Paper 54 min read

AFGHANISTAN AND RUSSIA – A NEW REALITY (2021)

TESPA Center for Strategic Analysis July 1, 2021

RESEARCH. AFGHANISTAN AND RUSSIA – A NEW REALITY

(published in 2021)

The study demonstrates the multi-level asymmetry of Russia’s roles in the Afghan case, where its strategy is based not on actual control, but on compensating for weakness through diplomacy, signals and institutional mechanisms.

At the local level, it is explicitly stated that the Russian Federation has no structural influence within Afghanistan, but is attempting to rapidly integrate into the new configuration through contacts with the Taliban and the creation of an image as a ‘prepared player’. This means that real influence is being replaced by the simulation of access and usefulness to other actors.

At the regional level, the situation is even more complex: Russia acts indirectly (through the CSTO, contacts with Pakistan, Qatar and China), but is not a decisive player. Key positions are held by countries with geographical or economic advantages (China, Pakistan, Iran). The text explicitly emphasises that the Russian Federation is forced to compete and coordinate, rather than set the rules.

At the global level, a major shift is taking place: Afghanistan is being used by Russia as a tool to return to the global negotiating architecture. By promoting the role of the UN, the issue of terrorism and humanitarian mechanisms, Russia is attempting to create frameworks where it holds an institutional advantage (the right of veto).

The key mechanism is shifting competition from the level of resources (where Russia is weaker) to the level of rules and procedures (where it is stronger). This is precisely why Russia:

insists on the central role of the UN;
promotes the ‘nuclear five’ format;
attempts to set precedents (humanitarian mechanisms, anti-terrorist coalitions).

At the level of the world order, the text clearly sets out the conflict between models:

the US — a coalition based on values and rules;
Russia — a system of ‘poles’ and spheres of influence.

In this context, Afghanistan becomes a testing ground for these models, but without any real possibility for Russia to control the processes independently.

Conclusion: The Afghan case demonstrates Russia’s structural weakness as a regional player and its attempt to compensate for this through institutional and diplomatic superstructures.

In effect, the Russian Federation operates according to the following model:

lack of control → creation of an image of influence → conversion of this image into a diplomatic resource → use of it at the global level.

Russia’s key strategy lies not in controlling Afghanistan, but in using the Afghan case as a lever to:

return to global negotiations with the West,
promoting a model of the world with spheres of influence,
consolidating the UN’s role as an instrument where it has the right of veto.

Thus, the main discrepancy highlighted in the text:
the Russian Federation’s ambition to act as a global pole ≠ its actual capacity for influence on the ground.

In this logic, Afghanistan is not a control asset, but a diplomatic resource for bargaining and reshaping the rules of the game at the global level.

PART 1. INTRODUCTION.

The local level.

Russia–Afghanistan.

Regional level.

Positions on Afghanistan held by regional players: Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Iran, China, India, Turkey, Qatar, Russia.

PART 2. GLOBAL LEVEL.

Positions on Afghanistan held by global players: the US, NATO, the Security Council, the EU, the UN, and Russia’s attempts to exert influence.

Attempts by the Russian Federation to influence the world order through Afghanistan:

Values, the ‘Nuclear Five’ format, Sphere of influence, The threat of terrorism, Refugees and humanitarian aid.

On 14 April 2021, US President Joe Biden announced the decision to end the operation in Afghanistan. Following this, the Taliban launched a large-scale operation to establish control over the country and entered Kabul without a fight on 15 August 2021. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country. By 31 August, Western countries had completed the evacuation of their citizens and Afghans who had assisted them.

The Taliban’s capture of the Afghan capital, Kabul, came as a surprise to Moscow as well.

Looking at this period, it can be said that Russia’s involvement (engagement and influence) in Afghanistan can be traced at three levels:

Local;
Regional;
Global.

LOCAL LEVEL

At the local level in Afghanistan in 2021, Russia is attempting to rapidly integrate into the new political landscape following the Taliban’s return to power, despite lacking any real structural influence within the country. The main focus is on acting as a mediator and a channel of communication between the Taliban, internal groups and external actors. At the same time, Moscow is actively shaping a narrative of its ‘readiness’ and prior contacts with the Taliban, seeking to legitimise itself as one of the key players in the settlement process.

Functionally, this strategy is of a signalling nature: Russia lacks sufficient levers of influence within Afghanistan, but is attempting to compensate for this by demonstrating access to the new authorities and potential utility for other actors. The promotion of the narrative regarding contacts, security cooperation and potential economic collaboration (particularly in the resources sector) is aimed at consolidating its position within the future framework of engagement concerning Afghanistan.

Thus, Russian policy at the local level appears to be an attempt to adapt swiftly to the change in government through a pre-emptive information and diplomatic campaign, without any real, deep-rooted influence. Its key objective is to occupy the role of mediator and lay the groundwork for further expansion of its presence—particularly its economic presence—should the situation in the country stabilise.

It is worth noting that the total value of mineral resources believed to be located in Afghanistan is estimated at 1–3 trillion dollars (according to the news and analysis programme Tagesthemen on German television channel ARD). And this is only for the 30% of Afghan territory that has been surveyed by the US Geological Survey (USGS).⁽

At the local level within Afghanistan itself, the Russian Federation has virtually no presence (apart from the embassy), but is attempting to fill the role of mediator in the negotiation process between the Taliban and other representatives in Afghanistan.

Initially, Russia stated that it would not rush to recognise or refuse to recognise the new Afghan government and that this would depend on its conduct, in particular on how it would, in practice, uphold the rule of law and fundamental civil liberties and human rights.

The Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation and Head of the Second Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Z. Kabulov, emphasised that although Moscow sees no evidence of a threat from the Taliban to Russia’s allies in Central Asia, and the Taliban themselves have stated that they have no objectives beyond Afghanistan, for the process of removing the Taliban from the list of terrorist organisations to begin, all members of the UN Security Council must be convinced that the new Afghan authorities are behaving in a civilised manner.

The local level requires players to have a certain degree of influence within Afghanistan itself. Russia is therefore rushing to secure its place in this niche and is actively promoting its purported capabilities to consolidate its influence within Afghanistan, sending signals to all parties involved.

