THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE CONFLICTS IN SYRIA AND UKRAINE AS A HYBRID INSTRUMENT OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY 2019

(published in 2019)

The study establishes a clear logic: Russia applies a standardised algorithm of actions in various conflicts, adapting it to specific conditions whilst retaining the basic structure. The key element is the artificial creation of external similarities between conflicts, which allows:

• promote identical settlement mechanisms;

• legitimise its own actions through analogies with other cases.

The study clearly demonstrates that such ‘similarity’ is determined by several factors:

• autonomy within a unitary state;

• constitutional changes;

• the participation of “conflict parties” in the political process;

• deployment of peacekeepers;

• resource base (oil/coal).

In other words, a conflict matrix is being formed, which the Russian Federation is attempting to replicate across different regions.

However, the central analytical focus of the text is the fundamental difference in the nature of the conflicts:

• Syria — an internal ethnic conflict;

• Ukraine — an externally induced (artificially created) conflict.

This means that identical conflict resolution tools are, by definition, unsuitable here, but the Russian Federation is attempting to impose them precisely because of the manufactured ‘similarity’.

Next comes a deeper mechanism — ‘substitution of concepts’ as a strategic tool:

• “national minority” → “Russian-speaking minority”;

• “military groups” → “political actors”;

• “separatists” → “negotiating party”.

This allows:

1. alter the legal framework of the conflict;

2. legalise the actors under their control;

3. create grounds for international recognition of their own demands.

Another important aspect is the creation of a precedent: if the international community accepts one such model (for example, in Syria), it can be used as an argument for:

• Ukraine;

• other European countries (due to the ‘Russian-speaking’ factor).

In other words, Russia is not merely operating within the confines of a specific conflict, but is developing a universal tool of influence.

Conclusion: The Russian Federation uses conflicts as a platform to test and scale a single hybrid model of influence, based on three key elements:

1. creating artificial analogies between different conflicts;

2. imposing identical settlement mechanisms;

3. substituting basic concepts to legitimise these mechanisms.

The critical risk lies not in the scenario itself, but in its international recognition as a ‘normal’ approach. If such a model is accepted in even a single case, it becomes a precedent that the Russian Federation will be able to:

• apply to Ukraine;

• scale up to other European countries;

• use to expand its spheres of influence.

Key conclusion: this is not about resolving specific conflicts, but about the Russian Federation’s attempt to create a universal negotiation and legal model that allows it to legitimise control over foreign territories through the mechanism of “analogies” and the substitution of concepts.

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC: THE KURDISH ISSUE IN SYRIA.

The positions of the main players:

• USA;

• Turkey;

• Syria.

Russia is acting as a mediator in resolving the issue of Kurdish independence with the Syrian authorities

OUTWARD SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE PROBLEM

• of the Kurds in Syria and the quasi-state entities ‘LNR/DNR’ created by Russia in Ukraine

• Russia’s specific actions in Syria and Ukraine are also similar.

DIFFERENCES IN THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICTS IN UKRAINE AND SYRIA.

• There has never been, and there is not currently, any inter-national, inter-ethnic or inter-confessional internal conflict in Ukraine.

• Therefore, the scenarios for resolving the situation in Syria and Ukraine cannot be identical.

ON THE POSSIBLE CREATION OF A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT NOT ONLY FOR UKRAINE BUT ALSO FOR EUROPE IN THE FUTURE — THE SUBSTITUTION OF TERMS:

• In the Ukrainian context, efforts are ongoing to replace the concept of ‘national or ethnic minority’ with that of ‘Russian-speaking minority’, treating them as synonymous or equivalent;

• As an example: possible consequences for Germany;

• As an example: the substitution of terms in Libya.

CONCLUSION

Attempts to equate and proposals for similar approaches in resolving two conflicts that are entirely different in nature (Syria – Kurds, Ukraine – ORDLO) constitute one of the hybrid instruments of the Russian Federation’s aggressive foreign policy.

INTRODUCTION

The Russian Federation’s modus operandi in various regions of the world is generally based on identical approaches, leading to situations in those regions unfolding according to similar scenarios.

A deep understanding of the nature of the Russian side’s actions in one of the world’s conflict regions makes it possible to predict its next steps in another conflict with a high degree of certainty.

First and foremost, of course, we are interested in Ukraine.

