RUSSIA’S PROPOSALS FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE EU ON THE TERMS FOR SHAPING A NEW WORLD ORDER (2020)

The study demonstrates Russia’s comprehensive strategy, aimed not so much at integration into the existing international order as at its transformation to suit Russia’s own limited resources and status-related capabilities. The key logic lies in an attempt to compensate for the loss of its ‘superpower’ status by changing the very rules of the system.

Russia proceeds from the assumption that within the framework of ‘old multilateralism’ (institutions, values, states) it is systematically losing out:

• institutionally — due to Western dominance;

• in terms of values — due to the lack of its own attractive universal agenda;

• politically — due to consolidated coalitions against it.

In response, Moscow proposes an alternative model — ad hoc multilateralism, which is effectively a mechanism for dismantling these constraints. Its essence lies in replacing rules with flexible agreements, values with interests, and alliances with situational coalitions. This allows Russia to act not as a weaker player within a rules-based system, but as an equal participant in a fragmented environment.

A central element of this strategy is the erosion of a consolidated West, primarily through the EU. Russia is attempting to:

• support the line of Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ (distancing itself from the US);

• shift relations to a bilateral pragmatic format;

• draw the EU into economic and logistical ties via the Eurasian Economic Union;

• form a model of a ‘balancing alliance’, analogous to its own status as a ‘balancing power’.

In this framework, Ukraine acts as a key object of the redistribution of influence, rather than an independent actor. The proposal for a de facto division of spheres of influence indicates that, for Russia, the Ukrainian direction is not merely regional but systemic — serving as a tool for revising the rules of the international order.

In a broader sense, Russia’s strategy appears to be an attempt to move from a losing position in a hierarchical system to a more advantageous position in a chaotic one. It does not create a new stable model, but seeks to reduce the level of institutionalisation and norms in order to increase its own manoeuvrability.

Key conclusion: Russia is not merely challenging individual elements of the international order — it is attempting to alter the very principle on which it operates: from a system of rules and values to a system of ad hoc agreements and power balancing. This allows it to maintain its status as a ‘pole’ even with limited resources, but at the same time leads to the fragmentation of the global system and the growing role of conflict zones, primarily Ukraine, as instruments of this reordering.

RESEARCH.

Part 1. Russia’s general proposals to the EU for discussing the terms of building a new world order

• Russia’s status as a superpower and options for spheres of influence

• International rules and Russia’s ‘special’ path.

• Reasons for changing the world order

• Two trends in the European Union: strategic autonomy (France) and Euro-Atlantic solidarity (Germany).

• Russia’s initiatives to overcome isolation in the context of building a new world order.

Part 2. Project-based (issue-based) multilateralism or the ad hoc format of multilateralism

• Old multilateralism.

• Project-based (issue-based) multilateralism or the ad hoc multilateralism format.

Part 3. Europe’s status as a ‘balancing alliance’ and its relationship with the EAEU

• Objective: To replace Europe’s direct contacts with the Russian Federation via the EAEU.

• Division of spheres of influence in Ukraine between the Russian Federation and the EU.

• The status of a ‘balancing alliance’ for the EU.

Part 4. Conclusions for Ukraine.

Primary sources of the study:

• Part 1. Russia’s general proposals to the EU regarding the discussion of the conditions for building a new world order: ‘Russia needs not to integrate, but to build independently’. Sergey Lavrov (speech at the 28th SWOP Assembly) https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/ne-vstraivatsya-a-stroit-svop/?fbclid=IwAR2J0i_hNLEpOjVRBXGggYxaJOqDhvAQcPbMx2035HTiK8Ob0o0A-xvsZoE

• Part 2. Project-based (issue-based) multilateralism or the ad hoc multilateralism format: ‘Multilateralism should not be restored, but reinvented.’ Andriy Kortunov. https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/mnogostoronnost-nado-ne-vosstanavlivat-a-izobretat-zanovo/?fbclid=IwAR14AlvCmansc5ZwfcAwHRLR0t56-rfA_Ymap2KiOWy5ejtCGTgdtB_nEUg

• Part 3. Europe’s status as a ‘balancing alliance’ and its relationship with the EAEU: ‘Europe and Russia: what to do?’ Tymofii Bordachev http://eu-russia-expertnetwork.eu/ru/analytics-rus/euren-brief-18

In his speech, Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov raised the most pressing issues for Russia in the geopolitical arena today.

He emphasised the importance of Russia retaining its status as a ‘superpower’ and its ‘spheres of influence’, whilst noting the possibility of Russia’s status being downgraded to that of a ‘regional power’. An attempt can be discerned to define and consolidate ‘Russia’s special path’ – a special new status as a ‘balancing power’ whilst retaining the option of ‘spheres of influence’ – by distorting cause-and-effect relationships. Having lost its status as a ‘superpower’, Russia seeks to retain the right to remain a ‘pole’.

In connection with this ‘special path’, reasons for changing the world order are considered – a transition to multipolarity (the formation of a multitude of independent ‘poles’). The EU is regarded as one such ‘pole’. It is emphasised that two trends are present within the EU: ‘strategic autonomy (US–EU)’ (France) and ‘US–EU Euro-Atlantic solidarity’ (Germany).

The EU is invited to consider Russia’s initiatives to overcome its isolation in the context of building a new world order, in which it is more advantageous for Russia if the EU implements the model of ‘strategic autonomy (US–EU)’. The main targets of such influence by Moscow are France and Germany.

Kortunov’s work highlights two main issues: ‘Old multilateralism’ and the proposal for a new format, ‘Project-based (issue-based) multilateralism or an ad hoc multilateralism format’, which is primarily proposed for consideration and approval by Germany, as the EU’s leader.

