RUSSIA – IRAN. WHO IS USING WHOM 2019

(published on 28 January 2019)

The study demonstrates a multi-layered configuration in which US sanctions policy against Iran is becoming a tool for reshaping a broader system of relations, including Russia, the EU and regional energy markets. The US operates through a combined model: direct pressure on Iran + secondary sanctions against all parties involved + targeted exemptions (e.g. pipeline projects), which allows it to manage the behaviour of allies and competitors simultaneously.

In this configuration, Russia formally acts as Iran’s ally (Syria, energy, the Eurasian Economic Union), but in fact is using the situation to strengthen its economic position:

• it captures markets for Iranian oil,

• benefits from barter schemes (‘oil for goods’),

• integrating Iran into its own economic networks (EAEU, transport corridors).

In other words, an asymmetrical model is emerging: Iran under sanctions → dependent on alternative mechanisms → Russia controls part of these mechanisms → gains additional influence.

At the same time, the EU is attempting to balance between the US and its own economic interests by creating mechanisms to circumvent sanctions, but remains vulnerable to American pressure. The US, in turn, is selectively shaping the region’s energy and logistics architecture (the Caspian Sea, gas supplies, alternative routes) through sanctions and exemptions.

The Caspian region and transport and energy projects (TANAP, ‘North–South’) serve as an arena of competition between Russia, Iran, the US and the EU, where economic decisions directly influence the geopolitical balance.

Conclusion: The Russian-Iranian ‘partnership’ is instrumental in nature and is not an equal one: Russia is using Iran’s isolation under sanctions to bind it economically and politically, whilst simultaneously strengthening its own position in energy markets and regional projects.

The US, in turn, uses sanctions not only to contain Iran but also to indirectly influence Russia and the EU, setting the rules of the game and forcing all actors to operate within defined boundaries.

The result is a system in which:

• Iran is the target of pressure and dependency,

• Russia is an opportunistic beneficiary seeking to capitalise on the situation,

• the EU is a balancing but constrained player,

• The US is the architect of the framework for interaction.

Key logic: sanctions become not merely an instrument of punishment, but a mechanism for redistributing influence and control over economic flows and alliances.

Part 1. Introduction.

Part 2. US sanctions pressure in the ‘US-Iran’ conflict on Iran, on other countries, in particular EU countries, and on the Russian Federation

• Iran’s attempt to resolve the sanctions issue through the UN court.

• US sanctions policy against Iran — continued.

• US sanctions policy against other countries cooperating with Iran (including the EU) – secondary sanctions – ongoing.

• US sanctions policy against Iran and Russia, which cooperate with Syria – secondary sanctions – ongoing.

Part 3. The economic aspect for Iran and Russia

Part 4. The economic aspect for the West

Part 5. The problem of Iran’s presence in Syria for Russia: the Israel factor

Part 6. Main threats from Iran

Part 7. Conclusion: The US withdrawal from Syria – how this may affect the US confrontation with Iran.

Part 1. The multifaceted nature of the Iranian issue

In the ‘introduction to the topic’, we noted that there are issues between Ukraine’s allies: whilst there is currently an alliance between the US and the EU on the issues of Ukraine and Syria, there are already differences between the US and the EU on the issue of Iran. This may indicate that other US-EU alliances (for example, in Syria and Ukraine) could also shift, and why this is dangerous for Ukraine.

In this article, we will examine the development of the conflict between the US and Iran in its dynamics, the involvement of European countries, China and Russia in it, as well as which instruments the EU is preparing for Iran to circumvent US sanctions, and how Russia plans to use these to advance its positions on the international stage in the future, including to weaken Ukraine’s position.

The US conflict with Iran — which is both Russia’s partner in the Caspian Five and an ally of the Russian Federation in Syria (the Astana format) — stems from the US withdrawal from the nuclear agreement (the so-called JCPOA: Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), as a result of which Western countries (the UK, France, Germany) have come out in support of Iran and the preservation of its position within the JCPOA.

Here, at the intersection of two conflicts (in Syria and Iran), it is also worth noting the position of Israel, which, on the one hand, is an ally of the US, and on the other, is in a state of complete and irreconcilable mutual confrontation with Iran and has an unresolved territorial conflict with Syria (the Golan Heights).

Note:

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is a political agreement between Iran and a group of states known as the ‘5+1’ regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. The group consisted of the US, Russia, China, the UK, France — the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) — as well as Germany.

‘In 2016, some international sanctions were lifted from Iran following the signing of an agreement to freeze its nuclear programme. Israel initially opposed this decision. Washington lifted only some of the sanctions on Iran and immediately announced the imposition of new ones — in response to Tehran’s ballistic missile programme.

Meanwhile, opposition to the JCPOA was growing in the US Congress: not only Republicans but also some Democrats spoke out against it. In their view, lifting restrictions on Tehran could lead to the strengthening of the Iranian regime and, subsequently, to the resumption of nuclear tests in circumvention of the agreement. US lawmakers described the nuclear deal with Iran as the greatest threat to the Middle East and, above all, to Israel — Washington’s main ally in the region. This view was shared by Donald Trump — at that time a US presidential candidate.

In October 2017, US President Trump stated that he would no longer assure Congress that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was in the US’s interests. This decision received support from Saudi Arabia and Israel; the EU, however, stated that the current agreement could not be denounced by the decision of a single country.

In early May 2018, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accused Iran of deception: Israeli intelligence had obtained around 100,000 documents confirming the development of nuclear weapons as part of the ‘Project Amad’ programme. Netanyahu stated that Tehran had not disclosed the existence of its nuclear programme to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), despite having signed the nuclear deal. The Prime Minister claimed that the programme had continued to operate under a different name, but with the same leadership and personnel.

On 8 May 2018, Trump announced the country’s withdrawal from the agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme. The US president stated that the US had evidence that Iran was continuing to develop nuclear weapons, thereby violating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. He also announced the reinstatement of sanctions against Tehran.

Thus, the multi-layered nature of the Iranian issue can be noted:

Confrontation:

JCPOA: US – Iran (Russia, China, UK, France, Germany)

Israel – Iran (Hezbollah and Hamas)

Against ISIS in Syria: US (coalition + NATO) – Syria, Iran, Russia

Iran’s alliances:

Caspian Five (Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan)

Syria (Russia, Iran, Syria)

Astana Format – Syria (Russia, Iran, Turkey)

Part 2. US sanctions pressure in the ‘US-Iran’ conflict on Iran, on other countries, in particular on EU countries and on the Russian Federation

On the one hand, the policies and tactics of some European countries towards Russia:

• which are experiencing certain economic difficulties due to previously imposed sanctions against the Russian Federation (in particular, their interest in direct economic projects with Russia, such as ‘Nord Stream 2’, for example),

• despite Russia’s aggressive behaviour on the international stage (the Skripal case, cyberattacks, election interference, espionage scandals, violations of the INF Treaty, etc.),

• organising and participating in armed aggression (Ukraine),

• involvement in other conflicts (Syria),

• interference in peaceful settlements in other countries with the aim of blocking them or resolving them on terms favourable to the Russian Federation as a third party (Afghanistan, Israel, Libya, the Central African Republic, etc.),

willingness to turn a blind eye to all of Russia’s ‘sins’ for the sake of economic gain – double standards that harm not only countries subjected to Russian aggression or pressure, but also international relations as a whole.

Such policies and tactics of some European countries apply not only to Russia, but also to other aggressive nations, such as Iran, for example. The EU is seeking its own interests – this is normal in today’s world. On the one hand, the EU seeks to establish its own order and pursue a policy independent of US decisions. On the other hand, at present the EU does not possess the power or the independent set of tools that could stand up to the Americans.

Thirdly, it is precisely the US’s tools – its military strength, funding and patronage – that enable the EU to develop economically. Under such circumstances, there can be no question of complete independence from the US, and this must be accepted. And if this does not happen through mutual agreements, the US forces it upon others, including its allies.

In early July, the US announced that it was ‘launching a campaign of maximum economic and diplomatic pressure on Iran. The US promises to reimpose sanctions against Iran in two stages – on 4 August and 6 November 2018’.

Among the sanctions the US planned to impose on Iran was a ban on oil supplies from that country, including to EU nations (signatories to the nuclear deal – France, the UK and Germany), which prompted a response from these countries, notably in the form of countermeasures, such as attempts to develop mechanisms to circumvent or mitigate the sanctions, as well as the introduction of blocking measures (secondary sanctions apply to countries that violate direct US sanctions, whilst Washington, in turn, has refused to grant the EU concessions regarding the imposition of sanctions against Iran).

Russia has a keen interest in the development and implementation of such mechanisms and defensive measures, having long sought similar schemes to counter US and European sanctions already imposed against it, and also planning to use or join these mechanisms, created for Iran, for its own purposes.

The threat of new sanctions from the international community severely ties the Russian Federation’s hands on the international stage and deprives it of room for manoeuvre in its aggressive policies towards Ukraine, Syria, Iran and other countries.

Recognising this point and the consequences it may lead to, the US is taking action on various fronts: against Iran directly, against countermeasures and attempts to circumvent sanctions by the EU and other countries, and against Russia and Iran in Syria for violating sanctions.

US proposals for a new nuclear deal with Iran have been made throughout the entire period of confrontation; here are a few examples:

• Late July — Trump’s proposal: ‘The US is ready to conclude a genuine agreement with Iran on its nuclear programme’.

• Early October — US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook: “US President Donald Trump remains ready to negotiate with Iran if Tehran is genuinely willing to change its behaviour. The US is prepared to offer a great deal in exchange for a new agreement with Iran that would address all of Washington’s concerns, particularly regarding Tehran’s missile programme.”

Iran’s attempt to resolve the sanctions issue through the UN court

On 17 July 2018, the UN International Court of Justice accepted a case brought by the Iranian authorities against the US in connection with the imposition of unilateral sanctions. “The Islamic Republic of Iran yesterday initiated proceedings against the United States of America at the International Court of Justice,” the UN judicial body announced. On 27 August, the court began hearing the case.

Several statements were made by the US on this matter, such as:

• US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that “Iran’s lawsuit against the US at the UN International Court of Justice is an attempt to interfere with Washington’s sovereign right to take lawful measures, including the reimposition of sanctions”

• and a US representative, acting as the defendant in court, who argued that “the US withdrawal from the JCPOA was motivated by national security considerations, and that the UN court has no jurisdiction to hear this case”

03.10.18 The International Court of Justice issued a preliminary ruling in the case regarding the US’s obligation to lift certain sanctions against Iran: ‘The UN’s highest court has ruled that the US must lift sanctions relating, in particular, to the supply of humanitarian goods to Iran’.

The ruling states that the jurisdiction of the UN International Court of Justice includes the consideration of Iran’s claim against the US authorities in accordance with Article 21 of the 1955 Treaty of Friendship between Iran and the US. The Court also called on both parties to refrain from actions that could subsequently exacerbate their differences. The ruling emphasises that throughout the entire legal proceedings, it is impermissible to cause any harm to the Iranian side.

And on the same day, 3 October 2018, the American side, represented by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, issued an official statement announcing that the US was terminating the 1955 Treaty of Friendship with Iran: ‘I hereby announce that the US is denouncing the 1955 Treaty of Friendship with Iran. This decision was long overdue, having been necessary 39 years ago (following the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries). Iran is attempting to interfere with the sovereign right of the US to take lawful and necessary measures to protect our national security. Iran is using the International Court of Justice for political and propaganda purposes.”

There you have it, short and sweet. No friendship treaty – no obligation to be friends or to have the case heard at the UN court regarding a breach of friendship. Very demonstrative, it must be said, for other countries. And prompt (presumably, the decision had been prepared in advance and they were simply waiting for the right moment).

The development of US sanctions policy against Iran

Early August 2018 – the first package of sanctions was introduced: on 4 August 2018, the US reinstated large-scale sanctions against Iran, which had previously been suspended following the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the Iranian nuclear programme.

Mid-August – Establishment of a task force on Iran and appointment of a US Special Representative for Iran, as announced by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Brian Hook (Director of the Office of Policy Planning) was appointed US Special Representative for Iran, stating that Trump would be open to dialogue with Iran if it demonstrated a willingness to ‘fundamentally change its behaviour’.

Iran’s reaction to this statement came from Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif: “The US has set up an ‘action group’ against Tehran to overthrow the government, just as happened in 1953,”

In other words, the signal sent by the US is clear to Iran: if this government does not wish to negotiate with the US, then sooner or later there will be a different government in Iran one way or another, and this is why a long-term sanctions regime is necessary.

Since, throughout this period, Iran has been behaving aggressively and making numerous threatening statements of various kinds — ranging from threats of a military blockade of the Persian Gulf and the development of new ballistic missiles to the country’s return to uranium enrichment (we will examine these in detail in another part of our review) — whilst Europe has remained silent — the US is also stepping up the tone of its warnings.

In late August 2018, US National Security Advisor John Bolton stated that the US had no intention of stopping and might resort to other measures to put pressure on Iran: ‘We will do other things to put pressure on Iran, apart from economic sanctions’ — this sounds like a serious threat, but without any specifics.

In mid-September, the new Special Representative for Iran, Brian Hook, emphasised the point that ‘the tightening of sanctions against Iran is aimed at preventing the financing of terrorism’. Bolton, meanwhile, stated that Tehran would pay a ‘damn high price’ if it tried to stand up to the US. “The regime of murderers and its supporters will face serious consequences if they do not change their behaviour. Today I want to make it clear: we are watching you, and we will come for you.”

And at the end of September, US President Donald Trump announced that “the US will continue to impose sanctions on Iran even after the previously announced package of measures, which comes into force on 5 November”.

Early October: US National Security Advisor John Bolton warned: “Our objective is to reduce Iranian oil and gas exports to zero. We will undoubtedly achieve this goal. Other countries should harbour no illusions on this matter.”

05.11.18 The US reinstated sanctions against Iran – the second package of sanctions (which existed prior to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on the Iranian nuclear programme in 2015):

• The US has added over 700 individuals, organisations, aircraft and ships from Iran to the sanctions list.

• The list includes Iran Air, the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, and 70 financial institutions, including 14 of the largest banks. Washington accuses them of financing destabilising activities.

• Iranian banks are being cut off from the SWIFT system.

• Those who continue to do business with them risk falling under secondary US sanctions, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said.

An American diplomatic source told media journalists that Iran would be able to sell oil not for cash, but in exchange for goods authorised by Washington. According to the source, these countries (which have received permission from the US) will have to transfer the money for the crude oil purchased to a special escrow account. In this way, Iran receives a kind of credit to purchase authorised goods, the list of which is determined by the US.

In mid-November, the US further escalated its rhetoric, with Bolton announcing new sanctions against Iran: ‘We will soon see new sanctions against Iran with even tougher restrictions’.

The US sanctions policy against other countries cooperating with Iran consists of secondary sanctions.

At the end of July, even before the first package of sanctions was introduced, the US took countermeasures against other countries; in particular, Republican US senators sent letters to the embassies of Germany, France and the UK in the United States warning against these countries’ intentions to circumvent US sanctions against Iran.

The US stance towards other countries is evolving.

It should be noted that the US sent a team of negotiators (an expert interagency group from the US State Department and Treasury) to key partner countries of both the US and Iran, with the aim of clarifying US tactics, strategy and position regarding Iran, possible further joint action or non-interference, as well as the position of these countries, and to prevent a clash of interests between various countries in this conflict and US interests. Furthermore, the aim is to seek compromise solutions and assistance from both the US and its allies to minimise economic losses or prevent them altogether resulting from these countries’ cessation of economic cooperation with Iran.

Alongside this individual work with representatives of each country separately, general announcements are being made.

Late August — Brian Hook, the new Special Representative for Iran: ‘The US has stated its readiness to impose secondary sanctions against countries that continue to cooperate with Iran after the first wave of sanctions comes into full effect.’

Late September — John Bolton, the White House National Security Advisor: ‘The US will not allow the European Union or anyone else to circumvent American sanctions against Iran. Last night I was concerned and indeed deeply disappointed to hear that the parties remaining in the agreement had announced the creation of a special payment system to circumvent US sanctions. This is one of the most counterproductive measures imaginable for regional and global peace and security,” said Pompeo.

Meanwhile, US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook notes that: “Before imposing oil sanctions on Iran, the US will ensure there is sufficient oil on the market so as not to trigger a price hike.”

In October, the rhetoric regarding sanctions is intensifying, not only against Iran but also against those countries that attempt to circumvent these US sanctions (‘stoking the fire’). US National Security Advisor John Bolton: ‘Other countries should harbour no illusions that they will be able to circumvent the sanctions against Iran. Our objective is to reduce Iranian oil and gas exports to zero. We will undoubtedly achieve this goal.

A very important point, which matters for Iraq, for India and for others, whoever they may be, regarding the purchase of Iranian oil… we will go the whole length of the chain to find the end buyer of the oil, be it a company or a government. The US will not exempt EU countries from anti-Iranian ‘oil’ sanctions.”