Indeed, observing Russia’s attempts to implement its ‘Security Concept in the Persian Gulf’ scenario, we see a certain similarity with the logic of its actions in the Kerch Strait and the Black Sea (if not in their entirety, then in certain aspects). And the ‘peacekeepers in the Idlib zone’ fit perfectly into the scenario that Russia is trying to play out in Ukraine with ‘peacekeepers on the line of contact with the ORDLO’.

Many similar examples could be cited, but the clearest parallels with Ukraine are currently evident in the attempt to resolve the Kurdish issue in Syria. We therefore propose to examine this in more detail.

INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC: THE KURDISH ISSUE IN SYRIA

Let us identify, very broadly, the main players:

• The US (supports the Syrian Kurds)

• Turkey (supports opposition forces against Bashar al-Assad and is in fierce conflict with the Syrian Kurds)

• Syria (Bashar al-Assad’s regime opposes Kurdish independence)

• Syrian Kurds, who seek independence within Syria (supported by the US and the West as a whole)

To begin with, let us establish who could act as a mediator in resolving the issue of Kurdish independence with the Syrian authorities?

In Syria (under Bashar al-Assad), there are two allies — Russia and Iran — which could exert influence or pressure on Damascus in decision-making regarding the Kurds.

The US has no direct (official) contacts with either Syria or Iran, but maintains contact with Russia.

Thus, it is Russia that comes to the fore in this matter.

Furthermore, let us recall that in the process of resolving the situation in Syria, international players, in accordance with UN Resolution 2254, approved the following plan of action: the creation of a constitutional committee, the drafting of a new constitution, and the restructuring of the country’s government under the new constitution.

Initially, the resolution of political issues was entrusted to the Constitutional Committee, which comprised representatives of the current Assad regime, civil society and the opposition (50/50/50). However, reality has shown that its work is easily blocked and dragged out indefinitely. This committee was supposed to resolve, among other things, the Kurdish issue.

Let us now look at the recent chain of events, which is setting new priorities in the realities of the political process of conflict resolution in Syria.

Let us begin with the US withdrawal from the northern regions of the country, following Turkey’s operation against the Kurds to create the so-called ‘buffer zone’ in October 2019.

The Americans carried out a series of manoeuvres involving withdrawal, re-entry, a subsequent partial return and the redeployment of their forces to the Kurdish-controlled oil fields in the Euphrates Valley, as they claimed, for their joint protection against ISIL, Syria and Russia.

Washington’s official position:

• The US is present in Syria to fight ISIS.

• The US supports the Kurds in their fight against ISIS.

• They are providing assistance to the Kurds, in particular regarding the detention of ISIS militants whom the international community refuses to take back (we are talking about around 6,000 militants and a further 12,000 members of their families).

• This requires funding – for this purpose, in particular, revenue from oil fields, which the Americans now guard, is being used.

In effect, the US has achieved all its objectives, but most importantly, it has risen above the situation ‘on the ground’, shifting from the role of ‘direct participant’ to that of ‘international arbiter’.

At the same time, US representatives, notably the country’s Defence Secretary Mark Esper, have stated that they did not promise the Kurds assistance in granting them autonomy in Syria. This is done to ensure that no claims can be levelled against America regarding the issue of internal interference in the affairs of another country.

In reality, the US is managing these issues by delegating their resolution to the players remaining ‘on the ground’ – Syria, Russia, Turkey and Iran – whilst elevating the status of the Kurds themselves through its presence at the oil fields, positioning them as new legitimate participants in the political process (by introducing the energy factor).

Turkey’s position on the Kurds boils down to a few key points:

Firstly, there must be no independent (or even semi-independent) Kurdish entity on Syrian territory, under any name or in any form. To this end, Turkey has blocked the participation of Syrian Kurds (representatives of the ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF)) in the Constitutional Committee.

The Syrian Constitutional Committee includes Kurds, but there are no representatives of the ‘Syrian Democratic Forces’ (SDF) on the committee – Turkey has imposed a ‘veto’. Consequently, the Kurds will not be able to put forward their demands for autonomy at the level of the committee for discussion regarding inclusion in the new constitution.

Indeed, Ilham Ahmed, the chair of the Executive Committee of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Council (SDC), who is not represented on the Constitutional Committee, “expressed regret that Syrian Kurds are not participating in the Constitutional Committee due to Turkey’s veto”.

Secondly, the number of (Syrian) Kurds in possession of weapons must be reduced ‘to a minimum’.

