THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION OF 2 JULY 2021

(published in 2021)

This study presents a comprehensive model of the Russian Federation’s strategic thinking, as set out in the 2021 National Security Strategy, where the key objective is to consolidate its status as an independent pole in a multipolar world.

The first level — the basic structure of the world:

• rejection of unipolarity;

• the formation of several centres of power;

• Russia positions itself as a separate pole with its own system of values.

This means that Russia does not seek integration into the existing system, but is attempting to rewrite the rules of the game, replacing the priority of values with the priority of interests.

The second level — the logic of confrontation with the West:

• the conflict is presented as systemic (democracies vs autocracies);

• The West is a source of threats (sanctions, military pressure, information influence);

• the Russian Federation’s response is symmetrical/asymmetrical actions + reliance on the UN and peacekeeping.

Thus, a model is formed: confrontation + controlled channels of interaction.

The third level — instruments of implementation:

• The UN (veto power) as a key instrument of global influence;

• peacekeeping as a controlled mechanism of force;

• the formation of spheres of influence (particularly in the post-Soviet space);

• the development of alliances and integration formats (EAEU, CSTO, BRICS, SCO).

In other words, the Russian Federation seeks to act not through domination, but through institutional blocking and regional control.

The fourth level — adaptation to restrictions (sanctions and isolation):

• the creation of alternative logistical and economic links;

• de-dollarisation, import substitution;

• development of ‘network diplomacy’;

• reorientation towards non-Western markets.

This forms a model: partial autonomy + circumventing restrictions, rather than lifting them.

The fifth level — the ideological component:

• creation of an alternative value system;

• defending “historical truth”;

• control of the information space;

• prevention of “colour revolutions”.

This means that internal stability is viewed as an element of external security, and information control as a strategic tool.

The sixth level — the internal contradiction of the strategy:

• Russia aspires to be a pole;

• but is forced to act by adapting to pressure;

• a balance between isolation and interaction;

• dependence on partners (particularly China) limits autonomy.

Conclusion: The 2021 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation marks Russia’s transition to a model of an adaptive-revisionist state, which:

• seeks to change the international system;

• but is forced to act under conditions of limited resources and external pressure.

The key logic of the strategy: a combination of three modes — confrontation, bargaining and partial integration.

Russia is unable to become a fully-fledged global centre of power, therefore:

• it compensates for this through control over institutions (the UN);

• it creates regional spheres of influence;

• it builds alternative economic and political ties;

• it shapes its own ideological framework as a tool for legitimisation.

Systemic conclusion: the Russian Federation’s strategy is not one of expansion in the classical sense, but a strategy of maintaining status quo through balancing, circumventing constraints and partial autonomisation, reflecting the structural weakness of its position in the new world order.

RESEARCH

Main directions, threats and priorities reflected in the Strategy

The drive towards multipolarity.

Confrontation with the West

Allies, alliances, spheres of influence.

Diplomatic and economic isolation (including sanctions) and ways to overcome it:

The formation of an alternative system of values, information security and the outlines of a new Development Strategy

CONCLUSION:

On 2 July 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree approving the new version of the National Security Strategy[1]. The previous version had been in force since 31 December 2015.

This Strategy consists of five sections:

I. General Provisions.

II. Russia in the modern world: trends and opportunities.

III. The National Interests of the Russian Federation and Strategic National Priorities.

IV. Ensuring national security.

• Preserving the Russian people and developing human potential.

• National defence.

• State and public security.

• Information security.

• Economic security.

• Scientific and technological development.

• Environmental security and sustainable use of natural resources.

• Protection of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, culture and historical memory.

• Strategic stability and mutually beneficial international cooperation.

V. Organisational principles and mechanisms for implementing this Strategy.

This Strategy identifies key ideas, directions and indicators of threats, priorities for the Russian Federation, as well as possible scenarios for overcoming and implementing them in both Russia’s foreign and domestic policies.

Key directions, threats and priorities reflected in the Strategy

Within the framework of Russia’s vision of the world order, the key direction is the formation of a multipolar system in which the Russian Federation acts as an independent centre of power with an alternative system of values. Such a model envisages its positioning outside the Western coordinate system and a striving for strategic autonomy.

The main threats in this logic are confrontation with the West and the associated diplomatic and economic isolation. Accordingly, the Russian Federation’s priorities are aimed at minimising these risks and consolidating its status: maintaining a key role in the UN Security Council as an instrument of global influence; using peacekeeping as a controlled mechanism of force; establishing and securing spheres of influence; and gradually overcoming the pressure of sanctions and isolation whilst consolidating the results achieved. (see Fig. 1)

Fig. 1. The world order and the Russian Federation

The pursuit of multipolarity.