And it should be noted that they are being heard: major European energy companies are refusing to buy Iranian oil, despite the European Union’s attempts to circumvent US sanctions: the largest buyers of Iranian oil in Europe are France’s Total, Italy’s Eni and Saras, Spain’s CEPSA and Repsol, and Greece’s Hellenic Petroleum.

The US, as promised in previous periods, is working with partners not only on a ban on purchases, but also on potential alternatives – replacing Iran as a supplier; for example, Saudi Arabia is beginning to replace Iran in the Indian market and will supply India with an additional 4 million barrels in November.

US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that since May, Iran has lost over $2.5 billion in oil revenues, and more than 100 companies have left the Iranian market or refused to do business there.

In early November, on the eve of the introduction of the second package of sanctions against Iran, the European Union’s foreign policy service issued a statement declaring that ‘the European Union has expressed its unwavering determination, despite US sanctions, to continue working to expand economic contacts between European companies and Iran and to establish a mechanism for financial settlements with Tehran to circumvent these sanctions”.

05.11.18 The US reinstated sanctions against Iran: “those who continue to do business with them risk falling under secondary US sanctions” — Bolton. However, seven countries were granted temporary exemptions: China (including Taiwan), India, Italy, Greece, Japan, South Korea and Turkey.

The US has proposed an Azerbaijani pipeline project under which gas from the Shah Deniz field will be supplied to Europe via Turkey (we will discuss this point in more detail in the section ‘The Caspian Five’). US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also stated that the US is exempting the Bushehr nuclear power plant project from Iranian sanctions.

At the same time, a diplomatic source in Brussels reported that “the EU’s Blocking Regulation does not protect assets in that country belonging to EU trading operators from US sanctions. The US authorities may seize such assets or impose fines on them. Among the possible US sanctions, he cited the disconnection of EU companies trading with Iran from the US financial system, including depriving them of the ability to make or receive payments in dollars.”

The US has also warned countries that allow Iranian tankers and vessels into their waters — US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook: “Now that sanctions against Iran have been reinstated, we want to warn countries of the risks of doing business with the Iranian shipping sector. If Iranian tankers enter your ports or pass through your waters, this carries enormous risks.”

On 12 December 2018, following the Security Council meeting, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated: “The US does not rule out new sanctions in connection with the EU’s creation of a special mechanism that allows for the circumvention of a number of US sanctions against Iran. There must be a case related to the EU’s creation of a special mechanism; we will consider it. There are exceptions relating to humanitarian issues – these are food and medicine. If the actions taken do not comply with this, we will, of course, impose sanctions. And they will be applied to any parties involved in violating the sanctions regime.”

The US sanctions policy against Iran and Russia, which are cooperating with Syria, involves secondary sanctions.

Above, we have examined the US strategy directly regarding Iran itself and regarding the US’s allies and partners – the EU – who intend to help Iran overcome the consequences of US sanctions and conduct full-scale economic activity with it in circumvention of these sanctions.

But this is not the full extent of the US sanctions policy against Iran. There is also Syria, where Iran is actively involved. Here are some of the countermeasures against Iran and its ally in Syria, the Russian Federation, which the US is taking in Syria:

In mid-October, as reported by the American television channel NBC citing sources, information began to leak to the media that the Donald Trump administration was developing a new strategy for action in Syria, which involves imposing sanctions against Russian and Iranian companies involved in the reconstruction of Syria.

According to NBC sources, the strategy is primarily aimed at ousting Iran from Syria. It does not envisage direct clashes with Tehran-controlled forces; the plan emphasises ‘political and diplomatic efforts to oust Iranian armed forces from Syria through the application of financial pressure’.

The US is insisting on the withdrawal of Iranian forces from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic as a condition for providing assistance in the country’s reconstruction. US Special Representative for Syria James Jeffrey, however, clarified that the Americans would not resort to force; the focus is solely on political pressure.

Russia’s reaction: Vladimir Bruter, an expert at the International Institute for Humanitarian and Political Studies, listed the objectives of the new US strategy in Syria on Sputnik Radio; we quote some of them below:

‘The United States is thereby addressing a number of tasks it has set itself:

• increasing pressure on Russia and thereby, as they say, ‘raising the stakes for Moscow’.

• preventing the consolidation of Bashar al-Assad’s position and Iran’s influence in Syria.

• these measures are part of the White House’s anti-Iran programme, which is clearly set to expand.”

It should be recalled that for Russia, the ‘cost of the issue’ has already risen due to its support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria. Now the cost is rising further due to its support for Iran.

This announcement of a possible ‘new US strategy for Syria’ has provoked a very strong reaction in Russia, including threats against the EU of a new migration crisis involving Syrian refugees (an attack on the province of Idlib). The main thrust of the discussions in Russia regarding this news can be summarised as follows: ‘any sanctions against Iran are, strangely enough, beginning to coincide with sanctions against Russia: the Americans are trying to kill two birds with one stone’.

And whilst in mid-October the development of this strategy was reported in the media with reference to certain sources, on 20 November 2018 a statement published by the US Department of the Treasury, the State Department and the US Coast Guard it was stated that ‘the US warns of a significant risk of sanctions against anyone facilitating the supply of oil to Syria. This document warns individuals worldwide of the significant risk of US sanctions for all parties involved in the supply of oil to Syria.” The US promises to add freight companies, financial institutions, insurers, shipowners, managers and operators to the sanctions list.

“The US government will aggressively pursue and seek to sanction any person who supports the regime (the Syrian government), for example, by assisting the Syrian government’s exports or imports, including state-owned companies,” the statement specifies.

The US Treasury Department has also published a list of 16 vessels, including four Russian ones (‘Almetyevsk’, ‘Truvor’ (formerly known as ‘ ’ ‘Mukhalatka’), “Volga” (formerly “Marshal Zhukov”) and “Yaz”), which were involved in the supply of Iranian oil to Syria between 2016 and 2018. The US Treasury notes that this is not an exhaustive list of vessels that may be associated with sanctioned individuals. It is specifically noted that the inclusion of a vessel on this list does not mean that it has been definitively identified as belonging to anyone on the sanctions list.

At the same time, a senior US administration official told journalists that the Central Bank of Iran is directly involved in transferring large sums to Russia to support oil supplies to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. To this end, Iran uses companies involved in the trade of goods for humanitarian needs — medicines and the like. Previously, the US authorities, which imposed anti-Iranian sanctions, had made an exception for humanitarian supplies. He also added that the US has a ‘zero-tolerance’ policy regarding the use of quasi-humanitarian organisations to carry out illegal transactions.

In early December, the US Secretary of State’s Special Representative for Syria, James Jeffries, stated that “Iranian and Russian oil supplies to Syria have declined following the introduction of new US sanctions in November”.

As can be seen from the above, the US sanctions policy towards Iran and countries that support or plan to support it economically is quite tough and is being implemented on an escalating basis.

So far, Russia has suffered the most from this, falling under secondary US sanctions due to America’s stance, particularly regarding Syria. Syria is subject to tough sanctions from both the US and the international community; Iran is subject to tough US sanctions; Russia is subject to sanctions from both the US and the international community, but at present these are not as tough or severe as those imposed on its allies Syria and Iran; but by helping them, Russia falls under secondary US sanctions and suffers significant losses.

Naturally, the Russian Federation cannot accept this state of affairs and is seeking ways out of the current situation. What exactly?

Diplomatic isolation prevents Russia from making full use of international platforms to exert influence.

To a greater extent, Russia is currently employing the tool of so-called ‘economic diplomacy’, which has no effect on the US but works quite well with some EU countries.

And let us ask ourselves another question – why, in the face of such intense pressure from the US and its allies, is Iran behaving so aggressively and refusing even to begin the negotiation process to which the US is so strongly urging it? Who is giving it this confidence? Any conflict always ends in negotiations sooner or later. But Iran’s position has not changed, although there have been some fluctuations throughout the observation period. One could, drawing on ‘Eastern wisdom’, at least create the ‘appearance’ of negotiations beginning, find out exactly what demands the opponent is making, and start bargaining. If there’s one thing they know how to do in the East, it’s bargain…

Let us rephrase the question: which of Iran’s allies stands to gain from it remaining under sanctions and being linked to the international community solely through special EU mechanisms, and for whom might such mechanisms actually be created?

We shall attempt to find the answer to this question in the next part of our review.

Part 3. The economic aspect for Iran and Russia

Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi: ‘We will remain in the JCPOA as long as it benefits us, but in reality, Iran’s benefits—economic benefits—are dwindling. We will take the necessary decision when the time comes.’

What economic benefits did Iran expect from the outset by remaining in the JCPOA and not entering into negotiations with the US on a new agreement? Who offered them to Iran and why?

Some of Iran’s economic plans and projects

Since early August, Iran has been actively voicing its views on certain plans for the future:

Iran has agreed to halt the production of enriched uranium on condition that the country’s nuclear fuel is supplied from abroad. A second consignment of enriched uranium will be delivered from Russia in the near future.

Iran has also resumed negotiations with Russia on the construction of a new nuclear power plant capable of generating up to 3,000 megawatts of electricity, stated Iran’s Energy Minister Reza Ardakanian.

As reported by the Tasnim news agency, Iran already has one Russian nuclear reactor. It is located in Bushehr and was the first reactor to be commissioned in the country. In 2014, Russia signed an agreement with Iran to build a further eight reactors.

It should be recalled that in the second package of sanctions, the US exempted the Bushehr nuclear power plant project from Iranian sanctions — Russia’s bet on this project has paid off.

Iran intends to offer a discount on oil purchases to its customers in Asia. According to Reuters, the largest share of Iran’s crude oil and gas condensate exports (around 60%) was destined for Asian refineries. The largest consumers of raw materials in this region are China and India.

It should be recalled that, following the introduction of two rounds of sanctions against Iran, as well as the work of the US State Department and Treasury Department’s Interagency Expert Group, which visited the country on an explanatory mission with specific proposals to overcome the difficulties that had arisen and replace Iranian oil with other suppliers, temporary exemptions were granted to: China (including Taiwan), India, Italy, Greece, Japan, South Korea and Turkey. This involves barter agreements – US-approved goods in exchange for oil for a specified period.

We will examine Iran’s economic plans in more detail in the section ‘Russia and Iran in the Caspian Five’.

Russia and Iran in the Caspian Five.

The Caspian Five (Russia, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan)

12 August 2018: The heads of state of the Caspian Five signed a convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Work on the document had been ongoing for 22 years.

The convention was signed by

• Russian President Vladimir Putin,

• Iranian President Hassan Rouhani

• Turkmenistan’s President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov,

• Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev

• Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev.

Controversial issues and difficulties of previous periods – prior to the signing of the Convention, the main point was that

• without the consent of at least one of the five countries, the implementation of any project (regarding oil production, the use of bio-organic resources or the construction of a gas pipeline) was impossible.

• The positions of Iran and Russia made the construction of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which envisages gas supplies from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, impossible.

• Iran proposed dividing the sea into five 20-per-cent shares, which would have almost doubled Iran’s share.

Provisions of the convention worth noting:

The main area of the Caspian Sea’s water surface remains in the joint use of the parties, whilst the seabed and subsoil are divided through the conclusion of bilateral agreements. Navigation, fishing, scientific research and the laying of main pipelines are carried out in accordance with rules agreed upon by the parties.

Each state exercises sovereign rights to subsoil use within its sector of the Caspian Sea seabed. At the same time, provision is made for the laying of main pipelines and cables on the seabed, provided that environmental requirements are met.

It establishes provisions prohibiting the presence of armed forces of non-regional states in the Caspian Sea, and regulates in detail matters of navigation, including those concerning warships and submarines.

The Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea is of indefinite duration. The document is subject to ratification and shall enter into force upon receipt by the depositary (Kazakhstan) of the fifth instrument of ratification.

This convention could kick-start the implementation of several projects in the region — each country is pursuing its own objectives and setting its priorities at this stage with an eye to the future. Key projects for future implementation:

The Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan

with a future connection to the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and an outlet to the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) to Southern Europe

Beneficiaries: Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Turkey, the EU, and, if it joins the project, Iran.

Opponents: Russia – competition with Gazprom’s projects.

Ashgabat and Baku have yet to resolve a territorial dispute between them over several oil fields in the disputed part of the Caspian Sea. As for natural gas reserves, Turkmenistan ranks among the top four countries in the world alongside the Russian Federation, Iran and Qatar.

Of the three routes for Turkmen gas exports – northern (Russia), eastern (China) and southern (Iran) – only the Chinese route is currently operational. Russia has taken a break from purchasing Turkmen natural gas until 2019, and Turkmen gas is not being supplied to Iran due to disagreements over payment for previously supplied fuel.

The Shah Deniz-2 gas condensate field is being developed as part of the TANAP project, but the key point is that other participants may join the project in the future: Iran, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and possibly Qatar.

Two other pipeline systems of the Southern Gas Corridor of Europe – Nabucco and Trans-Anatolian – depend on how much capacity TANAP will have.

In Kazakhstan, the Kazagan field has been developed, and a pipeline has already been laid from Kazagan to Georgia (north of the Caspian Sea). Therefore, even without Shah Deniz, the pipeline could be filled.

A contradiction is emerging between Russia and Iran: on the one hand, Russia and Iran are allies in Syria; on the other, Iran is a direct competitor to Gazprom, with an interest in promoting the TANAP project, which competes with the Turkish Stream.

The EU, meanwhile, faces a choice: extending the ‘Turkish Stream’ from Russia via Turkey, or promoting the ‘Southern Gas Corridor’ project, which includes ‘TANAP’, with the possibility of other participants joining it later.

Recognising Europe’s reservations, the US has excluded the Azerbaijani pipeline project from anti-Iran sanctions, giving Iran a reason to consider joining the project against Russia’s interests, and preventing Russia (in the form of Iran, which is interested in such a proposal) from openly blocking this project, which is beneficial to the EU.

On 5 November 2018, the US added the Azerbaijani pipeline project, under which gas from the Shah Deniz field will be supplied to Europe via Turkey, to the list of exemptions from anti-Iranian sanctions.

The North–South International Corridor (ISC) project is a transport link between the Baltic states and India via the Russian Federation and Iran, including across the Caspian Sea.

‘North–South’ (NS) — an international transport corridor (ITC).

The transport corridor is designed to provide a transport link between the Baltic states and India via Iran.

The main advantages of the ‘North–South’ transport corridor over other routes (in particular, the sea route via the Suez Canal) are said to be a halving or more of the transport distance, as well as a reduction in the cost of container transport compared to the cost of transport by sea (the volume of cargo transported per year — up to 25 million tonnes).

Beneficiaries – the EU, the Russian Federation, Iran and India. Russia, Iran and India signed an agreement on the North–South transport corridor in 2000.

Implementation challenges:

• Iran is subject to US sanctions (the EU Blocking Statute may be applied as a countermeasure by Europe to implement the project);

• Russia is subject to EU and US sanctions, and may face tougher US sanctions in the near future (it hopes to receive the same guarantees from the EU as Iran – the application of the Blocking Statute for this project);

• Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are currently more observers than participants in this project; if they do participate, it will be minimal.

In early November, the Iranian TV channel Press TV reported: ‘Russia, India and Iran plan to discuss the launch of the North-South International Transport Corridor project in November 2018.

According to the Russian publication: “Earlier, India’s Minister of Commerce and Industry, Suresh Prabhu, stated that active use of the corridor should begin as soon as possible. Trial shipments via the new route took place as early as 2014.”

Directly linked to the project is the strategy for the development of Russian seaports in the Caspian Basin, as well as rail and road access routes to them, up to 2030. The implementation of the plan involves three stages: preparatory (2018–2019), main (2020–2025) and long-term (2026–2030).

Late November — Iran’s Minister of Roads and Urban Development, Mohammad Eslami, stated ahead of his trip to Moscow on 20 November that Russia had agreed to open a €3 billion credit line for Iran to develop railway infrastructure as part of the project. The Russian side, however, did not confirm this intention.

Transportation of energy resources, swap operations;

A swap is a commercial and financial exchange transaction involving the exchange of various assets

Beneficiaries — Iran — will resume swap oil supplies with Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan as soon as these countries are able to supply the necessary volumes of raw materials. This is a partial circumvention (mitigation of the consequences) of the second package of US sanctions on energy resources, which came into force in November 2018. In effect, these are barter agreements for the sale of Iranian oil.

Military bases

According to the provisions of the convention: the deployment of foreign military bases in the Caspian Sea is prohibited; the convention guarantees the absence of non-regional states at sea, which is of paramount importance to Russia, which holds a decisive advantage in the region’s naval forces.

Beneficiaries – the Russian Federation and Iran;

Opposed by: Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan – on the grounds of a breach of the balance of power; Azerbaijan – given the Russian Federation’s involvement in the Karabakh conflict.