In Bordachev’s work, it is proposed that the European Union consider a new status for Europe as a ‘balancing union’, and, on the basis of this status, to build new relations with Russia (in the status of a ‘balancing power’) through the formation of economic ties via the EAEU with Asia and China (a tool for circumventing sanctions) against the backdrop of US-China confrontation and the formation of a new world order and multipolarity. Ukraine remains one of the major obstacles to such a development. There is a proposal for a possible division of spheres of influence in Ukraine between the EU and the Russian Federation to overcome this obstacle.

Part 1. Russia’s general proposals to the EU regarding the discussion of the conditions for building a new world order

Russia’s status as a superpower and options for spheres of influence

Russia is attempting to preserve the previous world order, in which it held superpower status and the corresponding capabilities regarding the division of geopolitical space, such as: ‘spheres of influence’ recognised and assigned to the parties, the definition of conditional ‘lines of contact’ between such spheres and the collective West, and so on.

This superpower status was confirmed by the conclusion of bilateral treaties with the US on strategic stability: the New START, the INF Treaty, etc., some of which have already been terminated by the US, whilst the latest – the New START – is on the verge of termination.

Even if the relevant New START treaty is not currently terminated by the US, Washington is demanding a substantial revision of its content in the future and the inclusion of China in it, which in any case alters the geopolitical realities and Russia’s place within them.

“Evidence of our constant readiness to reach mutual understanding lies in Russia’s proposals in the areas of strategic stability, arms control and European security. You are aware of our position regarding the extension of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), the moratorium on the deployment of ground-based medium- and short-range missiles, and the de-escalation of tensions along the Russia–NATO contact line.

We have called for an agreement to ensure that both sides’ exercises are conducted away from the line of contact, as well as to agree on minimum distances that must not be breached by either the combat aircraft or warships of Russia and the North Atlantic Alliance.

Conceptually and ideologically, we have long proposed (and see no reciprocity on the part of the US) to confirm in a statement by our countries, and perhaps in the Russia–NATO format, the inadmissibility of nuclear war.” (c)

International rules and Russia’s ‘special’ path.

In this situation, and in light of the growing confrontation between the US and China, Russia is ‘downgraded’ from the status of a superpower, losing the corresponding options, to that of a regional power.

This means that Russia will face serious challenges and competition for its ‘influence’ on the international stage in its ‘former spheres of influence’, such as the post-Soviet space and, above all, Ukraine.  Moscow will no longer be able to justify its behaviour towards the countries of the post-Soviet space (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, etc.) by claiming its sole right to ‘protect its spheres of influence’; this will be interpreted as outright aggression against neighbouring states and a violation of international law.

Therefore, Russia seeks not merely to transition to the status of a ‘regional power’, but to carve out a special status for itself as a so-called ‘balancing power’, which would allow it to retain certain prerogatives of ‘superpower’ status, claiming that this is neither a violation of international law nor aggression, but rather “Russia’s special path”, to which it is entitled. Yet at the same time, Moscow demands that all norms and laws of the international community be strictly and fully observed in relation to the Russian Federation, thereby demonstrating double standards in the international arena.

In other words, having lost its ‘superpower’ status, Russia seeks to retain the right to remain a ‘pole’.

Moscow is also attempting to secure acceptance and support for this new special status of Russia and its rights within it on the international stage.

‘We need interaction with the West no more than the West needs Russia with our capabilities. If our Western colleagues wish to communicate with one another according to certain rules and concepts that they themselves have devised, that is their choice.

They can only establish dialogue with other participants in international life, including Russia, on the basis of a universally recognised code of conduct. One might call these the rules enshrined in the UN Charter: respect for the sovereign equality of states, the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, and the necessity of peaceful settlement of all disputes.

We have our own foreign policy course, which has taken shape over the last two decades. It is aimed at ensuring the country’s security and creating the most favourable external conditions for the realisation of our domestic development goals.

It is clear to us that the West’s aim is precisely to prevent us from creating these external conditions favourable to domestic development. Everything that is being done to contain Russia is clearly pursuing this aim.” (c)

Reasons for the change in the world order

Disruption of cause-and-effect relationships. Russia sees the main reason for the change in the world order and its place within it not as its own violations of international law, but as the consequences of the international community’s tactics to contain its aggressive actions, which the Kremlin has been unable to successfully overcome.

Russia accuses the collective West of taking a united stance against its behaviour and is attempting to overcome the consequences by imposing new rules of the game, favourable to Russia, in the construction of a new world order.

‘If we analyse what we have heard so far from the North Atlantic camp, it has made a conscious choice not merely in favour of a policy of containment, but in favour of escalating confrontation. Presumably, behind this lies a reluctance to acknowledge that the world must change.’ (c)

Two trends in the European Union: strategic autonomy (France) and Euro-Atlantic solidarity (Germany).

Russia’s task boils down to overcoming the consolidated position of the collective West by creating separate, independent ‘poles’ and working with each of them individually – ‘divide and rule’.

Taking advantage of internal contradictions within the EU and the ambition of some European representatives, Russia is attempting to exacerbate these divisions and propose a new possible model for building relations between Moscow and the EU and the US.

Thus, the Russian side notes that there are two main trends within the EU regarding the definition of Europe’s place in the global order:

• Strategic autonomy of the EU (France) – model: US–EU;

• Euro-Atlantic unity (Germany) – model: US/EU.

The EU’s strategic autonomy, promoted by the French side, is more advantageous for Russia. Russia uses the thesis raised by the French President, ‘social justice under capitalism’, which came to the fore particularly sharply during the prolonged coronavirus pandemic, including in European countries, as a pretext for arguing for a new model of relations between states worldwide.

‘We are currently seeing two opposing trends in Europe.

French President Emmanuel Macron is actively promoting the strategic autonomy of the European Union.

The trend, epitomised by Germany, is based on the premise that it is impossible to defend Europe without the US.