Indeed, it was stated in the State Duma that Russia would continue its presence in Afghanistan. And the Russian Ambassador to Kabul, D. Zhirnov, emphasised that Russia had been establishing contacts with the ‘Taliban’ over the past 7–8 years, and was therefore prepared for the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan. It has also been emphasised on more than one occasion that the Taliban appeared to Russia to be far more open to negotiations than the government in Kabul. And Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov stated that “Russia is actively facilitating dialogue between all ethnic groups in Afghanistan”.

There are also reports that Russia does not interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, but allegedly maintains ‘working contacts with the Taliban, including at a fairly high level’, who have provided assistance and support to Russia in matters of ‘ensuring the security of the embassy, staff, and the evacuation of Russian citizens’, with hints that these high-level Taliban representatives will also be part of the state apparatus, and that Russia intends to continue cooperating with them.

Meanwhile, the Russian media are actively broadcasting signals about the establishment of bilateral cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Taliban, including the following points:

The Taliban have expressed a desire to maintain political relations with Russia;
Russia has received an invitation from the Taliban to the ceremony announcing the composition of the government;
The Taliban have declared their readiness to resume air links with Russia;
Rospivtovodstvo is ready to begin operations in Afghanistan.

Furthermore, the Russian Ambassador to Kabul, Dmitry Zhirnov, stated that the Taliban are open to the participation of Russia and Russian businesses in the economy, including the development of mineral resources. Meanwhile, a representative of the Taliban movement, Suhail Shaheen, stated that “the Taliban movement is counting on the assistance of Russia and neighbouring states in the process of rebuilding Afghanistan”.

All these signals were intended to demonstrate that Russia allegedly has significant influence over the Taliban and representatives of other ethnic groups in Afghanistan, and that Moscow could be useful both in facilitating intra-Afghan dialogue and for other players at the regional and global levels in establishing their contacts with the Taliban.

REGIONAL LEVEL

The regional level of the Afghan issue can be represented by two groups of players:

the first level – countries directly bordering Afghanistan (Iran, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China);
the second level – influential regional players that do not share a border with Afghanistan but have an interest in relations with it (Turkey, Qatar, India, Russia).

At the regional level, the Russian Federation is also present indirectly, as it does not share a border with Afghanistan. However, its partners and allies within the CSTO (post-Soviet Asian countries) do share such borders, which compels the Russian Federation to participate more actively at the regional level, ostensibly to protect its allies.

The Russian Federation is also attempting to use the regional level to strengthen its influence by occupying the role of mediator between the Taliban and representatives of other countries in the region, and to coordinate joint actions in a manner most advantageous to Moscow.

Furthermore, the Russian Federation seeks to occupy one of the leading positions at the regional level in order to be able to extend its influence over future events and projects (including economic ones). However, there is competition here from the region’s more influential players — China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Qatar.

First-tier countries.

Among the countries directly bordering Afghanistan, a pragmatic model of engagement with the new authorities is taking shape, where security, economic interests and internal stability are key factors. Pakistan is attempting to convert its influence over the Taliban into regional leadership and coordination of engagement, whilst simultaneously mitigating the risks of a migration crisis. Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) are focused on maintaining contacts with the Taliban for practical purposes — border security and the implementation of infrastructure and energy projects.

At the same time, Tajikistan and Iran adopt more complex and cautious positions: Dushanbe emphasises political inclusivity and the protection of ethnic interests, effectively distancing itself from legitimising the Taliban, whilst Tehran balances historical opposition to the movement with pragmatic engagement, driven by economic, religious and geopolitical interests. China, for its part, acts as the most systematic economic player, focused on access to resources and the integration of Afghanistan into its infrastructure projects, provided that stability is ensured.

Thus, the first-tier countries do not form a single coalition, but act in their own interests, creating a multi-vector environment for engagement with Afghanistan, in which security and the economy take precedence over ideological or political alignment.

Below is a more detailed look at each country.

Pakistan

Pakistan supports the Taliban. Experts note that at the very start of the war, in 2001, the Pakistanis proposed not to overthrow the Taliban regime, but to improve it and cooperate with it. Pakistan has no interest in a migration crisis or a flow of refugees from Afghanistan. Furthermore, for Islamabad, increasing its influence in Afghanistan could be a way to strengthen its position in the standoff with India.

And although Pakistan has stated that it has influence over the Afghan Taliban but does not control them, Islamabad is seeking to create a regional coalition for engagement with Afghanistan and to play a leading role in it.

Pakistan’s Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Fawad Chaudhry, stated that the states of the region must also contribute to stabilising the situation in that country, and that an important role in this belongs to Pakistan and Turkey, which act here as two partners. He emphasised that if Afghanistan does not achieve stability, millions of local residents will head to the neighbouring country. “Pakistan has already taken in 3.5 million Afghan refugees, and our economy cannot bear the burden of new refugees,” Chaudhry noted.

On 25 August 2021, Pakistan’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Shah Mehmood Qureshi embarked on a tour of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Iran to discuss the situation in Afghanistan and matters relating to the strengthening of bilateral relations.^[xviii]

It can be said that Pakistan is pursuing several avenues for establishing channels: directly with first-tier countries (including China) and with second-tier countries – separately with Turkey (and Qatar) and separately with Russia.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan has stated that it maintains contacts with the Taliban on border security issues, and the Taliban has expressed a desire to establish fruitful relations with Uzbekistan. Indeed, Yusup Kabuljanov, spokesperson for the Uzbek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that Uzbekistan welcomes the formation of a provisional government in Afghanistan and expresses its readiness to develop a constructive dialogue with the new Afghan state authorities.

At a virtual meeting of the foreign ministers of Pakistan, China, Iran, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, held on 8 September to discuss the situation in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan’s Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated that Afghanistan must be involved in regional integration processes for the country’s economic recovery.

Turkmenistan

The Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced that it is in regular contact with the Taliban regarding border security. On 13 September, the Deputy Head of Afghanistan’s interim government held talks with the Turkmen Foreign Minister. The parties stated that they intend to develop bilateral relations on issues of mutual interest.

