COMPARISON OF THE ‘TRUMP DOCTRINE’ AND THE ‘GERASIMOV DOCTRINE’ — CONCLUSIONS FOR UKRAINE 2019

RESEARCH. COMPARISON OF THE ‘TRUMP DOCTRINE’ AND THE ‘GERASIMOV DOCTRINE’ — CONCLUSIONS FOR UKRAINE

(published on 02.07.2019)

The study presents a comprehensive model of the Russian Federation’s strategic thinking, as set out in the 2021 National Security Strategy, where the key objective is to consolidate its status as an independent pole in a multipolar world.

The first level — the basic structure of the world:

• rejection of unipolarity;

• the formation of several centres of power;

• Russia positions itself as a separate pole with its own system of values.

This means that Russia does not seek integration into the existing system, but is attempting to rewrite the rules of the game, replacing the priority of values with the priority of interests.

The second level — the logic of confrontation with the West:

• the conflict is presented as systemic (democracies vs autocracies);

• The West is portrayed as a source of threats (sanctions, military pressure, information influence);

• the Russian Federation’s response is symmetrical/asymmetrical actions + reliance on the UN and peacekeeping.

Thus, a model is formed: confrontation + controlled channels of interaction.

The third level — instruments of implementation:

• The UN (veto power) as a key instrument of global influence;

• peacekeeping as a controlled mechanism of force;

• the formation of spheres of influence (particularly in the post-Soviet space);

• the development of alliances and integration formats (EAEU, CSTO, BRICS, SCO).

In other words, the Russian Federation seeks to act not through domination, but through institutional blocking and regional control.

The fourth level — adaptation to restrictions (sanctions and isolation):

• the creation of alternative logistical and economic links;

• de-dollarisation, import substitution;

• development of ‘network diplomacy’;

• reorientation towards non-Western markets.

This forms a model: partial autonomy + circumventing restrictions, rather than lifting them.

The fifth level — the ideological component:

• creation of an alternative value system;

• defending “historical truth”;

• control of the information space;

• prevention of “colour revolutions”.

This means that internal stability is viewed as an element of external security, and information control as a strategic tool.

The sixth level — an internal contradiction within the strategy:

• Russia aspires to be a pole of influence;

• but is forced to act by adapting to pressure;

• a balance between isolation and engagement;

• dependence on partners (particularly China) limits autonomy.

Conclusion: The 2021 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation marks Russia’s transition to a model of an adaptive-revisionist state, which:

• seeks to change the international system;

• but is forced to act under conditions of limited resources and external pressure.

The key logic of the strategy: a combination of three modes — confrontation, bargaining and partial integration. Russia is unable to become a fully-fledged global centre of power, therefore:

• it compensates for this through control over institutions (the UN);

• creates regional spheres of influence;

• it builds alternative economic and political ties;

• it shapes its own ideological framework as a tool for legitimisation.

Systemic conclusion: the Russian Federation’s strategy is not one of expansion in the classical sense, but a strategy of maintaining status quo through balancing, circumventing constraints and partial autonomisation, reflecting the structural weakness of its position in the new world order.

A comparison of the ‘Trump Doctrine’ and the ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’:

• The concept of ‘hybrid conflict’ in the modern world, and the application of its elements by various countries.

• The matrix published by V. Gerasimov corresponds to the current actions of both Russia and the US – the ‘universal conflict matrix’.

• Differences between the approaches of the Russian Federation and the US in the application of the ‘matrix’ (explanations in the diagrams – simplified).

• The tools of the universal matrix can be broadly divided into long-range and short-range tools (diagrams):

• ‘Long-term’ – requires more extensive preparation for implementation and is spread out over time. The longer it lasts, the greater its effect (the Russian Federation faces difficulties).

• ‘Short-range’ – this set of tools is implemented relatively quickly and is more dynamic in execution (most suitable for the Russian Federation).

• Use of US and Russian tools in their doctrines:

• US: the ‘Trump doctrine’ places particular emphasis on all ‘individual non-military actions’ (especially the ‘long-range’ set), whilst employing only one ‘military’ component – namely, ‘military measures of strategic deterrence’. This elevates the US to a position ‘above’ the process.

• Russia, in regional conflicts, makes greater use of ‘military action’ instruments (‘short-range’). This makes the Russian Federation a direct participant in conflicts and processes – ‘within’ the processes.