We have already asked: protect us from whom? But we have not received a clear answer. In this situation, the multipolarity that Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov presciently foresaw many years ago has demonstrated its objectivity. In their desire to halt it, they are doing everything possible to minimise, at this stage, the number of potential poles capable of defending national interests with strength and courage.

One of Washington’s main objectives now is to ensure that the European Union loses its strategic autonomy and returns to the fold of Euro-Atlantic unity, where everyone knows who calls the shots and which ‘notes’ are played.” (c)

It should also be noted that these opposing trends are being voiced by France and Germany — countries whose representatives are directly involved in resolving the Ukrainian conflict within the Normandy format and have a certain influence on both Russia and Ukraine. In particular, Ukraine’s future depends on their consolidated position regarding the Ukrainian issue.

At present, the position of these EU representatives (France and Germany) corresponds to the consolidated position of the main players in the geopolitical arena and is based on compliance with international law.

Therefore, one of Russia’s objectives is to seek a new model in which these international laws can, if not be circumvented, then at least have their priority (importance) reduced in the establishment of relations, and thus minimise the consequences of their violation.

Russia is making every effort to influence these countries’ attitudes both towards Ukraine itself and towards their support for Ukraine’s position, offering various forms of ‘mutually beneficial’ cooperation both between Russia and these countries (France and Germany), and between Russia and, respectively, the entire European Union, in exchange for a softening of their negative stance towards the Russian Federation in this conflict.

This negative attitude manifests itself both in Russia’s political isolation and in the economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, which it seeks to overcome whilst preserving the results it has already achieved, with no intention of changing its behaviour or its stance regarding Ukraine and the Ukrainian conflict.

Russia’s initiatives to overcome isolation in the context of building a new world order.

Russia is trying by every means to prove that the international view that ‘Russia is in a state of isolation and geopolitical loneliness’ is false, citing as examples the alliances in which it participates or of which it is a member: BRICS[1] , SCO[2], CSTO[3], CIS[4], EAEU[5], G-20[6].

Russia also emphasises separately that “the EAEU is actively working to align its plans with China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative”, which may be of greatest interest to Europe in light of the emerging confrontation between the US and China.

This proposal from the Russian side is most extensively covered in T. Bordacheva’s article ‘Europe and Russia: What to Do?’[7] in our publication, particularly in the section: ‘Europe’s status as a “balancing alliance” and its relationship with the EAEU’.

‘We do not agree with the West’s attempts to portray the situation as though Russia were in a state of isolation, in a kind of geopolitical “loneliness”. The view held by our Western colleagues—that anyone who disagrees with them is alone—is, perhaps, entitled to exist. But we see how the positions we share are gaining ground within BRICS, the SCO, the CSTO and the CIS. The EAEU is actively working to align its plans with China’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative. There is the ‘Group of Twenty’. It has existed for a long time, but following the 2008 crisis, it was elevated to a higher level and meetings were made regular. Initially, they met twice a year, then annually.

The ‘Group of Twenty’ is an acknowledgement of the fact that the ‘G7’ (and indeed the ‘G8’ in its former composition) is incapable of solving all the world’s problems. The ‘Group of Twenty’ comprises the ‘G7’, the BRICS countries and a whole range of other states that share the views of BRICS.” (c)

Moscow also identifies the main ‘problem’ of the old world order and international relations, which lies in ideological differences, and argues that overcoming this requires ‘de-ideologisation’ in the international arena.

This proposal from the Russian side is most extensively presented in A. Kortunov’s work ‘Multilateralism Should Not Be Restored, But Reinvented’[8] in our edition, specifically in the section: ‘Project-based (issue-based) multilateralism or the ad hoc format of multilateralism’.

One of Russia’s proposals regarding the ‘de-ideologisation’ of international relations was the proposal to form a Greater Eurasian Partnership between the EAEU, the SCO and ASEAN, on the one hand, and the EU countries, on the other, with the prospect that the EU would become an independent ‘pole’ (strategic autonomy) and pursue an economic policy independent of other ‘poles’.

“Indeed, French President Emmanuel Macron is now proposing an analytical, philosophical dialogue: can modern capitalism meet the needs of the population and resolve the associated problems?

If we take Western models of development, there is really no place for us to fit in. The coronavirus, as if that were not enough, has demonstrated this very convincingly. We need to build our own way. This is a very ambitious, complex task, but at the same time an urgent one.

Global issues must be considered in a non-ideological manner, on an equal footing. In the same vein is the initiative by Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin to form a Greater Eurasian Partnership, which is intended to unite pan-continental efforts involving the EAEU, SCO and ASEAN countries and be open to all nations of our vast continent, potentially including EU member states in the future. This is a long-term process, but defining this goal is of fundamental importance.” (c)

The Russian side also proposes a series of initiatives aimed at preserving the existing world order with a view to finding ways to de-escalate conflicts:

• A proposal has been put forward on behalf of the heads of state of the CSTO to convene a meeting of authorised representatives of the CSTO, the CIS, the SCO, the OSCE, NATO and the EU (on the basis of the ‘Cooperative Security Platform’ adopted in 1999 at the OSCE Summit);

• A proposal was put forward to hold a summit of the permanent members of the UN Security Council at the initiative of Russian President V. Putin (the ‘nuclear five’ summit);

On 2 December 2020, the CSTO Summit and a meeting of the Collective Security Council took place, at which, among other decisions, a statement by the heads of state on the formation of a just and sustainable world order was adopted.

Among other initiatives, this document proposes exploring the possibility of authorised representatives of the CSTO, the CIS, the SCO, the OSCE, NATO and the EU meeting to ascertain whether all these organisations have the opportunity to discuss, formulate a common agenda, jointly identify problems and, ideally, outline ways to resolve them.