Within the framework of the concept of multipolarity, Russia views the future world order as a system of several autonomous centres of power, in which it acts as a separate, independent pole with its own spheres of influence. The key threat in this model is the formation of bloc-based approaches outside the UN, which undermine its coordinating role. Accordingly, the Russian Federation’s priorities are focused on preserving the central role of the UN and the Security Council as instruments of global governance, whilst simultaneously forming a system of independent poles (the US, China, the EU, India) and consolidating the principle of the primacy of interests over values in international relations. (see Fig. 2)

Fig. 2 The Russian Federation’s pursuit of multipolarity.

• Direction:

The Strategy asserts that the world is undergoing a period of transformation from a unipolar world to multipolarity. Such a transformation leads to the weakening of international institutions.[2] This strategy assumes that Russia has the right to claim moral leadership in the world (as the holder of its own ‘system of values’) and to create (present) an attractive ideological foundation for the future world order, which should guarantee the Russian Federation the realisation of additional opportunities.

Thus, Moscow seeks to create several independent poles in the international arena (the US, China, the EU, India, etc.), prioritises the convergence of interests over values in international relations and seeks recognition of Russia’s status as a separate independent pole, with the right to its own ‘spheres of influence’ recognised by all members of the international community.

• Threats:

In the Strategy, Russia also categorically opposes bloc approaches (a consolidated stance in the confrontation between Western countries, which seek to form a ‘coalition of democracy’, and autocratic states) implemented outside the framework of the UN. Such a confrontation leads to the diplomatic and economic isolation of the Russian Federation by Western countries (democratic nations), which Russia seeks to overcome whilst preserving previously achieved results and without altering its destructive behaviour.

• Priorities:

Russia is firmly in favour of preserving and strengthening the central coordinating role of the UN and the UN Security Council, of which it is a permanent member, holding the right of ‘veto’ in this forum. This enables it to influence decisions on virtually all global and regional issues in its own interests, which are often destructive for the majority of UN members, or to block other decisions that are disadvantageous to itself.

The Strategy also identifies the main potential points of contact with the West on global issues under the new conditions of confrontation:

• cooperation in the global information space;

• assistance in dealing with natural and man-made emergencies, the spread of disease, etc.;

• cooperation in the field of environmental protection and climate;

• development of a ‘green’ and low-carbon economy.

Confrontation with the West

In the logic of confrontation with the West, Russia views the international system as a battleground between democratic states and autocracies, accompanied by intensifying competition for spheres of influence and growing risks of the use of force. The Russian Federation identifies the main threats as NATO’s military build-up near Russian borders, the deployment of US missile systems, the escalation of the arms race, as well as new dimensions of confrontation — space and cyberspace, ‘grey zones’ and the erosion of allied ties. In response, the Russian Federation’s priorities are focused on using diplomatic mechanisms and peacekeeping as instruments of controlled influence, strengthening its own role in conflict resolution, employing symmetrical and asymmetrical measures, and establishing a collective security system through UN institutions on terms favourable to itself. (see Fig. 3)

Fig. 3. Confrontation with the West.

• Areas of focus

The Strategy refers to the ‘creation of a hostile image of Russia’ (based on allegations of its major destructive actions): [3]

• breaches of international obligations;

• carrying out cyberattacks;

• interference in the internal affairs of other states.

The Strategy highlights the confrontation between democratic countries (the West) and autocratic states (including Russia):

• the weakening and dismantling of existing international institutions and rules;

• the formation of new rules and principles of the world order (outside the UN);

• the application by the West and its individual representatives (the US) of unilateral restrictive measures (including sanctions).

Thus, the Strategy notes the very fact of this confrontation: it is recorded that a number of states regard the Russian Federation as a threat and a military adversary.

The transition to multipolarity itself is marked in the Strategy by an intensification of the struggle for spheres of influence, with an increased threat of military force (effectively a recognition of the new hybrid rules imposed by the Russian Federation in ‘grey zones’).

• Threats

The Strategy identifies the main military threat as the expansion of NATO’s military infrastructure near the Russian Federation’s borders, as well as the deployment by the US of medium- and short-range missiles in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. The growing arms race (including high-tech arms) is also listed among the priority military threats to the Russian Federation.

The Strategy also notes new threats arising from the confrontation:

• New domains of military confrontation or military action: outer space and cyberspace.