According to the head of the Turkmen Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Meredov, the most pressing projects for both states remain the completion of the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan railway line – Tajikistan railway line, which passes through the northern Afghan city of Andkhoy (Faryab Province), the implementation of the TAPI trans-Afghan gas pipeline project, through which Ashgabat will supply gas to South Asia, and the implementation of joint programmes in the field of electricity. In addition, the Turkmen minister pledged to continue providing humanitarian aid to the people of Afghanistan.

Tajikistan

The Afghan-Tajik border stretches for 1,135 km. According to UN experts, between 10 and 14 million Tajiks live in Afghanistan out of a total population of 33 million.

Tajikistan’s position on Afghanistan differs both from that of its neighbours in Central Asia and from that of Russia and China. Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon has spoken out against recognising the Taliban as a legitimate force in Afghanistan. At a meeting with the Pakistani side on 25 August, it was noted that, in order to urgently resolve political and security issues, Tajikistan considers it necessary to establish an inclusive government in Afghanistan as soon as possible, involving representatives of all ethnic groups, primarily Tajiks, who, as stated in the declaration, make up around 46% of Afghanistan’s population. The President of Tajikistan stated that his country would not recognise a Taliban government unless the ethnic Tajik minority in Afghanistan were given a ‘proper role’ in the running of the state.

Iran

Iran shares a long border with Afghanistan – 800 km. On the one hand, some experts suggest that Iran, being a Shia state, has historically opposed the Taliban. Tehran has supported anti-Taliban forces – warlord Ismail Khan, the Hazara, Shia and Tajik groups – by providing them with money and equipment. By simultaneously supporting anti-Taliban forces and cooperating with the Taliban, Tehran is attempting to strike a balance in shaping its foreign policy strategy in the region.

On the other hand, Iran has close economic, religious and ethnic ties with Afghanistan. A significant portion of Afghanistan’s population consists of Tajiks, who belong to the group of Iranian peoples, and Hazaras, who, like Iranians, practise Shia Islam. There are over 3 million Shia Hazaras living in Afghanistan (around 10% of the country’s population), who, in addition to their faith, are united with Iran by language.

According to the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, by 2018 Iran had become Kabul’s main trading partner. Afghanistan is also an important export market for Iran. Iran is the largest supplier of steel to Afghanistan. Every year, Iranian steelmakers supply 300–350 thousand tonnes of steel products to the country, accounting for around 25% of the total annual volume of steel imports into the country. The main product sold is construction rebar.

Iran has advocated for the establishment of an inclusive government in Afghanistan. On 10 September 2021, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council adopted an important resolution regarding the format of relations with the Taliban. The Council instructed the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to refuse to recognise the Taliban until further notice. The resolution of the Supreme National Security Council calls on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to submit a report to the Council on how to deal with the self-proclaimed Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

At present, relations between Iran and Afghanistan depend to a large extent on the dynamics of multilateral competition in the region. It is expected that Iran will continue to pursue a balanced and pragmatic policy in Afghanistan. It should also be borne in mind that Iran and China have signed a 25-year strategic agreement and that China is interested in developing relations with Afghanistan.

China

China has long been the most active in promoting its economic interests in Afghanistan. Under the new government in Kabul, China will secure access to these resources, according to Tagesthemen. For example, the copper deposit at Mes Aynak (two Chinese state-owned metallurgical companies won a tender back in 2008 to mine copper for 30 years), China has secured control over the largest of the discovered oil fields, and so on.

Afghanistan is also a country bordering the Pakistan-China Economic Corridor (PCEC). Afghanistan was also intended to serve as a land corridor between Iran and China for the transport of oil and gas from Iran — but following the outbreak of war in the 2000s, this project was put on hold. China is therefore prepared to negotiate with the Taliban to revive this transport strategy.

To implement its economic and strategic projects, China needs the situation in Afghanistan to be friendly, stable, controlled and secure. China, more than anyone else, is interested in a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan and the recognition of the new authorities at regional and global levels.

Initially, China emphasised that the key issue at present is the Taliban’s fulfilment of their earlier promises regarding non-aggression towards third countries, the formation of an open and representative new government in Afghanistan, and distancing themselves from terrorist organisations operating in Afghanistan.

As the Taliban had promised China to combat the ‘East Turkestan Islamic Movement’ and other terrorist organisations operating in Afghanistan, China pledged to assist Afghanistan once the Taliban had established control over the country.

On 24 August 2021, the Taliban also held a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador to Afghanistan. The parties discussed security issues and the current situation in Afghanistan, as well as bilateral relations and humanitarian aid from China. Earlier, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that the current Taliban leadership is more rational than the one that led the Islamists in the second half of the 1990s. China has also stated that it is ready to establish new diplomatic relations with the authorities.

On 25 August, Putin discussed the situation in Afghanistan with Xi Jinping. The parties agreed to make full use of the potential of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). A Kremlin statement following the talks also noted that Moscow and Beijing are ready to step up the fight against the threats of terrorism and drug trafficking emanating from Afghanistan.

China also stated that it is ready to work together with the international community to support the peaceful reconstruction of Afghanistan and improve people’s living conditions and well-being, as well as enhance opportunities for independent development. It was also announced that China would provide Afghanistan with emergency aid amounting to $30 million.

On 2 September, China’s Deputy Foreign Minister and a member of the Taliban’s political wing held talks. On 3 September, Taliban representative Zabihullah Mujahid stated that the Taliban regard China as their main international partner, as it is prepared to invest in and rebuild the country. He emphasised: “China is our gateway to global markets.” Furthermore, the Taliban expect Afghanistan to continue participating in China’s “Belt and Road” initiative.

On 8 September, China declared its readiness for dialogue with the new Afghan government, specifically noting that Beijing hopes the Taliban-led government will combat terrorism. It was also stated that China has reached a substantial consensus on the situation in Afghanistan with Russia and other countries.

Second-tier countries.