This is not entirely revolutionary. In 1999, at the OSCE Summit in Istanbul, a document was adopted – the Platform for Cooperative Security. It proclaimed, as a novelty, the pooling of efforts between the OSCE and all sub-regional organisations in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Cooperative security, the involvement of structures established in the post-Soviet space – all this was relevant in the 1990s (in this case, in 1999), when the West still expected us to ‘follow the path charted by the “winners” of the Cold War’. We have now officially submitted a proposal to this effect on behalf of the heads of state of the CSTO. We shall see how the West reacts to it.” (c)

“I mentioned the ‘rules’ on which the West wishes to ‘rely’ in the global order. There is an initiative known as ‘effective multilateralism’, which is openly opposed to multilateralism within the framework of the UN. There is a tendency to interpret this as a necessity to return to Euro-Atlantic solidarity without exception. We are observing this.

I believe that more positive and sustainable results can be achieved by joining forces on the basis of adherence to the norms and principles of the UN Charter. We consistently advocate this. One manifestation of our position is the initiative by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, to hold a summit of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. It is essential that they, having recognised their responsibilities under the UN Charter, fulfil those responsibilities. We must do everything possible to ensure that we jointly defuse this tension.

We understand that the UN is not a static structure. It requires reform, in particular reform of the UN Security Council. Our position is absolutely clear and consistent. For this body to become more representative, it is necessary to increase the representation of developing countries from Asia, Latin America and Africa. Only such an approach will add value to the reform of the UN Security Council. Everything else is open to discussion, but it is unlikely that increasing Western representation on the Security Council will help ensure greater diversity of opinion within this central body responsible for peace and security on the planet.” (c)

The Russian side emphasises in every way that it is prepared both to preserve the previous world order and to consider a new world order, but only on its own terms, under which it, Russia, will make the transition not to the status of a ‘regional power’, but to the special status of a so-called ‘balancing power’, under which the ‘superpower’ privileges from its previous status will be retained.

‘Despite this, we are open to an equal dialogue. The main thing is that there is mutual willingness. Until there is, we are keeping the channels of communication open. All our proposals and initiatives remain on the negotiating table. We have repeatedly confirmed them. It is enough for our partners to know: all this remains in force.” (c)

Realising that such conditions must be supported in the geopolitical arena by at least some of the major players (‘poles’), Russia is banking primarily on such ‘understanding’ from Europe, promoting its ideas and proposals specifically through its two leading players – Germany and France.

And whilst the French position of ‘EU strategic autonomy’ makes this task considerably easier for Russia, Moscow has to make considerable efforts to shift the German position of ‘Euro-Atlantic unity’, attempting to offer the entire European Union an alternative ‘advantageous’ reality via Germany.

This alternative reality manifests itself:

• both in geopolitical terms (the construction of a new world order in which the EU is offered the status of a ‘balancing alliance’ — ‘Project-based (issue-based) multilateralism or an ad hoc multilateralism format’),

• and in economic terms (for example, a logistics project within the framework of cooperation between the EU and the EAEU — transport and logistics links between Russian and Asian markets, which simultaneously serve as a tool for circumventing sanctions, including US sanctions).

These proposals by the Russian Federation on these issues are set out in greater detail in the works of Russian experts A. Kortunov and T. Bordachev of the Russian International Affairs Council (RIAC), which we will analyse below.

[1] BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa

[2] SCO: India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan

[3] CSTO: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan

[4] CIS: Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan

[5] EAEU: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russian Federation

[6] G20: Australia, Argentina, Brazil, the United Kingdom, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Canada, China, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United States, Turkey, France, South Korea, South Africa, Japan and the European Union.

[7]   http://eu-russia-expertnetwork.eu/ru/analytics-rus/euren-brief-18

[8] https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/mnogostoronnost-nado-ne-vosstanavlivat-a-izobretat-zanovo/?fbclid=IwAR14AlvCmansc5ZwfcAwHRLR0t56-rfA_Ymap2KiOWy5ejtCGTgdtB_nEUg

Part 2. Project-based (issue-based) multilateralism or the ad hoc multilateralism format

Old multilateralism.

Bipolarity is based on hegemony – the world order was established after the Second World War by a small group of major powers led by: the US through NATO, and the USSR through the Warsaw Pact[1]. Thus, these countries, the US and the USSR, acquired the status of ‘superpowers’ and, accordingly, the ability to secure ‘spheres of influence’ for themselves. Preserving Russia’s status as a ‘superpower’ is Moscow’s primary objective. This gives it the right to consolidate its existing spheres of influence within the geopolitical landscape.

Areas of concern for the Russian Federation:

The Soviet Union held the status of a ‘great power’ – the status of a victor in the Second World War and the status of a leader in the Warsaw Pact – whereas modern Russia is merely a fragment of that entity.

Substitution of concepts: Neither the USSR nor the Warsaw Pact Organisation exists anymore. The Kremlin attempts to portray the USSR’s victory in the Second World War as a victory primarily for Russia, rather than for the collective of all the states of the former Soviet Union – a substitution of concepts. Therefore, the theme of victory is highly relevant for the Russian Federation in the international arena. And Russia replaces the absence of the Warsaw Pact (a large-scale military alliance) with the need to preserve the New START Treaty (strategic stability).

‘The old multilateralism was based on hegemony. The post-World War II world order was established by a very small group of major powers and primarily reflected their interests and aspirations. The United States created NATO as a multilateral defence alliance, but it never occurred to anyone to challenge American leadership within that alliance. Soviet hegemony within the Warsaw Pact was even more evident and unquestionable. In a fully-fledged bipolar system, multilateralism always remains relative and incomplete; it might be more accurate to speak of the existence of quasi-multilateralism within this system.” (c)

The model of old multilateralism, foundations:

As can be seen from the table, Russia faces significant, even to insurmountable, problems in each of the points listed, on which the former multilateralism was based: institutions, values, states.

