THE WITHDRAWAL FROM SYRIA AS PART OF THE US’S NEW STRATEGY. WHAT UKRAINE CAN EXPECT 2019

(published on 19 January 2019)

The study demonstrates that the Syrian case for the US is not a standalone theatre, but part of a broader restructuring of the regional architecture due to the Iranian factor. The key logic: having achieved its basic objectives (the defeat of ISIS, the launch of a political process), the US is shifting from direct involvement to indirect management of the conflict.

An important structural shift:

• Syria ceases to be the focal point,

• and Iran becomes the defining element of the conflict.

This is confirmed by the fact that most of the disputes (US–EU, US–Turkey, US–Russia, regional conflicts) are centred precisely around Iran, rather than Syria.

In this context, the US withdrawal from Syria is not a retreat, but rather:

• a shift in the level of engagement (from military to strategic),

• a move to position itself ‘above the conflict’,

• shifting costs and responsibility onto other players (Russia, Iran, Turkey).

At the same time, a controlled configuration is taking shape:

• the US controls the political process (Resolution 2254),

• retains instruments of influence (sanctions, military intervention if necessary),

• but do not bear the main burden.

A separate, critically important element is the creation of a system of internal contradictions between regional players:

• Turkey vs the Kurds,

• Turkey vs Syria,

• Iran vs Israel,

• and the rivalry between Russia and Iran.

This means that the US is effectively transforming the conflict into a self-regulating system of deterrence, where the players mutually constrain one another.

At the same time, a key geostrategic manoeuvre is taking place — a shift in reliance on Iraq:

• maintaining a military presence,

• establishing bases near Syria,

• the capability for rapid intervention (“leap”).

In conjunction with Afghanistan, this forms a semi-circle of containment around Iran.

Another important signal: the new strategy is being formulated behind closed doors, without a public doctrine, and only certain priorities (the Kurds, Iran, Israel’s security) are being communicated externally. This signifies a shift towards a model of: not a declarative strategy → but an adaptive, signal-oriented policy.

Conclusion: The US is not withdrawing from Syria — it is changing the format of its control: from a direct military presence to the role of an external regulator, managing the conflict through the balance of power and contradictions between other players.

Key elements of the strategy:

• to remove itself from the field of direct confrontation,

• shift the burden onto regional actors,

• retain the ability to intervene and exercise control through other instruments.

Syria, in this context, becomes not an end in itself, but a tool within a larger framework —
a strategy of containing Iran and rebalancing the regional order.

Relying on Iraq and maintaining a presence in Afghanistan form the geographical basis of this model, allowing the US to control the situation without direct involvement in the Syrian conflict.

Key conclusion: the new US strategy is a shift from ‘participation in the war’ to managing the conflict system, where influence is achieved not through control of territory, but through control of the interactions between other actors.

• Part 1 – Introduction. A brief overview of the situation in Syria. The objectives of the countries involved in the Syrian conflict (summary)

• Part 2 – Objectives of the countries involved in the Syrian conflict – the coalition: Syria, Russia, Iran.

• Part 3 – Objectives of the countries involved in the Syrian conflict – the US-led international anti-ISIS coalition.

• Part 4 – Achieving interim objectives and developing a new strategy. Anticipated benefits of the new strategy.

• Part 5 – The essence of the new strategy: moving beyond the role of a regional player. Key contradictions and complications for the other ‘regional’ players.

• Part 6 – A strategically more advantageous position for the US – Iraq. Accelerating personnel decisions without announcing a new strategy to the wider public. Key players – countries in the region:

• Part 7 – Strengthening US influence in Iraq.

• Part 8 – The ‘Middle East Strategic Alliance’ (MESA) – the ‘Arab NATO’

• Part 9 – Saudi Arabia – as the leader of the regional anti-Iranian coalition

• Part 10 – The factor of Israel’s security and its involvement in the anti-Iranian coalition

• Part 11 – Syria and the influence of the regional anti-Iranian coalition on it. The creation and involvement of yet another regional coalition of players: Africa.

• Part 12 – The ‘pilot project for a regional coalition’ in the Middle East – as a blueprint for a future alliance of US regional coalitions (US strategy outline).

Part 1 – Introduction. A brief overview of the situation in Syria. The objectives of the countries involved in the conflict in Syria (in summary)

The Syrian case demonstrates the formation of a multi-level conflict architecture, in which a local civil conflict rapidly transformed into a field of global confrontation and the division of spheres of influence. The involvement of external actors — the US, Russia, Iran, Turkey and Western countries — led to the institutionalisation of the conflict through coalitions, parallel military operations and negotiation formats, which cemented the fragmentation of territory and interests.

A key trend has been the gradual shift from direct military confrontation to a managed balance: the defeat of ISIS, the creation of de-escalation zones and negotiation processes (notably within the UN and the ‘Astana format’) have cemented the de facto division of the country into zones of influence controlled by external actors. At the same time, each of these actors pursued their own objectives — ranging from counter-terrorism to containing rivals and controlling resources and territories.

Thus, Syria has become an example of the transition of modern conflicts into a model of regulated distribution of influence among external actors, where the outcome is determined not so much by internal processes as by the balance of interests of external players, and the conflict zone itself becomes an instrument of broader geopolitical competition.

Further details are provided below as an introductory explanation.

2011 — the start of the armed conflict within the country — The Syrian Civil War — a multi-sided, multi-level armed conflict on Syrian territory. Initially, fighting took place between the government army and the ‘Free Syrian Army’ (FSA) formations. The parties to the conflict received military aid from other countries: government forces were supported by Russia and Iran, whilst the Syrian opposition received aid from Western states and the Gulf monarchies. Foreign Shia militias (notably the Lebanese ‘Hezbollah’) also fought on the government’s side.

Support for government forces:

• Russia

• Iran

• Hezbollah (Lebanon)

Support for the armed opposition:

• USA;

• Turkey;

• United Kingdom;

• France;

• Saudi Arabia;

• Qatar.

2014 – On 17 September 2014, the US House of Representatives approved Obama’s plan to train and arm Syrian rebels in their fight against Islamic State. In a statement following the House vote, Obama said that the United States would not send troops to Syria. The US military leadership approved Obama’s plan on 18 September. The Senate gave its final congressional approval to Obama’s proposal the following day.

The military operation against the Islamic State began on 22 September 2014. A group of 68 countries, acting under US leadership, formed a coalition (the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)) at a meeting in Brussels on 3 December 2014. The operations carried out by this group in Syria are conducted without the consent of the Syrian government. On 25 May 2017, at the NATO summit in Brussels, a decision was taken to integrate Alliance forces into the coalition against ISIL.

Some coalition members:

• USA — US Air Force, US Navy, US Marine Corps Artillery, US Army Rangers, US Army 1st Special Forces Group ‘Delta’ (occasionally).

• United Kingdom — Royal Air Force, SAS

• France — French Air Force, French Navy, BFST (not directly involved in combat).

• Germany — German Air Force (non-combat bombing support).

Some regional participants:

• Saudi Arabia — Royal Saudi Air Force.

• Bahrain – Royal Bahraini Air Force.

• Jordan – Royal Jordanian Air Force.

• Qatar – Qatar Emiri Air Force.

• UAE – UAE Air Force.

2015: The start of the fight against ISIS in Russia – On 30 September 2015, following an agreement with President Bashar al-Assad, the Russian Aerospace Forces launched a military operation in Syria, operating in close coordination with government forces.

The war became one of the main causes of the European migration crisis, triggering a mass exodus of refugees from Syria (of the approximately 18 million people who previously lived in Syria, around 7 million are refugees in other countries, and around 6 million are internally displaced within Syria). As of December 2018, refugees are returning mainly from Lebanon and Jordan. In major cities and towns within the combat zone, 40–70% of the infrastructure has been destroyed.

In 2016, Turkey sent troops into northern Syria. The official aim of the operation was stated as the fight against ‘Islamic State’ terrorists; in reality, however, Ankara’s main adversary was the Syrian Kurds, who in March 2016 attempted to establish their own autonomous region along the border with Turkey.

The Kurdish factor. The Syrian government pursued a discriminatory policy towards the Kurds — the teaching of the Kurdish language and culture in schools was banned, land and oil fields were handed over to Arabs, and Kurdish activists faced prosecution. Furthermore, up to 300,000 Kurds had non-citizen status. The Syrian Kurdish population was estimated at 2–2.5 million people (around 10% of the country’s pre-war population). The region in north-eastern Syria, where they are predominantly based, is of strategic importance as it possesses significant oil reserves. The Kurds’ aim is to establish an autonomous region with extensive rights, and ideally to create their own state

Demarcation of zones and spheres of influence.

On 21 August 2016, the new commander of the US operation against ISIL, Lieutenant General Stephen Townsend, announced his intention to defend the northern regions of Syria from Assad’s forces, where US special forces soldiers are also present among the armed formations of the Syrian opposition. At the Russian-American talks in Geneva, which took place from 9 to 11 September 2016, the parties reached an agreement on the demarcation of spheres of influence in Syria.

2017 — the main outcome of the year was the defeat of the Islamic State group in Syria and Iraq, with the exception of a few enclaves.

With President Trump’s accession to power, two significant changes emerged in the strategy for combating terrorists:

• Firstly, Donald Trump expanded the powers of his Department of Defence to ‘strike aggressively and promptly at the enemy’s weak points in any country in the world’.

• Secondly, Trump ordered a shift in tactics from ‘driving militants out of their strongholds’ to ‘surrounding the enemy in their strongholds’.

President Trump’s decisions are motivated by a desire to prevent militants from returning to the countries from which they travelled to Syria and Iraq: from expulsion from territories to complete neutralisation without leaving the territories.

2018 is dedicated to the implementation of UN Resolution 2254 on the peaceful settlement of the situation in Syria (civil war), adopted unanimously by the UN back in 2015 (including by Russia) – the creation of a constitutional committee. Next – the drafting of a new constitution and the holding of elections in the country under it.

The fight against some remaining ISIS enclaves continues. All other hostilities have practically ceased.

De-escalation zones have also been established (the Astana format countries – Russia, Iran and Turkey – are responsible for these de-escalation zones):

1. Idlib (including the north-eastern districts of Latakia, western Aleppo and northern Hama) – a zone for which Turkey is responsible. It is considered the most problematic area in the country. The population is around 3 million people.

2. Homs (northern part of the province: the towns of Er-Rastan and Tel Bissa). It has a population of up to 200,000 civilians.

3. Eastern Ghouta — a suburb of Damascus. Up to 500,000 civilians live in Ghouta.

4. The de-escalation zone in south-western Syria — the Golan Heights (a disputed territory between Syria and Israel).

As of the end of 2018, the Syrian government controls two-thirds of the country’s territory. The remainder is controlled by opposition forces and the Kurds (with the support of the Western-led international coalition).

US forces stationed in Syria:

2018 — according to various sources, there were between 2,000 and 2,200 US military personnel in Syria. According to media reports, between 2015 and 2018 12 US military bases and two outposts were established: four military facilities in the province of Hasakah, six in the province of Aleppo, one in Deir ez-Zor, two in Raqqa, and the Al-Tanf base in the south of the province of Homs.

Related events:

Related to Iran

• The US withdrawal from the JCPOA with Iran (with active intervention and participation by Israel) in May 2018;

• Iran’s proposal to conclude a new agreement with the US regarding the nuclear deal and Iran’s missile programme;

• Reimposition of two rounds of sanctions against Iran (4 August and 6 November 2018);

• Ensuring, through negotiations (and the threat of secondary US sanctions against those violating the sanctions), a significant reduction in the volume of Iranian oil (and other energy resources) sold on the international market.

Russia-related

• The US has notified Russia that it is withdrawing from the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) due to violations by the Russian Federation;

• A US proposal to conclude a new INF Treaty with Russia and to involve additional players – in particular, China and Iran.

Part 2 – The objectives of the countries involved in the conflict in Syria – the coalition: Syria, Russia, Iran.

An analysis of the objectives and behaviour of key players in the Syrian conflict shows that the formally declared objectives (combating ISIS, resolving the conflict, implementing UN Resolution 2254) systematically diverge from the parties’ actual strategic intentions. For Syria, the priority is to preserve Bashar al-Assad’s power and restore control over the territory; for Russia, it is to consolidate a long-term presence and convert the Syrian case into a political and economic asset; and for Iran, it is to expand regional influence and form a ‘Shiite arc’.

A common element for all three actors is the desire to reshape the regional balance by weakening US influence and creating an alternative configuration — an ‘anti-American alliance’ (Iran–Iraq–Syria–Russia). At the same time, within this loose coalition, there remains hidden competition, primarily between Russia and Iran, for dominance in the political, military and economic spheres in Syria.

Thus, the Syrian conflict functions not merely as an internal crisis, but as a tool for implementing external strategies, where formal coordination of actions is combined with a struggle for control over the outcome. This creates a model of regulated distribution of influence, in which none of the players achieves complete dominance, but all seek to secure the strongest possible positions for themselves in the future configuration of the region.

More on this below.

To assess the events unfolding, one needs to understand what goals the main players in this region were pursuing and what they have achieved. We will therefore examine this information in summary form in the following order:

• Country;

• Officially stated objective;

• Additional (secondary) objective;

• Hidden objective;

• Contradictions that have arisen.

Syria

Officially declared objective. In reality — a civil war since 2011 (between government forces and opposition armed groups). As well as the fight against the terrorist organisation ISIS

Additional objective: to resolve the civil conflict. Not interested in implementing UN Resolution 2254 on Syria, but were forced to agree.

Hidden objective:

• To preserve Bashar al-Assad’s power;

• To preserve the territorial integrity of Syria;

• Seeking the lifting of sanctions against Syria (imposed due to the outbreak of the civil war and the use of chemical weapons against the civilian population) prior to the implementation of UN Resolution 2254;

• Seeking international humanitarian aid for the reconstruction and development of Syria (between $250 billion and $400 billion);

• Seeking Syria’s return to the LAS (League of Arab States) to overcome political and economic isolation.

• Increasing Iran’s influence in the region (counterbalancing Russia’s influence as a non-regional player);

• Reducing the influence of the US and its allies in the region (including reducing the influence of Saudi Arabia and Israel);

The main task of the Syrian authorities at this stage is to retain power, minimise discussion of the civil war (the Syrian authorities are accused by the international community of committing crimes: human rights violations, including the repeated use of chemical weapons) and preserve the country’s territorial integrity.

The second objective is to overcome political and economic isolation, specifically by lifting all sanctions against Syria, securing international humanitarian aid, facilitating the return of refugees to revive the economy, and so on – with the help of its allies, Russia and Iran.

Syria has sought the withdrawal of all US-led international coalition forces from its territory. Only Russia and Iran (along with their proxy, Hezbollah) have official permission from the Syrian authorities to remain on the territory. Furthermore, Iran’s presence in the country serves as a counterweight to Russia’s presence, and vice versa.

Regional objective: the creation of a regional anti-American alliance comprising Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia.

Russia

Officially declared objective: to protect Russian military bases in Syria and to combat the terrorist organisation ISIS.

Additional objective:

• The Syrian authorities are declared to be implementing the provisions of UN Resolution 2254 on a peaceful settlement: the establishment of a constitutional committee, a new constitution, and elections – the Russian Federation voted ‘in favour’ of the adoption of this resolution.

• Participants in the Astana format (guarantors in the de-escalation zones): Russia, Iran, Turkey.

• Ensuring the security of the Syrian authorities (B. Assad).

Hidden objective:

• Attempts to obstruct the implementation of the resolution’s provisions in every possible way or to implement them on terms favourable to the Syrian authorities (altering the provisions themselves, changing the sequence of their implementation, modifying procedural aspects, etc.);

• attempts to circumvent the resolution whilst preserving B. Assad’s power (Russia’s ‘Syria is Ours’ plan);

• Increasing its own influence in the region (while reducing Iran’s influence in the region — Russia is interested in having Iran as an ally, but not in allowing Iran to dominate).

• Neutralising the influence of the US and its allies in the region — Saudi Arabia — to counterbalance the growing influence of Turkey (with which Russia has several commercial projects, including ‘Turkish Stream’). Neutralising Israel’s influence in the region.

• Control and utilisation of energy resources in the region, economic dominance of Russian business there (Russia, itself subject to international sanctions, controls several entities not recognised by the international community – Transnistria, South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Crimea, ORDLO – Syria and Iran could become donors; additional funds are required – this topic is explored in greater detail in the article ‘The Syrian Round Dance’, link here)

• To preserve Bashar al-Assad’s power and maintain the territorial integrity of Syria. They are seeking the lifting of sanctions against Syria imposed due to the civil war and the use of chemical weapons, pending the implementation of UN Resolution 2254.

• Seeking the provision of international humanitarian aid for the reconstruction and development of Syria (between $250 billion and $400 billion) to develop the economy, provided that the funds are utilised under Russia’s patronage.

• They are seeking Syria’s return to the LAS (League of Arab States) – to overcome Syria’s diplomatic isolation.

• Syria’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union (or the creation of a temporary free trade zone, as with Iran, with subsequent accession to the union) – as a means of overcoming political and economic isolation.

Establishing a foothold in Syria on its own terms is Russia’s top priority.

This provides an opportunity to address both political objectives (building up liquid assets for further bargaining with the collective West, primarily with the US on other contentious issues – including the Ukrainian one) and economic ones (access to energy resources, the ability to influence international oil prices, overcoming sanctions imposed on the Russian Federation, etc.); seeking cooperation with EU countries with economic interests in Russia to lobby for the easing or lifting of sanctions, the ability to retain unrecognised territories under Russian control, including the ORDLO and Crimea, etc.).

To achieve this objective, it is necessary to preserve Bashar al-Assad’s power (even by implementing UN Resolution 2254) – through the holding of elections.

Should the outcome of the forthcoming elections prove unsatisfactory to the Russian Federation, Moscow may refuse to recognise these elections as having taken place and demand that new elections be held. Another possibility is that Russia might refuse to recognise the results of these elections, accusing the West of rigging them. In that case, there remains the possibility, with the support of allies (Syria and Iran), of remaining on Syrian territory, albeit in isolation, as Western military intervention under the pretext of ‘restoring the legitimacy of the elections’ is unlikely.

However, in such a scenario, the international community is likely to exert pressure on the Syrian authorities by tightening sanctions against Syria and its allies – Russia and Iran. To counter this pressure, a scheme for economic cooperation with Syria is being prepared to circumvent the sanctions, the so-called “Khorovod”, involving its satellites (internationally unrecognised entities), as well as countries within Russia’s sphere of influence that are also subject to sanctions, just like Russia (for example, Cuba, Venezuela, etc.).

Until the elections take place, the Russian Federation will endeavour to maintain the greatest possible balance in the use of military force by any of the parties remaining on Syrian territory, so as not to fall foul of sanctions for failing to implement UN Resolution 2254, as the chance of preserving Assad’s power through legitimate elections recognised by the international community (or attempting to rig them effectively in Assad’s favour) appears to Russia to be quite high.

Regional objective: Another of Russia’s objectives is to weaken US influence in the Middle East and strengthen its own influence in the region by supporting Iran: the creation of a regional anti-American alliance comprising Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia.

Therefore, the Russian Federation’s objectives also include supporting Iran in the JCPOA to create EU mechanisms for circumventing US sanctions and an analogue SWIFT system for Iran, which Russia also plans to use. It also involves supporting Iran’s missile programme as a means of blackmailing and intimidating the EU and regional countries, or as a bargaining chip in Western negotiations with Iran under the direct mediation of the Russian Federation.

Iran

Officially stated objective:

• Iran’s military support for the current Syrian government since the very beginning of the civil conflict.

• the fight against the terrorist organisation ISIS with the involvement of Hezbollah and Hamas units.

Additional objective:

• Not interested in implementing UN Resolution 2254 on Syria, but has agreed to it.

• Participation in the Astana format (guarantors in de-escalation zones): Russia, Iran, Turkey.

Hidden objective:

• Establishment of Iranian military bases on Syrian territory to ensure a guaranteed military presence in the region, thereby strengthening the militaristic component of ‘encirclement and control’ over the countries of the region;

• The creation of the so-called ‘Shiite arc’: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon (with the possible inclusion of Yemen);

• Iran and Syria jointly oppose the policies of the United States and Israel in the region.

• The struggle against Israel; support for Hezbollah and Hamas.

• Syria’s transit capabilities for the Iranian defence industry.

• The economic component – access and participation of Iranian business in Syria’s reconstruction and access to the international fund for Syria’s reconstruction in its implementation (a counterweight for Syria in the balance with Russia);

Iran’s main objective is to strengthen its influence in the region. Iran’s main ally in the region is Syria. In addition to all this, there is also a religious dimension: the Syrian ruling elite are Alawites, whilst the Iranians are Shia. These are similar branches of Islam. They are opposed by another branch of Islam – Sunni Islam. The Sunnis are represented by Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Iran’s main objectives in Syria are:

• Political (preserving Bashar al-Assad’s power).

• Military in nature (legitimising the presence of armed forces, establishing military bases, setting up production of certain types of weaponry and/or transit routes for its delivery to support its proxies in the region, such as Hezbollah, Hamas and others, which are involved, in particular, in various conflicts not only in this region. An example is support for the Taliban in Afghanistan.

• Economic dimension – control and use of energy resources, penetration of Iranian business, harnessing of international humanitarian aid for the reconstruction of Syria, etc. – here the objectives are similar to those of the Russian Federation, with the difference that each side wishes to play a dominant role in this process.

Iran’s main plans, however, are at the regional level: the plan is to create a Regional Anti-American Alliance comprising Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia.

As can be seen from the above, all three countries in this coalition adhere to a single plan – the creation of a ‘Regional anti-American alliance comprising Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia’.

Part 3 – The objectives of the countries involved in the conflict in Syria – the US-led international anti-ISIS coalition.

An analysis of the objectives of the international anti-ISIS coalition shows that the formal unity of the participants (the fight against ISIS and support for the implementation of UN Resolution 2254) is combined with deep internal contradictions, which encompass both the Syrian and the broader regional levels. The Euro-Troika, Turkey and the US, despite their joint participation in the coalition, pursue divergent economic and political interests — ranging from control over energy resources to strengthening their own influence in the region.

A key element of this configuration is the intertwining of interests and alliances: EU countries simultaneously cooperate with Iran and Russia on economic matters, Turkey combines participation in the Western coalition with support for Russia and Iran, whilst the US faces contradictions both with its opponents (Russia, Iran) and with its own allies (the EU, Turkey). Particularly telling is the conflict over the Kurds, where the interests of the US and Turkey are in direct opposition to one another.

Thus, the coalition against ISIL functions not as a coherent system, but as a temporary configuration of actors with different strategic goals, where the joint fight against terrorism is merely a unifying factor. This creates an unstable model of regulated power-sharing, in which each player seeks to pursue its own agenda, ultimately leading to an accumulation of contradictions and limiting long-term coordination of actions.

More on this below.

The Euro-Troika (France, Germany, the UK)

The officially declared goal is the fight against the terrorist organisation ISIS.

Additional objective:

• Ensuring the Syrian authorities implement the provisions of UN Resolution 2254 on a peaceful settlement: the establishment of a constitutional committee, a new constitution, and elections. Participation in the Small Group on the Syrian settlement: the US, the UK, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, with the involvement of Egypt (list from the opposition)

• Ensuring the safety of forces opposed to the Syrian authorities, including the Kurds, until UN Resolution 2254 is fully implemented.

Hidden objective:

• To increase their influence in the region;

• Economic: control and use of energy resources in the region; conducting business in the region (in particular, primarily with Iran).

Emerging contradictions:

These EU countries have sided with Iran in supporting the implementation of the JCPOA without the US, developing mechanisms to circumvent US sanctions and creating an analogue to SWIFT ( , the global interbank financial communications network), and are advocating for the abandonment of the dollar in international trade settlements.

They also have economic interests with Russia – the construction of Nord Stream 2 and a strong interest in the continuation of the Turkish Stream pipeline to EU countries.

They indirectly support strengthening Turkey’s influence in the region and have economic interests in Turkey (in particular through the ‘Turkish Stream’, Turkey’s loyal stance towards Iran and Saudi Arabia’s anti-Iranian position)

Turkey

Officially stated objective: the fight against the terrorist organisation ISIS.

Additional objective:

• Ensuring the Syrian authorities implement the provisions of UN Resolution 2254 on a peaceful settlement: the establishment of a constitutional committee, a new constitution, and elections.

• Participation in the US-led international anti-ISIS coalition.

• Participation in the Astana format (guarantors in de-escalation zones): Russia, Iran, Turkey.

• Ensuring the security of certain forces opposing the Syrian authorities.

Hidden objective:

• Ankara’s main adversary is the Syrian Kurds: neutralising the Kurds (it should be noted that the Kurds in Syria are represented as participants in the peace settlement within the Constitutional Committee);

• Turkey opposes the official regime of Bashar al-Assad;

• Strengthening its influence in the region to counterbalance that of Saudi Arabia.

Emerging contradictions:

• The Kurds are allies of the US and the EU. Turkey, however, has once again announced the advance of the Turkish Armed Forces into territory in Syria controlled by the Kurds, who are supported by the international coalition.

• Support for Iran (refusal to comply with US sanctions against Iran, preparation of joint economic projects with Iran).

• Support for Russia: the ‘Turkish Stream’ pipeline with Russia; growing economic ties with Russia.

• Overlapping US/Russian interests in the defence industry: the purchase of S-400 air defence systems from Russia (despite sanctions and restrictions) and the purchase of a batch of F-35 aircraft from the US.

• Declining Israeli influence in the region.

• Intense rivalry with Saudi Arabia for regional supremacy. Heightened interest in the development of the case regarding the murder of journalist Khashoggi.

USA

Officially stated objective: the fight against the terrorist organisation ISIS.

Additional objective:

• Ensuring the Syrian government implements the provisions of UN Resolution 2254 on a peaceful settlement: the establishment of a constitutional committee, a new constitution, and elections.

• Participating in the Small Group on the Settlement in Syria: the US, the UK, France, Germany, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, with the involvement of Egypt (area of responsibility: the opposition’s list).

• Monitor the implementation of UN Resolution 2254.

• Ensuring the safety of forces opposed to the Syrian government, including the Kurds, until UN Resolution 2254 is fully implemented.

Hidden objective:

• To increase their influence in the region;

• To neutralise the influence of Iran and its allies in the region (Hezbollah, Hamas);

• Neutralising Russia’s influence in the region;

• Economic: control and use of energy resources in the region; influence on the global oil market.

• Ensuring Israel’s security, increasing its influence in the region, including resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Conflicts that have arisen:

– With Iran:

With Iran directly in Syria:

• Iran’s support for the Assad regime and its military presence on Syrian territory, which threatens the security of Israel – a US ally.

With Iran – in the international and regional arena:

• The shortcomings of the JCPOA – nuclear and missile threats: an international threat, a threat regarding missile range to the EU and all countries in the region;

• Israel’s security factor: Israel/Iran (Hezbollah, Hamas) – confrontation, threat of Israel’s destruction, Iran supplying weapons to Lebanese militants.

• Confrontation in the region: Saudi Arabia/Iran, the threat of missile development, Iran’s support for the Houthis in Yemen.

• Iran has significant internal influence over Iraq.

• The Persian Gulf and the Red Sea – threat of a blockade by Iran on shipping and oil transport.

• Iran’s influence on Afghanistan: support for the Taliban.

– With Russia:

With Russia in Syria:

• Russia supports Bashar al-Assad, who has committed war crimes against the civilian population, and Iran’s military presence on Syrian territory (a threat to Israel and other countries in the region);

With Russia in the region:

• Iran/Russia: support for Iran (economic ties + defence industry); Russia’s use of its veto power at the UN against any action regarding Iran by both the US and the international community.

• JCPOA/Russia: support for Iran (economic ties – assistance in circumventing US sanctions against Iran).

– With EU countries

With the EU in the region:

• JCPOA/EU: support for Iran (economic ties, creation of a mechanism to circumvent US sanctions)

• EU/Russia (economic ties, ‘Nord Stream 2’ and ‘Turkish Stream’)

• EU/Turkey (economic ties, in particular through the extension of ‘Turkish Stream’ to the EU).

– With Turkey

With Turkey in Syria:

• Kurds/Turkey: armed conflict;

With Turkey at regional level:

• Support for Iran (economic ties), opposition to US sanctions against Iran.

• Hidden confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey: a struggle for regional leadership; relations have become even more complicated following the murder of journalist Khashoggi.

• Israel/Turkey: tensions; Turkey strongly condemns Israel over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and for its support of the Kurds in Syria, as well as for Israel’s anti-Iran stance.

• Support from the Russian Federation (economic ties + defence industry), with particular interest in tourism from the Russian Federation and trade agreements.

As can be seen from the above, at the time of the decision to withdraw troops from Syria, the US had accumulated the most contradictions with key players – both opponents and allies, and both on the Syrian issue and in regional relations.

Part 4 – Achieving interim objectives and developing a new strategy. Anticipated benefits of the new strategy.

An analysis of the achievement of interim objectives in Syria shows that the international coalition’s key task – the fight against ISIL – has effectively been accomplished, whilst the political process (the implementation of UN Resolution 2254) has entered the final phase of establishing institutional mechanisms. This creates the basis for a review of the strategies of the main players, primarily the US, which, whilst maintaining its core objectives (containing Russia and Iran, and controlling influence), is shifting the means of achieving them — from direct military presence to sanctions, economic and political-diplomatic pressure.

At the same time, the accumulation of contradictions between the US, its allies and opponents is shifting the focus of tension from the ‘Syrian issue’ to the ‘Iranian factor’, which encompasses a wider region and a greater number of actors. It is Iran that is becoming the key element in the configuration of the confrontation, forming alternative coalitions and posing systemic challenges to the US and its partners.

Thus, the announced withdrawal of US troops from Syria appears not as a relinquishment of influence, but as a transition to a new phase of strategy: a reduction in direct military involvement whilst maintaining control over political processes and simultaneously increasing pressure on the key opponent — Iran.

More details follow.

As can be seen from the previous sections, the main task of all the participants under consideration – the ‘fight against the terrorist organisation ISIS’ – has been practically accomplished. Some enclaves in the region still remain under ISIL control within Syrian territory, but their destruction or neutralisation does not require a significant military presence; work in this direction is already being carried out by small forces at the regional level.

The second task, defined as an additional objective for all participants, is ‘the implementation by the Syrian authorities of the provisions of UN Resolution 2254 on a peaceful settlement (under the guarantee and with the participation of its allies, Russia and Iran), which was adopted back in 2015: the establishment of a constitutional committee (three lists of representatives: one from the government, one from the opposition, and one from representatives of Syrian civil society, followed by their drafting of a new Syrian constitution and the holding of democratic elections in the country’ is in the final stages of implementing the first point – the establishment of the constitutional committee.

And although this work is proving rather difficult, with all manner of obstruction and countermeasures from Russia, Syria and Iran, the US has brought this process under its control.

Looking at the sections ‘The Hidden Agenda’ and ‘Contradictions that have arisen’, we conclude that the priorities of some of the countries involved have changed during this time. And this applies first and foremost to the US and its closest allies.

It should also be noted that the US entered Syria during the presidency of Barack Obama and continues to do so under the new president, Donald Trump. The main objectives, both declared and hidden (the fight against international terrorism, strengthening US influence in the Middle East, reducing the influence of Russia and Iran in the region, etc.) — have remained unchanged, but the tactics for achieving them and the reorientation of US priorities have changed, as interim results have been achieved.

For example, the US has withdrawn from or terminated treaties and alliances deemed disadvantageous to it — UNESCO, the JCPOA (the nuclear deal with Iran), the INF Treaty (the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), the Global Compact for Migration, the Paris Climate Agreement, etc.; the US is also unilaterally terminating trade agreements with various countries and alliances and proposing to renegotiate them, but on different terms – the so-called ‘trade wars’.

The United States has begun to actively use instruments such as ‘sanctions’ and ‘secondary sanctions’ (the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATS)).

Special separate regional task forces have been established to address specific issues: a task force on Iran; the post of Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on all aspects of the Syrian conflict has been created; a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Lebanon and Countering Hezbollah has been appointed; and a special operational task force to combat Hezbollah has been established.

A tool such as outreach work is being used – the ‘US State Department and Treasury Department expert group’.

The countermeasures being developed by the US against its opponents (Syria (B. Assad), Russia, Iran) are sometimes unexpected even for the US’s own allies, and not just for its opponents. An example is the topic under consideration in this paper: ‘The consequences of the US implementing its plans to withdraw its troops from Syrian territory’.

Returning to the section ‘Emerging contradictions’, we can see that the so-called ‘Syrian issue’ is Russia’s top priority at present, whilst the contradictions arising between the US and its allies on the ‘Syrian issue’ are minimal — the most acute point of contention being: Turkey versus the Syrian Kurds.

The main complaint of Syria and its allies (Russia and Iran) regarding the US’s obstruction of the implementation of UN Resolution 2254 on Syria is the illegality of the presence of armed forces on Syrian territory without permission from the UN or the official Syrian authorities.

However, resolving the ‘Iranian issue’ is a higher priority for the US and other countries, as the resulting disputes involve a greater number of both participants and territories:

As for the countries of the international anti-ISIS coalition – EU countries (the UK, France, Germany) and Turkey – some of the disagreements with the US relate specifically to these countries’ economic cooperation with Iran, in circumvention of US sanctions regarding the JCPOA.

The same applies to a sufficient number of regional countries, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Yemen and others, whom Iran threatens with the development of its missile programme, the supply of weapons to its proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas, which destabilise the situation in the region, as well as the arming and support of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the arming and support of the Houthis in Yemen.

And also at the international level – the threat of continuing nuclear development.

Through economic and military cooperation (with Iraq, Turkey, Russia and Syria, in particular), Iran is building a new coalition in the Middle East; its plans, in conjunction with Russia and Syria, include the creation of a ‘Regional anti-American alliance comprising Iran, Iraq, Syria and Russia’, and it could realistically secure the tacit support of certain EU countries (France and Germany), Turkey, as well as Iraq, which are dissatisfied with US policy, particularly regarding sanctions against Russia and Iran, due to which these countries are suffering economic hardship in the region (primarily Iraq, Turkey and Germany) or are suffering losses on their own territory (Europe).

Developments in Syria are currently of a more limited and controlled nature. It can therefore be assumed that the withdrawal of US troops from Syria, announced by the US President on 19 December 2018, which raised many questions among both allies and opponents, is a deliberate strategy to maintain US and coalition control, on the one hand, the peace settlement processes in Syria, and a strategy to contain Iran in the region, on the other – a ‘transition to a new phase’.

What might this strategy entail?

Let us consider the potential benefits of withdrawing US forces from Syria and the signals currently being sent.

Part 5 – The essence of the new strategy: moving beyond the role of a regional player. Key contradictions and complications for the other ‘regional’ players.

An analysis of the new US strategy in Syria reveals a shift from direct military involvement to the role of a ‘super-conflict’ mediator, enabling the US to transcend its status as a regional player and maintain control over developments without direct involvement. The withdrawal of troops creates a situation in which the main burden of the settlement is shifted to Russia, Iran, Turkey and the Syrian authorities, but under constant external scrutiny and with the possibility of US intervention through sanctions and military instruments.

At the same time, this configuration sharply increases the level of internal contradictions among the players remaining on the ground. The most telling example is the web of contradictions surrounding the Kurdish issue, where the interests of Syria, Turkey, Russia and the US intersect, as well as a wider range of conflicts — from Syrian-Turkish relations to tensions between Turkey and Israel and Iran’s role in the region. In these circumstances, it is Russia that is forced to take on the role of balancer, which significantly complicates its position.

Thus, the new US strategy consists of creating a managed conflict system, where responsibility for resolution falls on regional players, whilst the US itself retains the ability to influence the process ‘from the outside’. This allows Washington to simultaneously minimise costs and strengthen control, turning the internal contradictions of other actors into a tool for curbing their influence.

Let us consider the potential benefits of the withdrawal of US forces from Syria and the signals currently being sent.

Withdrawing troops from Syria allows the US to rise above the situation, removing itself from the regional conflict (from a ‘regional player’ to an ‘international arbiter’).

Russia, Syria, Iran and Turkey will have to resolve issues on the ground amongst themselves and their interests in the territory, but under the supervision of the US, both as the body overseeing the peace settlement process in Syria in accordance with UN Resolution 2254 and as the leader of the anti-ISIS coalition in the region, as well as the additional objective declared by the US —  ‘Ensuring the safety of forces opposed to the Syrian regime, including the Kurds, until the full implementation of UN Resolution 2254 – the holding of democratic elections’, thereby raising the ‘stake’ for Russia for supporting not only Bashar al-Assad, but also Iran, which is present on Syrian territory.

The US has decided to withdraw from Syrian territory, proposing that all countries not present there prior to 2011 do the same (with the exception of Russia): Iran and Turkey – classifying their presence on Syrian territory as illegitimate following the US withdrawal, a position the US can subsequently use to exert pressure on both these countries and on Russia, as their ally.

As a result of violations by participants remaining on the territory, or the resumption of military action against the opposition and the Kurds, all participants in the process could face punishment: they could be subject to additional US economic sanctions, including Turkey, or face a military response from US forces.

The US, meanwhile, can always delay the withdrawal of its troops for an indefinite period, for example, by extending the timeframe from 120 days to four months (160 days), thereby providing ‘cover’ for the security of opposition forces in the event of a delay in implementing UN Resolution 2254 or the emergence of critical situations surrounding them.

The issue of disagreements among the remaining players: Russia, Iran, Turkey and Syria

The issues of contention between the remaining players – Russia, Iran, Turkey and Syria – are quite varied and require numerous compromises. Here are just a few examples.

The Syria (B. Assad) – Kurds – Turkey (R. Erdogan) track.

This is a complex track:

• On the one hand, the Syrian government does not recognise the Federation of Northern Syria, which was self-proclaimed by the Kurds;

• On the other hand, the Kurds are a mandatory party to the peace settlement in Syria under UN Resolution 2254;

• Thirdly, the Kurds are supported by the US-led anti-ISIS coalition;

• On the fourth hand, Turkey is extremely hostile towards the Kurds and aims, if not to destroy them, then to expel them;

• Fifthly, it is now up to Russia to untangle this whole web of contradictions, as the leader of those remaining on the ground, as a signatory to UN Resolution 2254 and the guarantor of its implementation, and as the party most likely to face consequences.

In other words, as is evident from the above, the process of compromise, the creation of counterbalances and balances, is in full swing amongst the remaining participants, but with the US involved from the sidelines – at the right moment, they step into the game, steering the internal process whilst remaining outside its framework.

The Syria–Turkey track.

Iran is reminding Turkey that when making any military decisions on Syrian territory, it is now necessary to coordinate actions with the Syrian government, and not just with Russia.

But both sides – Syria (Bashar al-Assad) and Turkey (Erdogan) – harbour deep animosity and hostility towards one another, a fact that has been stated openly on more than one occasion.

Israel–Turkey track

Relations between Israel and Turkey have also deteriorated sharply once again, with mutual accusations being levelled.

Furthermore, Russia has raised the possibility of Iran’s forces withdrawing from Syrian territory; this may be a response to ongoing behind-the-scenes negotiations between Russia and the US regarding the easing of sanctions against Iran in exchange for its withdrawal from Syria.

It should be noted that this is only part of the problem. There are other contentious issues – such as Idlib (a de-escalation zone for which Turkey is responsible) and so on.

Part 6 – A strategically more advantageous position for the US – Iraq. Accelerating personnel decisions without announcing a new strategy to a wider audience. Key players – countries in the region:

An analysis of the US shift in focus towards Iraq reveals the formation of a more advantageous strategic configuration, which allows Washington to maintain control over the region without a direct link to the Syrian theatre. The deployment of military infrastructure in Iraq and the maintenance of a presence in Afghanistan creates the conditions for ‘encircling’ Iran whilst simultaneously ensuring the ability to respond rapidly to the situation in Syria without a permanent military presence there.

A key element of this strategy is the shift towards indirect control through regional allies and coalitions. The US is gradually forming the basis of an anti-Iranian alliance, combining the global level (through the UN and sanctions pressure) with the regional level (Iraq, Turkey, Middle Eastern countries), whilst exploiting the limitations of partners, particularly the EU, in their dealings with Iran. In parallel, the strategy is being developed behind closed doors, as evidenced by signals regarding priorities (the Kurds, Iran, Israel’s security) without any formal announcement.

Thus, the US is shifting to a model of multi-layered containment of Iran, where a military presence is complemented by political, economic and coalition-building tools. This allows for a reduction in the costs of direct involvement, whilst retaining strategic initiative and the ability to influence key processes in the region through control of flashpoints and engagement with regional actors.

More on this below.

A strategically more advantageous position for the US is Iraq. Iraq borders Iran.

Iran borders Afghanistan, where a contingent of NATO’s non-combat mission (Operation Resolute Support, a NATO mission to train and assist the Afghan government forces, which began on 1 January 2015 and is represented, in particular, by US forces) is stationed.

In Afghanistan, the process of a peaceful settlement of the armed conflict between the government and the Taliban (who are supported by Iran) is also ongoing, with the US and the EU (through the UN and the Geneva format) and the Russian Federation (Moscow format) also participating.

The negotiation process is complicated by the Taliban’s unyielding, single-minded stance. One of the Taliban’s demands for unblocking the negotiation process is the complete withdrawal of NATO forces (including US forces) from Afghanistan, followed by new elections in the country; only then, they claim, will substantive negotiations with a new government be possible.  Following the Moscow-format talks, to which Russia officially invited the Taliban to state their position, military escalation in Afghanistan by the Taliban has intensified significantly.

For a long time, there has been persistent talk that US President Donald Trump would reduce the American contingent in Afghanistan as much as possible, but this has not yet happened.

The US President has also stated that he has no plans to withdraw troops from Iraq. There are also reports of the construction of new US bases in Iraq near the border with Syria, whilst NATO is present in Iraq with a new training mission and AWACS surveillance flights to support the global coalition.

It appears that control in Syria (the coalition’s zone of influence, agreed back in 2016 – the territory currently controlled by the Kurds) and control of Iran from two sides (from the direction of Iraq and Afghanistan) are being established.

As is clear from the US President’s own words, the Americans make no secret of the fact that bases in Iraq could be used for a rapid ‘leap’ into Syria should the situation require urgent intervention.

This made it possible to expedite personnel decisions without announcing a new strategy to the wider public.

Following the announcement of the withdrawal of US armed forces from Syria, a series of resignations took place, which had in principle been planned earlier, but this situation accelerated the process; the main arguments for the early withdrawal boil down to a lack of understanding of the situation and disagreement with it: ‘the President’s decision came as a shock and represents a complete reversal of the policy that had been discussed with us’.

Against this backdrop, it is very interesting to examine two statements by Republican Senator L. Graham, who is listened to very closely in Russia, where he is seen as a direct and influential channel between US President D. Trump and representatives of the Russian Federation. In his typically straightforward manner, L. Graham directly conveyed the US’s signals to its allies and ‘partners’:

• This is not an instant decision – it is a well-thought-out plan and strategy that is still being refined, and he understands it in broad terms and likes it, but this is information not for discussion.

• Some signals regarding US priorities concerning Syria:

• ‘ensuring the safety of the Kurds’ (a signal to everyone, especially Turkey);

• “concerned about the growth of Iranian influence” (a signal to everyone);

• “there is a potential threat to Israel” (a signal to everyone, especially to Russia).

It can also be concluded that the new strategy is being developed in a rather closed manner and within a narrow circle, without clear guidelines as yet.

Main objective: To create an international anti-Iranian coalition. To establish an international political framework — initially, the announcement of the anti-Iranian coalition was made at the global level on the central international platform of the UN:

Due to the threat of secondary sanctions, the EU is currently unable to implement mechanisms and instruments to assist Iran; realising this, Iran is shifting its focus to regional economic ties. Examples include Iraq and Turkey.

Therefore, the time has now come to introduce a regional regime and engage regional players. The main priority of the task: organising an anti-Iranian regional coalition

Part 7 — Strengthening US influence in Iraq.

An analysis of the situation in Iraq shows that the country is becoming a key arena of competition between the US, Iran and, to some extent, Russia, where military, economic and political interests intersect. Despite Iran’s active attempts to consolidate its influence through the economy, military cooperation and support for Shia militias, its position is gradually weakening due to both external pressure from the US and a decline in domestic support among the Iraqi population.

At the same time, the US is consistently implementing a strategy to oust Iran from Iraq, using sanctions pressure, political demands (in particular regarding the disarmament of pro-Iranian forces) and the maintenance of a military and strategic presence. In parallel, Russia is attempting to expand economic cooperation with Iraq, viewing it as a potential partner; however, its capabilities remain limited and are overshadowed by competition from other players.

Thus, Iraq functions as a balancing system, forced to manoeuvre between external centres of power in order to preserve its own sovereignty. In this configuration, the strengthening of US influence occurs not through domination, but through the creation of conditions under which other players, primarily Iran, lose the opportunity to consolidate control over the country, thereby cementing Iraq’s role as a key element of regional deterrence.

More on this below.

A powerful factor in bringing Iraq and Iran closer together was the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, which took place on 27 September 2017. Iran, in a show of solidarity with the government in Baghdad, condemned the referendum, declaring its full support for Iraq’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, Tehran offered Baghdad military assistance in the event of a deterioration in relations between the Iraqi government and the leaders of Iraqi Kurdistan.

In October 2017, Iran and Iraq held joint military exercises in the province of Kermanshah, near which Iraqi Kurdistan is located, for the first time in 38 years. The exercises involved tanks, artillery, drones and aircraft.

Russia and Iraq have managed to agree on the development of the large ‘West Qurna-2’ oil field by the Russian company Lukoil. And this is far from the only joint Russian-Iraqi project launched in recent years. Russia is interested in financial and investment cooperation with Iraq. The Russian Federation believes that Iraq could become another ally of Russia in the region in the future. However, Russian companies are currently wary of entering the Iraqi market on a large scale.

Russia also expects that Iraq’s new government will maintain friendly relations with it and develop cooperation, particularly in the military-technical sphere — this too is an opportunity to strengthen its ties with Iraq.

