(published July 2019).
The study documents a situation in which the collapse of the arms control system (the INF Treaty, with the New START Treaty in question) leads not merely to security tensions, but to a systemic transformation of Russia’s role in the international architecture.
The key shift is the Russian Federation’s transition from the position of an EU ‘partner’ to that of an ‘adversary’, which automatically changes the logic of interaction: from economic cooperation to security deterrence. In this new configuration, Russia loses the ability to fully utilise the tools of economic diplomacy, as resources are redirected towards the military sphere, whilst sanctions pressure limits its room for manoeuvre.
This creates a vicious structural cycle: military confrontation → economic weakening → even greater dependence on military means.
The second key level is the crisis of status. Arms control treaties served not only a practical but also a symbolic function for the Russian Federation—they established it as a superpower on a par with the United States. Their collapse shifts the question of status from a formal (institutional) to a practical dimension, where Russia is forced to prove its status through behaviour, which fuels escalatory rhetoric and demonstrative actions.
The third level is the US–Russia–China triangle. The US is attempting to integrate Russia into its strategy of containing China, using arms control negotiations as a tool. However, Russia lacks sufficient influence over China, which effectively reduces its negotiating value and relegates it to the role of a limited intermediary without any real leverage.
Thus, Russia is simultaneously:
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losing ground in Europe;
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cannot become a full partner of the US;
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has no control over China.
Conclusion: In this configuration, the arms race is not a tool for strengthening Russia’s position, but a structural trap combining three constraints: economic, security and status-related.
Russia is forced to build up its military capabilities to preserve its status, but this very action undermines its economic potential and diplomatic manoeuvrability, deepening its isolation. The loss of institutional mechanisms (treaties) means that status is no longer guaranteed by rules, but must be confirmed by resources, of which Russia lacks sufficient quantities for long-term competition.
In strategic terms, this signifies Russia’s transition to a model
reactive power, forced to operate within conditions shaped by other players, and to compensate for this through tougher but less sustainable instruments.
Systemic conclusion: the arms race does not strengthen Russia, but traps it in a state of forced confrontation, where the preservation of status is achieved at the cost of narrowing real capabilities.
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The US withdrawal from the INF Treaty shifts Russia from being an EU ‘partner’ to an ‘adversary’ and forces Europe to strengthen its own security.
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The status of ‘adversary’ limits Russia’s ability to use economic diplomacy with the EU
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Arms control (INF Treaty, New START) ensured Russia’s status as a superpower on a par with the US.
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The arms race is economically burdensome first and foremost for Russia itself.
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The US views agreements with Russia as a tool for containing China; Russia agrees, but has no influence over China.
The ‘arms race’ is a serious problem for Russia.
The US withdrawal from the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty) has put Russia in a difficult position. Russia is becoming the main security threat to Europe, which is forced to seek a new balance of power to protect its territory from the Russian Federation’s military capabilities directed against it, despite the fact that many countries are members of the NATO military alliance. Many, but not all.
This shifts Russia’s status from an EU ‘partner’ to an EU ‘adversary’ in the security sphere and forces Europe to respond independently to the growing threat. After all, the US has freed itself from restrictions on the production of this type of weaponry. The Russian side has also withdrawn from this treaty, meaning that these countries are becoming ‘rivals’ and will build up their military capabilities in competition with one another.
On the other hand, the role of the EU’s ‘adversary’ in such a configuration makes it difficult for Russia to utilise the instrument of ‘economic diplomacy’ with these countries to its full potential, particularly because part of the funds must be spent not on developing economic ties, but specifically on building up military capabilities, and making ‘generous investments and gifts’ in the form of joint economic projects, in which the Russian Federation can shoulder the lion’s share of the costs – a tactic used to attract partners whose loyalty it wishes to win or ‘buy’ – is becoming increasingly difficult, particularly under the sanctions pressure of the collective West.
The extension of START III (the treaty between Russia and the US on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, which expires on 5 February 2021) also remains in doubt. Here, the focus is on the arsenal of deployed strategic nuclear weapons.
The arms race is a costly process for all those drawn into it. For Russia, however, it is also a matter of prestige, for as long as the INF Treaty existed and the New START Treaty remains in force, it has been recognised by the world as a superpower on a par with the US. All of Russia’s diplomacy in recent years has been built on this basis, demanding that the US address Russia and engage in dialogue with it as an equal superpower. And on this basis, it puts forward this demand – recognition of its status as a superpower – in its relations with other countries of the world, seeking to dominate the international arena.
Now it will have to prove in practice that it is still a superpower of that calibre. And this greatly worries the Russian leadership, which is losing these positions and wants to preserve them at all costs. Therefore, Russia is forced to resort, in particular, to threats against European countries so that they, in turn, exert pressure on the US position, which, in essence, triggers a new arms race.
Such an arms race is, first and foremost, disadvantageous to Russia itself, and it ‘threatens’ European countries. But such threats to EU countries prevent the Russian Federation from building ‘economic diplomacy’ and overcoming ‘diplomatic isolation’ with these countries – resulting in a vicious circle for Russia, into which it has been drawn by the US. That is why Russia is doing its utmost to emphasise, in every forum and in every format, the argument that ‘Moscow supports any means of curbing the arms race’.
This argument is of great interest to the US in terms of containing China, a country it recognises as a ‘rival’ at the international level, unlike Russia, which the US recognises as a ‘rival’ at the regional level.
The US objective, which it has been articulating recently, is to bring China – which is rapidly developing in this area – into a new treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. To this end, it wishes to utilise Russia and its potential influence on China in this matter. China itself categorically refuses to participate in such treaties, as they are not in its interests and contradict its own security doctrines.
Russia lacks the tools and the level of influence over the PRC that would enable it to change China’s position, at least for the time being. Therefore, on the one hand, the US is in no hurry to decide on extending the START III treaty, signalling to Russia that it still has time to try to preserve it. On the other hand, it is increasingly asserting its main objective – the conclusion of a new treaty involving new participants, specifically China. The Kremlin’s main argument at present boils down to the fact that Russia acknowledges the US’s reasoning regarding China’s involvement, but is currently unable to influence the PRC.
The ‘arms race’ presents Russia with a structural trap that combines security, economic and status-related constraints. The US withdrawal from the INF Treaty transforms Russia from an EU partner into a security adversary, which automatically limits the scope for economic diplomacy and intensifies the pressure of sanctions. At the same time, the need to build up military capabilities diverts resources away from economic development, creating a vicious circle: security confrontation undermines economic instruments of influence, and their weakness further increases dependence on the military factor.
A key element is also the crisis of status: the treaty system (INF Treaty, New START) served not only as an arms control instrument but also as a mechanism for confirming Russia’s equality with the US as a superpower. Their collapse shifts the status issue from the institutional level to the practical one — the need to prove it through real capabilities, which pushes the Russian Federation towards tougher behaviour, including threats and escalatory rhetoric towards Europe.
At the same time, within the US–Russia–China triangle, Russia finds itself in an intermediate position: the US is attempting to use it as a tool to influence China in negotiations on new arms control, but Russia lacks sufficient leverage over China. This further narrows its strategic options and increases its dependence on the decisions of other players. Ultimately, the arms race appears to Russia not as a tool for strengthening its position, but as a forced reaction in the face of a loss of control over the security architecture and limited resources to maintain its declared status.