This is because the Russian Federation lacks a distinct ‘system of shared values’ — as an alternative to that which exists in democratic countries and is recognised globally — and has no allies who share these values and defend them.

Russia has chosen a path of violating the fundamental principles of international values, calling such actions a ‘special path’ — a distortion of concepts, in an attempt to force the countries of the post-Soviet space to become its allies. Hence Russia’s direct aggression against Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.

“The old multilateralism was based on institutions. It involved a large number of well-developed organisational structures with multi-tiered bureaucratic apparatuses, complex decision-making mechanisms, and systems of the most diverse explicit and implicit interconnections, allowing participants to balance their actions in some areas with concessions in others.

The old multilateralism was based on values. In a world divided into two opposing blocs, most multilateral mechanisms and procedures presupposed a unity of values among participants. In most cases, the world was viewed as a confrontation between ‘us’ and ‘them’, and multilateralism within the ‘us’ groups (NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the European Union and the CIS) was only very rarely complemented by multilateralism between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (the Helsinki Final Act). Even the concept of ‘global public goods’ as such, in a divided world, applied only to very narrow spheres of international relations.

The old multilateralism was state-centred. Some non-state actors (primarily transnational corporations) occasionally attempted to challenge states as monopolists in multilateral agreements, but with very limited success. Nation-states remained the exclusive participants in the most important multilateral institutions and regimes, whilst non-state actors (the private sector, civil society, educational institutions, etc.) were content with the role of observers and/or implementers of the relevant decisions of ‘their’ state.” (c)

In the Russian Federation, it is claimed that without Russia being recognised as a ‘superpower’, the old world order can no longer exist in its former form.

In the new geopolitical realities, which Moscow itself has created through its behaviour by blocking the functioning of the key elements of the previous multilateral world order, it has deprived itself of ‘superpower’ status.

“The only plausible alternative to multilateralism in the modern world is not the recreation of old unipolar, bipolar or multipolar international systems, but general chaos characterised by the absence of agreed rules, procedures and hierarchies.” (c)

That is why Russia is rushing to impose its vision of a new world order and its own rules of the game on the world, should it have to transition to the status of a ‘balancing power’.

Project-based (issue-based) multilateralism or the ad hoc multilateralism format.

In effect, Moscow is proposing to alter the existing provisions of the old world order, but within a context more favourable to itself.

Russia’s goal: to create new rules of the game in the geopolitical arena that are advantageous to itself, by attempting to change other players’ attitudes towards the established rules currently in place.

In other words, Moscow is attempting to reshape the global order as a whole because it risks losing its ‘superpower’ status and slipping into the role of a regional power lacking the options of a major player.

The Kremlin does not simply want to transition to a new status; it is attempting to reshape the entire global system to suit its own status as a ‘balancing power’, so that other players accept it and continue to cooperate with Russia on its terms.

Moscow’s main message to the collective West is a proposal to move away from a consolidated position (the international format of alliances) in favour of building bilateral pragmatic cooperation based solely on a convergence of interests, rather than values.

To some extent, this echoes certain tenets of the ‘Trump Doctrine’, but America holds the status of a ‘superpower’ and possesses the full range of options (including instruments of economic influence, such as secondary sanctions), whereas Russia does not. And Russia understands this perfectly well, which is why it seeks to influence other states and alliances so that they stop ‘looking to’ the US when making their decisions.

In other words, Russia is attempting to preserve (transfer) the options of ‘superpower’ status to the status of a ‘balancing power’.

I would like to highlight another interesting aspect of Russia’s proposals separately: the involvement of the private sector in negotiation processes between states at the level of interaction and decision-making.

In other words, it can be assumed that corporations such as, for example, ‘Rossneft’ (headed by Sechin) will be granted the right to conduct negotiations with representatives of other states, representing the interests not only of the corporation but also of Russia as a whole, as a state, thereby replacing or supplementing the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs directly.

“To invent a new format by adapting its general principles to a changing reality. What does this mean in more concrete terms?

Firstly, state leaders must be prepared to promote multilateralism without relying on the leadership of a hegemon that is sympathetic to multilateralism. (This refers to the US)

Secondly, diplomats and experts must learn to utilise multilateral formats in the context of the relative weakness of international organisations and the erosion of international hierarchies. There is a pervasive sense of ‘institutional fatigue’ in the world, which is unlikely to disappear in the near future. Old alliances are losing their former cohesion, whilst new ones often remain alliances in name only.

Voluntary commitments by states may prove more practical than traditional legally binding international agreements, which require lengthy negotiation and ratification procedures.

Thirdly, a new type of multilateralism should not regard shared values as a prerequisite for reaching agreements. A necessary and sufficient condition is merely a convergence of interests.

Multilateralism must become a tool for overcoming the value conflicts that exist in the modern world. In other words, shared values should not be the starting point in the move towards multilateralism, but the end point to which multilateralism may ultimately lead. Project-based multilateralism in the interests of pragmatic cooperation.

Fourthly, multilateralism must become as inclusive as possible. In many cases, multilateral agreements between states are insufficient if they do not involve the private sector, civil society and other private and public organisations.

It can be assumed that most of the new generation of multilateral coalitions will be built on the principle of public-private partnerships.

Thus, if multilateral practices are to survive in the near future, they will do so primarily in the form of ad hoc multilateralism or project-based (issue-specific) multilateralism.

Examples of this type of multilateralism already exist at the regional level (the Arctic Council) and in specific functional areas (the International Civil Aviation Organisation – ICAO). This format of multilateralism has many shortcomings and limitations – it is excessively fluid, unstable, selective and fragile. Nevertheless, it appears to remain the best option for the immediate future — given the lack of conditions for implementing more complex and advanced formats.” (c)

At this stage, Russia has chosen Germany as its main partner for discussion and to win over to its side in developing this concept.