• The growing threat of the use of military force, particularly near Russia’s borders (in so-called ‘grey zones’).

• The breakdown of the Russian Federation’s ties with its traditional allies (primarily in the post-Soviet space).

• A threat to Russian citizens and compatriots abroad, interpreted as discrimination and persecution.

The Strategy also highlights the threat of terrorism and its link to attempts to exclude Russia from global and regional security systems (due to its destructive behaviour), whilst terrorism is viewed as interference in Russia’s internal affairs.

Thus, the Strategy notes that tensions are continuing to escalate in conflict zones:

• in the post-Soviet space,

• in the Middle East,

• in North Africa,

• in Afghanistan,

• on the Korean Peninsula.

It is emphasised that the weakening (due to the rejection of Russia’s terms and its destabilising and destructive behaviour) of global and regional security systems creates conditions for the spread of international terrorism and extremism, leading, in particular, to illegal migration.^[4]

The Russian Federation further asserts that, by seeking to isolate Russia (due to its destructive behaviour) and refusing to cooperate with Moscow on the issue of equal and indivisible security, particularly in Europe (due to the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine), the West is thereby allegedly hindering conflict resolution and the fight against terrorism and extremism worldwide.

The issue of the spread of terrorism (including via the internet) is also viewed as a threat of interference in Russia’s internal affairs (destabilisation of socio-political life).

• Priorities

The Strategy emphasises that the Russian Federation adheres to the use of diplomatic mechanisms (in forums under Russia’s control (including the UN) and with its participation) and peacekeeping (force scenarios under Russia’s control). In the event of hostile actions against the Russian Federation (including political pressure on it or its allies, sanctions, etc.), Russia reserves the right to take symmetrical and asymmetrical measures.

It follows from the Strategy that the establishment of collective security (at the global and regional levels) is possible only through the UN platform, where the Russian Federation wields influence via its right of ‘veto’:

• Russia advocates preventing the use of military force in violation of the UN Charter; Moscow agrees only to forceful scenarios under Russia’s control (peacekeeping). Therefore, the need to strengthen Russia’s role in peacekeeping activities is emphasised.

• The Russian Federation calls for the development of confidence-building measures only on its own terms.

• The development of international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, extremism, illegal migration, etc. must take place on Russia’s terms and under its control.

Allies, alliances, spheres of influence.

As part of its strategy to establish itself as a centre of power, Russia seeks to consolidate its status as a distinct pole by strengthening its network of allies, integration blocs and spheres of influence. Within this framework, the West’s attempts to sever Russia’s ties with its traditional partners—particularly in the post-Soviet space—are viewed as a key threat. In response, priorities are focused on maintaining allied relations (in particular with the CIS countries, China and India), developing integration frameworks under Russia’s leadership (the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the CIS, as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS), and the consolidation of strategic spheres of interest — from outer space and the world’s oceans to the Arctic, Antarctic and regions of Asia, Africa and Latin America. (see Fig. 4)

Fig. 4. Allies, alliances, spheres of influence

• Priorities

One of the main objectives of the Kremlin’s foreign policy, according to the Strategy, is to strengthen the Russian Federation’s position as one of the influential centres of the modern world (a bid for Russia to be recognised as a separate ‘pole’). [5]

Accordingly, such an influential centre must possess the requisite attributes – strategic allies and partners, integration into various alliance frameworks, and spheres of influence.

Thus, the Strategy identifies the following allies and partners:

• the CIS member states (part of the post-Soviet space), the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia (entities not recognised by the collective West);

• a comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation with the People’s Republic of China;

• a particularly privileged strategic partnership with the Republic of India.

The integration alliances of highest priority for the Russian Federation are highlighted:

• the EAEU, the CSTO, the SCO, and the CIS (with the Russian Federation playing a leading role in the post-Soviet space);

• SCO, BRICS, RIK (with the participation of the Russian Federation).

Areas and spheres where the Russian Federation would like to expand or maintain its spheres of influence are also identified. The Russian Federation’s priority spheres of interest are defined: outer space, the World Ocean, the Arctic and the Antarctic.

The main priority of maintaining spheres of influence is set out in the Strategy for the post-Soviet space (countries of the Near Abroad).

In the interests of developing regional and sub-regional integration in the Far Abroad, the Asia-Pacific region, Latin America and Africa have been highlighted. The Middle East (including Syria) is not mentioned in the Strategy.

