(published on 02.07.2019)
The study describes the logic of Russia’s ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ as a systemic model of conflict management, in which the key feature is the combination of non-military and military instruments, with the former dominating in the initial stages.
The first level is the structure of the ‘conflict matrix’:
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a 4:1 ratio in favour of non-military instruments;
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information, political and economic destabilisation as a preparatory stage;
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military force as the final phase.
This means that war is viewed not as a separate act, but as the final element of a long process of preparing the environment.
The second level — the role of “peacemaking”:
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not as a neutral instrument, but as a mechanism for consolidating the outcome;
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deployment of peacekeepers = legitimisation of presence;
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control of the territory following the phase of active conflict.
In other words, peacekeeping is integrated into the logic of war as its institutional conclusion.
The third level — restricting the Russian Federation in the international arena:
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key instruments (sanctions, pressure, international decisions) are controlled through the UN;
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Russia uses its veto to block undesirable decisions;
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this allows it to paralyse international mechanisms and move to unilateral action.
In effect, a pattern emerges: blocking at the international level → shifting the game to a unilateral format → imposing one’s own terms.
The fourth level — geographical limitations on instruments:
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full implementation is possible only in regions where the Russian Federation has a physical presence;
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hence the focus is on border zones and countries with Russian military infrastructure.
The fifth level — the model’s inherent weakness:
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the Russian Federation cannot apply all instruments to their full extent;
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it itself becomes the target of similar actions (sanctions, information pressure);
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the asymmetry of resources with the West limits its effectiveness.
Conclusion: ‘Gerasimov’s Doctrine’ is not merely a concept of hybrid warfare, but a systemic model of conflict management, where:
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non-military instruments shape the environment;
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military force completes the process;
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peacekeeping consolidates the result and legitimises the presence.
Key logic: war → is a process, not an event, and its outcome is the institutionalisation of control.
At the same time, the effectiveness of this model is limited:
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dependence on regional presence;
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the inability to fully control international instruments;
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the asymmetry of resources compared to the West.
Systemic conclusion: the Russian model of conflict is effective as a tool for local influence and the creation of “managed zones of instability”, but it cannot be scaled up to the level of full-scale global control due to structural limitations within the Russian Federation itself.
RESEARCH.
Analysis of the ‘Conflict Matrix’ (diagram) from V. Gerasimov’s article ‘The Value of Science in Prediction’:
• the balance between non-military and military actions, identification of instruments;
• these instruments can also be divided into individual and international (diagram).
• Highlighting the thesis on the ‘principle of waging war based on the coordinated use of military and non-military measures, with the Armed Forces playing a decisive role’.
• ‘non-military actions’ are seen as a prelude, creating the conditions for the use of ‘military action’
Russia sees peacekeeping as the main focus of its potential involvement in the geopolitical arena:
• The thesis on the decisive role of peacekeeping has been enshrined in the National Security Strategy and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.
• The main obstacles to Russia’s influence in international conflicts lie in the realm of ‘international instruments’ — namely, UN instruments.
• Russia creates conditions for the use of only individual instruments within the ‘conflict matrix’, leaving the ‘Peacekeeping Operations’ block for international negotiations (diagram).
• ‘Peacekeeping operations’ (diagram) represent the culmination of the Russian Federation’s plans for involvement in international conflicts.
The onset of Russia’s heightened activity on the international stage following the 2008 armed conflict with Georgia is based on the study of military conflicts, particularly those linked to the so-called colour revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East. Russia has carefully analysed the actions of its rivals.
The civil war in Syria (which began in 2011), on whose territory Russian military bases were located, posed a threat to the legitimate presence of the Russian Armed Forces outside Russia. Furthermore, the situation in Ukraine, which was ‘unstable’ for Russian influence, carried the risk of losing Russian military bases in the Ukrainian Crimea.
By studying the experience of international conflicts and the behaviour of various countries within them, Russia adopted the core principles of conflict management from that period, which were encapsulated in the term ‘hybrid war’. In the US, the concept of hybrid warfare became firmly associated with the term ‘Gerasimov’s doctrine’, the tenets of which were subsequently adapted into the ‘National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation’.
In February 2013, General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, published a 2,000-word article entitled ‘The Value of Science in Forecasting’ in the weekly Russian newspaper ‘Military-Industrial Courier’.
Conflict Matrix
Fig. 1 Illustration from Gerasimov’s article ‘The Value of Science in Forecasting’.
This ‘matrix’ envisages a ratio of non-military to military actions of 4:1.
Military actions
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Military measures of strategic deterrence
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Strategic deployment
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Conduct of military operations
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Peacekeeping operations
Non-military actions
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Formation of a political opposition
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Action by opposition forces
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Formation of coalitions and alliances
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Break in diplomatic relations
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Economic sanctions
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Economic blockade
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Political and diplomatic pressure
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Conversion of the enemy country’s economy to a war footing
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Change in the political leadership of the opposing country
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Seeking ways to resolve the conflict
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Implementation of a range of measures to reduce tensions in relations following a change in political leadership
In addition, the matrix provides for ‘Conducting information warfare’ in all forms and throughout the entire implementation period.
It should be noted that these instruments can also be divided into domestic and international ones. (see Fig. 2)
Fig. 2 Classification of tools from the matrix.
In his work, Gerasimov discusses Russia’s ‘active defence strategy’, based on a number of principles, in particular ‘the principle of waging war based on the coordinated use of military and non-military measures, provided that the Armed Forces play a decisive role’. He wrote: ‘The very “rules of war” have changed. The role of non-military means in achieving political and strategic objectives has increased many times over, and in many cases they prove to be more effective than the use of weapons… All this is complemented by covert military means.”