Currently, the Russian side has cited a figure of 63,000 such fighters. An attempt was made to resolve this issue by proposing that the Kurds ‘join’ the ranks of the Syrian army. However, without a resolution to the political issues, the Kurds refused, leaving the door open for negotiations.

Syria’s (Bashar al-Assad’s) position, however, is unequivocal: ‘The SAR is a unitary state’. Bashar al-Assad needs this to preserve his own power, maintain control over territories and the population during the upcoming elections, and to avoid punishment for the consequences of the civil war and crimes committed against his own people.

Naturally, the Syrian authorities express their reluctance to draft a new constitution, believing that a few amendments to the old one will suffice, and will do everything in their power to obstruct and delay the work of the Constitutional Committee, which is precisely what we are witnessing now.

The situation has reached an impasse.

In our view, all these factors and contradictions create favourable conditions for Russia to put forward its proposals for resolving the Kurdish issue in such a way that they can then easily be applied to the process of resolving the conflict with the ORDLO in Ukraine.

After all, if Russia manages to resolve the Kurdish issue in Syria, it can certainly count on the gratitude of the international community (primarily the US) and propose to resolve yet another international problem – in Ukraine – in exactly the same way, only to its own advantage.

SUMMARY OF THE MAIN TEXT

And the superficial similarity between the Kurdish issue in Syria and the quasi-state entities ‘LNR/DNR’ created by Russia in Ukraine is, of course, evident. (see Fig. 1)

OUTER SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE KURDISH ISSUE AND THE ORDLO

Outward similarity:

an attempt to establish autonomy within a unitary state:

• Syrian Kurdistan

• DPR and LPR (ORDLO)

support for opposing sides by the same global players in reverse order:

• the Kurds (separatists) are supported by the US and Europe, whilst the Syrian government is supported by Russia

• the ‘DPR and LPR’ authorities (separatists) are supported by Russia, whilst the Ukrainian authorities are supported by the US and the EU

Resolution of the issue through constitutional amendment

• Demand for the adoption of a new constitution

• Demand for constitutional reform

energy-rich region

• in Syria – it is oil,

• in the Donbas – it is coal

Possible deployment of peacekeepers (between the warring parties – as one of the options for addressing the issue in various interpretations)

• between Turkey and the Kurds on Syrian territory;

• between Ukraine and the ORDLO.

Russia’s specific actions in Syria and Ukraine are also similar. (see Fig. 2)

RUSSIA’S ACTIONS TOWARDS RESOLVING THE KURDISH AND UKRAINIAN ISSUES

Russia’s actions:

Consolidating autonomy whilst preserving territorial integrity.

• Demonstration by the Russian Federation of support for the Kurds in their quest to enshrine autonomy in the Constitution, even though Russia is an ally of Assad, who opposes this. “All Kurds in Syria must be included in the Syrian Constitution”

• The Steinmeier formula in the Constitution of Ukraine: The ‘DPR and LPR’ should be granted special status, enshrined on a permanent basis in the Constitution of Ukraine

Constitutional issues

• Inclusion of Kurds in the Constitutional Committee

• Representation of the ORDLO in the drafting of Ukraine’s new Constitution

Direct contact between the parties

• Establishing direct contact between the Kurds and the Syrian authorities – Syria was opposed, not recognising the legitimacy of Kurdish authority on their territory;

• Establishing direct contact between the ORDLO authorities and Ukraine (an attempt to organise inter-parliamentary dialogue in the Normandy format)

Integration of paramilitary units into security forces

• Establishment of a local Kurdish police force and preservation of the current local Kurdish authorities

• Similar actions in the ORDLO

However, despite the apparent similarities between the situations in Syria and Ukraine, it is essential to fully understand the DISTINCTIVE nature of the origins of these conflicts and to firmly counter any attempts by the Russian Federation to follow the same script in the process of their resolution.

Equating the entirely different aspirations of the parties to these conflicts for autonomy could set a dangerous precedent, initially for Ukraine, and in the near future for the whole of Europe.

And the difference in the nature of the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria is fundamental – it lies in the basis of their emergence and the subsequent aspirations of the participants. (see Fig. 3)

THE DIFFERENCE IN THE NATURE OF CONFLICTS IN SYRIA AND UKRAINE

DIFFERENCES:

Causes — the nature of conflicts

• An internal inter-ethnic conflict;

• a conflict based on language, artificially provoked and controlled by an external party (Russia);

Attempts at external integration

• The Kurds seek autonomy within Syria;

• The desire of the unrecognised authorities of the ORDLO to integrate into Russia. Russian passportisation (issuing passports of another state, Russian citizenship);

The Russian side has repeatedly stated at the highest official level that

in Syria:

• Kurds, like any other ethnic or religious minority, must be guaranteed inalienable linguistic, cultural and other rights, whilst adhering to the principle of territorial integrity.

