THE FORMATION OF RUSSIA’S ROLE AS A ‘LEADING BALANCING POWER’ IN THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER. 2019

(published in 2019)

This study reflects the attempt by Russian strategic thinking (as of 2019) to shape a new role for the Russian Federation in the world following the collapse of the unipolar system — that of a ‘leading balancing power’.

The first key level — Russia’s initial problem:

• the deterioration of relations with the US and the EU;

• sanctions pressure;

• the loss of instruments of superpower status (arms control treaties);

• dependence on China.

The Ukrainian issue, meanwhile, acts as a central blocking factor:

• it hinders the normalisation of relations with the West;

• at the same time, it is used as a bargaining chip;

• Russia is attempting either to sideline it or to trade it for other issues.

The second level — a realistic assessment of the Russian Federation’s position (in the text itself):

• in relations with China, the Russian Federation is the ‘junior partner’;

• in the new bipolarity (US–China), Russia is not an independent pole;

• its economic and technological capabilities are limited.

This creates a structural problem: the Russian Federation cannot be a centre of power → it seeks a role through function.

The third level — the proposed role of a “balancing power”:

• manoeuvring between the US, China and the EU;

• participation in ad hoc alliances;

• a model of “variable-geometry partnerships”;

• avoiding a rigid alignment with any single camp.

The formula: “never against each other, not always together” — describes relations with China.

The fourth level — tools for fulfilling this role:

• maintaining strategic parity with the US (the nuclear factor);

• using military technology as an advantage over China;

• “economic diplomacy” with the EU;

• promoting security dialogue in parallel with the Ukrainian issue (but without resolving it).

The fifth level — internal contradictions within the strategy:

• the role of a balancer requires autonomy;

• but dependence on China undermines this autonomy;

• control over Ukraine is needed as an asset, but it is precisely this that blocks the path to balancing with the West.

In other words, a vicious circle arises: Ukraine = an asset → but at the same time a barrier to the implementation of the strategy.

Conclusion: The Russian concept of a ‘leading balancing power’ is an attempt to compensate for the loss of superpower status through the functional role of a mediator between centres of power.

Key logic: not to be a pole → but to be an essential element of the balance of power system. However, this strategy contains a critical contradiction:

• autonomy is required for balancing;

• but actual dependence on China reduces the Russian Federation’s ability to act independently;

• the Ukrainian issue simultaneously strengthens Russia’s negotiating position and blocks its integration into the new security architecture.

Strategically, this means:

• Russia is forced to shift from a ‘superpower’ model to that of a situational player;

• balancing is becoming not a choice of power, but an adaptation to constraints;

• the fulfilment of this role is only partially and precariously possible.

Systemic conclusion: the concept of Russia as a ‘balancing power’ is not so much a new strategy of dominance as a forced model of survival in the face of losing its status as a fully-fledged global centre of power.

INTRODUCTION

OUTLINES OF THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER

• The collapse of the unipolar world.

• The formation of a new world order.

• Relations between Russia and the US

• Relations between Russia and China.

• Relations with Europe

• The Ukrainian question as a tool for improving Russia’s relations with the EU

• Interim conclusion.

THE FORMATION OF RUSSIA’S ROLE AS A LEADING ‘BALANCING’ POWER

CONCLUSION.

INTRODUCTION

Since 2014, against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis, the main bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for maintaining political dialogue and practical cooperation, in particular between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), as well as between Russia and the European Union, have ceased to function.

Resolving the Ukrainian issue is a significant obstacle for Russia in the realisation of its plans. In negotiation processes and in establishing new relations with the West and the US, Russia has made various attempts to preserve previously achieved results on the Ukrainian issue, whilst advancing its own interests in other areas of importance to it.

Moscow has tried in every way to achieve the following in various scenarios on the international stage:

• by circumventing (excluding) the Ukrainian issue from the negotiation agenda,

• replacing the Ukrainian issue with assets more palatable to the West,

• reaching a compromise on possible approaches to resolving this issue in the future whilst retaining its current control over the Ukrainian issue.