• Threats

As noted earlier, one of the main threats to the Russian Federation identified in the Strategy is attempts by the collective West to undermine the Russian Federation’s ties with its traditional allies (primarily in the post-Soviet space) — in other words, there is competition for influence between the collective West and Russia in areas that the Russian Federation previously considered its conventional spheres of influence.

• Priorities

Russia identifies the following actions, in particular, as its priorities in addressing the threats of growing competition for ‘traditional’ spheres of influence (the post-Soviet space), which enable it to strengthen its influence and control in this space:

• deepening cooperation on a bilateral basis and within the framework of integration associations (economic control, in particular through unions);

• facilitating the elimination and prevention of hotspots of tension and conflict in the territories of states bordering the Russian Federation (conflict control and management);

• providing support to the Russian Federation’s allies and partners in resolving issues related to defence and security, and neutralising attempts at external interference in their internal affairs (control of the ruling authorities within allied countries (political control));

• carrying out work aimed at developing common approaches to participation in the activities of international organisations (forming and controlling a consolidated position, favourable to the Russian Federation, on international platforms).

The strategy specifically emphasises the Russian Federation’s task of strengthening fraternal ties between the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples (defining the contours of the desired priority ‘sphere of influence’). It was precisely because of the Russian Federation’s actions in Ukraine that the confrontation between the collective West and Russia began, manifesting itself in a growing trend towards the diplomatic and economic isolation of the Russian Federation.

Diplomatic and economic isolation (including sanctions) and ways to overcome it:

In response to growing political and economic pressure and sanctions-based isolation, Russia is formulating a multi-tiered strategy to overcome these challenges. Key threats relate to restricted market access, control of transport routes and the curtailment of strategic initiatives, particularly in the Arctic. In response, priorities are focused on developing alternative logistical and economic links, deepening integration within non-Western frameworks, protecting the interests of domestic business, and establishing new centres of economic influence. In parallel, at the domestic level, a policy of import substitution, financial sovereignty, de-dollarisation and reducing dependence on raw materials is being implemented, which should ensure the economy’s adaptation to conditions of long-term external isolation. (see Fig. 5)

Fig. 5. Ways to overcome diplomatic and political isolation

• Areas of focus

The Strategy repeatedly notes that a number of states are exerting overt political and economic pressure on Russia and its partners (through destructive behaviour), with which the Russian Federation categorically disagrees.[6]

• Threats

It is noted that even such global issues as climate change and environmental conservation are used by the West not as a response to the Russian Federation’s destructive actions in the international arena, but allegedly as a ‘pretext’ for restrictions against Russia, reflecting the Kremlin’s distortion of cause-and-effect relationships:

• restrictions on the Russian Federation’s access to export markets,

• establishing control over transport routes,

• hindering the Russian Federation’s development of the Arctic.

• Priorities

To overcome the negative consequences of economic isolation (sanctions), the Strategy proposes, in particular:

At the global level:

• prioritising the development of logistics projects (integration into the global transport network, realising the Russian Federation’s transit potential with the aim of offering the collective West a stake in the future use of such logistics routes on terms favourable to Russia, particularly for political purposes).

• ensuring the integration of economic systems and the development of multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Greater Eurasian Partnership (cooperation between the EU and the EAEU; utilising the potential of the EAEU, including as a tool for circumventing sanctions).

• Protecting the rights and interests of Russian companies abroad.

The strategy highlights the following additional priorities for overcoming economic isolation:

• promoting the strengthening of the role of nation states and regional agreements (Russia seeks to encourage, in every way possible, the non-alignment of states and the prioritisation of situational interests and benefits over values in relations with Russia);

• supporting the formation of new centres of economic influence and using them to expand new markets for Russian products (including those of the Russian defence industry);

• counter attempts to regulate global markets that are key to Russian exports;

• expand network diplomacy (including to overcome or circumvent sanctions).

At the local (domestic) level, the following tasks have been set:

• overcoming the Russian economy’s critical dependence on imports of technology, equipment, components, etc. (giving priority to domestic products when modernising the economy);

• reducing the share of exports of primary raw materials (by processing them extensively within the Russian Federation to the level of finished products);

• reducing the share of imports (saturating the domestic market with Russian-made goods);

• strengthening the financial system and its sovereignty;

• reducing the use of the US dollar in foreign economic activities;

• creation of strategic reserves of mineral and raw material resources for the long term.

etc.

