Russia’s proposal as a precondition for negotiations – ‘A moratorium on mutual accusations’ (2019)

This scenario – “Russia’s proposal as a condition for negotiations: A moratorium on mutual accusations” – is currently playing out in relation to Iran’s behaviour. Russia’s main argument regarding a moratorium on mutual accusations is the setting aside of political claims for the sake of economic benefit.

Another argument from the Russian side is also noteworthy; this may well be indicative of Russia’s future behaviour on the international stage: “Sooner or later, international players will have to declare a moratorium on mutual accusations that hinder dialogue” (Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov).

Such a tactical trend may involve escalating contradictions in the international arena to the point of complete irreconcilability, with the aim of completely nullifying claims on both sides in order to initiate a negotiation process.

What this might mean for the Russian Federation. That Russia will ‘plough ahead’, overcoming the critical mass of accusations levelled against it, after all, it is no coincidence that they cite statistics on the number of sanctions against the country, complain about minimal cooperation from developed nations, and are actively preparing survival schemes within a closed loop, which envisages economic and political cooperation only with countries under sanctions, thereby encircling them.

This is a sort of repetition of North Korea’s path: ‘cutting off’ economic ties with the world and building up its military potential to a critical point, when it will be impossible to resolve a few remarks or accusations to improve the situation, because their number will be critical. To begin negotiations, it will then be necessary to impose a moratorium on all disputes – to reset them to zero – and start from scratch to find common ground for negotiations. As a rule, these are economic points.

Russia often speaks of this in the following vein: ‘Let us set aside political grievances – that which divides us – and focus solely on the economy – that which unites us’.

CONCLUSION:

The model of a ‘moratorium on mutual accusations’ proposed by Russia is not an instrument of de-escalation, but an element of a negotiating strategy aimed at nullifying political accountability and cementing the status quo through economic interaction. Its essence lies in the fact that the accumulation of a critical mass of conflicts, sanctions and claims is used as a precondition for moving to a new phase of negotiations, where all previous claims are proposed to be ‘set aside’ as an obstacle to dialogue.

This means that the Russian Federation deliberately allows and even provokes escalation, calculating that in the long term it will impose a ‘clean slate’ format for negotiations, where the results it has already achieved (territorial, political, military) are not subject to review. In this logic, the economy serves as the entry point for negotiations, whilst political and security issues are sidelined or put on hold.

Strategically, this points to a model of behaviour akin to a scenario of controlled isolation: the Russian Federation is preparing to operate under conditions of limited interaction, rallying sanctioning or neutral countries around itself so that, once ‘negotiation fatigue’ sets in among its partners, it can propose the withdrawal of all claims as the only path to resuming cooperation. Thus, the ‘moratorium’ is not a compromise, but a tool for restarting negotiations on terms favourable to Russia whilst preserving the outcomes of the conflict.