Gerasimov clarifies that the main such objective is to create conditions for constant unrest and conflict within the enemy state.
We would highlight, in our view, the main thrust of Russia’s understanding of its capabilities for engagement in the geopolitical arena in the context of Gerasimov’s words on the ‘decisive role of the Armed Forces’ in the new realities. For throughout the text of the so-called ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’, ‘non-military actions’ are viewed as a prelude to creating conditions for the use of ‘military action’ against the enemy.
‘The value of science lies in foresight’, V. Gerasimov:
The emphasis in methods of confrontation is shifting towards the widespread use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military measures, implemented with the involvement of the population’s protest potential. All this is complemented by covert military measures, in particular the implementation of information warfare measures and the actions of special operations forces.
The open use of force is often resorted to only at a certain stage, usually under the guise of peacekeeping activities and crisis management, primarily to achieve a definitive victory in the conflict.
One form of deploying Armed Forces units abroad is a peacekeeping operation. In addition to traditional military operations, this may also include specific activities: special operations, humanitarian operations, rescue operations, evacuation operations, medical and border operations, and others. At present, their classification, nature and scope are not clearly defined.
Furthermore, the complex and multifaceted tasks of peacekeeping, which regular troops may have to undertake, necessitate the creation of a fundamentally different system for their training.
Subsequently, the principles regarding the decisive role of peacekeeping were enshrined in the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 683 of 31 December 2015 ‘On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation’) and the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (26 December 2014):
104. With a view to maintaining strategic stability, the Russian Federation: regards international peacekeeping as an effective instrument for the settlement of armed conflicts and participates in it; advocates the strengthening of this institution in strict accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations
Activities of the Russian Federation to deter and prevent military conflicts:
(p) participation in international peacekeeping activities, including under the auspices of the UN and within the framework of cooperation with international (regional) organisations;
30. For the conduct of peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate or a CIS mandate, the Russian Federation shall provide military contingents in accordance with the procedure established by federal legislation and international treaties of the Russian Federation.
31. With a view to protecting the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, and maintaining international peace and security, units of the Armed Forces may be deployed outside the Russian Federation in accordance with the generally recognised principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation and federal legislation.
32. The main tasks of the Armed Forces, other military units and bodies in peacetime are:
(l) participation in operations to maintain (restore) international peace and security, taking measures to prevent (eliminate) threats to peace, and suppressing acts of aggression (breaches of peace) on the basis of decisions of the UN Security Council or other bodies authorised to take such decisions in accordance with international law;
56. Main priorities of military-political cooperation:
e) with the UN and other international, including regional, organisations — the involvement of representatives of the Armed Forces, other military units and bodies in the leadership of peacekeeping operations, and in the process of planning and implementing measures to prepare for operations to maintain (restore) peace.
International conflicts in which the Russian Federation is actively involved are considered within the UN framework, which develops a coordinated solution for each of them.
Russia may deploy its armed forces outside its own territory in peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate or at the official request of the legitimate authorities of another country (as, for example, in Syria at the request of President B. Assad in the fight against ISIL – in the fight against international terrorism).
The main obstacles to Russia’s influence in international conflicts lie in the realm of ‘International instruments’ – these are UN instruments:
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‘political and diplomatic pressure’,
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‘economic sanctions’,
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‘peacekeeping operations’.
Therefore, Russia places a decisive emphasis on the international arena of the UN, where it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and holds a ‘veto right’ (it can block UN Security Council decisions that are unfavourable to itself or its allies), through which it aims to influence and control processes in these key, in its view, decisive areas, under the guise of international law:
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Political and diplomatic pressure (the ability to express an alternative (opposing) viewpoint on the issues under discussion; justifying its own actions and those of its allies at the international level; accusing opponents, etc. That is, shaping international public opinion in its favour, or undermining a consolidated view on a given issue, or blocking decisions that are disadvantageous to itself and its allies);
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Economic sanctions (the ability to block international sanctions both against oneself and against one’s allies);
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Peacekeeping operations (the ability or inability to adopt international decisions in this area without fully agreeing on terms favourable to itself, which enables it to control the ‘hotspot’ unilaterally).
Thus, by blocking the UN’s international platform, Russia creates conditions for the use of only individual instruments within the ‘conflict matrix’, leaving the ‘Peacekeeping operations’ bloc open for international negotiation, but on its own terms and with its mandatory participation. (see Fig. 3)
Fig. 3: The Russian Federation’s blocking of international mechanisms within the UN Security Council.
It is also worth noting that the ‘Individual Instruments’ in the section on ‘military actions’ envisage the physical presence of the Russian Armed Forces in the conflict zone or in its immediate vicinity. The Russian Federation does not fully possess such a capability in the international arena, but it does in the regional sphere (along the border perimeter or at the locations of its military bases outside Russian territory).
If we examine Russia’s actions through the ‘matrix’, a pattern emerges which is further emphasised in the implementation of the Russian Federation’s plans for participation in international conflicts, the pinnacle of which is ‘Peacekeeping operations’. (see Fig. 4)
Fig. 4 Simplified diagram of the conflict matrix according to the Russian scenario.
The deployment and maintenance of its peacekeepers in disputed territory are necessary for the Russian Federation to secure the outcome it requires: control over the achieved result and influence over the territory in the future.
In other words, it can be concluded that this is a MANDATORY legitimate element of the final phase for the Russian Federation. Peacekeeping also gives the Russian Federation the opportunity to legitimately increase its military presence on the global stage.
Why does the plan not always work?
Because Russia cannot utilise all the tools of the ‘matrix’ even individually, and because Russia itself is subject to the influence of the tools of this matrix, which are now directed against it and its allies, but to a greater extent than it can deploy itself.