The mention in the Strategy and the development of such priorities give some indication of attempts to partially ‘close off’ the country and assert sovereignty over the Internet, creating (presentation) of a value system of its own that is competitive with the Western (democratic) one, which inevitably leads to the need to formulate the tenets of a new development strategy for Russia in the new conditions of confrontation with the outside world.

The formation of an alternative system of values, information security and the outlines of a new development strategy

In the context of the emergence of a multipolar world, Russia views the creation of its own alternative system of values as a necessary condition for strategic autonomy. Key threats are linked to the spread of external ideological influences which, in its assessment, undermine cultural sovereignty and internal stability, as well as to pressure on traditional values. In response, priorities are focused on safeguarding its own historical interpretations, fostering a patriotic identity, supporting the Russian language, and limiting external ideological influence, which is intended to ensure the resilience of the domestic development model in the face of global competition. (see Fig. 6)

Fig. 6. Alternative value system

In the sphere of information security, Russia views external influence, primarily from the collective West, as a factor interfering in internal affairs and undermining sovereignty, which may lead to a rise in protest sentiment and the risk of ‘colour revolutions’. In response, the strategy focuses on strengthening control over the information space, developing tools for information confrontation, and shaping a controlled environment for the circulation of information. Another key element is the active promotion of narratives favourable to the state, both domestically and internationally, which is seen as part of a broader policy of influence. (see Fig. 7)

Fig. 7. Information security

• Areas

To secure its right to be regarded as a separate and independent pole in the emerging multipolar reality, Russia must create (create) an alternative, competitive system of values in order to gain new opportunities in its confrontation with the Collective West, which defends democratic values throughout the world, justifying its destructive behaviour by Russia’s alleged right to its own ‘special path’. [7]

The Strategy asserts that the further development of the Russian Federation’s democratic system can only be facilitated by the preservation of Russian identity, culture, traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, and the patriotic education of citizens (the Russian Federation is forming its own ‘Russian’ understanding of democracy to replace the universally recognised standards and rules of the international democratic community).

• Threats

Values. The Strategy asserts that humanity faces the threat of losing traditional spiritual and moral guidelines and enduring moral principles. It also emphasises that the imposition of foreign ideals and values allegedly destroys the foundation of Russia’s cultural sovereignty and undermines the foundations of its political stability and statehood.

The Strategy also states that traditional Russian values are under active attack from the US and its allies (who defend democratic values), and that Russia’s traditional religions, culture, Russian language and so on are being discredited.

Cyber security (the internet). Russia accuses the Collective West of influencing Russian society, primarily through the capabilities of global internet companies utilising information and communication technologies (including via the ‘internet’).

The Strategy regards such influence as interference in the state’s internal affairs, an undermining of sovereignty and a violation of territorial integrity (the main threat to the Russian Federation being the rise of protest sentiment and the possibility of a ‘colour revolution’).

The Strategy also notes that Moscow’s initiatives in the field of international information security (cyber and information security within the Russian Federation) face opposition from foreign states.

• Priorities

Values. The Strategy proposes a set of tasks aimed at protecting traditional values, among which the following can be highlighted:

• the protection of historical truth (upholding its own interpretations of historical events and processes);

• the spiritual, moral and patriotic education of citizens using historical and contemporary examples (substituting concepts based on distorted facts and its own interpretations of historical and contemporary events, etc.);

• the protection and promotion of the Russian language;

• protection of Russian society from external ideological and value-based expansion (lack of choice and the absence of alternatives in value systems, etc.).

Information security (the internet). The Strategy identifies the strengthening of the Russian Federation’s sovereignty in the information space – ensuring information security (sovereignisation of the internet) – as a priority task.

One of the measures also identified is the development of forces and means of information confrontation and the creation of a ‘secure environment for the circulation of information’ (sovereignisation of the internet, censorship), as well as conveying ‘reliable’ (beneficial to the Russian Federation) information about Russia’s domestic and foreign policy to the Russian and international public (influence operations).

To keep the internal socio-political and economic situation in Russia under control, an internal development strategy is required in the new conditions of partial isolation that have emerged.

It can be said that the Strategy reflects certain themes from such a Strategy currently being developed (the emergence of which is expected following the completion of the ‘transfer of power’); let us highlight a few of them:

• eliminating imbalances in the economy and territorial development;

• overcoming infrastructure constraints;

• the formation of an independent financial and banking system, and moving away from the dollar;

• state regulation of the economy;

• reliance on the country’s internal potential.

