding judicial and economic reform within Russia itself, with a view to possible future cooperation.

• completion of the power transfer process within Russia: the election or appointment of a successor/president.

Stage Three:

• Russia proposes that the EU initiate an INFORMAL negotiation process on the basis of ‘concessions’ by Russia in the ORDLO in exchange for a series of concessions by the EU regarding the normalisation of EU-Russia relations.

Sources:

• Joe Biden’s administration and Russia, 22 December 2020, Andriy Kortunov, https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/workingpapers/administratsiya-dzho-baydena-i-rossiya/?fbclid=IwAR2XoG_G1A0fc_j-WtQJzZs7D0oF_7JOdHzv0yc5UFTkSHo960ck-DasXbM

• Expert predicts Biden’s policy in the post-Soviet space https://ria.ru/20201225/bayden-1590978338.html

• Why an arc of chaos has emerged around Russia’s borders F. Lukyanov

• https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/vokrug-granicz-rossii/

Prospects for the formation of Russia’s new policy in the post-Soviet space. E. Treschenkov 12.2020 https://www.ipg-journal.io/rubriki/vneshnjaja-politika-i-bezopasnost/nuzhny-li-rossii-sojuzniki-1207/?utm_campaign=ru_214_20201223&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter