DONALD TRUMP’S DOCTRINE AND ‘WHAT IT ENTAILS’ (2019)

(published on 24 May 2019)

Trump’s doctrine marks a qualitative shift in US foreign policy — a transition from an ideological model (globalism, ‘spreading democracy’) to hard-line national pragmatism (‘principled realism’), where the balance of benefits and costs becomes the key criterion.

The central element is the replacement of the logic of confrontation with the logic of competition:

• the US is abandoning the category of ‘eternal enemies’ (with the exception of terrorism);

• it is introducing a flexible system of roles: partner / ally / competitor;

• it allows for both competition and cooperation with the same actors at the same time.

This broadens the scope for manoeuvre and allows the US to act on a case-by-case basis rather than in a bloc.

The second key level is a shift in the tools of influence:

• priority is shifting to economic pressure (sanctions, trade wars);

• military force is used as a deterrent and to raise the stakes (“peace through strength”);

• analysis and forecasting become a distinct instrument of influence.

The US is thus developing a combined model of pressure: economy + security + information.

The third level involves restructuring the architecture of international cooperation:

• a move away from multilateral institutions;

• a shift towards bilateral formats;

• the formation of regional coalitions to serve its own interests;

• a shift in the US’s role: from ‘world policeman’ to ‘arbitrator’, who does not enter the conflict directly but controls its parameters.

The fourth level — the structuring of rivals:

• China — systemic competitor (economy + technology);

• Russia — a regional challenge (security + influence);

At the same time, the US is launching a long-term model of attrition through competition:

• forcing rivals to expend resources (economy + defence industry);

• creating unfavourable playing conditions for them;

• bringing them to the negotiating table from a position of strength.

Conclusion: Trump’s doctrine lays the foundation for contemporary American strategy as a system of managed competition through economic and military pressure, where war is not the primary instrument, but merely a last resort.

The US is shifting to a model of “pressure → exhaustion → negotiations on favourable terms”, using the economy as the main lever and military force as a guarantee.

Key strategic outcome:

• a system is emerging where rivals are not destroyed but integrated into the competitive arena on US terms;

• international politics ceases to be a struggle between blocs and becomes a continuous process of bargaining and competition.

Under this logic:

• China is the main long-term competitor;

• Russia is an instrumental challenge, which is contained and partly used to balance the system.

Key systemic conclusion: the US is shifting from governing the world through presence to governing through rules, pressure and control of the terms of the game, whilst remaining an external arbiter of conflicts.

The new US foreign and domestic policy doctrine, an overview of the main sections:
• national defence,
• prosperity,
• promoting peace through strength
• expanding American influence.

Key conclusions from Trump’s doctrine:

• The US has defined itself as a ‘nation-state’, so the balance of national interests will be taken into account. For the US as a ‘nation-state’, the balance of power and the balance of interests equate to national rationalism.

– There is no concept of ‘eternal enemies’ (‘adversary’), apart from ‘terrorism’. The concept of ‘competition’ is introduced and, accordingly, that of ‘rival’. This broadens the US’s diplomatic options.

– A clear distinction is made between the concepts of ‘partners’ and ‘allies’.

• A drive towards bilateral engagement in the political arena, moving away from multilateral institutions where American interests are ignored.

• The doctrine allows the US to move towards the concept of a ‘hegemon’ on the international stage and envisages competition (rivalry), where the emphasis is now on the superiority of:

– China and Russia as a threat to the security of the US as the ‘hegemon’.

• Two areas of rapid development for itself – economic superiority and military-industrial complex superiority:

– The military-industrial complex is being developed by identifying threats from China and Russia as ‘rivals’:

– The economy is planned to be developed by stabilising the situation and resolving regional conflicts

• The formation of regional coalitions on the ground – new alliances beneficial to the US, in which the US’s role shifts from ‘world policeman’ to ‘international arbiter’.