At the level of second-tier countries, a more complex configuration of interests is emerging, where Afghanistan serves as an element of broader regional strategies and competition. India views the situation through the prism of its rivalry with Pakistan and China, combining security risks with economic interests, but adopts a cautious stance without directly legitimising the Taliban. Turkey and Qatar, by contrast, demonstrate pragmatic engagement, combining infrastructure interests and political mediation with cautious expectations regarding the stability of the new government.

Russia appears to be a relatively weaker player in this group, lacking both geographical and economic advantages, and therefore relies on coordination with other actors and multilateral formats. Its strategy boils down to minimising security risks (migration, radicalisation), avoiding direct costs for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, and simultaneously positioning itself as a participant in regional negotiation processes.

Thus, second-tier countries form a multi-vector field of competition and interaction, where economic and security interests, rather than ideology, play a key role. In this configuration, Russia does not set the rules of the game, but is forced to operate in a competitive environment with more resource-rich players, adapting its policy through coordination and diplomatic engagement rather than direct influence.

We will now examine in more detail the interests of second-tier countries that do not share a border with Afghanistan — India, Turkey, Qatar and Russia.

India

India has border disputes with Pakistan and China, and also competes with these states for regional leadership.

India has generally supported anti-Taliban forces and has not wanted to see the Taliban grow stronger. Delhi does not want Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan to increase, as this could threaten India’s own security. If Pakistan were to use Afghanistan as a base for training radicals, Delhi fears that these radicals would then be deployed to Kashmir: India and Pakistan have been disputing ownership of these territories for several decades.

India also has economic interests in Afghanistan. India is actively involved in the development of the Iranian port of Chabahar and hopes that Afghanistan will become a vital link between Iran and the countries of Central Asia.

Delhi also fears a resurgence of the Taliban for cultural reasons. Although Afghanistan is a Muslim country, it also has a Buddhist cultural heritage. In 2001, despite protests from the international community, the Taliban blew up one of Afghanistan’s main Buddhist landmarks – the giant Bamiyan Buddhas. And, naturally, India does not want people who treat non-Islamic historical heritage in this way to come to power in the country.

Given that the Taliban are recognised and supported by Pakistan and China, it stands to reason that India will seek support in the region from global players, primarily the US, which fits in with America’s strategy to strengthen its influence in the Indo-Pacific region.

And although Taliban representative Suhail Shaheen called on India to complete its infrastructure projects in Afghanistan, should New Delhi so wish, the wording itself suggests that there is no question of new projects with India for the time being.

During the period under review, reports emerged that the Taliban had carried out searches at Indian consulates in Kandahar and Herat, and that the Taliban had banned Sikhs from undertaking a pilgrimage to India.

Consequently, the Indian Foreign Minister stated that the country intends to continue relations with the people of Afghanistan; there were no reports regarding recognition of the Taliban’s authority.

Turkey

Turkey is interested in reviving the transport corridor across Afghanistan – the Lapis Lazuli or Jade Route, which once largely coincided with the Silk Road. In its current form, this infrastructure project, developed and approved in 2017–2018, but which has made little progress since then, is intended to connect Turkey via Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea and Turkmenistan with Afghanistan, and from there provide access to both South and Central Asia.

On 25 August 2021, the Turkish Ministry of Defence announced the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. Turkish troops had been stationed in Afghanistan since 2002 as part of UN and NATO missions and bilateral agreements.

Turkish President Erdogan expressed his readiness to cooperate with the Taliban, and on 29 August, the Turkish embassy in Afghanistan returned to its premises in Kabul following a temporary evacuation. At the same time, Ankara stated that Turkey has no intention of rushing to recognise the Taliban government and would like to see a government in Afghanistan in which various political forces are represented.

The Taliban view Qatar and Turkey as countries that could technically manage the airport in Kabul. On 2 September, Qatar and Turkey provided financial support to Kabul Airport amounting to $30 million. Ankara also reported that Turkey is cooperating with Qatar and the US on the issue of managing the airport in the Afghan capital, Kabul.

Turkey then adopted a wait-and-see approach. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated that the new Afghan government, formed by the Taliban, is likely to be temporary. According to him, it is difficult to predict how long it will last, and Turkey’s main task now is to monitor further developments while maintaining engagement with the Taliban. Turkey also noted that it does not consider the Taliban’s interim government to be sufficiently inclusive.

Qatar

Contacts between the Taliban and Qatar are taking place quite intensively and regularly. In particular, it is noted that on 24 August 2021, the head of the Taliban’s political office met with a representative of the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and on 3 September, a special envoy from Qatar arrived in Kabul to discuss the transition process with the Taliban. Furthermore, the Qatari Foreign Minister arrived in Kabul on 12 September, where he and Taliban leaders agreed on the development of relations.

The Russian side notes that on the eve of this visit, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held talks with the Qatari Foreign Minister in Moscow. In particular, the parties discussed the situation in Afghanistan.

Russia

Against the backdrop of China, Turkey and other players, Russia’s economic role in the Afghan market appears, for the time being, to be more than modest.

Russia does not share a border with Afghanistan; the two countries are separated by Kazakhstan, followed by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and – via Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan. Nevertheless, Russia views events in Afghanistan as a threat to its own security. Russia has a visa-free regime with almost all of these states, and consequently, refugees and, far worse, radical elements could make their way to Russia.

It is also worth noting that Russia’s ties with Central Asian countries are based not only on bilateral treaties but also on commitments within the CSTO, which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

To reassure international players and its domestic audience regarding non-interference in the conflict in Afghanistan, Russia is sending signals that Moscow will not supply weapons to Afghanistan and that the question of sending a military contingent to Afghanistan is not on Russia’s agenda.

Russia is also in no hurry to provide economic or financial aid to Afghanistan on an individual basis, counting on others to do so. Indeed, on 30 August, Zamir Kabulov, the Russian President’s Special Representative for Afghanistan and Director of the Second Asian Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that all the world’s wealthy nations would have to come together and discuss the restoration of the economy and social sphere with representatives of Afghanistan’s new government. According to him, this primarily concerns, of course, the NATO coalition countries that took part in the operation in Afghanistan; they will have to deal with the country’s reconstruction, as this is a matter of their conscience.