According to information from open sources at the time of the convention’s signing:

Russia is the most active of all in attempting to maintain the initiative and control in this territory.

The opportunities arising from the future signing of the convention are mainly linked to the economic and energy aspects of this region for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and Iran.

Judging by the statements made, the initiative in the military sphere lies predominantly with the Russian Federation and, to a lesser extent, with Iran.

As can be seen from the above, the EU may be interested in at least two future projects in this region (one of which the Russian Federation is capable of blocking — the construction of the gas pipeline), and the second is directly linked to Russia and Iran (the North-South International Transport Corridor), both of which are subject to sanctions (including those imposed by the US), and US sanctions policy towards these countries may deteriorate significantly in the near future.

These countries, Russia and Iran, may propose continuing cooperation with the EU under the cover of the EU Blocking Statute in these projects, which, in turn, could lead to the US imposing secondary sanctions on EU violators, a scenario the US has already warned Europe about on more than one occasion.

And whilst the US has already taken a stance on the pipeline project – adding it to the list of exemptions from anti-Iranian sanctions – the situation regarding the transport corridor is not so clear-cut.

Instead, in exchange for implementing the project, Russia and Iran may seek cooperation with the EU, for example in Syria, thereby weakening US influence in several regions at once (Syria, the Caspian region and neighbouring – Afghanistan) and sidelining the US on the issue of the coalition in Syria and regarding sanctions against Russia, Iran, Syria and their allies in the region, which will lead to a weakening of the positions of Ukraine’s allies (the EU and the US) in the configuration regarding the Ukrainian issue.

Iran had pinned its hopes on Asia, EU assistance and, most importantly, on Russia’s support.

At the end of October, Iran reported on its main ally – Russia: “In general, on matters of aviation, space, power station construction, rail transport and others, Iran has the most serious intentions to develop cooperation with Russia,” said Mehdi Sanaei, the Islamic Republic’s ambassador to Moscow. He also added: “Following the withdrawal from the ‘nuclear deal’, it is the US that has found itself isolated, not Iran.”

Who is instilling such ideas in Iran?

Iran’s agreement with the EAEU on a free trade area.

Some time ago, Iran officially expanded its cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). In November, developments surrounding the EAEU accelerated significantly.

Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak stated that “Russia may begin settling accounts with Iran in national currencies in order to continue bilateral cooperation, despite the US sanctions imposed on that country. We do not recognise the sanctions (imposed by the US against Iran), which were introduced unilaterally without the approval of the UN Security Council. We will continue to seek mechanisms for cooperation, one of which is the use of national currencies for payments for goods supplied.”

On 24 November 2018, the Federation Council ratified the interim agreement on a free trade area between the Eurasian Economic Union and Iran, and on 28 November 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified the interim agreement leading to the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Iran, according to a document published on the legal information portal.

The agreement, signed during the Astana Economic Forum on 17 May, is valid for three years and provides for the creation of an FTA covering a limited range of goods between the EAEU and Iran.

Under the terms of the agreement, no later than one year after its entry into force, the parties undertake to commence negotiations on the conclusion of a full-fledged free trade agreement . The implementation of the agreement is intended to contribute to an increase in trade volumes and the development of economic ties between its participants, as well as an increase in supplies of Russian industrial and agricultural products to Iran.

The agreement establishes the basic rules of trade between the EAEU and Iran, which are as close as possible to WTO rules, and also covers issues of most-favoured-nation treatment and national treatment, the application of safeguard measures and customs administration.

The agreement provides for trade liberalisation covering a limited range of goods: 502 HS codes on the part of the EAEU (or 4% of the current EAEU HS nomenclature) and 360 commodity codes on the part of Iran (or 5% of Iran’s current commodity nomenclature). The volume of current Russian exports from Iran of goods included in the EAEU’s list of tariff commitments is estimated at $249 million in 2017 (including goods for which the duty rate is set at zero).

On 20 December 2018, the Armenian government approved a provisional agreement on a free trade area between Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union. This agreement means that import duties on a wide range of goods will be reduced or eliminated.

Russia is rushing to bind Iran to itself and to the union it controls. It should also be noted that the Syrian government, led by Bashar al-Assad, has simultaneously put forward a similar request – a proposal – to establish a free economic zone with the EAEU. We previously examined the economic scheme for circumventing US sanctions and economic cooperation between sanctioned countries, tentatively named ‘The Round Dance’, which Russia is building around Syria. A strong Iran is not needed in such a scheme. A controlled Iran is needed.

Things are getting more interesting with Iran. After all, if the EU does manage to implement the ‘Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)’ project and create a SWIFT-like system, then Iran, for whom these instruments are being created, will already be included in the EAEU Free Trade Area, where Russia, one of the union’s main members, is subject to sanctions, which will allow it to use these instruments to its advantage through its ties with Iran; Syria will also be brought into the EAEU, creating a free trade area that, through Iran’s connections, will also be able to access the EU while circumventing all sanctions. But this is a matter for the future.

Back in July, Iran began negotiations with Azerbaijan and Armenia regarding the possibility of exporting electricity to Russia via the territory of these countries. Iranian Energy Minister Reza Ardakanian: ‘We have begun negotiations between Iran and Armenia, and between Iran and Azerbaijan, regarding the possibility of supplying electricity to Russia. Today, an important task for Iran is to connect to European electricity grids. One option is to connect to Europe’s electricity grids via the territories of our northern neighbours.”

In mid-November, an expert inter-agency group from the US State Department and Treasury visited the South Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia), where they discussed sanctions against Iran.

“This visit was the last in a series of planned meetings aimed at explaining to governments around the world the US policy on sanctions against Iran and answering questions about Washington’s objectives regarding Iran,” reads a statement from the US Embassy in Azerbaijan. For its part, the diplomatic mission in Armenia notes that members of the delegation “outlined US efforts aimed at changing Iran’s negative behaviour through economic and diplomatic pressure, whilst identifying areas of cooperation with partner states”.

As for exactly which projects and areas of cooperation were discussed by US representatives with these countries — I think we will find out in the near future. These issues have not been covered in the media.

What interest does Russia have in such support for Iran? Does Russia stand to gain anything?

‘After withdrawing from the “nuclear deal”, it was the US, not Iran, that found itself isolated.’ Who is instilling such ideas in Iran? Russia’s position.

Before the introduction of the second package of US sanctions in early November, the Russian side assured Iran that “Moscow intends to assist Tehran in finding ways to sell Iranian oil in defiance of the US sanctions, which come into force next week. “We do not recognise sanctions imposed unilaterally without a UN Security Council resolution,” said Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak.

He also noted that “a ‘oil-for-goods’ mechanism is currently in place between Russia and Iran, designed to increase trade turnover between the countries. It allows Tehran to use part of its oil revenues to pay for Russian goods.” This means that Russia runs little risk of falling foul of secondary US sanctions by receiving Iranian oil.

So what happens next to the oil obtained for next to nothing under the ‘oil-for-goods’ scheme in Russia?

Mid-November — “Russia has managed to benefit from US sanctions against Iran,” writes the Wall Street Journal.

The publication notes that Moscow has poached buyers from Tehran and increased oil supplies thanks to Washington’s restrictive measures against Tehran. At the same time, Russia is also helping Iran weather the pressure of sanctions by buying up its oil for domestic consumption, whilst exporting the ‘black gold’ freed up by this manoeuvre primarily to Europe. The publication also reports that “Russia intends to purchase Iranian energy resources on a barter basis — in exchange for manufacturing equipment and foodstuffs”.

The Wall Street Journal also notes that “for European refineries, Russian oil is a natural substitute for Iranian oil, as it is typically of medium density and has a relatively high sulphur content. Furthermore, it can be delivered to European refineries more quickly than supplies from other countries. For instance, the Italian refineries of Eni and Saras are buying more Russian oil, particularly the popular Urals grade, to compensate for the halt in supplies from Iran.”

“Russia is also supplying its oil to buyers outside the European Union as a substitute for Iranian oil. According to official statistics, in June, following a three-month hiatus, Turkey resumed imports of Russian oil, thereby offsetting the reduction in supplies from Iran. Turkey has also promised not to comply with US sanctions, but many Turkish companies have deep international ties and fear sanctions from the US,” the publication writes.

“This situation is already translating into increased profits for Russian state-owned energy companies. Rosneft reported that in the first nine months of 2018, its net profit tripled (to 451 billion roubles ($6.8 billion)) compared with the same period last year. This is mainly due to increased production and rising prices for the Urals crude grade,” the Wall Street Journal emphasises.

Let’s highlight another point: back in early July, Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, stated after a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin that Moscow had declared its readiness to invest $50 billion in Iran’s oil and gas sector.

So how are things looking in December, almost six months on?

According to the Russian publication Vedomosti, Rosneft has decided against operating in Iran. Negotiations were suspended in the summer of 2018 due to the threat of US sanctions against Iran. One reason for the withdrawal from Iran was a change in the state-owned company’s strategy: it now intends to focus on growth within Russia.

Rosneft and the National Iranian Oil Company were planning to implement joint projects in the oil and gas sector with investments of up to $30 billion and oil production of up to 55 million tonnes per year. “Rosneft had no obligations to the Iranian side; the state-owned company did not invest any money, so there will be no losses,” one of the newspaper’s sources clarified.

All major Russian oil companies were planning to operate in Iran but have suspended negotiations, writes Vedomosti: for example, Gazprom Neft and Tatneft are interested in Iranian projects but are assessing the situation due to sanctions, whilst Lukoil has prepared a contract but will not sign it until the restrictions are lifted.

Refusing to invest in Iran is a sensible move in light of Rosneft’s new strategy and the increased political and sanctions risks, explained Dmitry Marinchenko, director of Fitch’s corporate division, to the publication: “To some extent, the refusal to cooperate may also be linked to the fact that Russia is attempting to forge a political alliance with Saudi Arabia, which has poor relations with Iran.”

And to avoid accusations of re-exporting Iranian oil and falling foul of secondary sanctions, Russia, represented by Energy Minister Alexander Novak, issued a statement at the end of November that ‘Russia is not considering the possibility of exporting Iranian oil via its infrastructure’.

Against this backdrop, Russia’s assurances regarding its ally Iran at the end of December — assurances of selfless friendship, support and assistance — sound rather cynical:

“The Russian Federation intends to do everything possible to ensure that Iran does not suffer from the new wave of extraterritorial US sanctions, following the US’s earlier announcement of its withdrawal from the nuclear deal. We are determined to do our utmost to ensure that the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran is strengthened, so that there are no negative consequences from the new wave of extraterritorial sanctions, which are being reinstated by decision of the US administration,” Ryabkov stated at a meeting with Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi.

Indeed, why does Russia need a new agreement between Iran and the US on the JCPOA and Iran’s release from sanctions? It is in Russia’s interest for Iran to remain in such a ‘frozen’ state on the world stage for as long as possible; then the Russian Federation will be able to continue profiting from it, remaining virtually its sole ally, completely tying Iran to itself and its projects, drawing it into its alliances on the subordinate terms of a debtor.

And the fact that Russia profits (and profits very successfully) from intercepting profits from Iran’s business, from the reduction in the value of its goods due to US sanctions pressure, from barter agreements with Iran, and so on – it invests these funds in the implementation of its geopolitical projects on the international stage; these funds enable it to continue conflicts (for example, in Ukraine – the ORDLO, in Syria), to hold and maintain illegally annexed territories (Crimea, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria) and to continue destabilising activities around the world (Israel, Afghanistan, Libya, etc.).

And what about other countries, including EU member states? Why is their interest in Iran so high that they defy the sanctions policy of the US – their direct ally – at the risk of being punished? We will examine this in the next section.

Part 4. The economic aspect for the West.

Iran’s main argument, which it has been repeating since the US withdrew from the nuclear deal and to this day, can be summed up by the following quote: ‘Preserving the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme is the task of the international community’ and ‘Iran will remain in the nuclear deal as long as it brings benefits, but these benefits are diminishing,” stated Abbas Arakchi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister.

Other countries’ preservation of the JCPOA following the US withdrawal.

In early July, a meeting of the ‘P5+1’ (the UK, Germany, Iran, China, Russia and France) took place in Vienna to discuss the preservation of the JCPOA without the US.

Key decisions following the meeting:

• The JCPOA participants agreed to work with international partners to establish mechanisms to protect economic ties with Iran;

• The UK will take over from the US as co-chair of the Arak Working Group within the JCPOA Implementation Commission

• The meeting participants (the UK, Germany, Iran, China, Russia and France) agreed to protect their companies from US sanctions and reaffirmed their commitment to maintaining oil and gas exports from Iran.

Of particular interest are the remarks made by the Russian Federation, as voiced by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov: “JCPOA participants will explore ways to trade with Tehran regardless of the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. It is of fundamental importance that trade with Iran remains substantial in volume. Iran has warned that it has the right to withdraw from the agreement following the US, though it will not do so.” “We have agreed — although this was not easy to achieve, given the interests of the European ‘troika’, China, Russia and Iran itself, which do not always coincide — that the mechanism of the joint commission at expert level will continuously examine options that will allow us, regardless of the United States’ decision, to continue to fulfil the commitments undertaken under the JCPOA, and to ensure methods of conducting trade and economic relations with Iran that will not depend on the whims of the United States,” Lavrov stated.

The price of disagreement?

Beijing is counting on a joint statement with the European Union condemning Trump’s economic policy. As part of the preparations for the document, Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang visited Eastern European countries and Germany. Agreements worth $23 billion were signed in Berlin, and China promised to facilitate access to its domestic market for European investors. The Chinese authorities also intend to expand cooperation with Arab states in the field of oil and gas extraction and processing.

Ali Akbar Velayati, an adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, stated after a meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin that he had delivered a message in Moscow from Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and President Hassan Rouhani to President Putin; and that Moscow had declared its readiness to invest $50 billion in Iran’s oil and gas sector.

As we can see, the stakes are quite high.

Russia, China and Iran have drawn European countries into efforts to find ways to circumvent US sanctions – this is precisely the experience that Russia so sorely lacks, and the universal schemes that Russia has so far been unable to devise on its own for its businesses and economy, which have fallen under US sanctions.

Russia hopes to use the experience gained by the JCPOA signatories to shape its own counter-sanctions policy against the US (and, incidentally, against EU sanctions, though to a lesser extent) to its own advantage, as well as to enlist the support of the European countries that have signed up to the agreement (primarily Germany and France).

First package of sanctions: 04.08.18 The US reinstated large-scale sanctions against Iran, which had previously been suspended following the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme.

The EU reacted immediately – with countermeasures for its companies – the updated EU Blocking Statute: ‘As the first series of sanctions reimposed by the US on Iran comes into force, the updated EU Blocking Statute also comes into force to mitigate their impact on the interests of EU companies conducting legitimate business in Iran.’

On 23 August 2018, the European Commission approved the first package of funding for projects supporting sustainable economic and social development in Iran (€18 million out of the €50 million earmarked for this purpose).

This was met with a negative reaction from Israel and the US:

• from Israel: “The EU’s decision to allocate €18 million to Iran is a grave mistake. The funds are likely to be misappropriated”

• and from the US: “The EU’s decision to allocate $20.7 million to Iran ‘sends the wrong signal at the wrong time’; the US and the EU must work together to help ordinary Iranians.” The US also emphasised that it intends to impose tougher sanctions on Iran than those in place prior to the conclusion of the JCPOA (Washington plans to revoke almost all exemptions for American companies that were able to do business with Iran ‘under certain conditions’).

EU instruments: Blocking Statute, Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), SWIFT equivalent.

According to the International Energy Agency, Iran ranks third in the world in terms of oil reserves — 18.8 billion tonnes, or 9.9% of global resources. The country also holds 16% of the world’s natural gas reserves. The world’s largest gas field, South Pars, is located within the country’s territory.

According to Reuters analysts, around 40% of hydrocarbon exports go to the European market. According to the agency, EU investment (primarily from Germany, France and Italy) in Iranian projects has exceeded $20 billion since 2016. Iran: 45% of budget revenue comes from oil and gas exports, 31% from taxes and duties.

As early as May, immediately following the US President’s announcement of withdrawal from the nuclear deal and Germany’s statements of support for Iran under the JCPOA, the consequences began to be felt, particularly for German businesses in the Middle East.

For example, Saudi Arabia, dissatisfied with Germany’s policy in the Middle East, is cancelling orders with German firms. According to Der Spiegel magazine, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud issued a corresponding internal directive to state institutions. It is reported that major German corporations such as Siemens, Bayer and Boehringer, which have been working closely with the Ministry of Health in Riyadh for many years, have been hit by the sanctions. The ban on orders also extends to the automotive group Daimler, which was due to supply hundreds of buses to Riyadh and Jeddah, reports DW. As noted by NEWSru Israel, the reason for the sanctions imposed by Riyadh was Germany’s support for the nuclear deal with Iran.

Against this backdrop, at the end of August, the German Eastern Business Association (Ost-Ausschuss der Deutschen Wirtschaft e. V.) expressed “grave concern” regarding the possibility of the US imposing new sanctions against Russia as well.

The German Eastern Business Association represents the interests of 350 German companies and associations in the markets of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Central Asia, the Caucasus and South-Eastern Europe. The organisation’s managing director, Michael Harms, stated: “As Europeans and Germans [we believe], <…> our ties with Russia are closer in nature (than those between Russia and the US), and this point must be taken into account.”

One of the stumbling blocks for German business and the international community is the construction of Nord Stream 2, which most European countries and the US regard as a political project capable of giving Russia significant influence over the EU in international decision-making and the pursuit of an independent policy. The US is calling for construction to be halted and is threatening to impose additional sanctions on the project and its participants (including Russia).

Anticipating such possible consequences, discussions in Germany have intensified regarding sanctions and their impact on the business environment; the main points put forward by Harms are: ‘The sanctions against Russia proposed by US senators threaten the cooperation of EU companies with Moscow in the financial and energy sectors. German business fears the impact of new anti-Russian sanctions from the US on the European economy and is calling on Brussels to counter this with a blocking regulation, as was the case with Iran.”

The German side is also lobbying for the creation of an independent alternative to the SWIFT system; German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas stated that “the European Union needs to create an independent alternative to the US SWIFT payment messaging system in order to protect its companies from US sanctions against Iran.”

The precedent set by Iran is beginning to bear fruit in Russia’s interests – it should be noted that this proposal is particularly to the Russian Federation’s liking; whether Iran will prevail in its standoff with the US remains to be seen, but the establishment of ties between the Russian Federation and the EU within such a systemic economic framework – featuring a separate, independent banking system – could open up new prospects for the Russian Federation.

The question arises: what is actually in the Russian Federation’s interest – a resolution of the conflict between the US and Iran, which could lead to the abolition, due to obsolescence, of the creation and use of EU instruments such as the Blocking Statute, Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), or an analogue of SWIFT; or, conversely, the escalation of this conflict and the torpedoing of the creation and implementation of these EU instruments for its own economic and political interests?

In September, the Russian Federation is actively participating in negotiations with the EU on overcoming US sanctions against Iran, taking the initiative and reassuring Iran:

Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak: “Russia is generally committed to continuing cooperation with Iran in all areas of energy, despite US sanctions against that country.”

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov: “Russia intends to continue, together with Iran, to ‘build defences’ against US extraterritorial sanctions. Together with Iran, we will continue intensive work with the Europeans and continue our efforts in contact with China and other states in order to build, if you will, a layered defence against US extraterritorial sanctions. Russia , and Iran have outlined a set of measures to protect against US sanctions against Iran, which need to be discussed with the EU Troika.”

It appears that the situation with Iran and the EU Troika regarding the circumvention of sanctions serves as a testing ground for Russia to implement and trial various mechanisms for avoiding, circumventing or overcoming US sanctions using various EU instruments and international laws. They are observing what works, what might work, and what does not work; what the reaction of the US and other countries is; and how this experience can be utilised for their own purposes when the time comes and Russia finds itself in a similar situation.

This indicates that the Russian Federation has no intention of changing its behaviour on the international stage and is preparing for the consequences of its ongoing active actions in the form of sanctions, which it intends to overcome by all means at its disposal, including, in particular, by lobbying on behalf of Iran’s interests.

End of September: The EU develops financial mechanisms for settlements with Iran to circumvent US sanctions

• The European Union will establish a financial mechanism for settlements with Iran to circumvent US sanctions — EU member states will set up a legal entity. This will allow European companies to do business with Iran in accordance with European laws

• The special purpose vehicle (SPV) for the sale of Iranian oil, which is intended to help the EU circumvent US sanctions against Iran, will most likely operate by avoiding cash settlements where possible and using direct barter — oil in exchange for goods. But such a mechanism does not suit Iran — it needs money for its oil.

• The mechanism being created by the EU for doing business with Iran will be open to third countries — Iran has not ruled out the possibility of creating a parallel SWIFT system to circumvent US sanctions. All interested parties are constantly emphasising the creation of this instrument.

In order to be included among these third parties, and subsequently in the European system analogous to SWIFT, Russia needs to maintain close ties with Iran, which is becoming increasingly difficult for it to do, as (secondary) sanctions are already having an impact on Russian companies.

Late November — EU mechanism to circumvent US sanctions against Iran

As the Financial Times reports, citing its own sources: ‘The EU has so far failed to set up an SPV to circumvent anti-Iran sanctions — EU plans to create a company through which settlements with Iran could be made are under threat. None of the EU countries is willing to host this company on its territory.’

Citing its own sources, the FT reported: “One of the three remaining candidates in Europe — Austria — has refused to host the headquarters of the clearing house that would be responsible for trade with Iran. Despite the decision to create a mechanism to circumvent sanctions against Iran, EU countries have proved unwilling to agree on who will host the headquarters of the new body. All candidates for this role fear punishment from Washington. Only two candidates remain — Belgium and Luxembourg. The latter offers little hope. Thus, Belgium, as the organiser, finds itself in a deadlock. The unasked question remains open — can Europe cooperate with Russia regarding Iran?

As for Austria, it is worth recalling that this country is also an active participant in the construction of ‘Nord Stream 2’. Furthermore, Austria periodically advocates, if not for the lifting of European sanctions against Russia over the Ukrainian issue, then at least for their relaxation, citing Europe’s economic interest in an alliance with the Russian Federation.

RTRS offers the following explanation: “EU countries are afraid to host a special purpose vehicle (SPV) to circumvent US sanctions against Iran. No EU country has yet agreed to host the headquarters of this entity on its territory due to fears of retaliatory measures from the US. The newly created European mechanism for settlements with Iran will have to cooperate with banks in the country where its headquarters is located. The authorities of countries that are potential candidates for hosting such a headquarters fear that banks cooperating with the mechanism for trade with Iran could fall under US sanctions.”

Alongside the publication of this negative news for Iran, the European Commission has stated that active development of a SWIFT-like system is currently underway. Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany are participating in the creation of the new mechanism: “The primary goal of the platform is to establish legal financial transactions with Iranian companies subject to US sanctions. It may later be rolled out more widely.” The SWIFT payment system suspended Iranian banks’ access to its communication channels on 5 November.

As explained in Russia by Oleg Vyugin, former first deputy chairman of the Central Bank and professor at the Higher School of Economics, it is not technically difficult to create an analogue of the SWIFT settlement system. All that is needed is to create the conditions for a larger number of players to join the system. At the same time, the most important issue on the agenda for such a system is which currency will be used for settlements, given that prices are quoted in dollars, he explains.

Iran remains optimistic and confident that this instrument will be created, and continues to insist — Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran: “Soon, all EU oil deals with other countries worth over €300 billion will be conducted solely in euros, not in dollars. If this mechanism is implemented, the dollar will cease to exist as a global currency.”

Early December — a diplomatic source in Brussels reported: “None of the EU member states has yet dared to register a legal entity within its borders on the basis of which a special financial mechanism will be created to circumvent US sanctions against Iran. The issue of financial backing also remains unresolved.”

Meanwhile, in mid-December, the following information emerged:

Chinese oil and gas company CNPC has suspended its participation in the Iranian ‘South Pars 11’ gas project under pressure from the US against the backdrop of trade negotiations between the countries – RTRS.

The European Union has suspended steel purchases from Iran pending the creation of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to trade with the country in circumvention of US sanctions. – Iranian media, citing a source in the national steel association ISPA.

The threat of US sanctions and the seriousness of the US’s intentions regarding violators are having an effect. And so, as an alternative to all attempts by the EU, Russia and China to create their own separate mechanism for dealing with sanctioned Iran (as a universal system for circumventing US sanctions), the following news is circulating in the media:

“Switzerland may soon launch a payment channel that will allow food, medicines and medical equipment to be sold to Iran. It is expected that this mechanism will be approved by Washington and will not violate the US sanctions imposed on Iran,” according to FT sources.

This is a kind of signal from the US to all interested parties, including those in the EU: if you wish to cooperate with Iran, you will have to coordinate this matter with the US – otherwise you will face consequences.

This is a very unwelcome signal for Russia. Iran may not be able to withstand such economic pressure from the international community and may enter into direct negotiations with the US – without intermediaries, which is not part of Russia’s plans – this would mean the loss of an ally in both economic and military terms – in Syria; in Iran’s support for Hezbollah, Hamas and the Taliban against Israel, in Afghanistan and other countries.

Where peace prevails, there is no longer a need for Russia’s mediation services, and consequently, Russia will be unable to amass ‘liquid assets’ to trade with the West in pursuit of its geopolitical interests. Consequently, the escalation surrounding the Iranian issue begins to rise sharply, not without the direct involvement of the Russian Federation – Iran’s aggression and threats towards the collective West increase exponentially, prompting a reaction, primarily from the US. And Russia begins to offer itself in every possible way as a mediator for the US and the collective West in negotiations with Iran.

Part 5. The problem of Iran’s presence in Syria for Russia:
the Israel factor

Confrontation:

• Against ISIL in Syria: US (coalition + NATO) – Syria, Iran, Russia

• Israel – Iran (Hezbollah and Hamas)

Iran’s alliances:

• Syria (Russia, Iran, Syria)

• Astana format – Syria (Russia, Iran, Turkey)

Regarding Iran’s military presence in Syria, it should be remembered that Tehran arrived there before Moscow (in 2012), helped Syrian President B. Assad to remain in power at a critical moment and, consequently, expects generous compensation (in particular, a guarantee of a permanent military presence), but Tehran has never concealed its objectives regarding Israel – namely, the destruction of that country.

The Israel factor in Syria: the issue of the inadmissibility of Iranian forces’ presence on Syrian territory is a matter of Israel’s security.

In June, Russia’s actions in Syria are taking on a clear shape in the context of implementing the ‘Syria is Ours’ plan, which involves the final conclusion of hostilities and a shift towards the issue of rebuilding Syria’s economy.

The issue here is that, in accordance with UN Resolution 2254 on the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Syria (it should be recalled that a civil war has been ongoing in Syria since 2011, and since 2014, an international campaign against ISIS has been underway in the region), the following provisions are set out: the establishment of a constitutional committee (comprising representatives of the government, the opposition and civil society), the drafting of a new constitution, and democratic elections in the country. Following these procedures, the international community is prepared to join forces to begin the process of rebuilding the country (at a cost of between $250 billion and $400 billion) with the gradual lifting of all sanctions against the SAR.

Russia’s ‘Syria Is Ours’ plan at that time was to circumvent the implementation of the provisions of UN Resolution 2254, first attempt to repatriate refugees from abroad (numbering around 7 million people in various countries, including the EU), demand international humanitarian aid for their support and for economic development, demand the prior lifting of sanctions against Syria, and only then – organise, if necessary, elections in the country.

This is a plan to keep Bashar al-Assad in power, with the disbursement of international aid for Syria’s reconstruction and the lifting of international sanctions against Syria without implementing the provisions of UN Resolution 2254 on Syria.

All this was justified by the fact that Russia is in Syria legitimately, at the invitation of the current official Syrian authorities in the person of Bashar al-Assad, and that it was Russia (together with the official Syrian authorities and Iran) that defeated ISIS. Meanwhile, the coalition countries led by the US were to leave Syrian territory, where they were present illegitimately, and participate materially (without a direct presence) in the reconstruction of Syria under Russian leadership; in this way, by remaining on Syrian territory, the Russian Federation positioned itself as the sole administrator of international humanitarian aid.

This plan (‘Syria Is Ours’) was not made public; publicly, the Russian Federation agreed in every way to the inevitability of implementing UN Resolution 2254, whilst in every way obstructing and delaying the implementation of its provisions, attempting to push through its own plan in secret, seeking support from various countries individually and attempting to rally new allies into a coalition (particularly intensive efforts were made with Germany and France).

To realise its own vision of a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Syria, Russia needed guarantees that hostilities in the country would cease — the return of refugees presupposed the end of the active phase of the war and a return to peaceful life.

To achieve this, it was necessary to consolidate ‘peace’ in the demilitarised de-escalation zones. It was also necessary to obtain guarantees from the other parties present on Syrian territory (the US-led international coalition forces, as well as Israel, which, it should be recalled, has an unresolved conflict with Syria over the Golan Heights in southern Syria) that hostilities would not resume.

And here, in resolving this issue—which Russia sought to settle as quickly as possible in order to proceed with its secret ‘Syria Is Ours’ plan—the interests of Israel and Iran, who are at odds with one another, come into play. On the one hand, Iran is an ally of the Russian Federation in Syria; on the other, it is a rival in the future division of spheres of business influence and the distribution of international humanitarian aid in that country (remember, this involves vast sums of money). At that time – in early summer – Iran was still very powerful and sufficiently independent of Russia.

Early June 2018: In response to Putin’s statement on the need to withdraw all foreign military contingents from Syria (the statement was aimed primarily at the coalition forces led by the US and Turkey, whose troops are present in northern Syria), the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a counter-statement: “No one can force Iran to do anything against its will.”

NATO, meanwhile, has stated that it would be unable to support Israel in the event of a war against Iran, because Israel is not a member of NATO, thereby cementing Israel’s place within the coalition of allied nations against Iran directly at the regional level (including the strengthening of tacit (secret) cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia against Iran in the region).

Iran has no intention of backing down and is quite resolute, whilst Israel has been warned that it should not continue an open military conflict (let alone declare war) with Iran and should seek a diplomatic solution to the disputes and allies.

Resolution of the situation between Israel, Russia, Syria and Iran regarding the Golan Heights

In early July, some details of the negotiations between Russia and Israel regarding the resolution of the issue of the Golan Heights were leaked to the press, according to The Washington Post:

Under the terms of the agreement with Russia, the Israeli leadership:

• recognises Syrian government control over territories in southern Syria and is beginning work on implementing the 1974 disengagement agreement

• will begin work on implementing the agreement on the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces, which establishes the borders within which UN observers are to be stationed.

In return, Russia will agree with Iran that the latter will not allow its forces in southern Syria to come within 80 km of the border with Israel.

According to the publication, Moscow “undertakes not to object” if the Israeli military strikes Iranian targets in this region, “especially if Iran deploys weapons that threaten Israel”.

This issue – the ‘agreement’ – is being actively discussed by both the media and politicians at various levels as one of the key topics likely to be addressed at the Trump–Putin meeting, and, although the Russian President’s press secretary, Peskov, publicly denies reports of such an alleged agreement between Russia and the US, Iran is visibly nervous and is taking active measures (countermeasures).

Israel, meanwhile, is publicly taking a stance on the Syrian issue, insisting on the complete withdrawal of Iran’s military presence from Syrian territory, and consistently emphasises this in its communications with Russia.

Ultimately, the issue of Iran’s presence in Syria was discussed at the meeting between US President Trump and Russian President Putin on 16 July 2018 in Helsinki (Finland). From Trump’s statements:

• he emphasised the importance of putting pressure on Iran.

• He noted the cooperation between the United States and Russian armed forces regarding Syria.

• Trump paid particular attention to ensuring Israel’s security (“the situation in the Golan Heights must be brought fully into line with the 1974 agreement on the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces”).

As can be seen from the statements, the issue of Syria was viewed by the US at that time through the prism of the following aspects: Iran’s presence on Syrian territory and its aggressive actions, and Israel’s security.

Resolving the issue of Syria (Russia’s top priority) is directly linked to the Russian Federation’s ability to influence Iran regarding its withdrawal from Syria (the issue of Israel and its security conditions) — Russia did not have such direct influence over Iran at that time, but sought to act as a mediator.

20 July 2018: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated in a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin that he would continue to counter the Iranian military presence in Syria. And to confirm his determination not to back down from this position, he launched a missile strike on Syrian territory as a pre-emptive measure against Iran’s presence: Damascus (Syria) accused Israel of carrying out a missile strike on 22 July on a research centre in the north-east of the town of Masyaf in the west of Hama province. The research centre in Masyaf had previously been used by Iranian forces and, according to Israeli intelligence, was involved in the development of a Syrian nuclear reactor.

Moscow remained silent – there were no comments on the incident.

Israel also evacuated White Helmets activists and their families from Syria at the request of the US, Canada and European countries. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that during a covert operation (following appeals from President Trump, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau and others), around 800 activists from the humanitarian organisation the White Helmets and their family members were evacuated, Some members of the White Helmets organisation and their families could not be evacuated from Syria. The government approved the passage of members of the Syrian White Helmets organisation through Israeli territory as an ‘important humanitarian gesture’.

It should be recalled that the Grand Mufti of Syria, Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassoun, labelled the ‘White Helmets’ organisation as war criminals and called on the governments of Syria and Russia to prosecute its members. According to him, it was this group that used chemical substances during attacks, particularly in the provinces of Aleppo and Idlib – although the rest of the international community believes that these attacks were carried out on the orders of Bashar al-Assad against his own people.

