REAL AND POTENTIAL THREATS TO UKRAINE, AS SET OUT IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION’S SECURITY STRATEGY (2021)
The study demonstrates that the 2021 Russian Federation Security Strategy is not a collection of individual threats, but a comprehensive architecture of systemic influence on Ukraine, where all instruments — institutional, military, informational and ideological — are interlinked and operate according to a single logic.
The key point is that Russia operates simultaneously on several levels:
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institutional (UN) — to block decisions and legitimise favourable frameworks;
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military and security (NATO, the Black Sea) — to restrict Ukraine’s manoeuvring;
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legal and discursive (terrorism) — to create grounds for the use of force;
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information (the internet, cognitive warfare) — to create an environment in which these actions appear justified.
This creates a multi-layered model of pressure, where each element reinforces the others.
A key logic can be observed separately: the Russian Federation is attempting to bring the conflict under control, where:
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either a favourable political solution is imposed;
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or the conflict is ‘frozen’ with the results achieved being locked in.
At the same time, responsibility for blocking the process is systematically shifted onto Ukraine.
Crucial is the use of a universal legitimising framework:
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“terrorism” → a pretext for military or hybrid actions;
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“protection of citizens” → justification for intervention;
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“information security” → a tool for accusations and provocations.
This framework creates a flexible set of tools for escalation, which can be activated at any moment.
Another key element is the shift towards cognitive warfare: Russia is working not only with territories but with identity (language, history, the “Russian World”), which signifies an attempt to reshape Ukraine’s political space itself, rather than merely controlling it.
In parallel, there is a clear drive to consolidate the status of a “pole of power” through the concept of spheres of influence, where Ukraine is defined as a key element of this sphere, rather than as an independent actor.
Conclusion: The Russian Federation’s security strategy shapes not merely a policy towards Ukraine, but a long-term model of its subordination through combined pressure.
Its essence lies in creating a situation in which:
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Ukraine loses its strategic autonomy (through security and institutional constraints);
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the conflict enters a managed or frozen state on the Russian Federation’s terms;
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any resistance can be legitimised as a “threat” (terrorism, destabilisation, etc.) with subsequent justification for the use of force.
A key feature of this model is its flexibility and scalability: Russia does not fixate on a single scenario, but reserves the right to shift from informational and political pressure to direct military intervention.
In summary: Ukraine is viewed in this strategy not as a subject of negotiation, but as a systemic asset within the Russian Federation’s sphere of influence, control over which must be restored by any means available — from cognitive influence to a military scenario.
Russia’s Security Strategy. Threats to Ukraine:
• UN.
• NATO.
• TERRORISM.
• USE OF MILITARY FORCE.
• INFORMATION WARFARE (the internet)
• SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.
Conclusion.
The Russian Federation’s security strategy outlined here forms a multi-layered and systematic model of pressure on Ukraine, in which military, political, information and legal instruments are interlinked and mutually reinforcing. The key logic lies in securing for Russia the status of a separate centre of power with the right to ‘zones of influence’, where Ukraine is defined as a priority and fundamentally non-negotiable asset.
Through the institutional level (the UN), the Russian Federation seeks to block undesirable decisions and impose a conflict resolution format that suits its own interests, whilst through the security track (NATO, the Black Sea) — to limit Ukraine’s strategic capabilities and lock it into the status of a neutral or dependent state. In parallel, a universal legitimisation framework (terrorism) is employed, which creates grounds for potential military action, as well as an information circuit (the internet, ‘interference’, ‘extremism’), which allows for the fabrication of pretexts for escalation and the conduct of systematic influence operations.
It is worth noting separately the shift towards cognitive warfare as a long-term tool: through the ‘Russian World’ narrative, cultural identity, language and history, the Russian Federation is attempting to regain control not only over the territory but also over Ukraine’s conceptual space. Ultimately, the Russian Federation’s strategy does not envisage de-escalation — on the contrary, it involves constant pressure with the possibility of transitioning from hybrid to direct military scenarios, confirming its intention to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence by any means available.
The transition to multipolarity in the Russian Federation’s Security Strategy is marked by an intensification of the struggle between the West and Russia for spheres of influence, with an increased threat of the use of military force.
UN
In its Security Strategy, Russia categorically advocates the preservation and strengthening of the central coordinating role of the UN and the UN Security Council, of which it is a permanent member, holding a veto right in this forum. This enables it to influence decisions on virtually all global and regional issues in its own interests, often to the detriment of most UN members, or to block other decisions that are disadvantageous to itself.
For Ukraine, this means that if the role of the UN Security Council (and Russia’s role within it) in resolving regional conflicts is maintained and strengthened, the resolution of the Ukrainian issue (the occupation of the ORDLO) and the Crimean issue (the annexation of Crimea) will be significantly complicated, if not impossible.
If Russia fails to resolve these issues on terms favourable to itself, Moscow will attempt to ‘freeze’ them (including through the UN platform) whilst preserving the gains it has already made, but blaming Ukraine for this freeze in an attempt to avoid further sanctions due to its destructive stance.
NATO.
The Strategy identifies the expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure near Russia’s borders as the main military threat.
This thesis poses a threat to Russia not only in terms of direct military confrontation, but also to the realisation of its geopolitical plans.
Therefore, Russia will seek, both from Ukraine and from its allies, primarily European ones, to promote and implement the thesis of a ‘concept of permanent neutrality’ for Ukraine (following the example of Austria) and to promote the thesis of reducing the military presence of non-regional NATO forces in the Black Sea, in an attempt to maintain its own dominance there.
Such naval dominance in the Black Sea threatens Ukraine with the disruption or complete blockage of shipping in both the Azov and Black Seas, as well as the blocking or aggressive control by the Russian Federation of potential logistics routes involving Ukraine (should Russia be excluded from them) to Central Asia (via the South Caucasus), which are important for the EU.
In particular, for this reason, and also to overcome the negative consequences of economic isolation (sanctions) The Russian Federation’s strategy proposes, in particular, to prioritise the development of its logistics projects at the global level (integration of Russian projects into the global transport space, realisation of the Russian Federation’s transit potential) with the aim of proposing to the collective West participation in the use of such logistics routes in the future on terms favourable to Russia, including for political purposes.
It should be noted that Ukraine’s territory is also included in the Kremlin’s plans for logistics projects, but on their own terms, which Russia is currently unable (or has already failed) to implement.
The Kremlin’s political objectives, meanwhile, may be expressed in actions aimed at reconciling the Russian Federation with the collective West, primarily with Europe, as the partner with the greatest economic stake. In return, Europe will be required to conditionally recognise Crimea as part of Russia (or to effectively freeze this issue indefinitely – de facto neutrality), support for a resolution of the Ukrainian conflict (in the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions) on terms favourable to Russia, or recognition of a ‘freeze’ on the conflict under current conditions without further restrictions on Moscow (again, neutrality), and so on.
Russia therefore seeks to aggressively defend its right to dominance in the Black Sea to prevent the possibility of its exclusion from logistical projects beneficial to the EU. The presence of NATO military forces and non-regional actors involved in the protection of shipping, initiated by Ukraine and the ‘Crimean Platform’ (NATO warships), is a highly undesirable development for Russia.
It can be assumed that, as a result, Russia’s pressure on Ukraine – particularly regarding the adoption of a concept of permanent neutrality – will intensify significantly, as will Moscow’s efforts on this issue with its partners, primarily European ones.
TERRORISM.
Throughout the Strategy, emphasis is placed on the threat of terrorism and its link to attempts to exclude Russia from global and regional security systems (due to its destructive behaviour). The Russian Federation asserts that, by seeking to isolate Russia (due to its destructive behaviour) and refusing to cooperate with Moscow on the issue of equal and indivisible security, particularly in Europe (due to the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine), the collective West is thereby allegedly hindering conflict resolution and the fight against terrorism and extremism worldwide.