• Russia lacks the resources for an independent, sustained confrontation with the ‘long-range’ instruments used against it, and for the ability to deploy these instruments itself.

Conclusion: Russia will seek or create pretexts for the use of the ‘peacekeepers’ instrument (‘short-range’).

Regarding the issue of Ukraine in the context of this regional conflict with Russia, possible scenarios include the creation of pretexts for the deployment of ‘peacekeepers’.

Based on the definition provided by Western experts, the methods of waging any war by humanity can be characterised as ‘hybrid’:

• the use of military force;

• simultaneous information operations (economic pressure, methods of ‘covert warfare’, attempts to undermine the enemy, seeking out and exploiting contradictions within their ranks, ‘weak links’, the use of regular forces as ‘volunteers’).

This ‘technology’ of warfare has been used by peoples and states against one another to a greater or lesser extent since ancient times, and there is nothing innovative about it.

Hybrid warfare is a form of hostile action in which the aggressor does not resort to a conventional military invasion, but subdues their opponent by employing a combination of covert operations, sabotage, cyber warfare, and by providing support to insurgents operating within the enemy’s territory. The aggressor strategically coordinates these actions whilst retaining the ability to plausibly deny involvement in the conflict.

Back in 2005, an article entitled ‘Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Warfare’ was published in the US. The co-authors were Lieutenant General James Mattis, who was then responsible for the theoretical and practical combat training of the US Marine Corps, and Frank Hoffman, an expert on hybrid warfare. The thrust of their proposal was to supplement the traditional range of military tasks with ‘psychological and information operations’.

In 2014, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said: ‘It has become fashionable to argue that Russia waged and is waging some sort of “hybrid war” in Crimea and Ukraine.’ It is an interesting term, but I would apply it primarily to the US and American war strategy — it is indeed hybrid and aimed not so much at the military defeat of the enemy as at regime change in states pursuing policies unwelcome to Washington.”

The minister emphasised that, as part of this strategy, the Americans employ a wide arsenal of tools. Among these, he cited ‘financial and economic pressure, information attacks, building up pressure through third parties along the perimeter of the relevant state’s borders and, of course, information and ideological influence, relying on externally funded non-governmental organisations’.

It turns out that what is actually meant is one and the same strategy (in both the Russian Federation and the US), and it can be viewed as a general matrix of conflicts.

A universal matrix of conflicts

Fig. 1 Conflict matrix

Such a matrix does indeed correspond to the current actions of both Russia and the US. The difference lies in which instruments and in what sequence these countries use in their doctrines when implementing their plans.

The term ‘hybrid war’ does not appear in Gerasimov’s report. The concept closest to it is ‘asymmetric conflict’, which is mentioned three times. The term ‘hybrid war’ first came to prominence following the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia in 2008. At that time, the post of Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces was held not by Gerasimov, but by Nikolai Makarov.

Economic sanctions or the overthrow of a legitimate government are clear manifestations of hybrid warfare, which emerged long before Gerasimov, Makarov and even Putin.

It can be said that the Russian military leadership has implemented tools from a general ‘matrix’, paying particular attention to some of them and testing them during the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of part of the Ukrainian Donbas, as a pilot project in its updated strategy for involvement in international conflicts.

Russia’s main target, however, is the US.

Russia identifies America as its main adversary and rival. The Russians know that they are unable to compete with it economically, militarily or technologically. Therefore, they are creating new areas of tension. They do not hope to become stronger than the Americans. On the contrary, they want to weaken them to such an extent as to match them in strength and minimise their influence in the international arena as much as possible.

Western experts are particularly concerned by the clear focus of Russia’s ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ on exploiting the weak links in the Western approach to decision-making, which is based on a system of checks and balances involving a comprehensive analysis of the situation, extensive public debate and thorough coordination of efforts across various agencies.

Consequently, in its ‘Trump doctrine’, the US has placed different emphases within the ‘matrix’. The US identifies Russia as a regional threat, as the elements of the matrix it employs indicate that the Russian Federation lacks the capacity to operate fully at the international level, which it itself, moreover, blocks. With the instruments it employs from the matrix, Russia poses a greater threat specifically in the regional sphere, particularly to Ukraine.

Let us examine this in more detail:

Differences between the Russian and US approaches to the application of the ‘matrix’:

Fig. 2 Comparison of the capabilities of the US and the Russian Federation regarding the use of instruments from the conflict matrix.

The tools in the matrix can also be classified as individual and international, as well as military and non-military actions (see Fig. 3).