Moscow is also demonstrating that it is establishing contacts with other players at the regional level regarding the Afghan issue.

Russia – Qatar. Lavrov praised Qatar’s efforts to stabilise Afghanistan. Qatar and Russia expressed their shared view on the need to provide humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.

Russia – Pakistan. On 7 September, Pakistan’s Ambassador to Russia, Shafqat Ali Khan, stated that Islamabad and Moscow had established harmonious cooperation within the framework of the ‘enlarged troika’ (comprising the US, Pakistan, Russia and China) regarding the situation in Afghanistan, and that the parties could intensify intelligence cooperation if necessary.

Russia – China. It is also worth noting that whilst China may not be directly ‘dragging’ Russia into all issues related to Afghanistan, in any case, seeks to control all of Moscow’s moves in order to prevent the Kremlin’s influence in the region from growing beyond what is beneficial to China itself, as well as to prevent the development of scenarios detrimental to China’s interests, both in Afghanistan itself and in the region as a whole.

Indeed, during a telephone conversation with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 17 August, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that China and Russia must defend their legitimate interests in Afghanistan and provide mutual support to one another. He emphasised that, in the new situation, China and Russia must strengthen their strategic ties and cooperation, and to this end it is necessary to:

protect the legitimate interests of the PRC and the Russian Federation in Afghanistan, exchange information on the situation in a timely manner, and provide mutual support to one another;
encourage the Taliban to assume responsibility and properly ensure the safety of citizens, institutions and organisations of the Russian Federation and the PRC in Afghanistan;
encourage the new political regime in Afghanistan to draw a clear line with various international terrorist groups, contain them and combat them;
China and Russia must persuade the Taliban to pursue a peaceful and friendly foreign policy, as well as a moderate and restrained policy in the sphere of religion.

As a result of such multilateral contacts and a kaleidoscope of negotiations, the Taliban named China as Afghanistan’s main partner; it was emphasised that the Taliban are interested in relations with Russia, Iran and Pakistan, and that the Taliban are not opposed to the establishment of a US embassy in Kabul.

As can be seen from the above, Russia’s position in Afghanistan, both at the local and regional levels, is not sufficiently strong or competitive; therefore, the Russian Federation is attempting to exert influence directly at the global level, with the aim of weakening US influence globally (primarily in relations with the EU – to exacerbate differences over a potential migration and humanitarian crisis, terrorist threats, to sow doubts about the US as a reliable partner and ally, etc.) with the aim of weakening US influence in the Central Asian and Indo-Pacific regions as a whole.

GLOBAL LEVEL

At the global level, the Afghan issue is taking shape as an attempt by the collective West to maintain control of the situation following the US withdrawal through the consolidation of positions and the application of a conditional ‘carrot and stick’ approach towards the Taliban. The US, NATO, the EU and the UK are effectively synchronising their approaches: non-recognition of the new government unless conditions are met (human rights, security, the fight against terrorism), the maintenance of sanctions, and limited pragmatic dialogue.

In this configuration, Russia is attempting to use the Afghan case as a tool to return to the global negotiating architecture alongside the West, in particular to enhance its own significance in other key issues (Ukraine, Syria). Its strategy lies in promoting the role of the UN as a central platform where it can exert its influence through the veto mechanism, as well as in attempts to establish precedents (humanitarian mechanisms, counter-terrorism frameworks) that can be utilised in other regions.

Thus, the global level for the Russian Federation is not so much a channel for direct influence on Afghanistan as a tool in a broader geopolitical game: Moscow seeks to convert a limited regional resource into a diplomatic asset, strengthening its role in international institutions and using them to influence the balance of power with the West.

Below, we will examine in greater detail the positions of the global players – the US, NATO, the UK, the EU and the UN – regarding Afghanistan in the current period.

The US’s main intentions during this period have been for America to continue to lead the consolidation of the collective West at the global level, the US side states that it plans to apply a carrot-and-stick approach to the Afghan authorities, as well as to act in unison with allies and partners regarding the radical Taliban movement.

The Russian side, for its part, is keen to mediate and engage at the global level in resolving the Afghan issue alongside Western countries, with whom relations have recently deteriorated significantly. Russia seeks to enhance the influence of its presence in Afghanistan so as to be able to participate not only in additional negotiating forums, from which the Russian Federation has recently been virtually excluded, but also to attempt to soften the position of Western countries in its favour on other contentious issues of paramount importance to the Russian Federation, such as Syria, Ukraine and others. Indeed, Maria Zakharova, an official spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated that the West understands that it cannot cope with the ‘catastrophe’ associated with the situation in Afghanistan without Russia.

USA

On 16 August 2021, US President Joe Biden declared that the American objective in Afghanistan had been achieved, and in an address to the nation explained why he had decided to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, noting that ‘American troops will not and should not fight in wars that Afghans themselves are not fighting’. Biden also emphasised that Russia and China have an interest in Washington pouring endless funds into Afghanistan.

On 30 September, the US announced the end of its mission in Afghanistan. President Joe Biden stated that the US withdrawal from Afghanistan marks the end of an era of large-scale military operations aimed at rebuilding other countries by force, and that the sole American interest in Afghanistan is to prevent the country from becoming a launching pad for terrorist attacks against the United States.

The State Department plans to apply a carrot-and-stick approach to the Afghan authorities and does not intend to review sanctions against the Taliban in the near future, nor will it grant the Taliban access to Afghanistan’s state reserves for the time being.

US President Joe Biden does not plan to personally enter into negotiations with the leadership of the Afghan Taliban movement, his National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan stated. The US has also stated that the Taliban must earn legitimacy and that the US expects the Taliban to fulfil their commitments regarding respect for human rights. Meanwhile, the State Department stated that the US still has sources of information in Afghanistan. US Deputy Secretary of State Victoria Nuland said that the US would “judge the Taliban not by their words, but by their deeds”, noting that the UN Security Council had already outlined what kind of Afghan government it would like to see.

US President Joe Biden also announced that he had discussed the situation in Afghanistan with the leaders of the G7 countries, representatives of NATO, the UN and the EU, and that they had all agreed to present a united front against the radical Taliban movement.