The Russian side acknowledges that one of the most problematic areas in relations between the US and the Russian Federation is arms control.

The last remaining bilateral treaty between the US and Russia, which gave the Russian Federation grounds to project its ‘superpower’ status internationally, is the New START Treaty, which expires on 5 February 2021.

The Russian side proposes simply extending the treaty without changes, whilst the US insists on a new treaty including China and agrees to extend New START for a short period, but with new conditions that Russia refuses to meet.

The Russian side acknowledges that New START is the last bilateral treaty between the US and Russia, and its extension in its current form is unlikely; if this treaty expires, “then, in essence, there will be no instruments whatsoever in the world to curb the arms race”.

Thus, the resolution of the issue of strategic stability is linked to the question of Russia retaining its superpower status and the possibility of direct participation in shaping the contours of the architecture of the new world order.

The logic behind Russia’s participation in shaping the architecture of the new world order and its place within it, in the current context of the post-pandemic crisis and the crisis in relations between the US, Russia and China, is quite interestingly reflected in the works of many Russian experts. I would like to draw attention to several such works by Russian experts on the RSMD (Russian International Affairs Council) platform, namely:

(1) Alexander Dinkin[1] ,

‘The Republican Convention: A One-Man Show’

“The US-China confrontation will be the main feature of the post-pandemic world”

(2) Igor Yurgens[2] ,

‘What will the world be like after the pandemic: scenarios and key players’

(3) Andriy Zagorskyi[3] ,

“Restoring the European security system” (Rachel Ellehuus and Andriy Zagorskyi),

(4)   Andriy Kortunov[4] ,

“Russia-US Interaction on Resolving the Crisis in Ukraine: Opportunities and Significance” (Samuel Charap and Andriy Kortunov)

We have attempted to piece together these future contours from the works of these experts.

OUTLINES OF THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Experts note that the former structure of international relations – the unipolar world – has been destroyed.

The collapse of the unipolar world.

Explanations of the causes and nature of the current European security crisis continue to differ in the interpretations of the parties involved.

(3) Russia and the US accuse each other of serious violations of international law and the fundamental principles of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), particularly regarding the territorial integrity of other states.

Both sides accuse each other of violating the right to self-determination, of undermining or destroying the fundamental arms control regimes that are key to maintaining European security, and of interfering in internal affairs.

Both Russia and the West agree that the former system of relations between them has run its course. Both sides have reverted to mutual deterrence.

The formation of a new world order.

Experts predict three possible world orders following the end of the pandemic (2):

• A new two- or three-polar system, with rivalry between the US and China or the US, the EU and China;

• Preservation of the previous world order with reforms of international institutions (the best option for the Russian Federation);

• Chaos — a period of absence or failure of basic international treaties and agreements; the United Nations (UN) system is effectively collapsing, with a game of sovereign states and local alliances continuing.

According to experts, the formation of a two- or three-polar model is the most likely scenario.

Experts also point out that the deterioration of US-China relations is becoming a key constant of the post-crisis world order. However, according to experts, the PRC is not yet ready, either intellectually or materially, for the role played by the Soviet Union during the years of confrontation between the two systems.

To understand the role of the Russian Federation and its place in the architecture of the new world order, experts analyse the state of Russia’s relations with leading international players, such as the US, China and the EU, and assess the impact of the Ukrainian issue on these relations.

Russia-US relations

(1) A bipartisan consensus in the US has emerged only around three areas: American leadership and countering Russia and China. Experts suggest that, regardless of the US election results, the deterioration of Russian-American relations will continue.

Experts also believe that ‘in the event of a Democratic victory, the administration will most likely be inclined to preserve the foundations of strategic stability, but the overall strategic line of the Republican and Democratic elites in the US regarding Russia is clear: to minimise and complicate the generation of revenue from hydrocarbon exports as much as possible and to exhaust the country economically by provoking an increase in defence spending”.