Fig. 3 Classification of tools from the matrix.

Below are explanatory diagrams (simplified): Comparison of the capabilities of the US and the Russian Federation regarding the use of tools from the conflict matrix (see Figs. 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, 4-4).

Fig. 4-1 Capabilities of the US and Russia on the UN Security Council’s international track.

Fig. 4-2 Capabilities of the US and Russia to apply instruments in individual non-military actions

Fig. 4-3 Capabilities of the US and Russia to apply instruments in individual non-military actions

Fig. 4-4 Capabilities of the US and Russia to employ instruments in individual military actions

As can be seen from the diagrams:

The UN’s international forum may be blocked by both sides — Russia and the US. This shifts the resolution of conflicts (confrontations) to the realm of the matrix’s ‘individual instruments’.

Russia actively uses such individual instruments as:

• ‘Formation of a political opposition’;

• ‘Action by opposition forces’;

• “Waging an information war” (but is beginning to encounter difficulties due to countermeasures being taken in the international arena regarding this type of instrument);

• ‘Changing the political leadership of the adversary country’.

However, it faces significant difficulties with tools such as:

• “Forming coalitions and alliances” (Russia itself is facing diplomatic isolation from abroad),

• ‘Breaking off diplomatic relations’,

• ‘Economic blockade’,

• “Putting the economy of the adversary country on a war footing” (this involves allies providing assistance to a country (or specific forces within that country) that has come into conflict with Russia).

Classification of conflict matrix instruments by timeframe

It should be noted that the first set of instruments is relatively short-lived in terms of implementation and more dynamic in execution (‘short-term’).

The second set of instruments, however, with which the Russian Federation faces difficulties, requires more extensive preparation for implementation and is spread out over time. The longer it lasts, the greater its effect (“long-term”). (see Fig. 5)

Fig. 5. Classification of conflict matrix tools by time frame: short-term (fast-moving) and long-term (slow)

Russia faces difficulties precisely in overcoming the ‘long-distance’ nature of implementation and attempts to achieve its goals through ‘short-distance’ approaches.

The faster events unfold, the better for the Russian Federation. The international reaction to events in the context of ‘short-distance’ implementation is complicated by weaknesses in the Western decision-making process, and Russia is attempting to exploit this to the full , utilising the tool of ‘information warfare’ and the UN platform.

Therefore, in the regional arena, Russia would like to use its familiar tool of ‘individual military actions’ (‘short-range’), but due to growing sanctions pressure (the application of the ‘long-range’ tool against it), it cannot fully afford to do so.

Hence, as the Russian Federation is unable to utilise its full arsenal of ‘individual non-military actions’, the main emphasis is placed on deploying peacekeepers as a ‘military component’ with direct participation in the mission, which automatically shifts Russia from the status of a party to the conflict to that of an inviolable observer. Russia views this as a means of ending the conflict in the short term and ensuring the fulfilment of peace terms that are primarily beneficial to Russia itself, as well as expanding and controlling its sphere of influence in the international arena.

Consequently, in regional conflicts, Russia relies to a greater extent on instruments of ‘military action’ (‘short-range operations’), as outlined in the so-called ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and subsequently reflected in the ‘Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’ and the ‘National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation’. This makes the Russian Federation a direct participant in conflicts and processes, but does not actually place it ‘above’ the process.

In the US, however, the ‘Trump Doctrine’ places particular emphasis on all instruments of ‘individual non-military actions’ (especially the ‘long-range’ component), whilst employing only one ‘military’ component: ‘military measures of strategic deterrence’.

Therefore, the ultimate goal in the US is a ‘change in military-political leadership’ without deploying military forces to the territory, including peacekeeping forces, in order to further strengthen influence over that country through allied nations within regional coalitions. This allows the US to stand ‘above’ all regional processes and conflicts in the international arena, that is, not to be a participant, but to be the leader of the process.

Russia, however, lacks the resources for an independent, protracted confrontation with the ‘long-range’ instruments being used against it, and for the ability to deploy these instruments itself. In its strategies, the Russian Federation seeks to avoid using them. Instead, it creates numerous precedents in the international arena where it can achieve a ‘quick’ victory by employing ‘short-range’ instruments, to subsequently use as leverage on contentious issues of interest to it.