Iran is concerned about losing the Iraqi market. Ibrahim Mohammad Reza, an expert at the Iranian Ministry of Trade, warned that Iran could cede its market share in Iraq to competitors if urgent measures are not taken. Today, Iran controls 13% of the Iraqi market, whilst the United Arab Emirates hold 25%, Turkey 18%, and China 17%. Iran’s national economy is heavily dependent on exports to Iraq, as the neighbouring country accounts for 21% of all exports to foreign countries.

Barham Salih, who took office as President of Iraq in October following an agreement between the political groups that won the parliamentary elections, flew to Tehran after visiting Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan as part of the fourth leg of his regional tour. On 17 November, Iraqi President Barham Salih met with his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani, during which the importance of developing bilateral economic ties was reaffirmed. Rouhani, in turn, stated that ‘Iran and Iraq can increase bilateral trade from $12 billion to $20 billion’.

Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said during his meeting with Salih: “The numerous plots being hatched by the United States and certain reactionary countries in the region (referring to Saudi Arabia) to undermine the friendly ties between our peoples are doomed to failure.”  Although Salih responded positively to Iran’s appeals and thanked Tehran for its support in the Iraqi war against ISIL, the Iraqi delegation took no steps towards signing trade and economic contracts and did not even broach the subject. Moreover, there was not a single minister in the Iraqi delegation.

On 18 November, Salih travelled from Tehran to Saudi Arabia, Iran’s main regional rival. In Saudi Arabia, he was joined by Iraq’s Foreign Minister Muhammad Ali al-Hakim, Economy Minister Saleh Abdullah, and other high-ranking officials, notes Al Monitor.

The US makes no secret of the fact that it strongly disapproves of the warm relations between Iraq and Iran, and is attempting to reduce Iranian influence in Iraq. The US’s objective is to prevent Iran from establishing a so-called ‘Shiite arc’ across Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

The Donald Trump administration is demanding the disarmament and disbandment of pro-Iranian military formations in Iraq as part of the 12 conditions that US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo set for signing a new agreement with Iran to replace the 2015 ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’, from which Washington withdrew in May this year.

The seventh condition stipulates ‘respect for the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and agreement to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of Shia militias’.

The ‘Popular Mobilisation Forces’ number around 120,000 personnel. Much depends on their future conduct. Over three years of fighting against the terrorist organisation ISIS, the PMU has lost approximately 8,000 personnel. To some, they are saviours from Islamic radicals; to others, they are Iran’s proxies and, consequently, a fifth column and a destabilising force in Iraq. It is no surprise that many Iraqis, and above all their Western allies, fear that the predominantly Shia paramilitary militias will become a powerful shadow force in Iraq, modelled on Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) or Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

However, Hadi al-Amiri sees his organisation ‘Badr’, which has become the backbone of the PMU, not as Iranian ‘guards’ but rather as the US National Guard. At the same time, he insists that the ‘Hashd al-Shaabi’ is a purely Iraqi phenomenon and that they are not subject to any external influence.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accuses Iran of supporting Shia militias with the aim of infiltrating and weakening Iraq’s security forces. The US State Department classifies many commanders of the ‘Popular Mobilisation Forces’ as ‘terrorists’. For example, Al-Amiri’s deputy, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, and his ‘Kata’ib Hezbollah’.

Many consider the PMU to be Iran’s second most successful foreign project after the Lebanese ‘Hezbollah’. The influence Iran wields in Iraq is also eloquently demonstrated by the news that the Iranian Quds Force (part of the IRGC) has secretly deployed Zelzal, Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar missiles in southern and western Iraq. With a range of between 200 and 700 kilometres, they are capable of reaching both Tel Aviv and Riyadh.

As for the most important issue — the future of the ‘Popular Mobilisation Forces’ — much will depend on Iraq’s new government.

Meanwhile, reports have emerged of a decline in Iran’s influence and popularity in Iraq. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Alustakilla think tank, support for Iran among Iraqi Shias has plummeted: from 88% in 2015 to 47% in autumn 2018. Over the same period, the proportion of Shias who do not support Iran rose from 6% to 51%.

The proportion of Shias who consider Iran a reliable partner for Iraq has fallen from 76% to 43%. Those who consider Iran an unreliable partner increased from 24% to 55%. An increasing number of Iraqi Shias now see Iran as a real threat to Iraq’s sovereignty: a rise from 25% in 2016 to 58% in 2018.

US influence in Iraq remains strong too — this refers to agreements on strategic alliance and military-technical cooperation, which remain in force. Iraq’s new government will be forced to balance between external players just as its predecessors did. Through this balancing act, Iraq is attempting to preserve its independence. Navigating between Iran and the US will be far more difficult due to American sanctions against Iran.

There is also significant Iraqi involvement in the Syrian issue (in the fight against ISIS – aircraft have received permission from the Syrian authorities to fly and bomb terrorists in the buffer zone, for which the US-led coalition and Kurdish territory are responsible).

Part 8 — Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA, ‘Arab NATO’)

An analysis of the concept behind the creation of the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) shows that the US is seeking to institutionalise a regional system of deterrence against Iran by forming a coalition of allied Arab states. The focus is not only on the military component, but also on the integration of security, intelligence, economic and diplomatic mechanisms, which is intended to create a multi-layered system of influence in the region.

At the same time, the implementation of this project faces significant internal constraints: inter-state disputes (in particular the conflict over Qatar), varying levels of military capability among the participants, and the heterogeneity of their relations with Iran. This complicates the formation of a unified and effective alliance, forcing the US to adapt its approach and partially shift the focus to regional ‘pilot’ formats, such as cooperation in the Red Sea.

Thus, MESA functions not so much as a fully-fledged military bloc, but rather as a tool for the gradual formation of a regional coalition under the leadership of the US and Saudi Arabia. Its strategic function lies in delegating part of the security tasks to allies whilst maintaining overall US control, which allows for limiting Iranian influence whilst minimising its own direct involvement in the region.

More on this below.

The term ‘moderate Arab states’ was coined by Western think tanks towards the end of George W. Bush’s first presidential term to refer to the Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan. These states act as a counterweight to the so-called ‘axis of resistance’ — Iran and its allies.

Former US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice chaired the first meeting of the states in this alliance — the so-called ‘axis of moderation’ — in October 2006 in Cairo. Six Gulf states, Egypt and Jordan took part, but at that time it was a purely political alliance, and the prospects of its transformation into a military alliance had not yet been discussed.

On 9 December 2018, the US State Department called on the Gulf states to establish the ‘Middle East Strategic Alliance’ (MESA) in order to counter Iran. On the same day, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Abdul al-Jubeir, speaking at a press conference following the conclusion of the Gulf Cooperation Council summit in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, endorsed the US call: “Talks between the Gulf states and the US are ongoing; this idea (of creating MESA) is being worked on… Work is in progress, and both sides would like to see this happen.”

According to four American and Arab sources speaking to Reuters, the White House intends to develop cooperation with the countries of the ‘Arab NATO’ in the fields of missile defence, military training, counter-terrorism and other issues, such as supporting regional economic and diplomatic ties. , spokesperson for the US National Security Council, told the agency that the alliance would serve as a bulwark against Iranian aggression, terrorism and extremism and would bring peace to the Middle East.

A report prepared by a leading Israeli research centre — the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies — entitled ‘Are We Moving Towards an Arab NATO?’, reveals the details of the alliance’s formation and its objectives.

The Israeli centre’s report analyses the reasons for the need to form this alliance, including in the Red Sea:

• it warns of the deployment of members of the Lebanese ‘Hezbollah’ to Yemen, who are to lead the war against Saudi Arabia and establish control over shipping lanes.

• Hezbollah’s elite officers in Yemen have set about transforming the Houthis into an army capable of carrying out complex operations across the globe.

• The fight against Hezbollah has become a priority for the Trump administration, particularly since the group’s activities have begun to spread across Latin America (collaborating with drug cartels, infiltrating the US and playing a key role in Syria).

• It is warned that Bahrain is also not immune to the infiltration of Hezbollah members into the country;

• Hezbollah has managed to use Lebanese air force weapons (which are American) to carry out its agenda;

• Expanding the US military presence to combat the Houthis ‘directly’ could be regarded as an act of war and therefore require further approval from Congress.

• The US and its Arab allies could join forces to combat this threat and, in doing so, strike a blow against Iranian influence in the region.

• A recommendation has been made that, given that some countries have fairly friendly relations with Iran (Qatar, Kuwait, Oman), attention should be paid to short-term differences and objectives that give rise to conflicts between members, whilst focusing on their strategic interests and security

This bloc is intended to cover areas such as the creation of a unified regional air defence and missile defence system, military training and joint exercises, as well as close cooperation between counter-terrorism services. If the bloc proves its effectiveness, a transition to closer military ties is entirely possible, potentially leading to the conclusion of a treaty on collective security, mutual assistance and the formation of joint military contingents of an ‘Arab NATO’.

Jamil Al-Ziyabi, a Saudi writer, analyst and editor of the newspaper Ukaz, put forward several points:

• Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE and Jordan will have the decisive say in the process of forming an Arab NATO — these countries are well aware of the scale of the Iranian threat and the crimes committed by Iranian armed groups across the region.

• the Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia, which aims to restore legitimate authority in Yemen, has achieved tangible success by thwarting Iranian plans in that country;

The White House wants to forge a stronger link between the forces and resources possessed by Arab countries. Washington also states its intention to strengthen economic and diplomatic ties in the region.

The essence of the new concept is to unite the pro-American regimes of the Middle East into something akin to a NATO-style bloc, but with an Arab flavour. Initially, the ‘Arab NATO’ will comprise Jordan, Egypt and the six Gulf states (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia).

There are a number of regional problems that need to be overcome, such as:

• Arab countries are not particularly adept at warfare. Their capabilities cannot be compared even to the weakest of NATO countries, despite the fairly substantial military spending of some Persian monarchies.

• There is a significant obstacle to such an alliance, namely the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the one hand, and Qatar on the other.

• Qatar is home to the largest US military base in the region, but it is currently considered an outcast and, during its year of isolation in the Arab world, has significantly improved relations with Iran; Oman traditionally maintains neutrality;

The new alliance is a military union dedicated to security and defence matters and isolated from economic, diplomatic or political conflicts; consequently, the crisis surrounding Qatar and any other crises should not affect the alliance.

There is no doubt that Qatar’s admission to the Arab NATO, alongside Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, would mark the end of the Gulf crisis and the start of a rivalry with Iran, which has allowed the Qataris to use its airspace to circumvent the Gulf blockade.

However, a new alliance including Qatar, should it be accepted, would leave the country in a deadlock, as it would be dominated by Saudi Arabia and the UAE. If they have further disagreements with Qatar, they will reinstate the blockade, the airspace will be closed to it on all sides, and it will no longer be able to count on Tehran’s help.

Bloomberg has published a report calling for the creation of an intelligence alliance rather than a military alliance. The report’s authors warn that Iran possesses a multitude of tools to inflict harm, including cyberattacks and the use of proxy groups, and call for the containment of these threats and the expansion of this alliance to include Turkey, Egypt, Jordan and NATO, with the possibility of Tel Aviv joining.

As we can see, the project has encountered some obstacles. This likely explains the postponement of the launch of activities to establish the BSA until 2019, although the Trump administration had originally intended to do so much earlier. Back in the first half of the year, White House representatives had set mid-October as the approximate date for convening the inaugural summit in Washington. On 27 October this year, during the annual security conference in Manama (Manama Dialogue 2018), Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa announced that the formation of the Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) would likely take place next year.

One of the reasons for the delay may also be the incident involving the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, which is why the implementation of the idea had to be postponed until next year.