However, experts believe that a Biden victory could bring about changes to the policy of ‘dual containment’ of Russia and China. According to them, ‘it cannot be ruled out that Biden will shift the blame for the coronavirus onto his predecessor and will be keen to resume a pragmatic and strategic dialogue with China’.

Experts also suggest that, should Biden win, his administration will pay much greater attention to humanitarian issues, as well as support for Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova.

Experts also emphasise that the Democratic Party is rejuvenating more rapidly, and therefore will renew its ranks more quickly and inevitably move further to the left in its ideological views in line with its electorate.

Relations between Russia and China.

(2) According to experts, China appears to be the only viable market for Russian manufacturers amid ongoing sanctions from Europe and the US. Russia is also heavily dependent on the outside world for the acquisition of new technologies. Under the sanctions, China is replacing Russia’s Western partners, but with second- or third-generation technologies and a quality that is sometimes the subject of criticism.

In its current state, Russia can only aspire to the position of ‘younger brother’. Such a status does not suit the Russian elite, the leaders of the economic, military and diplomatic blocs. But for now, according to experts, Russia will have to live with this, seeking ways to balance its geostrategic position.

Relations with Europe

(1) The pandemic has demonstrated the fragility of European values, but the resilience of national interests.

Double-digit GDP declines due to the pandemic will curb European military spending. Against this backdrop, Russia has a chance to engage Europeans in actively supporting the NPT, START III, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

Experts suggest that Europeans’ economic and geopolitical aspirations are pushing them towards the creation of a third powerful independent player, so as not to fall victim to the US-China confrontation.

The European Union is facing difficulties, such as the UK’s withdrawal, the failure of attempts to establish a France–Germany partnership on issues of both economic and military-strategic leadership, the closure of borders due to the coronavirus pandemic, and so on.

According to experts, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (most notably the Visegrád Group) are increasingly falling into the category of ‘dissatisfied hangers-on’.

Experts in Moscow also believe that the far right is losing its ‘edge’. Borders have closed even more tightly than they had anticipated. Meanwhile, the ruling centre-left parties have consolidated their positions in Germany, Italy and Spain. Society is concerned about the state of healthcare, medicine and social issues. And these are not the far-right’s issues.

It is also noted that there is currently much talk of an inevitable shift away from the liberal values of the free market towards the social-democratic principles of a regulated economy.

The Ukrainian issue as a tool for improving relations
between Russia and the EU

(1) Russian experts divide Europe into two camps:

• In Europe, there are ‘frontline’ states that ‘enjoy’ their anti-Russian status. This is a belt stretching from Bucharest to Tallinn. These countries need to ‘strengthen their weak identity’, according to the experts.

• A group of European countries whose ‘statehood dates back at least 120 years’. Regarding the countries in the second camp (older than 120 years), Russian experts propose adopting an approach based on economic expediency and pragmatism.

They suggest quantifying and comparing this rivalry in figures: for instance, according to Eurostat, in 2018 annual subsidies to Lithuania from the EU budget alone amounted to almost 4.4% of GDP, to Latvia — 3.9%, to Estonia — 2.8%, and to Poland — 3.16%. But how much could these countries increase their GDP if they were open to trade and investment cooperation with Russia, as, for example, Finland is: ‘Brussels, Berlin, Paris and Rome would do well to ask themselves: does the policy of the Baltic states and other “frontline states” contribute to strengthening European security, or is it a constant source of tension?’

(1) Russian experts believe that to neutralise anti-Russian opposition within the EU, including among the ‘frontline states’, a compromise must be found on the Ukrainian issue.