Presumably, the calculation is that, firstly, Germany has recently had rather strained relations with Washington; secondly, Germany is the leader of the EU and has significant influence over all the countries in the bloc; thirdly, elections are scheduled in Germany in 2021, in which Angela Merkel will not be standing. It is believed that with her departure, German policy may undergo changes.

If Russia manages to prevent Germany from drawing closer to the US (weakening its consolidated position), as well as persuade it to accept (embrace) its proposals regarding ‘project-based multipolarity’, then Moscow could achieve significant results for itself during the transitional period of the ‘power transition’ (until 2024).

For Germany, the Russian Federation’s approach may be familiar, as seen in their joint cooperation under these principles proposed by the Kremlin regarding the construction of ‘Nord Stream 2’ in the context of the Ukrainian conflict. A similar model of interaction could be tested with other EU countries with Germany’s support.

‘It seems unlikely that major powers — such as the United States, China or Russia — will become the leaders in developing a new format of multilateralism. All these states are too accustomed to relationships of asymmetric interdependence with their weaker partners, and therefore they tend to pursue a path of maximising their comparative advantages within the framework of bilateral relations with these partners. On the other hand, countries such as Germany have already accumulated a great deal of experience working within various multilateral frameworks. This is why the discussions currently taking place in Germany regarding the future of multilateralism appear so important and relevant.” (c)

[1] The Warsaw Treaty of 14 May 1955 — a document that established a military alliance of European socialist states under the leadership of the USSR — the Warsaw Pact — and cemented the bipolarity of the world for 36 years.

Part 3. Europe’s status as a ‘balancing alliance’ and its relationship with the EAEU

In Russia, a narrative is being actively promoted to its foreign partners in the EU that relations between Russia and Europe have ceased to follow the course that previously led them into a state of crisis.

It is noted that the period of Europe’s external expansion has ended, and the EU’s foreign policy strategies do not require the inclusion of Russia in the European balance of power and institutions. And today, the EU’s main goal is to preserve its foreign policy autonomy.

Accordingly, Russia itself has allegedly ceased to seek integration with its European partners, redirecting its interests towards China.

‘Given how much Russia and Europe have always meant to one another in terms of survival, the fundamental issues of their relationship are discussed less than one might expect. The main question is whether it is possible to include Russia in the internal European balance of power on which the monumental edifice of European integration is currently based?

However, the best news is perhaps that relations between Russia and Europe have indeed ceased to move in the direction that previously led them to a state of crisis. Firstly, the foreign policy strategies of the partners no longer require a solution to the aforementioned problem of Russia’s inclusion in the European balance of power and institutions. It is unlikely that Moscow is currently seeking to achieve dominance in Europe or to join the European ‘concert’ of democratic nations. The steady strengthening of relations between Russia and China, as well as the gradual shift of the centre of gravity of Russian strategy towards the East, relieve the country of the need to resolve its ‘European problem’.

European states, for their part, are gradually setting themselves new strategic goals. The primary one is to preserve their foreign policy autonomy in a changing global context. Europe’s period of external expansion has come to an end with the attainment of most of its natural borders.

Russia, for its part, has ceased to devise plans for restructuring the European order in such a way that it would occupy a position within it commensurate with its overall power capabilities. Elements of isolationism that have emerged in Russian foreign policy discourse against the backdrop of the pandemic are intensifying amid fears of being drawn into the unfolding conflict between China and the US.” (c)

In Russia, it is believed that the ‘trust and integration’ paradigm is a thing of the past. However, the Russian Federation emphasises that it is ready to gradually restore and improve relations with the EU. And this applies first and foremost to economic relations.

Objective: To replace Europe’s direct contacts with the Russian Federation via the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).

To overcome the accumulated political problems that have affected direct contacts between the Russian Federation and the EU, further complicated by Europe’s sanctions policy against Russia, Moscow proposes to begin implementing cooperation under new conditions through the economic instruments of the two unions: the EU and the EAEU — a project of multilateral cooperation.

Russia’s argument boils down to the fact that this is not direct bilateral cooperation, and it is beneficial to European countries:

• firstly, such cooperation opens up the possibility of channelling European investment into the production of goods on Russian territory specifically for the EAEU market

• secondly, through the ‘opportunity to strengthen transport and logistics cooperation between the Russian and Asian markets’.

‘As a separate area where Russia and the EU intersect, one can note the sporadic contacts between Brussels and the bodies of the Eurasian Economic Union. Although this multilateral cooperation project will remain in a state of stagnation for the next few years, some aspects of foreign economic activity and technical regulation already involve the participation of representatives of its executive body – the Eurasian Economic Commission. These forms of dialogue will be necessary and sufficient to address the challenges that Russia and Europe may set for themselves beyond the ‘trust and integration’ paradigm, which is now a thing of the past.

In the coming years, we can expect continued investment in production within Russia, not only for the Russian market but also for the EAEU countries and Asia. This is facilitated by the ongoing strengthening of transport and logistics cooperation between the Russian and Asian markets. Should the Russian government decide to pursue more extensive forms of mutual economic openness with China, such investments will become even more profitable.” (c)

The division of spheres of influence in Ukraine between the Russian Federation and the EU.

When considering such proposals to integrate the logistics chains of Europe and Russia with access to Asia, two buffer territories remain the most relevant for Moscow: Ukraine and Belarus. Without resolving the accumulated contradictions and the confrontation with the collective West, such a logistics project becomes difficult to implement.