On 8 April 2018, US President Donald Trump, commenting on the latest use of chemical weapons in Syria, directly accused Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Iranian authorities of directly supporting “the beast Assad” and promised that they would “pay a heavy price” for this, while US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stated that “since entering Syria, Russia bears joint responsibility for the casualties in Eastern Ghouta and the numerous other Syrian casualties resulting from the use of chemical weapons”.

The Russian Foreign Ministry, meanwhile, described the activities of the ‘White Helmets’ as part of a major disinformation campaign aimed at discrediting the Syrian authorities. Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova stated that ‘representatives of the non-governmental organisation “White Helmets” are criminals in the eyes of the Syrian people; their activities are associated with those of militants’.

On 23 and 24 July, provocations were carried out by Syria: on the morning of Monday, 23 July, the IDF deployed the ‘David’s Sling’ missile defence system to intercept two missiles launched from Syrian territory. A day later, the Israel Defence Forces shot down a Syrian Air Force aircraft that had penetrated two kilometres into Israeli territory.

Consequently, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated that Russia was not fulfilling its obligations regarding south-western Syria, whilst the Russian side responded in a statement issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry, stating that Russia rejects US accusations of allegedly failing to fulfil its obligations regarding the south-western de-escalation zone in Syria; on the contrary, it is Washington that has done nothing to separate moderate opposition forces from terrorists.

These episodes demonstrate just how difficult it is for Russia to maintain a balance in the multi-layered relations and conflicts involving the parties in the Middle East region.

At the same time, on 27 July, the Palestinian Ambassador to Moscow, Abdelhafiz Nofal, made a very interesting statement that ‘Palestine will agree to US mediation in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict only if Russia participates in the negotiations as a mediator’.

The Israeli press began to raise the obvious issue – that Russia is waging war against Israel through the hands of Hamas and Hezbollah (we will examine this issue in more detail in the next section – ‘Threats from Iran’).

Russia again – and again, participation in negotiations. One way or another, the Russian Federation cannot directly influence Israel and its demands regarding the inadmissibility of Iran’s presence on Syrian territory. Russia cannot influence Iran to leave the country. But Russia can try to influence Israel and its position in another conflict, which many countries have been working to resolve for many years ( ), and put forward terms favourable to itself on this issue – to bargain.

On 30–31 July, a meeting on Syria took place in Sochi in the Astana format, during which active attempts were made to find a solution, including on the issue of Israel’s security. The question of Iran’s military presence in Syria was raised during the consultations, but no general decisions were reached.

The Russian side, represented by the Russian Ambassador to Tel Aviv, Anatoly Viktorov, ultimately stated that ‘Russia cannot force Iran to leave Syria’. It was also acknowledged that Russia considers any demands for the expulsion of foreign troops from Syrian territory to be unrealistic.

Russia does not approve of Israeli strikes on Syrian territory. However, Russia cannot dictate to Israel how to act. “The border with Israel will be controlled solely by regular units of the Syrian army; there will be no foreign formations there. He confirmed the existence of relevant agreements and described ensuring Israel’s security as a priority of Russian foreign policy. “There should be no non-Syrian forces in the southern de-escalation zone,” the ambassador stated.

The Russian Federation cannot resolve the issue of Iran’s presence on Syrian territory, a fact it has effectively admitted officially by putting forward a compromise proposal to Israel; on the other hand, it is attempting to take full control of the negotiations on resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict under US mediation, because, given the current circumstances surrounding Syria, Russia cannot allow this conflict to be resolved – it would lose its leverage over Israel and would not receive preferential treatment in addressing its priority objectives (in Syria).

Iran, for its part, continues to remain part of the JCPOA and has promised to scale back its presence in Syria (the second promise does not necessarily have to be kept, but in any case, such a statement, as a kind of compromise, has been made; however, the question of who will determine whether significant success has been achieved in the fight against terrorism on the ground or not remains unanswered in this announcement, which gives reason to believe that this was yet another manipulation).

On 4 August, Bahram Qasemi, the official spokesperson for the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that ‘Iran will reduce its advisory presence in Syria, which it maintains at Damascus’s request, or withdraw from the SAR altogether should the situation stabilise and significant progress be made in the fight against terrorism within the country’.

Subsequently, the situation essentially stabilised. Russia fulfilled all the commitments it had undertaken without any objections from Israel and without any provocations during that period in the Golan Heights: the demilitarised zone was patrolled by the Russian military police; subsequently, the UN mission carried out its first independent patrol in one of the areas of responsibility without an escort from the Russian military police; the process of establishing eight Russian military police posts near the demilitarised zone on the Syrian side began (on the opposite side are Israeli posts, with the UN patrol zone in the middle).

And let us note another statement from Israel, which will subsequently play a certain role in the triangle of relations and confrontations between Israel, Russia and Iran.

As reported by the former head of Israel’s missile defence organisation, retired Brigadier General Uzi Rubin: ‘Israel and Russia can cooperate in the field of missile defence provided that Russian S-300 air defence systems are not supplied to Syria. Relations between Israel and Russia are currently friendly. Russia is showing considerable and justified attention to Israel’s security concerns. However, if they (Russia) supply the Syrians with S-300s, relations between the countries will deteriorate. This (the supply of S-300s) has very serious political consequences; it is a political problem.”

Russia can do nothing about Israel – its aircraft continue to bomb Iranian targets on Syrian territory and have no intention of stopping. Israel is backed by the US, and Russia cannot respond directly to Israel. Syria could respond – by protecting Iranian military targets on its territory. But Syria’s air defence is outdated and cannot contend with the Israeli air force. Iran is very nervous – none of its allies can protect it. And this will play a further role in this conflict.

Consolidating the agreements between Iran and Syria on cooperation and the continuation of Iran’s legitimate presence in Syria.

Iran is playing its own game in Syria, and with Russia, they are, most likely, at this moment, forced situational allies on the same side, but bound by mutual obligations and counterbalances (the JCPOA, Caspian projects, etc.).

Iran is in Syria with the permission of the Syrian president and is his ally. It is also difficult for Syria to remain alone with Russia, so as not to lose its independence from Russia’s political interests for good and not to become that very bargaining chip in Russia’s geopolitical games and confrontation with the US, which could be traded away at any moment.

Syria relies on Iran. Iran is a strong regional player. For now. Iran is interested in preserving Assad’s power, whilst Assad receives military aid and protection from Iran. If Iran were to leave Syria, Assad’s only ally would be the Russian Federation, which would complicate his situation, making him more dependent and vulnerable.

On 27 August 2018, Iranian Defence Minister Amir Hatami paid a two-day visit to Syria. Following the meeting, a series of agreements were signed on military cooperation and Iran’s participation in Syria’s post-war reconstruction. The Iranian representative stated that ‘no third country can influence the presence of Iranian military advisers in Syria’ and that he has no intention of withdrawing his troops from there.

Iran is firmly intent on remaining in this territory — it has been promised permission to establish a military base with a permanent armed forces presence (a geopolitical military aspect), participation in Syria’s post-war reconstruction (a significant economic aspect), and so on.

Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Syrian Armed Forces and Minister of Defence Ali Ayyub held talks with Iranian Defence Minister Amir Hatami, who arrived in Damascus on a two-day visit. According to Al Ekhbariya, Ayyub described bilateral relations between Syria and Iran as exemplary.

According to the TV channel, following the talks, an agreement on military-technical cooperation between the two countries will be signed in Damascus.

In other words, Iran conducted independent talks, the outcome of which included, in particular, a further series of agreements on military cooperation and guarantees from Syria regarding Iran’s lawful presence on Syrian territory. This is yet another confirmation of the ‘legitimacy’ of Iran’s presence.

The Syrian side also noted that “with Iran’s participation and presence on Syrian territory, a peaceful resolution of the issue surrounding Idlib is entirely possible” – a sort of compromise or bargaining.

The incident between Russia and Israel – a Russian aircraft shot down by Syrian air defences, the consequences, and the parties’ countermeasures.

The Russian Ministry of Defence issued several official statements regarding the incident involving a Russian Il-20 aircraft on 17 September.

On 17 September at around 22:00, four Israeli Air Force F-16s struck Syrian targets in the Latakia area with guided bombs. ‘Russia regards the actions of the Israeli military in the Latakia area as hostile; Israeli pilots, using the Il-20 as cover, exposed it to attack by Syrian air defences. The Russian Il-20 was shot down by a missile from a Syrian air defence S-200 system. Following the incident involving the Il-20 off the coast of Syria, Russia will ensure additional security for its military personnel in the SAR,” reads the statement from the Russian Ministry of Defence.

A statement from the Israeli army dated 18 September reads as follows: “Israel denies responsibility for the crash of the Russian Il-20 in Syria. When the Syrian army fired the missiles that struck the Russian aircraft, Israeli Air Force planes were already on Israeli territory.”

“Last night, Israeli Air Force fighter jets attacked a Syrian military facility whose precision-guided munitions production systems were soon to be transported by Hezbollah to Lebanon at Iran’s request,” the statement notes. It is emphasised that these weapons were intended for an attack on Israel and posed a threat to the country. The Israeli military considers maintaining freedom of action in Syria to be of paramount importance.

But Russia played out its own scenario, using the incident as a pretext to introduce countermeasures against Israel to protect Iranian forces present in Syria: on 2 October, Russian Presidential Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu had reported at a meeting of the Russian Security Council that S-300 systems had been delivered to Syria. This includes 49 units of equipment, illumination radars, main systems and four launchers. He emphasised that it would take around three months to train Syrian military personnel to operate the Russian S-300.

As can be seen from the above, taking advantage of the opportunity to accuse Israel of creating a situation in which Syrian air defences shot down a Russian reconnaissance aircraft, Russia, in breach of previous agreements, delivered the S-300s to Syria. This is an invitation to negotiations and bargaining. The timeframe indicated is three months.

Indeed, active behind-the-scenes secret negotiations began, echoes of which only occasionally leaked into the media in the form of fragmentary reports or insider information:

Behind-the-scenes consultations took place between Russia, Israel and Iran regarding the situation in Syria and the possibility of easing tensions (as indicated by Patrushev’s visit to Tehran on 27 September), but no concrete results have been announced: Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, stated that Israel would ‘regret’ it if it continued to attack Iranian targets in Syria. This threatening statement came after Shamkhani’s meeting with his Russian counterpart Nikolai Patrushev, who had flown to Tehran to discuss the situation in Syria. Iran has made it clear on more than one occasion that it is in Syria for the long haul.

On 4 October, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin stated that “Israel and Iran will inevitably have to come to an agreement, even if this prospect is not imminent”. Attempts at a negotiation process – bargaining – are ongoing. But the talks are not going anywhere.

Russia then begins to insistently remind Israel that it could be of use in another conflict, but its proposal has not been accepted by Israel. Indeed, on 7 October, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov expressed regret that Moscow’s proposal for direct dialogue between Israel and Palestine had not yet been implemented, as the Israeli side was ‘shying away from such contact’.

Changing the status of the Golan Heights without the involvement of the UN Security Council would be a violation of existing agreements, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on 10 October.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated on 23 November that Moscow’s proposal to hold a meeting between the leaders of Palestine and Israel without preconditions remains in force. “We will, of course, support attempts to resume direct dialogue between Palestine and Israel. We reiterate the proposal we put forward several years ago to hold a meeting between the leaders of Israel and Palestine in Russia without any preconditions,” he said.

In other words, active negotiations are ongoing, with snippets of them leaking into the media: the issue of Iran’s presence, the status of the Golan Heights, the Palestinian settlement, and so on — all of this is being discussed behind the scenes.

The measures and countermeasures taken by Israel and the US on this issue, and Russia’s position.

Israel remains steadfast in its stance against Iran and its presence in Syria.

These few reports are of interest in terms of the countermeasures taken by Israel both against the Iranian presence in Syria and against the imported Russian S-300s, allegedly handed over for use by the Syrian army (i.e. with their, supposedly Syrian, crews), which upset the balance of power in the region and prevent Israel from carrying out attacks against Iranian forces on Syrian territory and their allies (such as ‘Hezbollah’).

Indeed, Israel’s Minister for Regional Cooperation, Tzachi Hanegbi, stated that ‘the effectiveness of the Israeli Air Force will not be affected by the delivery of S-300s to Syria’, as the Jewish state is armed with fifth-generation F-35 stealth fighters. In other words, Israel is also shifting the balance of power beyond previous levels – increasing it.

There is also active discussion of the claim that ‘the S-300 air defence systems in Syria will be operated by Iranian specialists’. A source in the national intelligence services reported this to the Israeli media in October. Allegedly, this is precisely why Russia supplied Damascus with the same variant of the S-300 that it supplied to Iran in 2016. Iranian military specialists are now being deployed to Syria, the source added, and the reason for this is Moscow’s reluctance to put its own military personnel at risk.

Iran, however, had to justify itself — General Ismail Kausari of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps stated that the Syrian military has sufficient skills to operate the Russian S-300 air defence missile systems and does not require external assistance. “The Syrians have more experience than the Iranians in operating Russian weaponry and equipment previously supplied by the USSR,” the general noted.

Israel may strike these installations if its aircraft are shot down by the S-300 systems supplied to Syria. This was stated in early November by Ze’ev Elkin, Israel’s Minister for Jerusalem Affairs, Environmental Protection and Cultural Heritage, and co-chair of the Russian-Israeli intergovernmental commission. “I very much hope that there will be no Russian specialists at the deployment sites of the S-300 systems during any possible Israeli response,” the minister noted. “Israel has done everything in its power all these years to ensure that Russian military personnel in Syria do not come to harm. The Iranians have repeatedly used Russian military personnel as human shields and carried out arms transfers, using the presence of Russian troops as cover.”

And so, quite simply, the air defence systems intended to protect Iran on Syrian territory have become a target for Israel. If the crews are Iranian, Israel believes it has the right to destroy such threats even if they are passive at the time of an escalation.

To confirm the seriousness of its support for Israel’s position, the US issued a statement on 16 October 2018 stating that ‘the US has added Hezbollah to the list of international criminal organisations. Washington is establishing a special task force to combat Hezbollah and four criminal groups. It will be headed by US Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein.” Earlier, Israel had begun erecting defensive structures on the border with Lebanon to protect against attacks by Hezbollah.

In early November, the State Department issued a statement saying that the US supports Israel in carrying out air strikes against Iran in Syria, and asked Russia not to interfere: “The US hopes that Russia will continue to allow Israel to strike Iranian positions in Syria, despite Moscow’s supply of S-300 systems to the Syrian government.”

Following these statements, Russia was forced to justify its actions.

“The delivery of S-300 systems to Syria was carried out with the aim of protecting Russian military personnel in Syria, and not to ‘punish’ Israel for the incident involving the Russian Il-20 aircraft,” said Russian Ambassador to Tel Aviv Anatoly Viktorov in an interview with the Israeli online publication Times of Israel.

Iran too.

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif stated in November in an interview with the Al-Arabi Al-Jadid portal that there were no Iranian forces in southern Syria. “Firstly, there were no Iranian forces in southern Syria,” Zarif said, responding to questions about reports that forces affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) had withdrawn from the area south of the territory adjacent to the Golan Heights, in accordance with a Russian-Israeli agreement.

He added that Hezbollah’s presence there was temporary and aimed at combating terrorism. Iran’s assistance, he said, served the same purpose. Hezbollah’s presence in the country was at the invitation of the Syrian government. He added that while there may be differences of opinion between Tehran and Moscow regarding the specifics of the situation, the parties have no disagreements regarding the nature and scope of Iran’s presence in Syria as a whole.

Overall, the story of Russia supplying and transferring S-300 systems to Syria under the pretext of Israel’s culpability for the downing of a Russian Il-20 military aircraft by Syrian air defences has, more likely than not, resulted in problems and an intensification of countermeasures against Iran, rather than the expected benefits for Russia and Iran. The pressure on Iran and its allies (Hezbollah) has accelerated and intensified, both from Israel itself and directly from the US.

Russia’s attempt to propose an exchange of the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria for the easing of sanctions against Iran.

On 20 November, the American publication Axios reported, citing members of the Israeli Knesset, that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu allegedly stated at a closed-door meeting that Russia had recently proposed to Israel and the US that Tehran be relieved of certain sanctions in exchange for the withdrawal of Iranian troops and proxies from Syria.

Russia proposed the exchange in order to secure an easing of sanctions against Iran; to this end, Moscow had drawn up a plan for the withdrawal of Iranian forces from Syria in exchange for an easing of sanctions against Iran by Israel and the US. It is noted that this proposal marks a shift in Russia’s position: previously, Moscow had stated that the presence of Iranian forces in Syria was legitimate. “The regime in Moscow has for the first time put forward a proposal for the total withdrawal of Iranians from Syria, linking the Syrian campaign to tensions between Washington and Tehran over the nuclear deal,” experts report.

On 21 November 2018, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that he could not confirm reports in the American media that Moscow had allegedly recently proposed to Israel and the US that a number of sanctions against Iran be lifted in exchange for the withdrawal of Iranian forces and proxies from Syria. “As for the specific aspect of lifting sanctions in exchange for something, I cannot confirm that,” Ryabkov told journalists in response to a question on the matter.

“There were ideas that were close but not identical to this, which did not come to fruition. But we continue to look at what can be done in this area in cooperation with all participants, all the countries we are currently discussing,” Ryabkov said.

In early December, Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi, a representative of the Iranian armed forces, stated that Iran does not need a military base in Syria. “Iran has no need whatsoever for a base in Syria, lest anyone should wish to attack it,” Shekarchi told the IRNA news agency, recalling that Tehran provides advisory assistance to Syria and Iraq at the request of the authorities of those countries.

A delegation of Israeli military officials presented to their Russian counterparts at a meeting in Moscow on 12 December a policy of continuing to counter the Iranian presence in Syria and the use of that country to transfer weapons to the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, the Israel Defence Forces press service reported following the visit.

The Russian side was represented by Major General Vasily Trushin, Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, and the Israeli delegation by Major General Aaron Haliva, Head of the Operations Directorate of the Israeli General Staff. The Israelis say that the meeting, which was arranged at the highest level, took place in a positive and professional atmosphere.

The Israeli authorities acknowledge that over the past two years, forces of Iran and its proxies have carried out at least 200 attacks in the neighbouring country, and express their readiness to continue the campaign. When conducting operations north of its borders, Israel relies on operational communication channels with Russia to avoid accidental clashes between the two countries’ military forces. The parties are working to establish a ‘deconfliction’ system following the tragedy involving the Russian Air Force’s Il-20 reconnaissance aircraft, which was accidentally shot down by Syrian air defences on 17 September whilst repelling an Israeli air raid.

In effect, Israel has informed Russia of its continued actions against Iran and asked not to be hindered. Politely.

Part 6. Main threats from Iran

Iran and the IAEA (increased uranium enrichment capacity)

It should be recalled that at the end of April, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu revealed that Israel had come into possession of an archive — some 100,000 paper and digital documents proving that Iran’s nuclear programme had a secret military component codenamed ‘Project Amad’. Netanyahu insisted that Iran had already breached its international obligations simply by concealing information about the programme and retaining it with a view to future use.

The IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) has refrained from publicly commenting on the statements made by Benjamin Netanyahu, who accused Iran of concealing archives relating to the development of nuclear weapons.

The US, however, considers the documents presented by Israel as evidence of Iran’s nuclear weapons development to be credible. This is stated in a statement by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The White House stated that the facts presented by Israel “corroborate what the United States has long known” and, moreover, reveal “new compelling details about Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons”.

Russia’s position: Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s permanent representative to international organisations in Vienna, stated that ‘the US is unjustifiably seeking to inspect Iran’s most sensitive security facilities’ and insisted that “the IAEA has no problems accessing facilities in Iran and does not need its mandate to be expanded”.

Ulyanov also made an interesting point: “The US should resolve issues with Iran through tracks parallel to the nuclear deal” — a sort of invitation to negotiations without commitments.

At the end of September, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu told the UN General Assembly that there was a secret nuclear facility in Tehran and accused Europe of being too lenient towards Iran. He also tried to persuade other countries to support US sanctions against Iran. According to Netanyahu, the facility contained around 15 kg of radioactive material, which was subsequently moved to another location. He called on the IAEA to immediately carry out an inspection of the site using Geiger counters.

US reaction — US National Security Advisor John Bolton stated at a conference on Iran in New York:

• ‘The US believes that Iran may have a peaceful nuclear programme.

• The US expects experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to inspect those sites in Iran where, according to Israeli intelligence, work on the nuclear programme is ongoing.

• IAEA experts must be able to visit ‘any civilian or military facility’ for inspections.

• “If at any point we determine that Iran is expanding its enrichment activities (of nuclear materials), the US will be prepared to implement a range of measures that are appropriate and necessary to ensure that the regime (the Iranian government) faces serious consequences for its actions.”

The IAEA continues to visit sites in accordance with the previously agreed plan and within the scope of the existing mandate (the extension of which Russia actively opposes) and states that it has not detected any violations by Iran at these monitored sites.

Israel continues to insist that the IAEA has not yet inspected the secret nuclear facility in Iran, the existence of which it announced from the UN podium — the IAEA speaks of inspections carried out at various locations in Iran, but not at the specific facility in Turquzabad.

Iran, naturally, categorically denies any allegations: Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Bahram Qasemi refuted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement regarding a stockpile of nuclear materials in Tehran, according to the Iranian Foreign Ministry’s website. “The IAEA is the sole authoritative body authorised to make such statements, and he recalled that in its last 12 reports, the IAEA has confirmed Iran’s compliance with its nuclear obligations.”

However, should there be changes to the IAEA’s rules or should any of the remaining signatories to the nuclear deal withdraw from it, Iran threatens to begin increasing its uranium enrichment capacity. These threats are of a consistently recurring nature; here are a few examples:

Indeed, similar statements were made at the start of the monitoring period – in early June 2018: Behrouz Kamalvandi, Deputy Head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), Behrouz Kamalvandi, stated that the agency would send a letter to the IAEA stating that Iran was beginning to increase its uranium enrichment capacity, according to the ISNA news agency.

And again in mid-December: Iran may resume work on 20% uranium enrichment at the Fordow facility if the other parties to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on the Iranian nuclear programme fail to comply with it. This was stated by the head of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), Ali Akbar Salehi: “I would like to warn that this is not a bluff.” He also expressed hope that the other parties to the nuclear deal would fulfil their obligations to fill the gap created by the US withdrawal from the JCPOA; otherwise, Iran would be forced to scale back its commitments.

The Russian side justifies Iran’s threats as follows:

“Tehran’s periodic statements about the possible escalation of its nuclear programme to a new level are linked to insufficient progress in negotiations with the participants in the nuclear deal following the US withdrawal and signal the need to step up efforts,” said Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia’s Permanent Representative to international organisations in Vienna.

“Some progress has been made, but so far it is insufficient. It is precisely for this reason, I believe, that statements are occasionally heard from Tehran about the opening of a new centrifuge production facility, the possible escalation of the nuclear programme to a new level, and so on. I personally see this as a signal from Iran that the other JCPOA participants need to step up their efforts to restore the balance disrupted by the US withdrawal from the agreement, primarily by strengthening the implementation of the economic provisions of the deal,” said the Russian Permanent Representative.

To put it simply, one could say that Russia understands that Iran’s statements amount to outright blackmail, and fully endorses and supports such actions by Iran in order to prompt EU countries to accelerate the development of protective measures and mechanisms to circumvent the US sanctions promised to Iran, in the creation of which Russia itself has an interest, if not to say even more so than Iran itself. Russia and Iran are openly blackmailing their JCPOA allies and do not even try to hide it.

And the latest statement in this series, made at the end of December: ‘Tehran will make a decision on the nuclear deal after consulting with friends, especially Russia’ — Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister

What changes have taken place during this period that Iran has decided to consult on withdrawing from the nuclear deal – “especially with Russia”? After all, Iran previously stated that it would always decide everything on its own…

Iran – the threat of blocking the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf

Another of Iran’s ‘favourite’ recurring threats is the blocking of shipping in the Persian Gulf, which Iran also periodically announces.

• Thus, in early July, the Iranian side stated that if the US imposed a ban on Iranian oil imports, Tehran would block all fuel supplies in the Persian Gulf via the Strait of Hormuz.

• At the end of July – “there are various options for responding to US threats, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz”, the security of which, according to Rouhani, the Iranian people have guaranteed throughout their history.

• In early August – Iran conducted military exercises involving 50 small vessels. They practised creating obstacles for other ships.

US reaction – Trump’s national security adviser stated that “an attempt by Iran to block the Strait of Hormuz, which separates the Persian Gulf from the Indian Ocean, would be a serious mistake by the Tehran authorities”.

At the end of August, Iran issued a statement claiming it had gained full control of the Strait of Hormuz (meaning it now fully controls the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz) and could guarantee the security of the Persian Gulf, and that there is no need for the presence of the US or other states not belonging to this region, said General Alireza Tansiri of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps’ naval battalion.

The reaction was quite harsh, coming not only from the US but also from regional players:

Saudi Arabia has announced a possible military operation against Iran. Indeed, Saudi Arabia will strike Iran if it blocks the Strait of Hormuz. This statement was made by Saudi Energy Minister Ibrahim al-Muhanna, reports Al Arabiya. According to him, Tehran has no authority to close the strategically important Strait of Hormuz, the northern coast of which belongs to Iran, and the southern coast to the United Arab Emirates and Oman. If Iran decides to block it, the UN Security Council will authorise military intervention, al-Muhanna asserts. He also added that sanctions against Tehran are unlikely to be lifted.

“The US does not recognise Iran’s territorial claims to the Strait of Hormuz and will continue to cooperate with its partners to ensure freedom of navigation and the free flow of trade on international waterways,” said US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo

Also of interest in this context is the statement by a Saudi Arabian representative at a press conference in Russia (where an official visit and a meeting between the country’s delegation and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov took place during the same period), that:

• Saudi Arabia supports the imposition of additional sanctions against Iran.

• As for the JCPOA itself, this programme is weak and does not provide for active measures that would prevent Iran from resuming its nuclear programme to build a nuclear bomb as soon as possible after the JCPOA expires (the agreement was due to expire in 2025).

• Furthermore, this agreement does not restrict Iran’s role in supporting terrorism nor does it limit Iranian developments in the field of ballistic missiles

An article by US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, published in the November-December issue of Foreign Affairs, states that ‘Washington does not seek armed conflict with Tehran, but will demonstrate its military superiority ’. It is emphasised that “Trump prefers not to conduct this campaign alone and is counting on the participation of US allies and partners”. US National Security Advisor John Bolton also stated that the US has no plans for military action against Iran if the country withdraws from the nuclear deal.

In late November, Iran stepped up its rhetoric: “American military bases and aircraft carriers are within range of Iranian missiles,” reported the Tasnim news agency, citing Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, part of Iran’s armed forces).

Then, in early December 2018, Rouhani again threatened the US with a blockade of oil exports from the Persian Gulf if the US attempted to prevent Iran from selling its own oil, according to Iranian media

Deputy Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, elite units of the Iranian Armed Forces) Brigadier General Hossein Salami had previously stated that Tehran’s access to ballistic missile technology had put an end to the freedom of action of American aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf and forced Washington to back down.

In response, reports have emerged in the media that “a group of US Navy ships will enter the Persian Gulf in the coming days to demonstrate force to Iran”, according to the Wall Street Journal, citing sources in the US Department of Defence. According to the WSJ, the US aircraft carrier John C. Stennis and a group of other US ships will enter the waters of the Middle East by the end of the week. The deployment of US ships to the Persian Gulf will be the first such operation in the last eight months. The aim of sending the ships there is to demonstrate US strength to Iran, the newspaper wrote.

A group of US Navy ships led by the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis entered the Persian Gulf on 21 December 2018. This was reported by the Associated Press. The aircraft carrier is expected to be deployed in the Middle East for two months, spending most of that time operating within the Persian Gulf.

This situation is still developing; it is also worth noting that the US carrier strike group entered the Persian Gulf almost simultaneously with US President D. Trump regarding the withdrawal of American troops from Syria, which in itself suggests a deliberate and carefully considered shift in US priorities in the Middle East towards even greater containment of Iran.

Iran – as a cyber threat to the US and Western countries

May: American cybersecurity experts fear that the US decision to withdraw from the nuclear deal with Iran could lead to an increase in the number of cyberattacks from that country. This is reported by The New York Times. According to the publication, a day after US President Donald Trump announced the withdrawal from the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme, CrowdStrike, a company specialising in combating cyber threats, reported a ‘significant shift’ in cyber activity by hackers from Iran.

Early July: Iranian hackers have laid the groundwork for large-scale cyberattacks on the critical infrastructure of the US and European countries, reports NBC, citing a number of US officials. These include DoS attacks on power grids, hydroelectric power stations, healthcare organisations and technology companies in the US, Germany, the UK, as well as other European and Middle Eastern countries.

July: A report published by German Interior Minister Horst Seehofer and the BfV highlights a rise in cyberattacks that has continued since 2014, with Iran likely being the source. A recent BfV report states that the cyberattacks, which are likely supported by Iran, have primarily targeted German government institutions, dissidents, human rights organisations, research centres, as well as facilities in the aerospace, defence and petrochemical industries.

August: The US is preparing for cyberattacks that Iran may launch following the reinstatement of sanctions imposed by US President Donald Trump, cybersecurity and intelligence experts told the Associated Press.

September: The Pentagon published the first cybersecurity strategy under President Donald Trump’s administration. It is noted that Washington has found itself ‘engaged in a long-term strategic confrontation with China and Russia’. In addition to these, the list also mentions countries such as North Korea and Iran. All of them, according to the Pentagon, seek to “harm the country’s citizens and its interests”. The law informs these countries “that the US is prepared to impose tough sanctions for cyberattacks”.

October: a report was prepared by the US National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) in conjunction with the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) – Foreign intelligence organisations and those acting on their behalf continue to pose a persistent and pervasive threat. China, Russia and Iran stand out as the three most capable and active countries engaging in economic espionage.

November: The US has added two Iranian nationals to its cyber sanctions lists, the US Treasury Department announced.

December: The US accuses Iran of hacking the email accounts of American nuclear scientists – AP

Accusations against Iran and evidence of its cyber threats to the international community represent yet another step towards the country’s complete international isolation and provide grounds for imposing further punitive measures in the form of sanctions.

Iran – missile programme

Russia’s general position on Iran, which it voices at all international forums, can be summarised in a few points:

Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergei Ryabkov: “Moscow believes that the development of Iran’s missile programme is Tehran’s sovereign right, and all issues arising in this connection must be resolved without pressure, let alone military pressure, at the negotiating table.”

Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation: “We have never seen a terrorist threat in Iran, including during very difficult times for my country when an international terrorist network was active in our North Caucasus. We have never seen any links between these terrorists in our country and Iranians.”

On terrorism: “Moscow has no evidence that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism.”

On the possible international isolation of Iran: “It is very naive to hope that Iran can be confined within its borders.”

It should be noted that during this same period, a draft of a second package of US sanctions against Russia in the ‘Skripal’ case is being discussed. This issue is also being discussed in the context of designating Russia as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’, which could lead to international oversight of the country by the UN.

Here, in the Iranian issue, another unpleasant prospect is emerging for Russia. If Iran is recognised as such a country – a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ – this will have a knock-on effect on Russia; it is very much hoping for the creation and implementation of EU instruments to circumvent US sanctions against Iran, but if Iran is recognised as a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’, such development will cease. Similarly, it will be very difficult for the Russian Federation to maintain any economic ties with Iran – it too would then fall under secondary sanctions, despite the schemes it has established with Iran, including barter arrangements, from which Russia profits handsomely.

Russia needs a weakened, dependent and controllable Iran, which it can use to intimidate and blackmail the international community, portraying itself as ‘restraining its aggression’ in exchange for its own advantages, but not an Iran that is completely isolated from the world. It will therefore fight tooth and nail to ensure that Iran is not designated a ‘state sponsor of terrorism’ and does not fall under full UN control or face international isolation. Another workaround is to draw up its own list of ‘terrorists’ with exceptions, as opposed to international recognition, which will be endorsed by alliances led by Russia (such as the CSTO or the EAEU), and this will give it the right to adopt a separate position from the international community – this will be discussed in more detail below.

Late July 2018 – Media: Iran begins mass production of a new air-to-air missile. The launch ceremony for mass production of the new ‘Fakour’ air-to-air missile took place on Monday in Iran. “Fakour” is a medium-range missile developed in accordance with the latest global technologies. This missile is capable of engaging various aircraft, noted the country’s Minister of Defence, Brigadier General Amir Hatami

On 9 September, Iran launched a missile strike on areas of Iraqi Kurdistan, near the headquarters of Kurdish opposition parties in Iranian Kurdistan. According to the Revolutionary Guards, the Kurdistan Party headquarters was struck by seven surface-to-surface missiles fired by a unit of the aerospace group. Modern drones belonging to the Iranian armed forces took part in the attack.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, part of the Iranian armed forces) confirmed that a missile strike had been carried out on the headquarters of the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan, located on Iraqi territory.

US Vice-President Mike Pence, in a conversation with the Prime Minister of Iraqi Kurdistan, Nechirvan Barzani, condemned Iran’s missile strikes on the Kurdish autonomous region.

In October, US Special Representative for Iran Brian Hook emphasised that the threat posed by Iran’s missile programme is becoming increasingly dangerous — in Yemen, Iraq and Syria.

In mid-October, Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, part of Iran’s armed forces) announced that the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) had succeeded in developing an anti-ship ballistic missile with a range of 700 kilometres.

In late November, according to the Tasnim news agency, citing Brigadier General Amir Ali Hajizadeh of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, part of Iran’s armed forces): ‘American military bases and aircraft carriers are within range of Iranian missiles.’

On 1 December, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated: “The Iranian regime has just tested a medium-range ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple warheads. The range of this missile allows it to strike parts of Europe and anywhere in the Middle East. This test violates UN Security Council Resolution 2231.

In response to accusations of ballistic missile testing, the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated that the country’s missile programme does not violate UN resolutions, according to a statement by the ministry’s official spokesperson, Bahram Qasemi, on the official website of the Iranian Foreign Ministry. He emphasised that Iran’s missile programme is defensive in nature and has been developed in accordance with the country’s needs. Brigadier General Abolfazl Shekarchi, a representative of the Iranian armed forces, stated that Iran would continue its missile tests and would not seek permission from other countries to do so.

Commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Force, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, confirmed the ballistic missile test previously announced by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, reports the Fars news agency. According to him, Iran conducts 40–50 missile tests a year, and the fact that the US reacts to some of these tests demonstrates the pressure being exerted on Washington in this way.

The German and French foreign ministries condemned Iran’s recent tests of a medium-range ballistic missile and called for an end to such actions. The permanent missions of the UK and France submitted a request to the UN Security Council for closed-door consultations regarding Iran’s missile tests,

Iran has more than doubled the number of missile tests this year, with some Iranian missiles capable of reaching the territory of a number of European Union member states, reports Welt am Sonntag, citing data from Western intelligence services. According to the publication, Iran conducted at least seven medium-range missile tests in 2018, some of which could reach the territory of south-eastern EU countries.

The missile tests in Iran contravene the terms of the agreement that Tehran signed in 2015 with the US, Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany, notes WAMS. It was enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 2231 and provides for Tehran to restrict its nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of international sanctions and unilateral restrictive measures imposed by the US and the EU. In May 2018, Washington withdrew from the agreement, accusing Iran of failing to comply with the deal and of supporting terrorism.

The US position — Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, speaking at the UN on 12 December, made a series of statements:

• Iran’s missile programme is out of control; the UN Security Council must stop it.

• Washington is calling for the UN Security Council to reimpose sanctions on Iran over its ballistic missile programme.

• He called on the UN Security Council to establish measures for inspecting ports and vessels on the high seas to prevent Iran from trading in weapons.

• Washington intends to form a coalition of countries to combat Iran’s nuclear programme within the UN framework. The US leadership intends to work not only with the Europeans – we are thinking not only of Germany, France and the UK, but also of many other European countries that share our concerns – – countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and all those who join the US efforts under our leadership, first to recognise the risk posed by Iran, and then to develop a response so that we can fully ensure their containment.

• The US will keep putting pressure on Iran until it changes its policy.

The EU’s position. There was also a reaction from the EU:

• The EU calls on Iran to halt its nuclear and missile programmes, according to a joint statement by EU member states, released by the Netherlands’ Permanent Representative to the UN, Karel van Ooster.

• EU member states in the UN Security Council (UNSC), in connection with Iran’s ballistic missile tests, have called on Tehran to refrain from escalating tensions in the region — this is stated in a joint statement by the permanent representatives of the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Belgium and Italy, circulated ahead of the Security Council meeting on Iran.

• Speaking at the meeting, the UK’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Karen Pierce, emphasised that ‘the Iran nuclear deal is not a licence for destabilising activities in the region. “We are concerned about the recent ballistic missile launches; these actions are not in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2231,” she noted.

Russia, however, on this issue, despite international pressure and the open dissatisfaction of its JCPOA allies (the UK, Germany and France), has decided to play its trump card – the right to veto UN Security Council decisions.

Russia’s position – Russia opposes investigations by the UN Secretariat into Iran’s ballistic missile programme without UN Security Council authorisation, stated Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya. “Uncoordinated inspection or monitoring activities by the Secretariat, whatever the reasoning behind them, must be stopped once and for all… The report must not contain information from open sources, nor references to unverified or knowingly unverified information provided by individual countries, especially when it is not brought to the attention of the Council members,” he said at the UN Security Council meeting. Nebenzia questioned the level of training of the experts, their mandates, the status of their visits, and their ‘authority to draw any conclusions’.

Any UN initiative, even regarding an investigation, to further discuss the facts under investigation and draw conclusions, will be blocked by Russia, and, most interestingly, with the argument that ‘to start gathering evidence, one must already have evidence’.

Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, also stated that UN Resolution 2231 does not prohibit Iran’s missile launches — Russia points out that the text of the resolution contains not a ban but a call, and there is no evidence of a nuclear component to these tests.

As business leaves Iran, oil buyers depart, and EU instruments for circumventing sanctions are blocked, Iran is beginning to ramp up its militaristic rhetoric and aggression – resorting to blackmail and coercion to force negotiations on Iran’s terms.

Iran is on edge due to economic losses and the EU countries’ failure to fulfil their promises in a timely manner to launch mechanisms to circumvent US sanctions. By raising the ‘level’ of threat through tests of ballistic missiles capable of reaching EU territory and countries, Iran is attempting to exert pressure on these nations. It is a kind of ultimatum: ‘either you fulfil your promises, or we (Iran) will proceed further with our missile programme and threats regarding the possible use of missile weapons’.

Russia benefits from this stance and from Iran’s threats towards the EU – after all, it is Russia that is fuelling them, guaranteeing Iran impunity through its instrument: the right of ‘veto’ in the UN Security Council. The US has announced that it is withdrawing from the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) with Russia. As a result of Iran’s demonstration of its ballistic capabilities, Europe finds itself caught in a crossfire: on the one hand, the threat to Europe comes from Russian missiles; on the other, from Iranian ones.

The Russian side has every interest in ensuring that this level of escalation does not subside, supporting and justifying Iran’s actions. Russia has an interest in escalation – for then it remains virtually Iran’s sole ally, upon whom international pressure, including economic pressure (sanctions and bans), is mounting. Consequently, Iran will become increasingly dependent on Russia (economically) and, therefore, more easily controlled by it.

In Russia’s view, presumably, such an escalation should prompt Europe to step up pressure on the US to prevent it from withdrawing from the INF Treaty and lead Europeans to believe that, regarding the Iranian threat, Russia will be the key negotiator guaranteeing Europe’s security against Iran – Russia’s ‘liquid asset’ in the Iranian issue.

The bargaining has begun. What will Russia ask of Europe in return: perhaps Ukraine?

Iran – support for terrorism

Late August 2018: Iran accused of arms smuggling and interference in a military conflict on foreign territory (in Yemen). The forces of the Arab coalition, led by Saudi Arabia, and the Yemeni president’s government accuse Tehran of smuggling weapons, including ballistic missiles, to Yemeni rebels and claim that Iran is directly involved in the conflict in Yemen.

Late August: US National Security Advisor John Bolton: ‘The tightening of sanctions against Iran is aimed at preventing the financing of terrorism.’

September: The main development is the media-led accusation that Iran is manufacturing and actively trafficking contraband weapons to Lebanon, intended for Hezbollah militants. In addition to halting its nuclear and missile programmes, the new US demands require Iran to cease supporting militant groups in the region, including Hezbollah in Lebanon. Washington also insists on the withdrawal of ‘absolutely all forces under Iranian command from the entire territory of Syria’.

Background:

Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shia paramilitary organisation and political party that advocates the establishment of an Islamic state within Lebanon. It is designated as a terrorist organisation in Canada, the US, Israel and Egypt, by the League of Arab States (since March 2016), in the Gulf states, and also partially in the EU, Australia and the UK. It receives financial and military support from Iran and Syria.

Early October: US National Security Advisor John Bolton: ‘The new US counter-terrorism strategy, approved by US President Donald Trump, will specifically highlight the threat posed by Iran. He accused Tehran of supporting Hamas, Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad, which the US has included on its list of terrorist organisations – ‘Iran provides support for terrorism across Europe’.

Background:

Hamas (‘Islamic Resistance Movement’) is a Palestinian Islamist movement that has ruled the Gaza Strip since July 2007. Its associated military wing is the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades.

Hamas is designated as a terrorist organisation by Israel, Canada, the US and Japan, as well as the European Union, and is banned in Jordan and Egypt. In Australia and the UK, only the military wing of Hamas is designated as a terrorist organisation.

In Russia, Hamas is not recognised as a terrorist organisation; it is considered a legitimate negotiating partner, and its leaders have visited Moscow on several occasions at the invitation of President Putin.

The movement is funded by Palestinian expatriates, Iran and private sponsors. Following Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, Hamas significantly accelerated the build-up of its military capabilities. The military preparations were directed by the Hamas headquarters in Syria and relied on Iranian and Syrian support, as well as funds coming from Iran, the Arab-Muslim world and even Western countries.

The EU is gradually being drawn into a confrontation with Iran (a tactic similar to that seen with the cyberattacks and chemical weapons used by Russia against EU countries). America is attempting to consolidate the collective Western stance against Iran.

Mid-October: The US has added ‘Hezbollah’ to its list of international criminal organisations. Washington is setting up a special task force to combat ‘Hezbollah’ and four criminal groups. It will be headed by US Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein. Earlier, Israel began erecting barriers on the border with Lebanon to protect against attacks by Hezbollah.

Recently, dissatisfaction and concerns regarding the development of Iran’s missile programme have been growing in an increasing number of countries. In mid-October, further reports were published suggesting that Iran is assisting Hezbollah in Lebanon in the development of precision-guided missile systems, supplying them with components for assembly at secret factories in Beirut, whilst Russia is doing everything in its power to obstruct the verification of this information and the implementation of countermeasures against Hezbollah:

Fox News, citing Western intelligence sources, reported that Iran this week supplied the Lebanese movement Hezbollah with components for the assembly of high-precision guided weapons, including GPS devices for the production of high-precision weapons at Iranian factories in Lebanon, Iran is increasing its supply of components for modern weaponry to Lebanon so that Hezbollah can convert old unguided rockets into high-precision guided missiles.

The Israeli military claims that the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, with Iranian support, is secretly establishing facilities in a densely populated area of Beirut to improve the accuracy of its missile arsenal. For its part, the movement’s leadership stated that it sees no need to respond to all the accusations made by the Israeli leadership, including those concerning the existence of missile depots in Beirut.

The Russian side, represented by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, stated that ‘Russia warns Israel against possible military strikes on Lebanon’. In doing so, it is shielding Iran’s allies.

November: On 13 November, the US added the son of Hezbollah leader Jawad Nasrallah to its sanctions list for planning and carrying out terrorist attacks. The US also added five individuals and a Palestinian group to its sanctions list for terrorism. Five citizens of Iraq and Lebanon were placed on the secondary sanctions list for links to the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah, which the US considers a terrorist organisation. The ‘Mujahideen Brigade’ group from the Gaza Strip was also added to the list.

In mid-November, the following statement was made: the US stated that ‘following the sanctions against Iran, we are now in a position to seriously address all the financial flows that Iran uses to fund (the Palestinian and Lebanese movements) Hamas and Hezbollah, the proliferation of missile weapons, and all threats to peace and security”, said Brian Hook, the US State Department’s Special Representative for Iran.

Lebanese economic expert, writer and journalist Iskander Kfoury commented on the imposition of US sanctions for supporting ‘Hezbollah’ and ‘Hamas’ as follows: ‘Of course, this is pressure on Russia.’ The US sanctions, imposed against a number of companies and citizens of Russia, Iran and Lebanon under the pretext of stopping funding for the Lebanese ‘Hezbollah’ and the Palestinian ‘Hamas’, are an attempt to economically strangle these organisations in the interests of Israel, he believes.

This expert noted that the US had levelled accusations without evidence or facts, and had done so unilaterally without the backing of the UN or the Security Council.

This indicates that the US is attempting to circumvent Russia’s ability to exercise a ‘veto’ at the UN and, where possible, is currently bypassing this decision-making platform, and Russia and its allies understand this. The right of veto is perhaps the only instrument of influence Russia has left on the international stage, and in such circumstances it ceases to be an instrument of influence — for the Russian Federation, this is a serious threat.

EU statement of 25 November 2018: “President Rouhani’s remarks, which call into question the legitimacy of Israel, are completely unacceptable. They are also incompatible with the need to resolve international disputes on the basis of dialogue and international law,” reads a brief statement issued by the EU’s diplomatic service.

“The European Union reaffirms its fundamental commitment to Israel’s security, particularly in the face of current and emerging threats in the region,” it added. Western media had previously reported that the Iranian president, speaking at a conference, had described Israel as a “cancerous tumour” created by the West to advance its interests in the Middle East.

Just before the end of November, the Palestinian movement Hamas announced that it had received an official invitation to visit Moscow, according to a statement from the movement.

On 12 December, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo called on the UN Security Council not to lift the arms embargo on Iran in 2020. According to him, Iran is violating a whole series of UN Security Council resolutions, in particular those concerning Afghanistan, the terrorist organisation Al-Qaeda, Lebanon, Yemen and Somalia.

‘Iran harbours Al-Qaeda, supports Taliban militants in Afghanistan, arms terrorists in Lebanon, facilitates illicit trade in Somalia, from which the terrorist organisation Al-Shabaab, and trains and equips Shia militias in Iraq… It is also fuelling conflicts in Syria and Yemen. The Council must take note of these malicious actions and cannot reward Iran by lifting the arms embargo,” he said.

On the question of who is the bigger terrorist:

On 8 December 2018, the second conference of the speakers of the parliaments of Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and Turkey on countering terrorism and strengthening regional cooperation took place in Tehran. A delegation from the State Duma, led by Volodin, took part in the conference.

State Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin called for the creation of a single list of terrorist organisations. “We need to have a common understanding of what terrorism is, a single list of terrorist organisations, and prevent any double interpretation of their actions.” Volodin believes that the CSTO’s approach and experience in combating terrorism could be of interest in the context of meetings between Russia, Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey: “I believe that the CSTO’s experience in closing legislative loopholes – where an organisation recognised as terrorist in one country could legally exist in another, may also be in demand within the framework of our meeting format.”

This is a very interesting signal. Russia is forming a coalition of countries to promote its own list of terrorist organisations, in order to engage with them legitimately (through negotiations, mediation, economic ties) without international pressure — as a tool for creating an additional “liquid asset”.

December: Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, stated during a UN Security Council meeting on Iran that “Russia is ready to provide all possible assistance in resolving the situation surrounding Iran and its relations with Israel and Arab countries.”

“A key focus of our work in the region must be the creation of conditions conducive to strengthening the general atmosphere of trust. This is of great importance for relations between Arab states, Israel and Iran,” said the Russian Permanent Representative.

“Our concept of strengthening security in the Persian Gulf under international guarantees remains relevant; this could be initiated by holding a conference involving the states of this sub-region. In the long term, such a conference could be expanded to include other Middle Eastern countries,” believes Nebenzia.

Everything is moving towards Iran being designated a state sponsor of terrorism. Russia, of course, has no intention of allowing such a scenario to unfold – to this end, it is playing its trump card at the UN: the right of veto. And here is Russia’s proposal, the very reason this whole affair was set in motion – negotiations which the Russian Federation would like to lead. Negotiations mean bargaining.

Espionage scandals involving Iran

Let us consider a few examples of ‘espionage scandals’ surrounding Iran.

The Denmark–Iran ‘spy scandal’:

On 30 October, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Iranian ambassador in Copenhagen to strongly condemn the illegal activities of Iran’s intelligence services in the country. According to the head of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET), his agency believes that ‘Iranian intelligence was planning an assassination on Danish soil. This is completely unacceptable’.

Denmark has recalled its ambassador from Tehran following reports of illegal activities by Iranian intelligence services in the country. “This is a very strong and unusual diplomatic move,” commented the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

On the eve of the introduction of a new package of US sanctions against Iran, this story has significantly tarnished Iran’s reputation in the eyes of European countries and, presumably, this is precisely why it was made public at this very moment, with such harsh measures in response— —to cast Iran in a more negative light. This echoes statements that ‘no EU country wishes to host the company (Special Purpose Vehicle, SPV) on its territory’. Iran’s image continues to be demonised.

EU foreign ministers at talks in Brussels in November agreed to consider expanding the sanctions list against Iran due to the scandal in Denmark, an EU source told journalists on Monday: “One legal entity and two individuals may be added to the sanctions list against Iran in connection with the scandal in Denmark.”