Stratfor (USA):

• January. The first meeting of the Middle East Strategic Alliance, dubbed the ‘Arab NATO’, may take place.

Turkish journalists working for media outlets close to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party have criticised the idea of creating the alliance, stating that it is a new mistake by Saudi Arabia and that its initiator is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

A Turkish journalist writing for the Daily Sabah newspaper believes that “this alliance will become a puppet, acting solely in the interests of the United States and its traditional ally, Israel, as it will give them a free hand across the entire region”.

The views of experts at various levels discussing the prospect of creating the BSA in Russia boil down to the main thesis that ‘Iran’s defeat will mean serious problems for Russia’.

Alexander Zhilin, head of the Centre for the Study of Social and Applied Problems of National Security and a military expert, believes that the US is planning military aggression (intervention) against Iran:

• “The US is indeed aiming for a military adventure against Iran, and the ‘Arab NATO’ is nothing more than a cover for it.

• This MESA (BSA) organisation is being set up primarily to blur accountability.

• The US does not need the armies of Arab countries to wage war against Iran. In this way, the aggression is being legitimised,” the expert emphasised.

Another argument is that ‘for Washington, resolving the Iranian issue in its favour is on the agenda. However, it is clear that this leads to a conflict with Russia’s interests. It is not in Russia’s interest for the Middle East to be fully subordinate to the US, as it would then find itself surrounded by hostile NATO states and their satellites, such as Ukraine.”

It is also worth noting that Iran is not yet capable of dominating the Middle East. It faces serious political and economic problems, and its armed forces have never managed to return to normal after the overthrow of the Shah. In 2017, Tehran’s military expenditure stood at around $16 billion, whilst Saudi Arabia’s defence spending amounted to $77 billion and the UAE’s to $25 billion. Tehran does not yet have sufficient independent forces to launch a blitzkrieg against its neighbours, let alone more distant countries such as Egypt. But Tehran is gradually, step by step, attempting to build its own coalition, and the balance of power may shift.

Apart from the ‘Iranian nuclear and missile threat’, there is another important factor for the implementation of the BSA project: Tehran’s warning that it could block the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf, through which the bulk of maritime oil traffic passes. At present, this strait is the only sea route allowing gas and oil produced in the Persian Gulf countries to be exported to third countries – in particular, to Japan, the US and Western European nations.

The US network CNN reports that the Trump administration also considered military options to keep vital waterways in the Middle East open following attacks by the Houthis (backed by Iran) on Saudi oil tankers (Red Sea).

Two officials in the US administration have confirmed that if any military measures are taken, they will be carried out by Washington’s regional allies, such as Saudi Arabia, rather than by American troops.

The US is allowing its allies to take charge of the Red Sea (forming an alliance, conducting exercises, establishing cooperation), whilst it continues to control freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf.

On 12 December, seven states located on the Red Sea coast approved the creation of a new association — by all accounts, this alliance can be viewed as a ‘pilot project’ for the BSA.

The aim: to protect the Red Sea from the threat of shipping being blocked by the Houthis (Iran’s proxies).

It is noted that the idea of forming a new inter-state alliance was put forward by Saudi Arabia. The main objectives of the alliance of states located on the shores of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are ‘to strengthen security in the region, develop mutual investment and implement joint economic projects’.

As can be seen from the above, a coalition of regional countries in the Middle East is forming around Saudi Arabia.

Part 9 — Saudi Arabia — as the leader of the regional anti-Iran coalition

An analysis of Saudi Arabia’s role shows that it is gradually emerging as a key regional driver of the US strategy to contain Iran, combining economic, military and political instruments. Close interdependence with the US (energy, defence contracts, investment) makes Riyadh a central element in the formation of the anti-Iranian coalition, whilst allowing Washington to delegate some of its regional leadership functions.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia’s position is complicated by a web of conflicting issues: competition with Turkey for influence in the region, crises in relations with the US (notably over the ‘Khashoggi affair’) and a long-standing confrontation with Iran. Despite this, there remains a tendency towards situational rapprochement with Washington, manifested, in particular, in a willingness to bear part of the costs (as in the case of Syria’s reconstruction) and to support US regional initiatives.

Thus, Saudi Arabia acts as a key pillar of the new regional architecture, through which the strategy of limiting Iranian influence is implemented. Its role lies in combining the functions of a regional coalition leader and an instrument of US policy, allowing the US to maintain influence whilst minimising its own direct involvement in the region.

More on this below.

Let us consider the changes in the balance of power and the situation in the Middle East should the US proceed with its plans to withdraw its troops from Syrian territory.

Saudi Arabia – as the leader of the regional anti-Iranian coalition

US-Saudi relations – The United States is Saudi Arabia’s largest trading partner, and Saudi Arabia is one of the US’s largest export markets in the Middle East. Both countries have signed a framework investment and trade agreement. The continued availability of reliable sources of oil, particularly from Saudi Arabia, is vital to the prosperity of the United States, as well as Europe and Japan. Saudi Arabia is one of the leading sources of oil for the United States, supplying over one million barrels per day to the American market.

Saudi Arabia is also a major creditor to the US. As of March 2016, the US national debt to Saudi Arabia stood at $116.8 billion. Relations between the two countries have been strained following the death of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul.

Jamal Ahmad Hamza Khashoggi, Khashoggi — a journalist, columnist and writer from Saudi Arabia, who gained prominence as a critic of the US government and his own country. He was brutally murdered on 2 October 2018 on the premises of the Saudi Arabian consulate in Istanbul. His body was dismembered and disposed of. The murder led to increased tensions in Saudi Arabia’s relations with Turkey, the US and other countries.

According to the US president, the defence contract between the two countries, signed during his visit to Riyadh in May of the year before last for a record $109.7 billion, has created 450,000 jobs in the US. “If they don’t buy it from us, they’ll buy it from Russia, China or other countries, and Russia and China would very much like that,” Trump told reporters, commenting on the possibility of halting US arms supplies to Saudi Arabia. Neither Russia nor China will certainly sever ties with Saudi Arabia over the missing journalist. On the contrary, they will use the situation to strengthen cooperation.

Saudi Arabia is important to Donald Trump not only in terms of contracts. His administration’s entire Middle East policy was built precisely on close ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:

• First and foremost, this was an alliance aimed at isolating Iran, which is a priority for both countries.

• In return for Riyadh’s political and military support, the US also secured Saudi approval for the American initiative to reconcile Israel and Palestine.

• A rift with Washington could bring Saudi Arabia closer to Iran, which is always ready for such a scenario.

Turkey and Saudi Arabia

Turkey and Saudi Arabia: the two countries are constantly vying for influence in the Islamic world, as well as for the right to be called the US’s main ally in the Middle East. And recently, the Saudis have been far more successful in this regard. At the same time, ‘in public’ Turkey and Saudi Arabia maintain the appearance of equal relations, with Saudi investment in the Turkish economy on the rise, and this has outweighed their diplomatic rivalry.

But as a result of the murder, the Saudi security services have given the Turkish security services a serious trump card for blackmail and for sowing discord in the alliance between Riyadh and Washington. Yet US-Turkish relations have also improved dramatically. There is a theory being discussed in Arab expert circles. Khashoggi was killed to frame the Saudi royal family. The conflict between the journalist and the young heir to the throne was all too obvious. There is a long queue of those wishing to remove Mohammed bin Salman from the throne.

Washington may also have an interest in weakening Mohammed bin Salman, having realised that the young heir is difficult to control – he is too ambitious and unpredictable. The US President hinted that Riyadh must pay Washington for its security, otherwise the current king would not last two weeks in power. These words were spoken just a few hours after the Saudi journalist disappeared without trace, but the news had not yet spread through the global media.

The prince’s response came a few days later, at the height of the scandal. In an interview with Bloomberg, he pointed out that Saudi Arabia has existed longer than the US, and pays a considerable sum for the weapons it receives – money that Washington so desperately needs. At the same time, the prince softened his response, saying that different situations can arise between friends and that Trump’s words had not damaged relations between the countries, but it was clear that he had been stung.

But it may well be that Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the US will find a solution that suits everyone, and the ‘Khashoggi affair’ will gradually die down. In search of such options, including Riyadh’s voluntary admission of an unintentional killing, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visited Saudi Arabia. If a compromise is reached, Riyadh will become even more dependent on Washington.

It seems that the reconciliation process is indeed underway, as Saudi Arabia has agreed to contribute funds in place of the US towards Syria’s reconstruction, indicating that the plan to create a regional coalition is continuing to be implemented.

And the fact that Syria’s reconstruction will be funded by regional players is of great significance in reducing the influence of Russia and Iran on the country ahead of the upcoming elections and may accelerate internal processes towards a peaceful settlement. It also has implications for the country’s future development and the direction of its involvement in coalitions.

Saudi Arabia and Iran

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran — particularly since the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1979) — have been very strained, as Riyadh accuses Tehran of supporting the Shia opposition, whilst Iran, in turn, accuses Saudi Arabia of violating the rights of the Shia minority. Another source of contention is the issue of Iranian pilgrims’ Hajj to Mecca and Medina, which are under Saudi Arabian control. Bilateral relations have been severed twice (in 1988 and 2016) on Saudi Arabia’s initiative.

Saudi Arabia is therefore keen to establish a regional anti-Iranian coalition under its leadership within such an alliance.

The British newspaper The Times reported that the main focus of the ongoing negotiations on forming an ‘Arab NATO’ alliance, led by Saudi Arabia, is on military training and defence, and noted that one of the options under discussion is the creation of a regional missile defence shield similar to Israel’s ‘Iron Dome’ system.

Part 10 — The Israel security factor and its involvement in the anti-Iran coalition

An analysis of the Israel factor shows that its gradual involvement in the anti-Iranian coalition is becoming one of the key elements of the new US regional strategy. Despite the absence of formalised relations with some Arab states, a gradual rapprochement is taking place based on the common threat posed by Iran, manifesting itself in both the security and economic spheres.

At the same time, Israel acts not only as a member of the coalition but also as an independent military and deterrent factor, particularly in the Syrian theatre, where it demonstrates a readiness to act independently to limit Iran’s presence. This creates an additional level of pressure on Iran and, at the same time, complicates Russia’s position, as it lacks sufficient leverage over Tehran but is forced to take Israel’s demands into account in the settlement process.

Thus, the inclusion of Israel in the regional configuration enhances the effectiveness of the US anti-Iran strategy by combining military, political and economic components. A coalition model is taking shape, where a shared threat serves as the basis for gradually resolving differences between the players, and Israel itself becomes one of the key instruments for containing Iran in the region.

More on this below.

The factor of Israel’s security and its involvement in the anti-Iranian coalition

It is worth recalling that initially, in its demands on Iran, the US called for an end to any threats against its main allies in the region: Israel, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and that in exchange for Riyadh’s political and military support, the US also secured Saudi approval for the American initiative on Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation.

A speech by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu last August at a military parade in Haifa also points to significant shifts in relations between Israel and the Arab countries of the region. The head of the Israeli government effectively came to the defence of the Saudi oil tankers attacked by Yemeni rebels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. He promised that the Jewish state could take part in an operation to unblock the waterway as part of a specific international coalition. “If Iran attempts to block Bab el-Mandeb (presumably with the help of Yemeni rebels), I am confident that it will face an international coalition that is determined to prevent this,” said the Israeli Prime Minister. “This coalition will also include the State of Israel and its armed forces.”

Israel and Saudi Arabia do not currently have official diplomatic relations. However, news agencies frequently report on behind-the-scenes cooperation between the two countries in the diplomatic and intelligence spheres, particularly regarding Iran.