Russia regards both these territories as within its sphere of influence and seeks to retain them on its own terms in a way that the collective West would recognise. Thus, the Kremlin plans to create the conditions for partial deconfliction of relations between Russia and Europe in this regard. Moscow sees one such prerequisite in the resolution (or freezing) of issues of fundamental importance to the security of Russia and European states.

With regard to Ukraine, Russia acknowledges the contentious nature of its exclusive influence and proposes that the EU consider the division and consolidation with Europe of corresponding ‘spheres of influence’ within Ukraine.

‘Ukraine. In international political terms, the notional “line of demarcation” between the interests of the European Union and Russia now appears clearer than it has for the past 30 years. The fact is that Ukraine will remain a contested territory, where European and Russian interests will take turns leading. As recent local elections in the country have shown, the population does not give a clear preference to any force consolidated around a ‘European choice’. Even if, following the military events of 2014–2015, Moscow cannot count on a friendly government in Kyiv for another 10–15 years, the country’s geopolitical position will retain its dual nature.

Belarus. With regard to Belarus, Russia and Germany bear a special responsibility for facilitating gradual constitutional reforms and halting attempts by neighbouring countries to bring about radical changes there outside the legal framework. Recent events have enabled the parties to make significant progress towards greater clarity of intent regarding their common neighbours.

The conditions are being created for a partial deconfliction of relations between Russia and Europe, as the potential for conflict will diminish as the areas of direct overlapping interests shrink. First and foremost, this is because issues of fundamental importance to the security of Russia and European states are being removed from the relationship.

This lays the groundwork for a relatively healthy relationship that would help Russia and Europe ‘pass the time’ until opportunities arise for more institutionalised forms of cooperation. This time should be put to good use, and there is certainly potential here. For example, the underdevelopment of interaction between Russia and Europe in the academic sphere, particularly in the social sciences, is striking.” (c)

The status of a ‘balancing alliance’ for the EU

Russia’s main ‘bet’ is that the geopolitical contours of the world have changed – the global balance of power is shifting towards a confrontation between the US and China, in which Russia and Europe must choose their place.

Moscow is also proposing that Europe ‘try on’ and adopt the concept of ‘balancing alliance’ status, modelled on Russia’s ‘balancing power’ status, which is currently being actively developed by Moscow.

Russia views the status of a ‘balancing alliance’ for the EU through the lens of embedding within it a key tenet: a shift away from global alliances and a transition to a policy of exclusively bilateral relations on a mutually beneficial basis, without political obligations to allies or partners.

One of the mutually beneficial projects in this direction is considered to be the cooperation between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which effectively creates a tool for both the EU and the Russian Federation to circumvent sanctions, including US sanctions.

‘Relations between Russia and Europe since the Cold War have never been isolated from the transatlantic context, and now they must increasingly take into account another — the Asian — context of international politics.

The global struggle for resources between China and the US will determine, at the very least, our immediate future. The global balance of power that emerges from the processes currently unfolding will, in all likelihood, place Russia and Europe, if not in the same position, then side by side.

Indeed, this is precisely why European states and Russia are already seeking to avoid making a hard choice, whilst at the same time maintaining special relations with each of their privileged partners. This creates new dependencies for their foreign policy, which they will have to take into account in bilateral relations.

The current balance of power does not allow Russia and Europe to speak of goals more attainable than a relatively non-confrontational neighbourhood. However, the similar nature of their political systems and societies will, one way or another, make a joint search for a long-term development model a rational course of action.” (c)

Part 4. Conclusions for Ukraine.

Having emphasised the importance of preserving the Russian Federation’s status as a ‘superpower’ and its ‘spheres of influence’, Moscow acknowledges the possibility of Russia’s status being reduced in the future to that of a ‘regional power’. There is an attempt, through the distortion of cause-and-effect relationships, to define and consolidate ‘Russia’s special path’—a special new status as a ‘balancing power’ whilst retaining the option of ‘spheres of influence’.

In the transition to the status of a ‘regional power’, Russia will face serious problems and competition for its ‘influence’ in the international arena within ‘its former spheres of influence’, such as the post-Soviet space and Ukraine in particular.

Moscow will no longer be able to justify its behaviour towards the countries of the post-Soviet space (Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, Belarus, etc.) by invoking its alleged exclusive right to ‘protect its spheres of influence’; this will be interpreted as outright aggression against neighbouring states and a violation of international law.

In other words, having lost its status as a ‘superpower’, Russia seeks to retain the right to remain a ‘pole’. Russia’s task boils down to overcoming the consolidated position of the collective West by creating a multitude of separate, independent ‘poles’ and interacting with each of them individually.

Within the EU, there are two main trends regarding the definition of Europe’s place in the global order:

• EU strategic autonomy (France) – model: US–EU;

• Euro-Atlantic unity (Germany) – model: US/EU.

The EU’s strategic autonomy, promoted by the French side, is more advantageous for Russia.

These opposing trends are articulated by France and Germany – countries whose representatives are directly involved in resolving the Ukrainian conflict within the Normandy Format and exert a certain influence on both Russia and Ukraine. In particular, Ukraine’s future depends on their consolidated position regarding the Ukrainian issue.

At present, the position of these EU representatives (France and Germany) corresponds to the consolidated position of the main players in the geopolitical arena and is based on compliance with international law. Therefore, another of Russia’s objectives is to seek a new model in which these international laws can, if not be circumvented, then at least have their priority (importance) reduced in the construction of relations, and thus minimise the consequences of their violations.

Russia is making every effort to influence these countries’ attitudes both towards Ukraine itself and towards their support for Ukraine’s position, offering various forms of ‘mutually beneficial’ cooperation both between Russia and these countries (France and Germany), and between Russia and, respectively, the entire European Union, in exchange for a softening of the negative stance towards the Russian Federation in this conflict. This negative attitude is expressed both in Russia’s political isolation and in the economic sanctions against the Russian Federation, which it seeks to overcome whilst preserving the results it has already achieved, with no intention of changing its behaviour or its stance regarding Ukraine and the Ukrainian conflict.