NATO. On 20 August 2021, NATO announced the completion of its mission in Afghanistan. Stoltenberg also stated that NATO had fulfilled its mission in Afghanistan.

United Kingdom

On 17 August, the UK Foreign Office announced its intention to cooperate more closely with Russia and China on Afghanistan. Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab ruled out the possibility of direct dialogue between London and the radical Taliban movement “in the near future”, but stated that the UK has long been engaging with the Taliban either through foreign intermediaries or through representatives of the Taliban’s political office in Doha.

The Taliban no longer behave “as if they were in the Middle Ages”, officials in the UK stated. The Chief of the Defence Staff called for the Taliban to be given a chance to build a state. The UK will cooperate with the Taliban if necessary, said British Prime Minister Boris Johnson; it was also announced that the British Embassy in Afghanistan would temporarily operate from Qatar. The UK’s Foreign Secretary, Dominic Raab, noted that the UK does not intend to provide support to movements opposing the Taliban in Afghanistan.

The British Prime Minister also believes that diplomatic recognition of the Taliban by the West is possible, but for this to happen, the movement must fulfil several conditions (guarantee safe passage for those wishing to leave the country, respect the rights of women and girls, and prevent Afghanistan from once again becoming a breeding ground for global terrorism).

The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borrell, described the developments in Afghanistan as the most significant geopolitical event since Russia’s annexation of Crimea. He also noted that Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and India, as well as Russia and China, are countries with which it will be necessary to engage in greater dialogue and insist on compliance with UN Security Council resolutions.

The EU stated that it had acknowledged that the Taliban had won the war in Afghanistan, but that the EU did not intend to recognise the Taliban, and that the EU would only resolve the issue of cooperation with Afghanistan on condition that human rights were respected. The European Commission also stated that the EU has frozen €1 billion in economic aid to Afghanistan for seven years, or until the Taliban prove their intentions. It was also stated that the EU has no intention of resuming the work of its mission in Afghanistan.

EU foreign ministers announced that the European Union would cooperate with the Afghan government formed by the radical Taliban movement, without recognising it politically, in order to ensure support for the local population. The EU has not yet decided on the form of its diplomatic presence in Afghanistan.

When it comes to selecting a potential mediator in the negotiation process with the Taliban in Afghanistan, the EU faces a difficult task: choosing an influential and responsible regional representative.

Against this backdrop, EU foreign ministers have decided to expand cooperation with China on Afghanistan. Some EU countries are also calling for closer cooperation with Russia on Afghanistan. Italy’s foreign minister has described Russia as the most important partner on Afghanistan. French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian stated that Paris is interested in engaging in dialogue with Russia and China regarding the situation in Afghanistan, with whom interests may coincide in ensuring that Afghanistan does not become a base for terrorists.

Furthermore, according to Le Drian, the country that stands to gain the most from the situation in Afghanistan is Pakistan. The return of the Taliban has enabled Pakistan to gain greater strategic depth to advance its interests, particularly in its relations with India. France will therefore call on Pakistan to assist in the fight against terrorism.

On 16 August 2021, the UN Security Council called for the formation of a new government in Afghanistan, comprising various groups within the country’s population, including women. This is stated in a declaration issued by the Council on 16 August. They (the members of the UN Security Council) emphasised that a sustainable end to the conflict in Afghanistan can only be achieved through an inclusive, fair, robust and realistic political settlement that upholds human rights, particularly those of minorities, women and children, the statement notes. It is emphasised that the Taliban and any other Afghan group must not support terrorists operating outside Afghanistan. The statement also stresses the need to ensure that no threat to other states emanates from Afghan territory.

On 30 August, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No. 2593 on the situation in Afghanistan, in which, among other things, it called on the Taliban to fulfil its obligations to ensure the free and safe departure of Afghans and foreigners from Afghanistan. The document was sponsored by the United Kingdom, the United States, France and the . During the vote, 13 states voted in favour of the resolution, whilst Russia and China abstained.

As explained by Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, Russia abstained during the vote on the UN Security Council resolution on Afghanistan because its authors had failed to take into account a number of Moscow’s concerns — in particular, the document makes no mention of the need to ‘combat ISIS’. Furthermore, as Nebenzia noted, the resolution’s authors ignored Russia’s proposals to include in the document “the imperative of providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan in strict accordance with UN guiding principles”.

It should be noted here that Russia has long been attempting to include the issue of combating ISIS and terrorism in resolutions submitted to the UN for consideration. By setting such a precedent at the UN, Russia will promote the idea of creating an anti-ISIL (or anti-terrorist) coalition under the auspices of the UN, in which it will participate directly without the approval of other members and control its actions through its right of ‘veto’. This idea is evident and is being promoted by the Russian Federation, for example, in the ‘Persian Gulf Security Concept’ and in other proposals from the Kremlin.

This will give the Kremlin the opportunity to assert that only anti-terrorist coalitions under the auspices of the UN are legitimate, which will help to more specifically challenge the legitimacy of the anti-ISIS coalition (led by the US) in Syria, as one not approved by the UN, and will provide the Russian Federation with ‘legal’ grounds to demand the withdrawal of such a coalition’s forces from Syrian territory.

It is also worth noting another development of interest to Russia, aimed at establishing certain models whose influence the Kremlin could use in the future to exert pressure – the imperative of providing humanitarian aid.

Earlier, on 16 August, French President Emmanuel Macron stated that France was ready to actively facilitate cooperation between Russia, the US and the EU to resolve the situation in Afghanistan, particularly within the framework of the UN Security Council, as their interests align. And on 29 August, he spoke of plans to establish a UN-controlled security zone in Kabul to protect humanitarian operations. Russian Presidential Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that French President Macron’s idea of a security zone in Kabul needs to be discussed. He emphasised that it is crucial to discuss all the conditions for the functioning of such a zone, its regime, and that it is also vital to understand the Taliban’s stance on it.

Such a zone, approved by a UN resolution, could open up new opportunities for Russia to influence both the countries of the collective West and the Taliban directly, following the example (analogy of the scenario) of the resolution on the mechanism for cross-border deliveries to Syria.