A founding member of the League of Arab States, Saudi Arabia has supported the Palestinians’ right to establish their own state and called for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West Bank, which has been occupied by Israel since 1967. Saudi Arabia played an active role in the attempt to establish a Palestinian government capable of negotiating with Israel. In recent years, Saudi Arabia has changed its approach to negotiations with Israel.

In 2005, Saudi Arabia announced the end of its economic and political boycott of Israel, as it had joined the WTO, and under the organisation’s rules, one member state cannot impose a complete boycott on another. However, the Saudi boycott was not entirely lifted. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia acknowledges that its ally, the US, maintains strong and supportive ties with Israel.

In March 2018, the Times of Israel, citing the UAE-based Al Khaleej Times, reported that, according to an unnamed Palestinian official, there had been a significant thaw in relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, which, however, remained unofficial.Furthermore, the London-based Arabic newspaper Al-Arabi Al-Jadid reported in early March that the Saudi Crown Prince had secretly met with representatives of the Israeli government to discuss the Middle East peace initiative proposed by the White House administration.

On 3 April 2018, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed stated in an interview with the American magazine ‘The Atlantic’ that ‘Israel has a right to exist’. Egypt is also quietly cooperating with Israel to ensure security on the Sinai Peninsula. “Israel is no longer the main enemy in the region,” a source told The Times of Israel.

The Lebanese television channel Al-Mayadeen reported that in mid-June 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman al-Saud at the initiative of Crown Prince Abu-Dabi Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. According to , the meeting discussed the so-called ‘deal of the century’ being promoted by US President Donald Trump’s administration, the status of Jerusalem and opportunities for economic cooperation between the countries. According to Israel’s Channel 10, sources in Jerusalem deny this information.

Oman has also granted Israeli national carrier El Al permission to use its airspace, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in early December. The agreements may serve as a further sign of a thaw in Israel’s relations with the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The leaders of the Jewish state are seeking closer ties with the Arab monarchies, banking on the fact that shared interests and threats will outweigh the unresolved conflict with the Palestinians. Israel views these countries as natural allies in curbing Iran’s growing influence in the region and as solvent consumers of its advanced technologies.

I would also like to highlight this signal from Israel and the US.

On 27 November, Israel announced that by the end of 2025 it plans to build the EastMed gas pipeline to Europe, with a capacity of 20 billion cubic metres per year. This represents 10% of Gazprom’s supply volume: in 2017, it supplied 192 billion cubic metres to Europe. American businesses are actively involved in Israeli gas production.

Israel will supply 10% of Gazprom’s volume to Europe. In 2010, the Leviathan field was discovered off the coast of Israel. It became the largest gas field discovered in the world in the 2000s. Total reserves are estimated at 453 billion cubic metres. The gas pipeline route will run exclusively through EU member states: Cyprus, Crete, Greece and Italy. When planning the route, Israel bypassed Turkish territory.

What this means: The US is freeing Europe from its gas dependence on Gazprom not only through LNG, but also through its partners. In the future, the US may organise supplies to Europe from Arab countries via the Israeli pipeline.

Israel – Syria. Israel as a deterrent to Iran following the withdrawal of US forces from Syrian territory.

Relations between Israel and Syria are quite hostile; the countries are in the process of resolving the unresolved conflict over the Golan Heights. Israel publicly advocates a solution to the Syrian issue conditional on the complete removal of Iran’s military presence from Syrian territory and consistently emphasises this in its communications with Russia, an ally of Syria (Bashar al-Assad) and Iran. Resolving the Syrian issue (Russia’s top priority) is directly linked to the Russian Federation’s ability to influence Iran regarding its withdrawal from Syria (the issue of Israel and its security conditions) – Russia does not have such direct influence over Iran, but has attempted to act as a mediator.

Also at the same time, on 27 July, the Palestinian Ambassador to Moscow, Abdelhafiz Nofal, made a very interesting statement that ‘Palestine will agree to US mediation in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict only if Russia participates in the negotiations as a mediator’.

The Israeli press began to raise the obvious issue — that Russia is waging war against Israel through the hands of Hamas and Hezbollah.

Russia again – and again, involvement in the negotiations. One way or another, the Russian Federation cannot directly influence Israel and its demands regarding the inadmissibility of Iran’s presence on Syrian territory. Russia cannot influence Iran to leave the country. But Russia can try to influence Israel and its position in another conflict, which many countries have been working to resolve for many years, and put forward conditions favourable to itself on this issue – to bargain.

Russia cannot resolve the issue of Iran’s presence on Syrian territory, a fact it has effectively acknowledged officially; on the other hand, it is attempting to take full control of the negotiations on the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict mediated by the US, because, given the current circumstances surrounding Syria, Russia cannot allow this conflict to be resolved – it would lose its leverage over Israel and would not receive preferential treatment in addressing its priority objectives (in Syria).

On 20 November, the American publication Axios, citing members of the Israeli Knesset, reported that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu allegedly stated at a closed-door meeting that Russia had recently proposed to Israel and the US that Tehran be relieved of certain sanctions in exchange for the withdrawal of Iranian troops and proxies from Syria.

Russia proposed the exchange in order to secure an easing of sanctions against Iran; to this end, Moscow drew up a plan for the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria in exchange for an easing of sanctions against Iran by Israel and the US. It is noted that this proposal marks a shift in Russia’s position: previously, Moscow had stated that the presence of Iranian forces in Syria was legitimate. “The regime in Moscow has for the first time put forward a proposal for the total withdrawal of Iranians from Syria, linking the Syrian campaign to tensions between Washington and Tehran over the nuclear deal,” experts report.

On 21 November, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that he could not confirm reports in the American media that Moscow had allegedly recently proposed to Israel and the US that a number of sanctions against Iran be lifted in exchange for the withdrawal of Iranian forces and proxies from Syria.  “As for the specific aspect of lifting sanctions in exchange for something, I cannot confirm that,” Ryabkov told journalists in response to a question on the matter. “There were ideas that were close but not identical to this, which did not come to fruition. But we continue to look at what can be done in this area in consultation with all participants, all the countries we are currently discussing,” Ryabkov said.

In early December, Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi, a representative of the Iranian armed forces, stated that Iran does not need a military base in Syria. “Iran has no need whatsoever for a base in Syria, lest anyone wish to attack it,” Shekarchi told the IRNA news agency, recalling that Tehran provides advisory assistance to Syria and Iraq at the request of the authorities of those countries.

A delegation of Israeli military officials presented to their Russian counterparts at a meeting in Moscow on 12 December 2018 a policy of continuing to counter the Iranian presence in Syria and the use of that country to transfer weapons to the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, the Israel Defence Forces press service reported following the visit. The Russian side was represented by Major General Vasily Trushin, Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and the Israeli delegation by Major General Aaron Haliva, Head of the Operations Directorate of the Israeli General Staff.  The Israelis say that the meeting, which was arranged at the highest level, took place in a positive and professional atmosphere.

The Israeli authorities acknowledge that over the past two years, forces from Iran and its proxies have attacked the neighbouring country at least 200 times, and express their readiness to continue the campaign. When conducting operations north of its borders, Israel relies on operational communication channels with Russia to avoid accidental clashes between the two countries’ military forces. The parties are working to establish a ‘deconfliction’ system following the tragedy involving the Russian Air Force’s Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft, which was accidentally shot down by Syrian air defences on 17 September whilst repelling an Israeli air raid.

Following the announcement of the withdrawal of US forces from Syria, a series of statements were issued by Israel, the main thrust of which was that nothing has changed for Israel regarding its strategy and actions towards Iran: Israel will continue to counter Iranian activities on Syrian territory if they pose a threat to Israel.

To back up its words, on the evening of 25 December, Israel carried out a missile strike near Damascus using six Israeli F-16 fighter jets. After taking a step back, listening to all the counter-arguments from the parties involved, and observing the actions of Russia—which, incidentally, without taking any real measures, stirred up a media storm condemning this raid and justifying the air defence forces’ inaction due to an alleged threat to passenger aircraft, explained that the raid was carried out against Iranian forces that posed a threat to Israel. In essence, this was a test to see whether Russia’s behaviour would change under the new circumstances, and a confirmation of the previous status quo with Israeli aviation – namely, Russia’s non-interference.

Incidentally, it should be noted that Iraqi aircraft are currently operating in the north-eastern part of Syria, and Israeli aircraft in the south-western part.

Another interesting point in Israel’s statement is Netanyahu’s remark – he is well known for his penchant for creating intrigue: ‘…cooperation in operations in Syria and elsewhere’. Where else does Israel intend to get involved in the near future, as an ally of the US?

Putting all these events together, one might assume that the US withdrawal from Syria is not a spontaneous decision or some sort of backroom deal with Russia in exchange for ‘something’, but rather a clear plan drawn up well in advance, which was even announced by the American side beforehand.

As we can see, the US is working to establish a coalition (including a military one) in the Middle East, incorporating Israel as a strong regional player. There is no question yet of resolving all the contentious issues between these countries – that is a long and painstaking process. But as the US has outlined its strategy on this matter, to paraphrase US Permanent Representative Nikki Haley on the new plan for a peaceful settlement of the Palestinian- -Israeli conflict, which the US announced at the UN in late 2018 – ‘the plan has parts that everyone will like, and parts that no one will like, and a choice will have to be made – to focus on the parts we don’t like, and nothing will change, or to focus on the parts we do like, and move forward.”

As for the common ground among the regional players in the anti-Iran coalition, for the time being, unity is centred on the idea of countering Iran’s aggression in the region.

The US is also proposing joint economic projects, such as the Israeli pipeline and gas supplies to Europe from Arab countries (with the possibility of connection). And just as importantly – Turkey has been excluded from this project. This could bring positions even closer together and smooth out the differences between the leading players. It also gives EU countries cause to reflect on their ‘friendship’ with Russia – gas reserves in the Middle East are very, very substantial.

Part 11 — Syria and the influence of the regional anti-Iranian coalition on it. The creation and involvement of yet another regional coalition of players: Africa.

An analysis of developments surrounding Syria shows that the US withdrawal from the region does not mean a reduction in its influence, but rather a shift towards a model of indirect governance through a network of regional coalitions. The formation of an anti-Iranian bloc, attempts to reintegrate Syria into regional structures (in particular through the LAS) and the intensification of intra-regional ties are aimed at gradually ousting Iran and reducing Russia’s role in the Syrian settlement.

In parallel, the US is expanding the geographical scope of this strategy, drawing Africa in as an additional sphere of coalition influence, notably through UN mechanisms and a policy of conditional support. This creates a system in which competition with Russia and China is shifted to the global level, whilst African countries become a tool for balancing votes and decisions within international institutions.

Thus, a comprehensive multi-regional US strategy is taking shape, combining the Middle East and Africa into a single system for containing Iran and limiting Russia’s influence. Its key feature is the creation of a network of dependencies and coalitions that allow the US to maintain strategic control, minimising direct military presence whilst simultaneously increasing the ‘cost’ of other players’ participation in regional processes.

More on this below.

Let us consider the changes in the balance of power and the situation in the Middle East should the US proceed with its plans to withdraw its troops from Syrian territory.

Syria and the influence of the regional anti-Iranian coalition

Such a regional anti-Iranian coalition could automatically become anti-Russian in the region if Russia fails to balance the interests of all players. Russia is not a regional player, just like the EU countries and China – that is, all non-regional players are being pushed out of the territory and gradually ‘sidelined’ from resolving issues on the ground – a reduction in influence or an ‘increase in the cost of intervention’.

There is an attempt to dynamically draw Syria into this process – specifically, to establish intra-regional ties – negotiations on a return to the LAS (League of Arab States), the return of diplomatic missions and the opening of embassies of regional countries in Syria, and so on. All this is aimed at opening and strengthening the channels of influence of regional players in the anti-Iranian coalition, and reducing the influence of Iran and Russia in Syria ahead of the upcoming elections in that country.