Realising that such new proposals from Russia must find support in the geopolitical arena, at least from some of the key players (‘poles’), Moscow is banking primarily on such ‘understanding’ from Europe, promoting its ideas and proposals specifically through the two leading players in this arena — Germany and France.

And whilst France’s position on ‘EU strategic autonomy’ makes this task considerably easier for Russia, and Moscow publicly supports this idea in every way, the Kremlin has to make considerable efforts to change Germany’s position on ‘Euro-Atlantic unity’, attempting to offer the entire European Union an alternative ‘beneficial’ reality via Germany.

Russia faces significant, even insurmountable, problems in every area upon which the former multilateralism was based: institutions, values, states. In particular, regarding ‘Values’ (which presupposes a shared set of values among participants), the Russian Federation lacks a distinct ‘system of shared values’ — as an alternative to that which exists in democratic countries and is recognised globally — and has no allies who share these values and defend them.

Russia has chosen a path of violating the fundamental principles of international values, calling such actions a ‘special path’ — this is a distortion of concepts, an attempt to force the countries of the post-Soviet space to become its allies. Hence Russia’s direct aggression against Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine.

Moscow’s main message to the collective West is that Russia proposes a shift away from a consolidated position (the international format of alliances) towards the establishment of bilateral pragmatic cooperation based solely on a convergence of interests, rather than values.

At this stage, Russia has chosen Germany as the main target for discussion and for winning over to its side in the development of this concept.

Presumably, the calculation is that, firstly, Germany’s relations with Washington have been rather strained of late; secondly, Germany is the leader of the EU and has significant influence over all the countries in the bloc; thirdly, elections are scheduled in Germany in 2021, in which Angela Merkel will not be standing. It is believed that with her departure, German policy may undergo changes.

If Russia manages to prevent Germany from drawing closer to the US (weakening its consolidated position), as well as to persuade it to accept (endorse) its proposals regarding ‘project-based multipolarity’, then Moscow may achieve significant results for itself during the transitional period of the ‘power transition’ (until 2024).

For Germany, the Russian Federation’s approach may be familiar, as seen in their joint cooperation under these principles proposed by the Kremlin regarding the construction of ‘Nord Stream 2’ in the context of the Ukrainian conflict. The same model of interaction could be tested with other EU countries with Germany’s support.

To overcome the accumulated political problems that have affected direct contacts between the Russian Federation and the EU, further complicated by Europe’s sanctions policy against Russia, Moscow proposes to begin implementing cooperation under new conditions through the economic instruments of the two unions: the EU and the EAEU — a project of multilateral cooperation.

Russia’s argument boils down to the fact that this is not direct bilateral cooperation, and it is beneficial to European countries:

• firstly, such cooperation opens up the possibility of channelling European investment into the production of goods on Russian territory specifically for the EAEU market

• secondly, due to the ‘opportunity to strengthen transport and logistics interconnectivity between the Russian and Asian markets’.

When considering such proposals regarding the connection of European and Russian logistics chains with access to Asia, two buffer territories remain the most relevant for Moscow – Ukraine and Belarus. Without resolving the accumulated contradictions and confrontation with the collective ‘West’, such a logistics project becomes difficult to implement.

Russia regards both these territories as within its sphere of influence and seeks to retain them on its own terms, in a way that the collective West would recognise. Thus, the Kremlin plans to create the conditions for a partial deconfliction of relations between Russia and Europe in this regard. Moscow sees one such prerequisite in resolving issues of fundamental importance to the security of Russia and European states.

With regard to Ukraine, Russia acknowledges the contentious nature of its exclusive influence and proposes that the EU consider the division and consolidation with Europe of corresponding ‘spheres of influence’ on Ukrainian territory. The division of such spheres of influence provides for the possibility, in the event of a deep freeze of the conflict, of creating a ‘free trade zone’ with the ORDLO between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, and accordingly between the EU (via Ukraine) and the Russian Federation.

Speaking on 17 December 2020 at the annual press conference, Vladimir Putin, responding to a question regarding Russia’s support for the Donbas, said: ‘We have supported the Donbas and will continue to do so; we will even increase our support for the Donbas, and this concerns: reducing production; resolving social issues, infrastructure-related issues, and so on.’

It can be assumed that Russia intends to address issues of improving logistics in the ORDLO. The creation of a ‘free trade zone’ with the ORDLO envisages the future use of ORDLO territory for the transit of goods from Europe via Ukraine, through the ORDLO, to the Russian Federation and vice versa, with the aim of circumventing sanctions.

Russia views the status of a ‘balancing alliance’ for the EU from the perspective of embedding within it a key tenet: a shift away from global alliances and a transition to a policy of exclusively bilateral relations on a mutually beneficial basis, without political obligations towards allies or partners.

One of the mutually beneficial projects in this direction is the cooperation between the EU and the EAEU, which effectively creates a tool for both the EU and the Russian Federation to circumvent sanctions, including US sanctions, and logistically links Europe — via Ukraine, through the territory of the ORDLO, and via Russia — with Asia and China.

Russia will therefore make every effort to persuade its European partners, primarily Germany and France, to change both their own stance on the Ukrainian conflict and agree to a division of ‘spheres of influence’ within Ukraine with Russia, as well as to change Ukraine’s position so that it would agree to recognise this.

As a result, the Ukrainian conflict will not be resolved but will be frozen even more deeply; however, Russia will gain time to prepare for further actions to restore its full influence in Ukraine and the opportunity for economic cooperation with the EU and other countries, bypassing sanctions, primarily those imposed by the US. This could significantly strengthen Russia’s position, both politically and economically, on the international stage.