It follows from the Strategy that the establishment of collective security (at global and regional levels) is possible only through the UN platform, where the Russian Federation wields influence via its right of ‘veto’. It is emphasised that Russia allegedly seeks to develop international cooperation in the field of countering terrorism, extremism, illegal migration, etc., but this must take place on Russia’s terms and under its control.
It would seem that Ukraine should face minimal threats in this regard, given that the issue of terrorism is not relevant in Ukraine due to its absence. Unfortunately, however, this is not entirely the case.
For Ukraine, this issue is relevant in terms of the potential establishment of a regional collective security structure incorporating Russia into its architecture, given that such a concept inherently involves the creation of an anti-terrorist coalition and the resolution of regional conflicts, the management and control of which would be exercised through the UN platform, where Russia holds a veto.
Russia is extremely keen on organising and participating in such a broad regional anti-terrorist coalition and is trying in every way to promote this idea on all international platforms (for example, in the Russian-authored ‘Persian Gulf security concept’).
Counter-terrorism is one of the few areas where American and Russian interests converge. Therefore, the argument about an alleged terrorist threat from Ukraine is extremely advantageous to Russia for advancing its own agendas in the geopolitical arena.
Based on the provisions of the Russian Federation’s Strategy, this argument will be further reinforced and supported by the Russian side, posing a threat to Ukraine, as it could provide Russia with a pretext for aggressive actions against the country, up to and including the implementation of a military scenario against Ukraine.
For example, the issue of the spread of terrorism (including via the internet) is also viewed by Moscow in the Strategy as a threat of interference in Russia’s internal affairs (destabilisation of socio-political life).
Thus, the Strategy, in particular, emphasises:
• ‘International terrorist and extremist organisations seek to intensify their propaganda and recruitment efforts targeting Russian citizens, establish their clandestine cells on Russian territory, and involve Russian youth in unlawful activities.’[1]
• ‘With the aim of destabilising the socio-political situation in the Russian Federation, false information is being disseminated, in particular knowingly false reports of the threat of terrorist acts. Materials from terrorist and extremist organisations, calls for mass unrest, the commission of extremist acts, and participation in mass (public) events held in violation of established procedures are being posted on the Internet (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Internet’).”
Russia has repeatedly accused the Ukrainian authorities of supporting radicals (nationalists) and Crimean Tatars, pointing to their alleged links with international terrorist organisations. Reports periodically appear in the Russian media about the threat of terrorist attacks in Crimea and on Russian territory, and the detention of their perpetrators, whom the Russian authorities have in one way or another linked to Ukraine. Reports have become increasingly frequent that such terrorists are allegedly ‘supervised’ by the Ukrainian security services and the Ukrainian authorities themselves.
In light of the adoption of new laws in Russia and the identification in the Strategy of such threats to Russia as ‘interference in internal affairs’, ‘destabilisation of the socio-political situation’, and the instigation of ‘colour revolutions’ linked to terrorism — this provides Russia with a wide scope for information operations and influence campaigns against Ukraine, falsely accusing it of such actions, which will only intensify.
Russia may move from information operations to direct provocations, primarily in the territories of Crimea and the ORDLO (staging terrorist acts against the civilian population holding Russian citizenship (Russian passportisation in the ORDLO), including the use of chemical weapons, drawing on its experience in Syria). Ukraine must be extremely vigilant and prepared to take decisive action, implement countermeasures and find ways to overcome such provocations, in order to avoid providing a pretext for Russia to carry out a military scenario against Ukraine under the guise of eliminating a terrorist threat from the latter.
Another potential threat to Ukraine in relation to terrorism, as interpreted by the Russian Strategy, is the intensification of illegal migration from Russian (and Belarusian) territories as a form of blackmail and a tool to exert pressure on the Ukrainian authorities, with the aim of influencing Ukraine’s position, the position of its partners and allies
in their relations with Russia, both regarding Ukrainian issues and other contentious international matters. Through such methods, Russia seeks to secure its involvement in international processes, such as its participation in regional collective security, as mentioned above.
USE OF MILITARY FORCE.