The crux of the matter is that in July 2014, the Security Council adopted a resolution authorising the delivery of humanitarian supplies to Syria via four border crossings. Since then, this authorisation has been extended on numerous occasions. In the resolution of 10 January 2020, under pressure from Russia, the Security Council authorised the passage of goods through only two of the four points, and in the resolution of 9 July 2021 (under the same intense pressure from the Russian Federation), only through a single operational crossing point, despite the fact that the humanitarian situation in Syria continues to deteriorate.

Thus, by reducing the number of checkpoints, Russia is attempting to impose its own terms on the collective West – terms favourable to the Russian Federation and the Assad regime in Syria – by threatening not to extend this resolution, which would make it impossible for the UN to provide humanitarian aid to people in areas opposed to the Assad regime.

It should be noted that Mohammad Sohail Shahin, a representative of the Qatari political office of the radical Taliban movement, rejected Macron’s proposal to establish a security zone in Kabul to allow humanitarian operations to continue. However, the interest this French proposal has generated in Russia may indicate that in the future, Russia will attempt to raise this issue once again at the UN.

Russia can employ the same methods of blackmail when adopting UN resolutions on a wide variety of issues, thanks to its right of veto, which enables it to continue exerting influence at the global level. However, a prerequisite for exercising such influence is that the issue must be considered within the UN framework.

That is why Russia repeatedly emphasises the importance of all issues being considered within the UN framework. For example, on 3 September, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated in his speech that the United Nations and its Security Council, in particular the five permanent members (Russia, the US, China, France and the UK), should be responsible for maintaining order in the world.

THE WORLD ORDER

At the level of the world order, the Afghan issue is being used as a platform for competition between models of international order. The US and the collective West are attempting to maintain control through the consolidation of allies and the shifting of key threats (terrorism, migration) to the regional level, whilst retaining the function of control and selective influence. This allows them to minimise direct involvement whilst retaining strategic influence over processes in the region.

Russia, for its part, is attempting to integrate the Afghan case into its own concept of a multipolar world: it is promoting the ‘nuclear five’ format, insisting on the central role of the UN, and seeking to secure a sphere of influence in Central Asia by blocking the US presence. At the same time, its actual capabilities remain limited: a lack of unity within the CSTO, a limited contribution to humanitarian processes, and an inability to independently ensure the region’s security reduce its capacity to convert its stated claims into actual control.

Thus, the Afghan case demonstrates the gap between Russia’s strategic ambitions and its resource base: Moscow attempts to act as a global pole through institutional mechanisms and the rhetoric of spheres of influence, yet in reality remains dependent on the decisions of other players and is forced to adapt to the architecture shaped by the collective West.

China’s position

Assessing this situation, particularly with regard to the CSTO and the other practical capabilities of regional players, the Chinese Foreign Minister called on the US to help Afghanistan stop the violence.

In its statement, the Chinese side noted that the US, whilst respecting Afghanistan’s sovereignty and independence, must take concrete measures to help the Afghan side put an end to the lawlessness and violence perpetrated by terrorists and, without applying double standards or a selective approach, strike a blow against terrorist forces.

The position of the US and the Taliban

The US, meanwhile, has downgraded the status of the potential terrorist threat from Afghanistan from global to regional. The US has also identified its current priority targets (areas of influence) in the fight against international terrorism — Syria, Yemen, Iraq, East Africa, and so on.

US President Joe Biden has stated that the sole American interest in Afghanistan is to prevent the country from becoming a launching pad for terrorist attacks against the United States.⁽ The US has stated that it will not tolerate Afghanistan becoming a safe haven for terrorists and has called for measures to prevent terrorists from using Afghanistan.

It was further stated that the US could combat terrorism in Afghanistan without a military presence and that NATO was prepared to carry out remote strikes against terrorist groups.

The head of US Central Command, Kenneth McKenzie, stated on 31 August that the US does not see any threats from the Taliban, but only from Islamic State.⁽ US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said on 13 September that the US intelligence community believes that the current situation of the Al-Qaeda terrorist group in Afghanistan does not yet allow it to carry out attacks abroad.

US President Joe Biden stated, in relation to the situation in Afghanistan, where the Taliban has come to power, that the US faces a more serious threat of terrorism from Syria, East Africa and other countries where terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State are spreading.⁽ US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines stated on 13 September that the main threat to the US from international terrorist groups originates from countries such as Yemen, Somalia, Syria and Iraq, whilst Afghanistan is far from being at the top of this list.

On 31 August, the head of US Central Command, Kenneth McKenzie, stated that there are at least two thousand militants from the terrorist organisation ‘Islamic State’ in Afghanistan. The Taliban have assured that they are in control of the situation regarding the IS threat in Afghanistan.⁽ The Pentagon, meanwhile, has allowed for coordination with the Taliban to combat IS in Afghanistan. However, the Taliban have stated that Afghanistan does not need foreign assistance to ensure security.

Blinken stated that the US expects the Taliban to fulfil their promise to combat terrorism. A Taliban representative assured that there were no threats to Afghanistan from IS and, as a demonstration of their capabilities, 80 IS militants were arrested in the Afghan province of Nangarhar, emphasising that the Taliban would not provide other countries with intelligence on terrorists.

As a result, the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan was shifted from a global to a regional level, and a statement was made that the NATO Secretary General believes that Russia and China must counter terrorism in Afghanistan.

Refugees and humanitarian aid.

The issue of the migration crisis is closely linked to the problem of terrorism and is particularly acute for Europe, which has experienced a migration crisis due to the military conflict in Syria.

It is therefore vital for the US and the Western alliance that the actions of regional players are directed towards influencing the Taliban, who have come to power, with the aim of stabilising the internal situation in Afghanistan and preventing a civil war within the country.

Consequently, the issue of the migration crisis and the provision of humanitarian aid is being shifted from the global to the regional level, so that regional actors supporting either the Taliban or anti-Taliban forces are also keen to ensure the Taliban fulfil their promises to the international community, in order to avoid civil war, an influx of refugees into their territory and a worsening of the humanitarian situation in the region.