In Ukraine:

• Speaking at a meeting of the UN Security Council (16 July 2019), Russia’s Permanent Representative V. Nebenzia stated that ‘Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine are not a national minority in the classical sense of the term’. However, ‘… sources and surveys allegedly show that the Russian language in Ukraine, as before, is the native language or the language predominantly used for communication by the majority of the country’s population’.

Let us emphasise once again – the nature of these conflicts is entirely different and incompatible. There has never been, and there is not now, any inter-national, inter-ethnic or inter-confessional internal conflict in Ukraine. Therefore, the scenarios for resolving the situation in Syria and in Ukraine cannot be identical.

This is where the main danger lies – ‘the devil is in the detail’.

ON THE POSSIBLE CREATION OF A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT

Let us now return to the question of the potential creation of a dangerous precedent not only for Ukraine, but also for Europe in the future.

A positive resolution of the issue regarding the Syrian Kurds, ensuring their integration into Syrian society and the state structure at a decent level, is in the interests first and foremost of both the US and the collective West. Russia, as the main mediator with influence over Bashar al-Assad, can assist them in this process. And if Russia manages to resolve the issue with the Kurds according to the scenario outlined above, it will be a victory for all.

But Russia will turn such a victory against Ukraine, demanding the same approach to resolving the Ukrainian issue.

Here, a consolidated position of the collective West will be crucial, based on the understanding that the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine cannot be equated simply because Russia proposes identical scenarios for their resolution.

If the collective West, at Russia’s suggestion, treats the resolution of these two conflicts—which are entirely different in nature—as equivalent—that is, resolving them according to a single scenario—the result will be an international precedent that Russia will not only develop but also actively exploit in the territories of other countries, primarily in Europe.

Such a precedent could develop into the recognition of Russian-speaking citizens as a ‘national minority’, which would open up enormous opportunities for Russia to increase its influence, exert pressure and destabilise the situation in many countries.

THIS IS A MISREPRESENTATION OF TERMS.

For example, we have recently been hearing increasingly frequent statements from representatives of the multi-million-strong Russian diaspora in Germany regarding the infringement of their rights to use the Russian language (on 16 December, the Left Party parliamentary group in the Bundestag submitted a parliamentary question to the government demanding clarification of the situation regarding the Russian language in Germany (the authors of the inquiry, MPs Sarah Wagenknecht and Dietmar Bartsch, and other members of the parliamentary group).

The politicians have put 46 questions to the government regarding various aspects of the use and support of the Russian language in Germany (in particular: what measures the government is taking to support the study of Russian).

There are a total of 6 million Russian speakers in Germany. If we also consider Russia’s need to fully control (including providing enhanced security for) its strategic asset — the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline (an energy factor) — which many find unsatisfactory, then the problems Ukraine is currently facing may well be encountered by Germany in the near future.

A little more on the semantic shifts employed by Russia

Misrepresentation of concepts in Libya. On 19 January, an International Conference on Libya took place in Berlin. The participating countries drew up a 55-point plan, which is being presented for approval and implementation at the UN.

Now, according to Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, there is a point in the plan that we find interesting: ‘There is a section on the political process, on how to resolve Libya’s economic problems, taking into account that all Libyan parties — religious, military and political groups — must have access to natural resources’.

In other words, military groups in the country are equated with religious and political ones. This is not only a legalisation of Haftar’s actions, but also a substitution of concepts in the political track, which is to be approved by the UN.

The substitution of concepts in key documents is something the Russian Federation seeks to achieve in other conflicts as well.

Indeed, in the Ukrainian context, efforts are ongoing to replace the term ‘national minority’ with ‘Russian-speaking minority’, treating them as synonymous or equivalent.

CONCLUSION:

The conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, despite their outward similarities, have entirely different origins.

Attempts to equate them and proposals for similar approaches to resolution are one of the hybrid tools of the Russian Federation’s aggressive foreign policy.

Attempting to resolve these fundamentally different conflicts according to a single scenario will not only fail to succeed but may also set a dangerous precedent for other countries, particularly in Europe.