‘For the Baltic elites and for European “Atlanticists”, the conflict in Donbas has become a breeding ground. The sooner it runs its course, the better it will be for us, for the Ukrainians, and for those European countries whose statehood dates back at least 120 years. We can deprive them of this breeding ground by finding compromises regarding Donbas. Without the Ukrainian crisis, these ‘Euro-teenagers’ will find themselves in a vacuum.”

(4) To this end, experts propose that, in parallel with the resumption of negotiations on Donbas, discussions on EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES should begin. The European Union should also be involved in these discussions.

This discussion could take the form of an informal dialogue, which would enable the parties to better understand each other’s positions and identify potential areas for cooperation and mutually acceptable ways forward.

The dialogue should focus not so much on the Minsk agreements as on risk reduction and ‘harm reduction’ for the local population.

The latter may involve the gradual implementation of fairly modest measures aimed, first and foremost, not at resolving the crisis, but at preventing further escalation of tensions and alleviating the burden on those directly affected by the conflict.

Such an approach entails the gradual building of trust on the ground, international cooperation in the provision of humanitarian aid, improvements to infrastructure for crossing the lines of contact, and enhanced communication between the parties.

The United States and Russia can use their influence to encourage their partners on the ground to show greater flexibility on these issues. Although Ukraine has a significant influence on the state of relations between Russia and the US, the Ukrainian issue is not given due attention on the bilateral agenda. Each side believes that time is on its side.

(3) According to experts, three issues are of key importance in any discussions on European security, namely:

• whether it is possible to bridge the differences between Russia and the West on European security issues, and how to achieve this;

• what should be done to PREVENT A NEW ARMS RACE IN EUROPE;

• what can be done to properly address the security concerns of states that have not joined alliances.

Two approaches are considered: a cautious one and a more decisive one.

The cautious approach stems from the fact that the tense security situation and deep mistrust on both sides necessitate action, starting with small, modest steps. These may include:

• using OSCE channels to discuss the security concerns of neighbouring states in the event of a change in a country’s status upon its accession to a union treaty;

• clarifying the meaning of the term ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ in relation to the non-military hybrid domain;

• considering the issue of unplanned exercises and their observation;

• developing options to enhance the security of states that have not joined alliance treaties.

Experts believe that, taken together, such efforts could help to increase transparency and predictability and, albeit not immediately but gradually, restore trust and create the conditions for achieving more ambitious goals in the future.

A more decisive approach suggests not shying away from discussing the key issues outlined above, but holding a series of high-level meetings to endorse the progress made (or agreements reached), as proposed back in 2015 by the OSCE Group of Eminent Persons on European Security. These would be high-level meetings within the framework of the OSCE, Russia-NATO and Russia-EU.

However, holding such summits is unlikely to be possible until the crisis in Ukraine is resolved and other differences between Russia and the West are settled. At the same time, experts believe that initiating discussions on the key issues outlined above, in parallel with efforts to resolve the Ukrainian problem, will contribute both to its settlement and to resolving the European security crisis.

Interim conclusion.

From the above, it is clear that the Russian side has the following understanding of the key issues on the current international agenda:

• The collapse of the unipolar world. Both Russia and the West agree that the former system of relations between them has run its course. Both sides have returned to mutual deterrence. Reforming the former systems has been significantly complicated or blocked. Maintaining its superpower status is essential for Russia to participate in shaping the contours of the new world order. However, the former international treaties confirming the Russian Federation’s status are being terminated by the US.

• Russia’s relations with the US are deteriorating. However, Russia hopes that a change of administration in the US (to the Democrats) might preserve the foundations of strategic stability (extension of the New START Treaty, revival of the INF Treaty), which would allow the Russian Federation to retain its superpower status.

• Russia’s relations with the EU are not so straightforward due to the economic difficulties facing Europe and the disputes arising with the US. With regard to EU countries, Russia is attempting to adopt a pragmatic approach of ‘economic diplomacy’.