The Albania–Iran ‘spy scandal’

The Albanian TV channel Top Channel, citing its sources, reported that Albania had expelled two Iranian diplomats from the country for their involvement in planning a terrorist attack against the Israeli national football team. According to an official statement released by the Albanian Foreign Ministry, the diplomats are suspected of activities threatening Albania’s security, and the decision was taken “in consultation with allied countries”. US National Security Adviser John Bolton announced on Twitter on 29 November that on 12 December “the Albanian government decided to expel the Iranian ambassador for supporting terrorism”.

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs described the expulsion of Iranian diplomats from Albania as unacceptable, stating that the US and Israel were behind this move.

Spy scandals benefit not only the US and Israel in demonstrating Iran’s aggressiveness and irrationality to Europe and persuading it to cooperate more closely against Iran, thereby exerting greater pressure on Iran from the EU.

These scandals also benefit Russia – they are intended to make the EU understand that Iran is determined to continue its aggressive policy towards all countries, blackmailing them, and poses a real threat to international security. The ‘demonisation’ of Iran plays into the hands of the Russian Federation, which plans to act as the main and indispensable negotiator between Iran and Europe.

Previously, Iran pursued a more autonomous and independent policy regarding its interests, notably by blocking Russia’s initiatives and hindering the implementation of certain Russian plans, for example in Syria. And Russia was forced to take this independent Iranian strategy into account.

By creating economic dependence and effectively tying Iran to itself, Russia is fuelling its militaristic tendencies with the aim of raising the level of escalation, ‘heating up the issue’, and elevating the significance of resolving the Iranian issue to a higher level through the threat to security in Europe and the Middle East region as a whole (the threat of withdrawing from the JCPOA and Iran’s return to uranium enrichment, refusal to negotiate with the US on a ‘new nuclear deal’, expansion of the missile programme, its funding of terrorist groups and organisations such as ‘Hamas’, Hezbollah and the Taliban, espionage scandals on European soil, threats to destroy Israel, threats to block shipping in the Persian Gulf, involvement in regional conflicts, cyber threats from Iran, etc.).

Russia is using Iran to create ‘its own liquid asset’ with the aim of positioning itself as the chief negotiator on international and regional security issues and entering into negotiations with the collective West over its own interests, among which the Ukrainian issue occupies a significant place for Russia.

Part 7. Conclusion: The US withdrawal from Syria – how this may affect the US standoff with Iran.

In the context of all the above, I would like to focus on one more issue: the withdrawal of US forces from Syria and how this might affect the situation of other countries, including Ukraine.

It is also important to understand that a US announcement of withdrawal from Syria, should it happen, will free up American resources for confrontation with Iran in the region, and consequently, for confrontation with Russia.

How are these connected? Let us examine the signals from recent times.

Let us consider the following signals from the recent period:

• US initiatives regarding a Middle East strategic alliance.

• A possible rapprochement between Israel and the US

• Israel’s construction of a gas pipeline.

• Competition in Africa.

• Turkey’s threats regarding an operation in Syria.

As can be seen from all the preceding material, the main thrust of the countries’ claims against one another regarding the Syrian issue is the legitimacy of their presence on Syrian territory; to put it simply – who should leave: Israel and the US demanded Iran’s withdrawal from the territory. Russia, Syria (Bashar al-Assad) and Iran – the withdrawal of the US and Turkey. Turkey – demanded the withdrawal of the Kurds and Israel, etc.

The entire peace settlement process hinged on the question of the presence of all interested parties in the territory, and this provided a pretext for shifting blame, accusing one another, and stalling all progress. This went on for a long time.

And then – a breakthrough: on 19 December, Trump announced that the US had defeated ISIS in Syria and was beginning to withdraw its troops. Moreover, unlike previous such statements, the order to withdraw troops has already been given.

Let us highlight a few more key points from the US:

• the fight against the terrorist group ‘Islamic State’ should primarily be led by Russia, Iran and Syria, as they are its enemies due to their geographical proximity to the region.

• The US expects Russia to fulfil its obligations regarding Syria under the previously adopted UN Security Council resolution.

• The US will continue to seek a resolution to the Syrian crisis through peaceful and diplomatic means. This was stated by Jonathan Cohen, Deputy Permanent Representative of the US to the UN, speaking at a UN Security Council meeting on the political settlement in Syria.

The US withdrawal from Syria took everyone by surprise. Comments from both politicians and experts have been rather restrained or bewildered.

Russia’s position: “In Moscow, they do not yet understand how, when and where the Americans are going in Syria; there is also no clarity regarding what the ‘next phase’ of the campaign means,” said Dmitry Peskov, the Russian President’s press secretary. The view is as follows:

a) we need to understand how, when, where and in what manner the Americans are leaving; this is not yet clear;

b) we need to understand what the next phase is; no one knows that either yet;

c) The Russian Federation is, in fact, the country which, legitimately, within the framework of international law and at the request of the Syrian Arab Republic, has provided assistance to the Syrians in liberating their country from international terrorism,” Peskov told journalists.

Israel’s position: Following the US withdrawal from Syria, Israel will continue to act there against Iran’s military presence and, if necessary, expand its operations, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated on 23 December. The Israelis acknowledge that in the last two years alone they have carried out strikes on Syria at least 200 times, and claim that the campaign has already resulted in a reduction of Iranian forces there by almost a quarter. Addressing those who are “concerned” about the implications of recent events for national security, the Prime Minister added that Israel’s security cooperation with the US is continuing “in full force”.

Earlier, amidst all the claims regarding the presence on Syrian territory, this report somehow went unnoticed:

On 7 November, James Jeffrey, the US Special Representative for Syria Engagement, stated that ‘the US is focusing its efforts on ensuring that all foreign armed forces that have been involved in the Syrian conflict since 2011 leave Syrian territory. Russia, which was there previously, will not leave of its own accord, but there are four other foreign military forces: Israel, Turkey, Iran and the US are currently in Syria.” This is a dangerous situation, said US Special Representative for Syria James Jeffrey.

What, then, might such a ‘sudden’ yet pre-announced move by the US – the withdrawal of its armed forces from Syria – signify? In the context of events surrounding Turkey, Iran, Russia and, in particular, Israel in the Middle East, several interesting points can be noted.

US initiatives regarding a Middle East strategic alliance.

According to reports in the American and Arab media, for over six months now, US President Donald Trump’s administration has been promoting an initiative to create, under its auspices, a military alliance comprising several Middle Eastern countries, dubbed the ‘Middle East Strategic Alliance’ (MESA).

The essence of the new concept, as President Trump’s associates suggest, is to unite pro-American regimes in the Middle East into something akin to a NATO-style bloc, but with an Arab flavour. Initially, the ‘Arab NATO’ is expected to comprise Jordan, Egypt and the six Gulf states (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia). But that is the ideal scenario. At present, there are misunderstandings or confrontations between some countries, which the US administration, among others, is working to resolve.

Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have become the main advocates of the project in the Middle East, as they are unable to cope with Iranian expansion on their own. However, apart from the ‘Iranian nuclear threat’, there is another important factor: Tehran’s warning that it could block the Strait of Hormuz, through which the bulk of maritime oil traffic passes.

A possible rapprochement between Israel and the US

‘The relationship between Saudi Arabia and Israel seems to be best described by the proverb “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. These two countries have held five secret meetings since early 2014, which took place in India, Italy and the Czech Republic with the aim of developing ‘underground diplomacy’ that could minimise Iran’s growing influence in the region,” notes The Jerusalem Post, citing diplomats from both countries.

Nezavisimaya Gazeta: “…” certain facts are fuelling talk of a tactical partnership between the Persian Gulf monarchy (Saudi Arabia) and the Jewish state. Iran’s policy in the region has contributed significantly to this rapprochement.

It was precisely this policy that was the focus of a conference organised by the lobbying NGO ‘United Against Nuclear Iran’ (UANI) in New York on the sidelines of the latest session of the UN General Assembly. It is noteworthy that the UANI meeting brought together not only high-ranking officials from the Gulf states. Also present was one of the heads of the Jewish state’s intelligence agency, the Mossad, which undoubtedly gave observers cause to speak of further signs of a thaw in relations between Jerusalem and the Gulf capitals.

However, a speech by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in August this year at a military parade in Haifa also points to significant progress in relations between Israel and the Arab countries of the region. The head of the Israeli government effectively came to the defence of the Saudi oil tankers attacked by Yemeni rebels in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. He promised that the Jewish state could take part in an operation to unblock the waterway as part of a certain international coalition. “If Iran attempts to block Bab el-Mandeb (presumably with the help of Yemeni rebels), I am confident that it will face an international coalition that is determined to prevent this,” said the Israeli Prime Minister. “This coalition will also include the State of Israel and its armed forces.”

Oman has granted permission for the Israeli national carrier El Al to use its airspace, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced in early December. The agreement may serve as a further sign of a thaw in Israel’s relations with the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. The leaders of the Jewish state are seeking closer ties with the Arab monarchies, banking on the fact that shared interests and threats will outweigh the unresolved conflict with the Palestinians.

Israel views these countries as natural allies in curbing Iran’s growing influence in the region and as solvent consumers of its advanced technologies.

Construction of a gas pipeline by Israel.

On 27 November, Israel announced that by the end of 2025 it plans to build the EastMed gas pipeline to Europe with a capacity of 20 billion cubic metres per year. This represents 10% of Gazprom’s supply volume: in 2017, it supplied 192 billion cubic metres to Europe. American businesses are actively involved in Israeli gas production.

Israel will supply 10% of Gazprom’s volume to Europe. In 2010, the Leviathan field was discovered off the coast of Israel. It became the largest gas field discovered in the world in the 2000s. Total reserves are estimated at 453 billion cubic metres. The gas pipeline route will pass only through EU member states: Cyprus, Crete, Greece and Italy. When planning the route, Israel bypassed Turkish territory.

What this means: the US is freeing Europe from its gas dependence on Gazprom not only through LNG, but also through its partners. In the future, the US may organise supplies to Europe from Arab countries via the Israeli pipeline.

Putting all these events together, one can make a modest prediction: the US withdrawal from Syria is not a spontaneous decision or some sort of backroom deal with Russia in exchange for ‘something’, but a clear plan drawn up well in advance, which was even announced by the American side beforehand.

As we can see, the US is working to create an anti-Iranian coalition (including a military one) in the Middle East, incorporating Israel as a strong regional player. For the time being, there is no question of resolving all the contentious issues between these countries – this is a long and painstaking process. But as the US has outlined its strategy on this matter, to paraphrase US Permanent Representative Nikki Haley – ‘the plan has parts that everyone will like, and parts that no one will like, and a choice will have to be made – to focus on the parts that are not liked and nothing will change, or to focus on the parts that are liked and move forward.”

For now, the common ground for unity lies in the idea of countering Iran’s aggression in the region. America is also proposing joint economic projects, such as the Israeli pipeline and gas supplies to Europe from Arab countries (with the possibility of connection). And just as importantly – Turkey has been excluded from this project. This could bring positions even closer together and smooth out the differences between the leading players. It is also a reason for EU countries to reflect on their ‘friendship’ with Russia – gas reserves in the Middle East are very, very substantial.

Competition in Africa.

Washington intends to form a coalition of countries to combat Iran’s nuclear programme within the framework of the UN, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo told journalists on 12 December. “The US administration intends to work not only with the Europeans – we are thinking not only of Germany, France and the UK, but also of many other European countries that share our concerns – — countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, all those who join the US efforts under our leadership to first recognise the risk posed by Iran, and then develop a response so that we can fully ensure their containment,” he added.

US President Donald Trump has approved the country’s key policy directions for the African continent, US National Security Adviser John Bolton announced on 13 December. “The President approved the strategy yesterday; it takes effect immediately,” Bolton said at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, where he presented the new US strategy for Africa.

The adviser noted that one of the key elements of the strategy would be a shift towards targeted aid to African countries and improving the effectiveness of such aid whilst avoiding inefficient spending. Furthermore, the US will no longer support ineffective UN peacekeeping missions and will not provide ‘indiscriminate aid’ to African countries without taking priorities into account. ‘And we will no longer support unproductive, unsuccessful and unaccountable UN peacekeeping missions.’

“China and Russia, as the US’s main rivals in Africa, are using unfair competitive practices and acting against the interests of the continent’s peoples,” Bolton stated. “Major rival powers, namely China and Russia, are rapidly expanding their political and financial influence across Africa. They are selectively and aggressively directing their investments to gain a competitive advantage over the US,” Bolton said.

Criticism was also levelled at Russia. “Across the continent, Russia is using its political and economic ties without due regard for the rule of law and transparent governance. It continues to sell arms and energy resources in exchange for votes (from African countries) at the UN, votes that keep ‘strongmen’ in power, undermine peace and security, and run counter to the true interests of the peoples of Africa,” Bolton said.

The adviser added that, taken together, such actions by Russia and China constitute “a significant threat to US national interests”. He noted, however, that unlike Russia and China, the only thing the US asks of its partners in Africa is “reciprocity, not subservience”.

US policy in Africa has proved ineffective, but Washington will no longer spend billions of dollars ‘without return’. ‘From now on, the US will not tolerate the long-standing practice of aid without return, assistance without accountability and support without reform. Instead, we will begin to implement a new policy which, we hope, will yield results. Americans are a generous nation, but we insist that our money be used for the greater good… Our priority is that every American dollar that goes to Africa is spent effectively, promoting peace, stability, independence and prosperity in the region,” the adviser added.

From all that Bolton has said regarding the new US strategy in Africa, the following is clear: America will not support the countries of the African continent for free and across the board, by investing money in general funds and participating in various UN missions – it wants ‘reciprocal relations’, including with regard to voting on UN decisions and their implementation. America is building its coalition within the UN, and by securing the support of African countries, particularly its allies, America will gradually deprive Russia of its allies among African nations, thereby raising the ‘stake’ for the Russian Federation in securing the support of African countries.

As we can see, Washington, using the threat from Iran, has stepped up its activities across several regions simultaneously: the Middle East, Asia and Africa – building regional coalitions around itself and depriving Russia of its former allies.

Turkey’s threats regarding an operation in Syria

Another question arises: how will the forces of Syria, Russia, Iran and Turkey, which remain on Syrian territory following the withdrawal of US forces, behave?

The Syrian government controls two-thirds of the country’s territory. The civil war in Syria is not over. The implementation of UN Resolution 2254 and elections lie ahead. If Turkey begins a military advance further into Syrian territory not controlled by Syrian government forces but where Syrian Kurds are present – how will Bashar al-Assad react? After all, this would effectively constitute an invasion and annexation of part of a sovereign state. How will Russia react? After all, Turkey is an ally of Russia and Iran under the Astana format for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Syria. And at the same time, Turkey is an ally of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition.

Turkey now faces a difficult choice of course of action. It should be recalled that on 12 December, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced his intention to launch an operation in the coming days on the eastern bank of the Euphrates against the Kurdish ‘People’s Protection Units’ and the ‘Democratic Union Party’ – Ankara considers them to be the Syrian offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. The EU countries and the US have categorically opposed such an operation, and Bashar al-Assad himself regards Turkey’s actions as an invasion and annexation of Syrian territory.

“No one will be able to prevent Ankara from conducting a military operation in northern Syria,” Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu stated on 22 December during a visit to Libya.

On 24 December 2018, Ibrahim Kalin, a spokesperson for the Turkish President, stated at a press conference in Ankara that “Turkey intends to coordinate with Russia on operations east of the Euphrates River in Syria. We will also work closely with Russia during these operations. In light of new developments, new coordination efforts with the Russian Federation will begin east of the Euphrates River.” At the same time, Ankara criticised the actions of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and accused government forces of violating the ceasefire in Idlib.

Previously, the US presence in Syria acted as a restraining factor for Turkey, with whom Turkey was constantly negotiating, often in Russia’s direct interests; now, however, this is becoming a problem for Russia itself.

CONCLUSION:

Following the US announcement of its withdrawal from Syria, the development of the situation now depends entirely on regional players, and Russia will find itself at the centre of these events, despite not being a natural player in the region; the US’s future actions, both towards Russia itself and towards all countries in the region, will depend on how Russia manages to resolve these regional issues.

That is one side of the coin.

On the other hand, whilst dealing with the mounting problems in Syria – and these will only grow and deepen – Russia will not be able to address the Iranian issue as effectively as before, nor play its ‘liquid asset’ to its own advantage. Iran risks, if not losing Russia as an ally, then being relegated to the background among its priority tasks – and this means that the positions of both sides will be weakened.

Meanwhile, the US and its allies will gain the opportunity and time to develop and implement all their plans in greater depth, forge new alliances and coalitions, and deploy new tools in this and other areas, whilst maintaining control of the situation.

Whether the US will succeed in implementing its plans remains to be seen.

Why is this important for Ukraine too? Because in resolving the Ukrainian issue – a peaceful settlement of the conflict with Russia’s direct involvement in it – there is a connection with events in Syria and Iran: the stronger Ukraine’s allies are, the weaker Russia’s position will be – this offers hope for the swiftest possible resolution of the conflict in Ukraine’s favour.