Based on the above, –

CONCLUSIONS

Russia will seek or create pretexts for the use of the ‘Peacekeepers’ (‘short-range’) instrument in the international arena in the future. These may be either conflicts in individual countries, in which the Russian Federation will justify its involvement on the grounds of protecting its citizens (using the ‘information warfare’ tool and the UN platform); or regional conflicts, in which it will justify its involvement as a fight against international terrorism.

To this end, it will continue to use its usual tools, which have already proven their effectiveness (‘short-range’):

• ‘Information warfare’;

• ‘The formation of the political opposition’;

• ‘Action by opposition forces’;

• “Change of political leadership in the adversary country”.

The task is to neutralise the Russian Federation’s efforts not only in the above-mentioned areas, but also in those where it has already encountered significant difficulties (‘long distances’), so that it cannot exploit them in the future or adapt to them, such as:

• ‘Formation of coalitions and alliances’,

• ‘The severing of diplomatic relations’,

• ‘Economic blockade’,

• “Putting the enemy country’s economy on a war footing”.

The Russian Federation will also continue to employ the tool of ‘information warfare’ in various countries to influence the collective West’s consolidated position in its confrontation with Russia.

In other words, the key points to focus on when countering Russian influence and aggression in the international arena are the more active use of ‘long-range’ tools to neutralise the tools employed by Russia at ‘short range’:

• neutralising its ‘information warfare’ both at the scene of events and in the international arena as a whole;

• participation in coalitions and alliances opposing the Russian Federation; preventing or hindering Russia’s own attempts to form coalitions and alliances; working with countries already part of such an alliance to weaken those ties, etc.; ; undermining or neutralising the implementation of Russia’s ‘targeted economic diplomacy’ with other countries.

• Preventing peacekeeping operations, both by Russia acting alone and through its direct participation in such international peacekeeping operations, on terms favourable to it. Neutralising Russia’s attempts to create pretexts for deploying peacekeepers.

• Continuing economic pressure on Russia (sanctions). Creating or seeking pretexts to intensify such pressure.

Regarding the issue of Ukraine in the context of this regional conflict with Russia.

The provisions of the Russian Federation’s military doctrine are formulated in such a way as to allow Russia to constantly point to Ukraine as a military danger and threat, building an ‘information confrontation’ on these premises and exerting pressure on our country for as long as it suits Russia.

Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 26 December 2014.

1. Military dangers and military threats to the Russian Federation

g) the use of military force on the territories of states bordering the Russian Federation and its allies, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and other norms of international law;

(i) the existence (emergence) of hotspots and the escalation of armed conflicts in the territories of states bordering the Russian Federation and its allies;

l) the existence (emergence) of hotbeds of inter-ethnic and inter-religious tension, the activities of international armed radical groups and foreign private military companies in areas adjacent to the state border of the Russian Federation and the borders of its allies, as well as the existence of territorial disputes, the rise of separatism and extremism in certain regions of the world;

n) the establishment in states bordering the Russian Federation of regimes, including as a result of the overthrow of legitimate state authorities, whose policies threaten the interests of the Russian Federation;

On 24 April 2019, Vladimir Putin signed a decree simplifying the process for residents of the ‘DPR and LPR’ to obtain Russian passports: ‘Decree on the determination, for humanitarian purposes, of categories of persons entitled to apply for Russian citizenship under a simplified procedure’.

In doing so, Russia ‘seized’ the strategic initiative regarding the Ukrainian agenda, taking advantage of the moment when the newly elected president had not yet assumed office. According to the same military doctrine of the Russian Federation, the tasks of the Russian Armed Forces include the protection of Russian citizens outside Russia, which could also mean the development of an Abkhazian scenario on Ukrainian territory, particularly in the ORDLO.

32. The main tasks of the Armed Forces, other military units and agencies in peacetime

k) the protection of citizens of the Russian Federation outside the Russian Federation from armed attack against them;

The issue is that, citing the dire humanitarian situation of the inhabitants of the unrecognised republics, the Russian Federation intends to grant citizenship to the population living there, but it is emphasised that Russian passports will be issued first and foremost to active members of the ORDLO Armed Forces and representatives of the republics’ administrations.

The difficult humanitarian situation also provides for ‘peacekeeping intervention’.

On this issue, at Ukraine’s initiative, a UN meeting was convened, at which it was initially stated that no specific decisions would be taken, but rather the international stance on such actions by Russia would be demonstrated, which manifested itself in the virtually unanimous recognition of the Russian Federation’s unlawful actions from the perspective of international law. Several speakers also noted that this scenario of ‘distributing’ Russian passports in the disputed (occupied) territories is not a new invention, but a repeat of the scenario involving Russian ‘peacekeepers’ in Abkhazia.