Active discussions are ongoing regarding the possible restoration of Syria’s membership in the LAS.

Note:

The LAS is a regional intergovernmental organisation. The League currently comprises 21 states. It was established on 22 March 1945 on the basis of the Alexandria Protocol. The organisation’s highest body is the Council of the League, in which each member state has one vote. The League’s headquarters are in Cairo. The League of Arab States comprises 18 Arabic-speaking countries, the State of Palestine and three Muslim countries in East Africa (the Comoros, Somalia and Djibouti), which are closely linked to the Arab world. The League’s objectives are set out in the agreement signed in 1945 and include ‘strengthening ties between the participating states, developing a unified political line to facilitate cooperation between them, safeguarding their independence and sovereignty, and addressing the affairs and interests of Arab countries’. Cooperation is not limited to political aspects and also includes economic, financial, communications, cultural, social and health interactions. Furthermore, cooperation covers issues of citizenship, passports, visas and the extradition of criminals.

Since 2011, Syria, a founding member of the LAS, has not participated in the organisation’s work. At the same time, the League of Arab States has also effectively not been involved in the Syrian settlement.

Syria’s membership of the LAS was suspended in 2011 due to clashes between government forces and armed opposition groups. Furthermore, a number of Arab states recalled their ambassadors from Damascus. The Syrian authorities described the decision to suspend its membership of the organisation as unlawful.

As can be seen from the statements, Syria has the prospect of returning to the LAS, but on condition of progress in the political resolution of the civil conflict. This once again demonstrates the system of checks and balances among regional players who have actively joined the process, and their growing influence on the Syrian authorities.

A brief overview of all configurations regarding the Syrian and Iranian issues, including future periods:

Against ISIL in Syria: US (coalition + NATO) — Syria, Iran, Russia

Astana format — Syria: Russia + Iran + Turkey

Syria: The Small Group – the UK, Germany, France, the US, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, with the involvement of Egypt (working with the opposition)

JCPOA (nuclear deal): US – Iran (Russia, China, the UK, France, Germany)

‘Middle East Strategic Alliance’ (MESA)
It is planned to initially include the following in the ‘Arab NATO’ (meeting – January 2019): Jordan, Egypt and the six Gulf states (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia)

Red Sea Basin Group
On 12 December 2018, representatives of seven states at a meeting in Riyadh approved the creation of a new alliance — the Red Sea Basin Group: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Djibouti, Somalia, Sudan, Yemen and Jordan

The creation and involvement of yet another regional coalition of players: Africa

Washington intends to form a coalition of countries to combat Iran’s nuclear programme within the framework of the UN, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told journalists on 12 December. ‘The US administration intends to work not only with the Europeans – we are thinking not only of Germany, France and the UK, but also of many other European countries that share our concerns – — countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, all those who join the US efforts under our leadership to first recognise the risk posed by Iran and then develop a response so that we can fully ensure their containment,” he added.

US President Donald Trump has approved the country’s key policy directions for the African continent, US National Security Adviser John Bolton announced on 13 December 2018. “The President approved the strategy yesterday; it takes effect immediately,” Bolton said at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, where he presented the new US strategy for Africa.

The adviser noted that one of the key elements of the strategy would be a shift towards targeted aid to African countries and improving the effectiveness of such aid whilst avoiding inefficient spending.

Furthermore, the US will no longer support ineffective UN peacekeeping missions and will not provide ‘indiscriminate aid’ to African countries without taking priorities into account. ‘And we will no longer support unproductive, unsuccessful and unaccountable UN peacekeeping missions.’

“China and Russia, as the US’s main rivals in Africa, are using unfair competitive practices and acting against the interests of the continent’s peoples,” Bolton stated. “Major rival powers, namely China and Russia, are rapidly expanding their political and financial influence across Africa. They are selectively and aggressively directing their investments to gain a competitive advantage over the US,” Bolton said.

Criticism was also levelled at Russia. “Across the continent, Russia is using its political and economic ties without due regard for the rule of law and transparent governance. It continues to sell arms and energy resources to in exchange for votes (from African countries) at the UN, votes that keep ‘strongmen’ in power, undermine peace and security, and run counter to the true interests of the peoples of Africa,’ said Bolton.

The adviser added that, taken together, such actions by Russia and China constitute “a significant threat to US national interests”. He noted, however, that unlike Russia and China, the only thing the US asks of its partners in Africa is “reciprocity, not subservience”.

US policy in Africa has proved ineffective, but Washington will no longer spend billions of dollars ‘without return’. ‘From now on, the US will not tolerate the long-standing practice of aid without return, assistance without accountability and support without reform. Instead, we will begin to implement a new policy which, we hope, will yield results. Americans are a generous nation, but we insist that our money be used for the greater good… Our priority is that every American dollar that goes to Africa is spent effectively, promoting peace, stability, independence and prosperity in the region,” the adviser added.

From all that Bolton has said regarding the new US strategy in Africa, the following is clear: America will not support countries on the African continent for free and across the board; by investing money in general funds and participating in various UN missions – it wants ‘reciprocal relations’, including with regard to voting on UN decisions and their implementation. America is building its coalition within the UN, and by securing the support of African countries, particularly its allies, America will gradually deprive Russia of its allies among African nations, thereby raising the ‘stake’ for the Russian Federation regarding the support of African countries.

As we can see, Washington, using the threat from Iran, has stepped up its activities, working simultaneously in several regions: the Middle East and Africa – building regional coalitions around itself and depriving Russia of its former allies.

This strategy, which began with the withdrawal of US forces from Syria, if implemented, could strengthen US influence in the Middle East, provide an opportunity to resolve several protracted conflicts (Syria – civil war, Israel – the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Yemen – the conflict with the Houthis) and provide an impetus for resolving regional disputes between countries in the region (Israel – the Arab world, Qatar – the Arab world, etc.) through the involvement and engagement of the EU via economic projects (excluding Russia and Iran) in an alliance with countries in the region (for example, an Israeli gas pipeline with the possibility of connecting Arab countries to it in the future), and thus, a reduction in Russia’s influence over EU countries and their dependence on energy supplies from the Russian Federation.

Part 12 — The ‘Regional Coalition Pilot Project’ in the Middle East — as a blueprint for a future alliance of US regional coalitions.

Regional coalitions as a ‘pilot project’ for US strategies in the future

It can be assumed that this ‘pilot project’ — a shift in US strategy as a whole — involves a move ‘from international policeman’ to the creation of an international ‘corporation of regional coalition allies’.

The rhetoric in the US is shifting towards raising the ‘stake’ for Russia regarding its presence in Syria and its influence on processes as a non-regional country: ‘Let’s talk about Syria, let’s note the fact that IS is Russia’s enemy, IS is Assad’s enemy, IS is Turkey’s enemy. Are we to maintain a presence in Syria for generations to come, spilling American blood to fight the enemy of all these countries? When did Americans commit to participating in every war, in every conflict wherever it may be on the planet? Let’s not shed American blood to fight the enemies of other countries. That is the situation with Syria.”

21.12.18

The essence of the strategy in my own words: to divide the world into regions, identify regional leaders, and build regional coalitions around them, participating in regional processes remotely – from a distance, through allied leaders, without direct military intervention, but with strong economic support (possibly via the defence industry), with management or advisory assistance from the centre, taking regional interests into account (both economic – where necessary, proposing or organising the replacement of economic partners both locally and from other regions of allied coalitions – and military-political ones – resolving ‘frozen conflicts’, contentious issues, curbing the influence or interference of opponents, etc.) and with the use of the instrument of ‘US economic sanctions’ against opponents or the threat of military suppression/intervention by countries of the regional coalition.

In other words, the scheme is as follows:

• The US oversees the international handling of the issue (the UN platform, etc.), highlighting the issue, involving major allies such as the EU in the discussion, or providing information support for them. Next, after proposing a settlement option to the opponent – more substantive negotiations or the imposition of a sanctions regime by the US in the event of refusal.

• Following international economic isolation (whether partial (as in Russia and Cuba) or complete (as in Iran and Syria), and at this historical stage, due to the threat of secondary US sanctions – so that the sanctions become international – there is no need to implement and approve them through the UN, where Russia and China hold veto power) – the transition to the regional level: the creation of a regional coalition on the ground, led by the most influential country in the region – the regional leader.

• Subsequently, the finer and more nuanced work is carried out directly by the regional coalition itself with the opponent (negotiations, influence-building, persuasion, bargaining, monitoring of compliance with commitments, etc.).

• At this stage, the US carries out supporting work (providing support, consultations, receiving and processing results, adjusting strategies, providing various forms of assistance, monitoring funds allocated to such coalitions and the commitments they have undertaken, identifying and countering the opponent’s influence, etc.), whilst remaining above the regional process.

• This allows for the simultaneous resolution of several tasks, the monitoring and management of processes (through regional coalition leaders) across multiple regions at once, and the identification of hidden overlaps in the opponent’s interests across different regions, thereby weakening their influence simultaneously across the entire international arena. And not just in a single region.

The strategy in outline. (see Fig. 1)

Fig. 1. US strategy.

The model presented here reveals the systematic logic of multi-level governance on the part of the US, where the key is not direct domination, but the organisation of the process through the sequential combination of global, sanctions-based and regional levels. The US frames the issue at the international level, legitimises it by engaging allies and providing information support, and then moves on to instruments of pressure and negotiation, whilst retaining the option of escalation through a sanctions mechanism not tied to UN institutions.

The next stage involves delegating operational management to the regional level through the creation of coalitions led by local leaders who interact directly with the opponent. This allows the US to remain ‘above the process’, acting as a coordinator, controller and corrector, whilst minimising its own costs and the political risks of direct intervention.

Ultimately, this architecture enables the US to exert simultaneous influence across multiple regions, identify and exploit the opponent’s conflicting interests, and systematically weaken their position on a global scale. In effect, this is a model of distributed control, where regional coalitions serve as instruments for implementing the strategy, and the US acts as the centre for integrating and managing the entire system.

The US no longer wishes to be the ‘international policeman’; it plans to become the ‘international arbiter’, replacing the UN platform due to the impossibility of changing Russia and China’s positions on its reform to eliminate the privilege of the ‘veto’ and thus the blocking of critically important international decisions.  Regional coalitions on the ground will take on the role of ‘police’.

What does this mean for Ukraine?

Firstly, given that Russia blocks decisions at the UN through its veto power and refuses to reform this provision, decisions regarding the Ukrainian issue are also frozen. Proposals to deploy UN peacekeepers across the entire territory of the ORDLO, as an attempt to break the deadlock in the settlement process, will not pass a UN vote for this reason. Therefore, finding a way around the decisions blocked by Russia at the UN is very important for Ukraine.

Secondly, if this US strategy is implemented in Syria, it will mean a significant freeing up of US resources for work in other regions, including in the Ukrainian theatre, which Russia fears greatly. We must consider our ability to complicate Russia’s position: if, whilst resolving the Syrian issue, it faces additional problems in other regions under its control (which it is currently trying to freeze as much as possible due to a lack of funds to cover multiple fronts) – perhaps Ukraine should focus more attention on them or increase pressure there, as a diversionary tactic? (for example, by obstructing the implementation of the ‘Khorovod’ scheme) and strengthen cooperation with regional players on the ground.

Thirdly, by understanding the US strategy, Ukraine can become more actively involved in this process when the time comes, drawing on the experience of countries that are participants in the ‘pilot project’ of such a strategy – preparing in advance for consideration a specific package of possible compromises, proposals, incentives, projects (involving other potential regional players) and so on, taking into account, in particular, the positive and negative outcomes of the participants in the Middle East regional coalition.