The Strategy also identifies new threats arising from the confrontation, in particular:
• The growing threat of the use of military force, including near Russian borders (in so-called ‘grey zones’); the Strategy proposes a series of measures, including
• ‘The achievement of the country’s defence objectives is carried out within the framework of military policy through strategic deterrence and the prevention of military conflicts’[2];
• ‘contributing to the elimination and prevention of hotspots of tension and conflict in the territories of states bordering the Russian Federation’;[3]
• ‘enhancing the role of the Russian Federation in peacekeeping activities’;
• “ensuring the protection and defence of the Russian Federation’s state border, territorial waters, exclusive economic zone and continental shelf”; [4]
• “…reducing environmental risks in border areas”;[5]
• Threats to Russian citizens and compatriots abroad, interpreted as discrimination and persecution.
• “Protection of the national interests and citizens of the Russian Federation outside its territory”; [6]
It should be noted that Russia’s Strategy includes provisions regarding the possibility of maintaining control over the Ukrainian conflict and resorting to force should political methods fail (for example, the denunciation of Minsk-2 (the provisions of which were formalised at the UN) and Ukraine’s withdrawal from the Normandy format; in the event of a decision by the Ukrainian leadership to resolve the conflict militarily – the return of the territories of the ORDLO by force, etc.)
It follows from the Strategy that Russia will not cease provocations and the intensification of pressure along the perimeter of the Ukrainian border (as an element of strategic deterrence) and does not rule out a forceful option regarding Ukraine in the event of a likely military decision by the Ukrainian authorities against the ORDLO (peacekeepers). Russia also provides for a forceful scenario (the so-called ‘Georgian’ scenario) in the section on the protection of Russian citizens outside its territory (issuing Russian passports in the ORDLO).
To ensure a more comprehensive range of countermeasures against possible forceful methods or actions regarding Crimea by Ukraine, its partners and allies, as well as for more comprehensive control, in particular, of the Black and Azov Seas, the protection of developing freshwater reserves in the Azov Sea, etc., a new clause has been introduced into the Strategy regarding additional protection of the Russian Federation’s territorial waters and continental shelves, as well as environmental risks in border territories.
This may give Russia additional advantages over Ukraine, as well as pose further threats to Ukraine both in terms of the ability to utilise marine resources and safe navigation, and in terms of new provocations by Russia using the environment as a pretext in the Black Sea region, subjecting Ukraine to fresh accusations from the Russian Federation.
INFORMATION CONFRONTATION (Internet)
Russia accuses the Collective West of influencing Russian society primarily through the capabilities of global internet companies utilising information and communication technologies (in particular via the ‘internet’).
In the Strategy, such influence is viewed as interference in the internal affairs of the state, an undermining of sovereignty and a violation of territorial integrity (the main danger for the Russian Federation being the rise of protest sentiment and the possibility of a ‘colour revolution’).
The Strategy identifies the primary task as strengthening the Russian Federation’s sovereignty in the information space – ensuring information security (sovereignisation of the Internet).
One of the measures identified is the development of forces and means of information confrontation and the creation of a ‘secure environment for the circulation of information’ (sovereignisation of the internet, censorship), as well as conveying ‘reliable’ (beneficial to the Russian Federation) information about Russia’s domestic and foreign policy to the Russian and international public (influence operations).
The main threat to Ukraine, as in the ‘terrorism’ section, lies in the fact that such Russian formulations, enshrined in the Strategy, allow it not only to make unfounded accusations against Kyiv of ‘interference in the internal affairs of the state and violation of territorial integrity’, which will be quite difficult to refute (including due to the sovereignty of the Russian internet), but also to create provocations on this basis, which could lead to scenarios involving the use of force (a violation of ‘territorial integrity’ could have far-reaching consequences in the interpretation of the Russian side, which is so fearful of ‘colour revolutions’ (protest actions) during a period of power transition).
On the other hand, the intensified development of forces and means of information warfare indicates that Russia, by closing off global access to its segment of the internet, is significantly stepping up its influence, including with regard to Ukraine on the internet, where open rules apply, which may pose a threat.
SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.
Recently, there has been competition for influence between the collective West and Russia in areas that the Russian Federation previously considered its ‘traditional zones of influence’ ( ). One of the main objectives of the Kremlin’s foreign policy, according to the Strategy, is to strengthen the Russian Federation’s position as one of the influential centres of the modern world (a bid for Russia to be recognised as a separate ‘pole’).
To secure the right to be regarded as a separate and independent pole in the emerging realities of multipolarity, Russia must (create) an alternative, competitive system of values in order to gain new opportunities in its confrontation with the Collective West, which defends democratic values throughout the world, justifying its destructive behaviour by Russia’s alleged right to this ‘special path’ of its own.
The Russian Federation’s actions in Ukraine have triggered a confrontation between the Collective West and Russia, manifested in a growing trend towards the diplomatic and economic isolation of the Russian Federation. The strategy specifically mentions the Russian Federation’s objective of ‘strengthening fraternal ties between the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples’ [7] (defining the contours of the desired priority ‘sphere of influence’).
Such wording may indicate that Russia has come to realise that its influence in Ukraine has significantly weakened, that pro-Russian political forces in Ukraine have little public support and are unable to make decisions in Russia’s interests, and therefore the Russian Federation’s main efforts in the near future will be directed not towards dialogue with the Ukrainian authorities (it is impossible for Russia to negotiate with Ukraine ‘on its own terms’ without the support of the Ukrainian people), but towards regaining at least the goodwill of the Ukrainian people as a whole.
Some changes in Russia’s methods of influence within Ukraine can be expected. It can be assumed that agents of Russian influence will attempt to infiltrate various civic movements and political parties with a patriotic slant (or create such new covert projects) so that, from within, under cover, attempt to alter the situation in Ukraine regarding Russia as a whole using the tools of cognitive warfare (‘war of meanings’).
The very wording of the thesis – ‘strengthening fraternal ties between the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples’ – points to the use of precisely these tools of cognitive warfare. The term ‘Russian’ is used, rather than ‘Russian people’.
In Russia’s understanding, ‘Russian’ refers not to nationality but to a mindset. This concept was most succinctly reflected in the ‘Doctrine of the Russian Donbas’[8], which received widespread coverage in January 2021. It follows from the Doctrine that the concept of ‘Russian’ refers to someone who possesses a particular (unique) worldview with the unified value system of the Soviet Union.
Furthermore, according to the Doctrine, it is emphasised that the Russian people constitute the Russian nation, which encompasses various sub-ethnic groups. The Russian nation is a supra-ethnic entity: a broad community of Russian speakers with a specific mindset – the Russian World. The people of Donbas form part of the core of the Russian nation and are part of the Russian World. According to the authors of the Doctrine, the Russian World is a unique phenomenon of world civilisation. The phenomenon lies in the worldview. The Russian World = Russian civilisation.
It is also worth noting that the entire ‘Russian Donbas’ Doctrine serves as Russia’s ‘justification’ to the international community that ‘Donbas’ (the ORDLO) is a ‘legitimate sphere of Russian influence’.
It can be argued that the inclusion of the term ‘Russian’ in the Russian Federation’s Security Strategy implies, at the very least, that the core meanings and narratives of the ‘Russian Donbas’ Doctrine will be taken into account in their subsequent implementation at the highest level.
In other words, the Strategy effectively states that Russia includes Ukraine (at least for now, the ORDLO) and Belarus within its concept of the ‘Russian World’, and that this is its new geopolitical project in the post-Soviet space.
The Strategy also proposes a set of tasks aimed at safeguarding precisely those narratives from the ‘Russian Donbas’ Doctrine, among which the following can be highlighted[9]:
• ‘strengthening the position of the Russian language as a language of international communication’;
• “providing support to compatriots living abroad in the exercise of their rights, in particular the right to preserve their pan-Russian cultural identity, and ensuring the protection of their interests”;
• “countering attempts to falsify history, defending historical truth, and preserving historical memory”; (upholding its own interpretations of historical events and processes);
• ‘strengthening the position of Russian media and mass communications in the global information space’.