A consolidated decision by the UN Security Council is required to deploy international peacekeepers with a UN mandate to the ORDLO. At the time, Russia submitted its own draft resolution on peacekeepers (5 September 2017), which provided for a ‘UN peacekeeping police mission for the OSCE’ only along the line of contact and failed to secure enough support for a vote.

The US and its allies in the Normandy format (Germany and France, with the support of Ukraine) proposed an alternative draft ‘UN peacekeeping police mission’, which consisted of a series of measures and included, first and foremost, control by such a mission of the border with Russia, the establishment of an international temporary administration comprising members of the mission in place of the local illegal authorities, the disbandment of military units, their disarmament and the taking of all military capabilities in the territories under control, demining, and so on, right up to the holding of elections in accordance with Ukrainian law – that is, the phased implementation of the ‘Minsk Agreements’ under the control of an international UN police mission, which would be vested with a range of functions and capabilities, including those of a coercive and military nature. This proposal did not receive support from the Russian Federation.

As mentioned earlier, Russia seeks to deploy peacekeepers as the final stage of any operation, either under the pretext of implementing the ‘Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation’ (the protection of Russian citizens outside the Russian Federation from armed attack) or under the pretext of combating international terrorism.

It is worth noting that in the autumn of 2018, Russia actively promoted the narrative in the media regarding the possible use of chemical weapons in the ORDLO region, linking this to President P. Poroshenko’s alleged endorsement of such a scenario (the connection: Poroshenko – SBU – nationalists – ISIS terrorists or ‘White Helmets’) – linking it to acts of international terrorism.

The material in question noted that in the near future, the Russian Federation is quite capable of staging a provocation involving the use of chemical weapons in Donbas, which, given its experience in Syria, could be carried out according to one of two scenarios:

– ‘the Aleppo model’ – a simulated chemical attack or an actual chemical attack on the front line or in the ORDLO with minimal consequences, as a result of which Russia finds itself first on the scene and takes full control of the situation;

– ‘the Idlib scenario’ – by hyping up the threat of a chemical attack and escalating tensions around this issue during the negotiation process (under pressure), to achieve a similar outcome in Idlib (officially withdrawing its regular forces to the line of demarcation).

The likelihood of such a scenario unfolding now, during the transitional period as the new president takes office and on the eve of parliamentary elections in Ukraine, is increasing and may take on new ‘hybrid’ aspects.

As one possible scenario.

Possible scenarios include creating pretexts for deploying ‘peacekeepers’ in connection with a ‘mass attack on Russian citizens’, as well as the ‘use of chemical weapons’, or in the event of a sharp escalation of hostilities along the contact line in the ORDLO, with accusations levelled at the Ukrainian side.

In the event of such a provocation involving the use of chemical weapons, the Russian Federation will not need to deploy its own peacekeepers (officially crossing the Ukrainian border, which would be a violation of international law without a UN mandate); they will already ‘find themselves’ there on the ground – these will be military units from the ORDLO, holding Russian passports, whom Russia can ‘authorise’ to become such ‘Russian peacekeepers’, whom it will then defend.

Such ‘hybrid peacekeepers’ with two passports in hand may well emerge, because, as is clear from the Russian side’s explanations, there is no need to surrender a Ukrainian passport when applying for Russian citizenship. On the international stage, Russia will use this dual citizenship to justify its ‘non-involvement’ on the one hand (by claiming that these are Ukrainian citizens lawfully present in the territory), and on the other hand, to justify its involvement in the protection of such ‘Russian’ peacekeepers (citing the clause in the military doctrine regarding the protection of Russian citizens outside Russia), depending on the situation.

Most likely, these decisions are linked to the fact that international pressure on Russia regarding the Ukrainian conflict is intensifying. The results of the Ukrainian presidential election also came as something of a surprise to the Russian Federation (and not just to them). As past elections have shown, it has become quite difficult for Russia to influence the course of the election campaign in Ukraine, and the parliamentary election campaign is of greater significance to Russia than the presidential one.

Thus, Russia is attempting to seize the initiative and impose its conditions on the country’s new leadership, raising the stakes in decisions regarding the ORDLO ahead of the parliamentary elections, and resorting to blackmail with ‘Abkhazian’ or ‘Syrian’ scenarios.