Indeed, the US representative to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, stated on 16 August that the US is calling on the international community, including Afghanistan’s neighbours, to accept refugees from the country, and on the Taliban to ensure that anyone wishing to leave is able to do so, she said.

French President Emmanuel Macron stated that destabilisation in Afghanistan threatens to trigger uncontrolled migration flows to Europe. German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for the possibility of neighbouring states taking in refugees from Afghanistan to be considered before discussing their resettlement in the EU. The President of the European Parliament has called for preparations to be made for a wave of migration from Afghanistan, whilst the President of the European Commission has reported that the number of refugees in Afghanistan has reached 3.7 million.

Some countries have stated their refusal to accept refugees from Afghanistan; in particular, the Austrian Chancellor has spoken out against accepting refugees from Afghanistan, , whilst Turkey has stated that the country will not be able to accept refugees from Afghanistan.

As a result, the EU proposed organising a forum on the resettlement of Afghan refugees. The EU will provide support to Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries to help them accept refugees.

Russia, of course, has exploited the refugee situation both to discredit US authority on this issue and to intimidate Europe with the prospect of a new migration crisis. However, whilst supporting the Taliban, it also seems illogical to suggest that their actions could lead to a large-scale migration crisis, and the Russian Federation understands this; consequently, the topic of refugees and the humanitarian crisis is covered by the Russian media, albeit extensively, but in cautious terms.

Russia itself is in no hurry to participate either in receiving refugees or in providing humanitarian aid to Afghanistan.

Indeed, Russian Senator A. Pushkov stated that the main flow of the more than three million migrants who have left Afghanistan, as mentioned by the President of the European Commission, will head towards Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that accommodating migrants from Afghanistan without visas in Central Asia and denying them entry to the US appears unfair. Meanwhile, Abdusator Esoev, Director of the International Organisation for Migration’s office in Moscow, stated that there would be no influx of Afghan refugees into Russia following the Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan.

On 20 August, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that it is important to prevent terrorists from infiltrating countries bordering Afghanistan, particularly under the guise of refugees. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Russia is guided by its obligations under international humanitarian law regarding the reception of refugees. Russian Presidential Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov said that no decisions had been taken in Russia regarding special status for refugees from Afghanistan. He also stated that Russia had not yet formulated a position on accepting migrants from Afghanistan, where the radical Taliban movement had seized power by force.

On 28 August, Russia’s Ambassador to Afghanistan, Dmitry Zhirnov, stated that Washington had not approached Moscow with a request to accept Afghan refugees. Furthermore, the Russian side does not rule out a new influx of refugees from Afghanistan, but this situation can be managed, in particular through the efforts of the UN.

Until the new Afghan government, formed by the Taliban, has demonstrated its commitment to these promises and gained legitimacy and recognition within the international community – and thus full access to the country’s funding – consolidated humanitarian aid could help resolve the refugee crisis. Such aid should also encourage the Taliban to fulfil their promises.

Indeed, the US Treasury Department has authorised aid to Afghanistan despite sanctions and has unfrozen funding for humanitarian aid programmes in Afghanistan. The US will provide $64 million for humanitarian activities in Afghanistan.

German Foreign Minister Maas stated that the Taliban must guarantee the safety of humanitarian operations in Afghanistan and that the provision of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan depends on the Taliban’s actions. The EU has announced that it will increase its humanitarian aid to Afghanistan to €200 million. Participants at the Afghanistan conference pledged over $1 billion in aid. China will provide Afghanistan with $31 million in aid and 3 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines.

So far, there have been no reports on what aid Russia plans to provide (or whether it plans to provide any at all).

To summarise the interim assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, it should be noted that the US is establishing a system of monitoring, influence and control regarding Afghan issues, taking into account the new circumstances, and in this process is assuming not only the role of leader but also that of chief arbiter, forming a coalition on Afghanistan outside the UN framework whilst upholding the principles of the confrontation between the pole of democratic nations and that of autocratic states.

Indeed, on 14 September, Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that the US administration intends to closely monitor the extent to which Moscow and Beijing support the course being pursued by Washington and its partners regarding Afghanistan.

According to him, the US has made progress in establishing a group of countries and organisations that have developed a unified approach to events in Afghanistan and to the radical Taliban movement. He also emphasised that there are states that may remain on the sidelines of these efforts; among them, China, Russia and Pakistan were mentioned.

Blinken also warned of consequences for those states that assist the radical Taliban movement in Afghanistan in ignoring the commitments that Washington and its partners expect it to fulfil. The US and its international partners, particularly within the UN, have drawn up a series of conditions for the Taliban, which the movement must fulfil in order, from Washington’s perspective, to secure normal treatment from the international community. If these expectations are not met, and other countries assist and encourage the Taliban not to meet these expectations, this too will have consequences, Blinken emphasised.

In summary, –

The 2021 Afghan case demonstrates a multi-level structure of interaction in which Russia is attempting to integrate into all levels simultaneously, yet its influence remains predominantly indirect and compensatory. At the local level, the Russian Federation lacks a deep-rooted presence and relies on information positioning and the role of mediator; at the regional level, it is forced to operate in conditions of competition with stronger and more engaged players; at the global level — it attempts to use the Afghan issue as a tool to return to the negotiating framework with the West.

The key logic of the Russian strategy lies in the attempt to convert limited real capabilities into political and diplomatic capital through institutional mechanisms (primarily the UN), the rhetoric of multipolarity, and the promotion of the idea of spheres of influence. At the same time, the West, whilst minimising its own direct presence, maintains control through the coordination of allies and the shifting of key risks to the regional level, which further limits Russia’s room for manoeuvre.

Thus, the overall balance reveals a structural disconnect between Russia’s ambitions to act as a global centre of power and its actual resources: the Afghan case is not an example of the realisation of this status, but rather an indicator of its limitations, where Moscow is forced to adapt to the rules of the game shaped by other actors.

About the author

TESPA Center for Strategic Analysis

System-level analytical publications from the TESPA research layer.