Overall, Ukraine should expect to see increased activity and intensified pressure in the information sphere regarding each of the points listed above (the Russian language, Russian cultural identity, the ‘historical truth’, and Russian media), both directly from the Kremlin’s agents of influence and from representatives of official Moscow and its allies.
CONCLUSION.
To summarise the above and the threats that Russia’s new security strategy poses to Ukraine:
UN:
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preserving and strengthening the central coordinating role of the UN and the UN Security Council in regional conflicts without reforming this platform;
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strengthening of Russia’s position in the international arena (recognition of the Russian Federation as a pole with the right to spheres of influence).
NATO:
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imposing a ‘concept of permanent neutrality’ on Ukraine due to the alleged build-up of NATO’s military infrastructure near the Russian Federation’s borders;
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a reduction in the military presence of non-regional NATO forces in the Black Sea, which would lead to the dominance of the Russian navy, the hindrance or blocking of shipping, and aggressive Russian control over logistics routes;
Terrorism:
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an increase in the terrorist threat within Ukraine itself (sabotage);
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the threat of a military scenario against Ukraine by Russia based on fabricated accusations of terrorism (provocations in Crimea, the ORDLO, and on Russian territory);
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the threat to the establishment of collective regional security and the creation of an anti-terrorist coalition including the Russian Federation;
Use of military force:
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provisions regarding the possibility of keeping the Ukrainian conflict under control by force (strategic deterrence, peacekeeping, the ‘Georgian scenario’ regarding the protection of citizens abroad);
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Russia is taking additional measures to protect its territorial waters and continental shelves, as well as to address environmental risks in border areas, which may hinder Ukraine’s ability to utilise maritime resources, lead to the disruption or blocking of shipping in the Azov and Black Seas, and trigger new provocations against the Ukrainian side;
Information warfare (internet):
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Russia’s assertion that the dissemination of certain information online may be regarded as interference in a state’s internal affairs, an undermining of sovereignty and a violation of territorial integrity (the main threat to the Russian Federation being the rise of protest sentiment and the possibility of a ‘colour revolution’), allow Moscow to create additional provocations in its accusations against Ukraine, which could lead to scenarios involving the use of force;
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Russia’s intensified development of forces and means of information warfare will enable it to significantly step up its negative influence regarding Ukraine on the internet;
Spheres of influence
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Russia includes Ukraine (for the time being, at least, the ORDLO through the ‘Russian Donbas’ Doctrine) and Belarus within its concept of the ‘Russian World’, and this is its new geopolitical project in the post-Soviet space.
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Continued struggle for spheres of influence across Ukraine, with a shift in methods of influence and the use of cognitive warfare tools;
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Intensification and escalation of pressure in the information space based on the key tenets (of cognitive warfare): the Russian language, Russian cultural identity, historical ‘truth’, and the strengthening of the Russian media’s position.
It follows from the Russian Federation’s security strategy that Russia has no intention of changing its destructive behaviour towards Ukraine, has no intention of deviating from its goals, objectives and scenarios, and is prepared to employ both old and new methods in the struggle for Ukraine as its priority ‘sphere of influence’.
[1] IV. Ensuring national security. State and public security. (para. 44, 55)
[2] IV. Ensuring national security. National defence. (para. 40).
[3] IV. Ensuring national security. Strategic stability and mutually beneficial international cooperation (para. 101 (11, 12))
[4] IV. Ensuring national security. State and public security. (para. 47 (3)).
[5] IV. Ensuring national security. Environmental security and rational use of natural resources. (para. 83 (18))
[6] IV. Ensuring national security. National defence. (para. 40 (5)).
[7] IV. Ensuring national security. Strategic stability and mutually beneficial international cooperation (para. 101 (20))
[9] IV. Ensuring national security. Strategic stability and mutually beneficial international cooperation (para. 101 (18, 19, 21, 22))