The Strategy also proposes, for example:

• improving the system of settlement and distribution of productive forces across the territory;

• taking measures to counter the trend towards the concentration of economic entities and the population in metropolitan areas;

• ensuring the socio-economic development of small and medium-sized towns, as well as rural areas;

• eliminating imbalances in the labour market and the shortage of engineering and skilled labour;

• develop vocational education systems to train skilled workers and mid-level specialists;

• – etc.

CONCLUSION:

The model of behaviour in the international system developed by Russia is structured as a comprehensive strategy for achieving the status of an independent pole in the context of the transition to multipolarity. At its core lies a combination of military and non-military instruments, relying on institutional mechanisms (primarily the UN), peacekeeping as a controlled instrument of force, and the consolidation of spheres of influence. At the same time, this strategy involves a constant balancing act between confrontation with the West and attempts to preserve or restore channels of influence through international institutions and negotiation formats.

Functionally, the Russian Federation’s model is implemented through several interrelated strands: supporting and expanding a network of allies and integration frameworks, adapting to sanctions pressure by creating alternative economic and logistical links, and forming its own ideological framework as an element of strategic autonomy. At the same time, all these elements are compensatory in nature — they are aimed at neutralising the restrictions arising from the confrontation with the West.

Thus, the Russian strategy is not offensive in the classical sense, but rather adaptive-revisionist: it combines attempts to alter the configuration of the international system with the necessity to operate within structural constraints. This accounts for its hybrid nature — the simultaneous use of confrontation, bargaining and partial integration, which allows the Russian Federation to maintain influence without being able to fully dominate on a global scale.

The Strategy reveals a tendency towards the partial ‘autonomisation’ of Russia — limiting external influence whilst maintaining control over its internal and neighbouring spheres. This approach combines elements of isolationism with selective external activity, aimed primarily at maintaining and restoring influence in regions key to the Russian Federation, particularly in the post-Soviet space.

[1] http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202107030001

[2] For primary sources, see Strategy:

II. Russia in the modern world: trends and opportunities (paras. 6, 7, 9, 19, 23, 24)
III. The National Interests of the Russian Federation and Strategic National Priorities (para. 25 (8))
IV. Ensuring national security. National defence (para. 34)
IV. Ensuring national security. Strategic stability and mutually beneficial international cooperation (clauses 97, 101 (23, 24, 26, 27, 28)
IV. Ensuring national security. Environmental security and rational use of natural resources. (para. 80).

[3] For primary sources, see the Strategy:

II. Russia in the modern world: trends and opportunities (17, 19)
IV. Ensuring national security. National defence. (34, 35, 36)
IV. Ensuring national security. Scientific and technological development (72)
IV. Ensuring national security. Strategic stability and mutually beneficial international cooperation (94, 95, 98, 99, 101 (2,3)).

[4] For primary sources, see the Strategy:

II. Russia in the modern world: trends and opportunities (para. 18)
IV. Ensuring national security. National defence. (para. 37)
IV. Ensuring national security. State and public security. (para. 44, 47 (7, 11))
IV. Ensuring national security. Information security. (52, 57 (11))
IV. Ensuring national security. Strategic stability and mutually beneficial international cooperation (101 (25)).

[5] For primary sources, see the Strategy:

IV. Ensuring national security. Environmental security and rational use of natural resources. (para. 83 (12, 18)).
IV. Ensuring national security. Strategic stability and mutually beneficial international cooperation (para. 100, 101 (5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 17, 20, 30, 31, 32)).

[6] For primary sources, see the Strategy:

II. Russia in the modern world: trends and opportunities (para. 16)
IV. Ensuring national security. Economic security. (para. 58, 60, 62, 63, 67 (7, 9, 14, 17, 18, 34, 35),
IV. Ensuring national security. Strategic stability and mutually beneficial international cooperation (para. 101 (6, 10, 14, 29)).

[7] For primary sources, see the Strategy:

II. Russia in the modern world: trends and opportunities (para. 19, 22)
III. The National Interests of the Russian Federation and Strategic National Priorities (para. 25 (4))
IV. Ensuring national security. State and public security. (para. 44, 47 (1, 11))
IV. Ensuring national security. Information security. (para. 48, 49, 50, 53, 55, 56, 57 (1, 3, 10, 13, 15))
IV. Ensuring national security. Economic security. (para. 64, 65, 67 (20, 25, 28, 34))
IV. Ensuring national security. Protection of traditional Russian spiritual and moral
values, culture and historical memory (para. 86, 87, 89, 91, 93 (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14))
IV. Ensuring national security. Scientific and technological development. (para. 71, 76 (10, 18, 21, 24)).