There is also a persistent anti-Russian lobby in EU countries, overcoming which has become the Russian Federation’s primary task in building relations with the EU. However, the incident involving Navalny, with allegations of the use of a toxic substance from the ‘Novichok’ series, has significantly worsened Russia’s relations with the EU at present and led to a new round of sanctions and mistrust.

The issue of Europe’s strategic stability and security is linked to the resolution of the Ukrainian question and constitutes a significant obstacle for Russia in implementing its plans. Russia understands that to neutralise (overcome) anti-Russian opposition within the EU, a compromise must be found on the Ukrainian issue.

The Russian Federation’s proposal boils down to commencing discussions on European security issues in parallel with the resumption of negotiations on Donbas. However, the main emphasis is not on resolving the crisis, but on preventing further escalation of tensions and alleviating the burden on those directly affected by the conflict.

Russia’s aim is to be in a position to negotiate a compromise on future approaches to resolving the Ukrainian issue, whilst retaining control over the territories of the ORDLO, as well as to break the deadlock on the issue of strategic security — preserving its status as a superpower in order to participate in shaping the contours of a new world order.

• At the same time, a new world order is taking shape. A new bipolar or tripolar system, as a rivalry between systems: US–China or US–EU–China, which do not envisage Russia’s direct participation as a separate, full-fledged player (participant).

In its relations with China, Russia acts more as a ‘junior partner’, possessing only one advantage over Beijing at present — defence technologies that are not yet available to the PRC.

If the issue of maintaining the status quo in the sphere of strategic security is not resolved positively for Russia (the extension of the latest START-3 treaty with the US), then Moscow will find itself in a new position on the international stage. Russia will be forced to seek ad hoc alliances with key players such as the US, the EU and China, balancing between their interests.

According to experts, Russia may act in tandem with China in opposing the collective West, but in a new capacity, and only by maintaining a balance between the two (or three) opposing camps.

SHAPING RUSSIA’S ROLE AS A LEADING ‘BALANCING’ POWER

(1) Russia must maintain strategic parity with the US and leadership in most defence technologies vis-à-vis China.

In this way, Russia, in alliance with China, can achieve in its confrontation with the US the formation of a ‘system of confrontation similar to that played by the Soviet Union’: the Russian Federation maintains strategic parity with the US, whilst China maintains economic parity.

According to experts, there is a ‘substantial reserve of political resilience’ in Russian-Chinese relations, which can be described by the formula: ‘Never against each other, not always together’. Experts believe that, provided close relations with China are maintained, a new role opens up for Russia — that of a leading ‘balancing’ power.

Their proposal boils down to the idea that ‘Russia is capable of pursuing a policy of multilateral partnerships in the interests of ensuring the stability of the international relations system. The model of “variable geometry partnerships” has been tested in the Middle East and is applicable in the Asia-Pacific region as well. This strategic culture can be applied at the global level.”

The distinctive feature of this model of building relations boils down to the assertion that ‘it is important for Russia to maintain a balance and not allow itself to be drawn into someone else’s conflict, for example, between the US and China. Balance does not mean equidistance’.

CONCLUSION

This trend towards a ‘leading balancer’—as Russia’s new role in the emerging bipolar world—is currently finding some confirmation. This can rather be described as a ‘test’ of the new strategy—sending out signals.

It can also be assumed that Russia will continue to do everything in its power to preserve the previous configurations of its positioning in the international arena and will only move towards a new role under the pressure of insurmountable circumstances.

In other words, in the near future, BOTH SCENARIOS WILL UNFOLD IN PARALLEL.

[1] (President of IMEMO RAS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Member of the Russian Council on International Affairs)

[2] (President of the All-Russian Union of Insurers, Member of the Board of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Member of the RSMD)

[3] (PhD in History, Head of the Department of Disarmament and Conflict Resolution at the Centre for International Security, IMEMO RAS; Professor at the Department of International Relations and Russian Foreign Policy, MGIMO University, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia; Member of the RSDC)

[4] (Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council. Member of the RSDC. Member of the Presidium of the RSDC)