The study traces Russia and Iran’s attempt to establish an alternative security architecture in the Persian Gulf in response to the US initiative to form an anti-Iranian coalition. Both concepts — despite formal differences — are structurally similar and aim to displace or significantly limit the US role in the region by creating an ‘inclusive’ security system, which is formally based on international law but effectively shifts the balance of power in favour of Iran as a regional hub and Russia as an overarching coordinator.
The key logic behind these initiatives lies in replacing existing Western security frameworks with a new model, where security is provided by the regional players themselves, whilst the extra-regional presence (primarily that of the US) is gradually delegitimised. At the same time, Russia is attempting to make its proposal more acceptable to a wider range of actors, including the West, through the formal involvement of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, whilst Iran is pushing a tougher line on ousting the US. At the same time, the mechanisms envisaged (peacekeeping under UN auspices, demilitarised zones, arms control) effectively provide the Russian Federation with instruments for a legitimate military-political presence, drawing on the Syrian experience.
In strategic terms, both concepts are aimed not so much at stabilising the region as at reshaping it: elevating Iran’s status, relieving it of international pressure, and creating conditions to circumvent sanctions through economic integration. At the same time, this constitutes a pre-emptive response by Russia to the risk of the US-led anti-Iranian coalition transforming into a broader anti-Russian framework. The refusal of the US and NATO to support these initiatives demonstrates their incompatibility with the Western security model, highlighting the deep-seated rivalry between two approaches to the regional order — a coalition-based one led by the US and an ‘inclusive’ but effectively revisionist one on the part of Russia and Iran.
In contrast to the US’s efforts to form an anti-Iranian coalition, Russia and Iran have put forward proposals to create a broad, inclusive coalition.
Against the backdrop of US attempts to form its own coalition to ensure security in the waters near Iran, Rouhani effectively proposed an alternative option — to create a regional coalition called the ‘Coalition of Hope’, putting forward the ‘Ormuz Peace Initiative’ (named after the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian and Oman Gulfs) regarding security along this waterway.
Comparison of Russia’s and Iran’s approaches to establishing a security system in the Persian Gulf (comparative table, 2019)
| Russia (“Security Organisation”) | Iran (“Coalition of Hope”) |
|---|---|
| Participants | |
| Persian Gulf countries | Persian Gulf countries: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, possibly Yemen |
Additional participants:
(left to be negotiated) |
Additional participants:
(left open for negotiation) |
| Principles of establishment | |
| Compliance with international law, UN Security Council resolutions and the UN Charter. | Creation based on the principles and objectives of the UN, recognition of international law |
|
Gradual development of a security system (starting with the most pressing issues) Involvement of all parties in joint conflict resolution. (involving all parties in the joint resolution of conflicts in the region) Ultimate goal: the creation of a unified anti-terrorist coalition under the auspices of the UN Security Council. Political settlement of conflicts (Syria, Yemen, etc.) (instead of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition) |
Dialogue and renunciation of aggression (demand to drop all accusations and claims) Joint mechanisms for early detection, prevention and resolution of conflicts. (involving all parties in the joint resolution of conflicts in the region) |
|
Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity (exclusion of a military scenario) |
Respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (exclusion of a military scenario) |
|
Peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the UN or at the request of governments (in effect, a proposal for a single scenario of military conflict resolution with the mandatory participation of the Russian Federation — peacekeepers) |
|
| Discussion of a wide range of issues | |
| Transparency in the military sphere | Security and contacts between the military |
| Arms control | Arms control |
| Reduction of military capabilities |
Non-aggression pact (exclusion of forces, not reduction of military capabilities) |
| Demilitarised zones (using Syria as an example?) | |
| Establishment of joint areas of cooperation | |
| Combating terrorism, illicit arms trafficking, migration and drug trafficking | Combating drugs and human trafficking |
| Investment in energy transit (economic integration) | |
|
Cybersecurity (clearing allegations of cyberattacks) |
|
| Formation of joint task forces in various areas | |
| Signing of an agreement on combating international terrorism, illicit arms trafficking and migration, drug trafficking and organised crime; | Combating drug trafficking and human trafficking; |
|
Joint investment in energy transit (Establishment of joint economic projects with Iran) |
|
|
Cooperation in the field of cybersecurity (dropping accusations against Iran and Russia regarding cyber warfare and cyber attacks) |
|
| Additional proposals: | |
|
Reducing tensions through simple steps: trust, transparency, military contacts and the development of dialogue. (overcoming diplomatic isolation: people-to-people diplomacy and economic diplomacy) |
The states of the Hormuz Community will hold regular multi-level meetings (including at the level of heads of state) with the possibility of business and academic participation. (Overcoming diplomatic isolation: public diplomacy and economic diplomacy) |
|
Taking measures to transform the region into a zone free from weapons of mass destruction; (renunciation of nuclear and chemical weapons, but not of missile programmes) |
|
|
Abandonment of foreign bases and reduction of extra-regional presence (effectively making Iran the regional leader; Russia stands behind Iran and oversees the processes — controlling them) |
Doubts about the advisability of a foreign military presence (effectively making Iran the regional leader) |
On closer inspection, both concepts — the Russian and the Iranian — are identical. There are a few points that do not coincide, and we will examine them.
Russia’s ultimate goal: to create a unified anti-terrorist coalition under the auspices of the UN Security Council to eliminate the extremist stronghold in the Middle East and achieve a political settlement in Syria, Yemen, and other countries in the region. This is an attempt to propose the creation of a new coalition to replace the US-led anti-ISIS coalition. In other words, to minimise US influence in the region.
In the Russian version, this is conditional on the mandatory inclusion of non-regional players: the ‘five’ permanent members of the UN Security Council (Russia, China, the US, France and the UK). In the Iranian version, this point is more veiled – ‘to provide the necessary international support to safeguard the legitimate interests of the international community’.
This is done to make the Russian version more acceptable to regional and non-regional players in the Middle East, including the US, than the Iranian one. Iran is categorically opposed to the US presence in the region. But many regional countries will refuse to consider the proposal if the US cannot participate in it. And the Russian Federation understands perfectly well that without the US, it is unlikely that a balance in the region can be maintained.
Russia’s objective is to diminish the US’s standing and limit its ability to make decisions independently and actively influence players in the region.
Another reason for the need to create a broad, unified anti-terrorist coalition under the auspices of the UN Security Council is the danger that the anti-Iranian coalition being formed by the US will, one way or another, gradually threaten to become an anti-Russian coalition in the Middle East due to Russia’s support for Iran.
Both concepts contain numerous points regarding the ‘exclusion of a military scenario in the resolution of regional conflicts’ in the Middle East. The Russian proposal, however, contains a point on ‘conducting peacekeeping operations on the basis of UN Security Council resolutions or at the request of legitimate authorities’. This is effectively a proposal for a single scenario of a military resolution to conflicts, with the possibility of the participation of the Russian Armed Forces.
As we have noted previously, the ideas regarding the decisive role of peacekeeping have been enshrined in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 683 of 31 December 2015 ‘On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation’) and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (26 December 2014):
32. The main tasks of the Armed Forces, other military units and agencies in peacetime:
(l) participation in operations to maintain (restore) international peace and security, taking measures to prevent (eliminate) threats to peace, and suppressing acts of aggression (breaches of peace) on the basis of decisions of the UN Security Council or other bodies authorised to take such decisions in accordance with international law;
In light of its experience in combating terrorism in Syria, at the invitation of the official Syrian authorities, significant prospects are opening up in Russia for the use of as a peacekeeping instrument in other countries of the Middle East, but the existing structure of the anti-ISIS coalition led by the US is a huge obstacle on this path.
The point on ‘Establishing demilitarised zones’ is also based on Russia’s experience in Syria, and Russia knows better than anyone else the mechanisms for flouting such agreements with impunity to its own advantage. This is clearly evident in the case of the ‘Idlib demilitarised zone’, where the Syrian Armed Forces, under the cover of Russian air support, are shrinking this zone by force, using the ‘fight against terrorists’ and the alleged failure of the opposition and Turkey – as one of the guarantors in this zone – to fulfil their obligations as a pretext.
The clause ‘Taking measures to transform the region into a zone free of weapons of mass destruction’ provides for the renunciation of nuclear and chemical weapons, but not the development or reduction of missile programmes, which the US and its allies actively oppose, accusing Iran of violating this clause, in particular in the ‘nuclear deal’. The adoption of such a clause would remove such accusations from Iran.
Incidentally, it should be noted that both the Russian and Iranian concepts, if implemented, would ultimately make Iran practically one of the most important players in the Middle East, elevating it to a leading position. Furthermore, both concepts envisage the US completely abandoning its claims against Iran, both regarding the nuclear deal and other issues such as the sponsorship of terrorism, the development of a missile programme, and so on.
In the Iranian concept, however, instead of making claims against it, an option is proposed ‘the creation of joint economic projects with Iran’, which is intended to serve as a guarantee of Iran’s interest in fulfilling its obligations; this resembles the approaches to problem-solving taken by the previous US administration and, in theory, should appeal to a certain section of the US political elite.
Earlier, the US administration had stated that it would not support Russia’s concept. During the period under review, NATO expressed a similar view — the alliance considers the existing mechanisms for cooperation with a number of states in the region under the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to be sufficient.