– It is proposed to use not only the direct threat of military force, but also analytics as a tool for simultaneous engagement across the full spectrum of conflicts in various regions

• The US employs the concept of a ‘hegemon’ in instruments such as the unilateral imposition of sanctions (restrictions) and the US CAATSA secondary sanctions law

– This effectively makes US unilateral sanctions international.

– This tool is mainly used against ‘rivals’

• The US actively employs tools such as ‘trade wars’

– the tool is used to a greater extent against ‘partners’ or ‘prospective partners’

• The US exerts its main pressure in international politics in the economic sphere.

– This provokes a so-called ‘arms race’ – the military component of the pressure.
A negotiating platform is being formed for opportunities to cooperate with the US’s ‘rivals’

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF DONALD TRUMP’S DOCTRINE

On 18 December 2017, the White House published a new US foreign and domestic policy doctrine, as defined by Donald Trump, which consists of four pillars: national defence, prosperity, promoting peace through strength, and expanding American influence. In the preamble, the authors describe the new national security policy as ‘principled realism’.

US President Donald Trump personally presented his national security strategy. ‘The strategy aims to address key challenges and trends that affect our position in the world, in particular:

• Revisionist states, such as China and Russia, which use technology, propaganda and coercion to shape a world contrary to our interests and values;

• Regional dictators who sow terror, threaten their neighbours and seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction (such as North Korea and Iran – ed.);

• Jihadist terrorists who incite hatred and instigate violence against innocent people in the name of a perverse ideology, and transnational criminal organisations that spread drugs and violence in our communities.

According to Trump, foreign policy must be based on US national interests, not on ideology or adherence to ‘humanitarian goals’. For him, the US is, first and foremost, a nation-state. In his speech, Trump criticises globalism and the notion of America as the centre of some sort of global empire.

In conducting its foreign policy, the state is guided by national interests, relying on strength. Trump calls for dialogue with Russia and China from a position of strength and sets as his main task the strengthening of the state’s military and economic power.

Foreign policy alliances are based on a balance of national interests and are therefore fluid. A current ally may become an enemy, and vice versa, if the balance of interests shifts.

D. Trump: ‘The world must know that we are not looking for enemies, that we are always happy when old enemies become friends, and when old friends become allies.’

From Trump’s perspective, the US cannot have eternal enemies or friends – only interests.

The four pillars of the ‘America First!’ doctrine.

Protecting the American people involves, first and foremost, restoring borders (land, air, sea, space and cyberspace), which globalists have constantly been dismantling.

The fight against terrorism. The United States is ready to work with any ally, ready to allocate resources for this purpose and to share the risks.

Trump: “America will target threats at their source: we will confront threats before they ever reach our borders or harm our people.”

In the fight against terrorism, Donald Trump does not rule out joint action with other states, including Russia and China. Trump also understands Russia’s economic problems and sees this as a way to achieve his goals.

As for the prosperity of the United States and ensuring military might, Trump places greater emphasis on economic and military capabilities rather than the idea of ‘soft power’ popular among liberals. The new strategy prioritises US economic interests.

Trump expresses his readiness to fight against any interference by foreign states and nationalised enterprises that violates fair trade relations with the United States.

At present, the United States’ primary economic need lies in trade relations that create jobs in the United States. The US’s priorities should be the same as those of other countries: trade relations that are beneficial specifically to them, rather than an abstract pursuit of free trade. The old goal – aggregate economic growth without regard for social consequences – is no longer acceptable. Free trade may well ensure GDP growth, but it in no way solves critical social problems.

Balance of power and balance of interests. Trump explains this thesis with a key idea: actions must be justified, must not cost too much, and must be rational. Trump is withdrawing from agreements under which America loses money.

Trump asks the right questions: why does the US intervene in conflicts where US interests as a nation-state are not obvious? The US bears responsibility for defending Europe. Europe bears no responsibility for defending American interests, which today lie beyond Europe’s borders. Trump believes that these relations must be mutually reviewed. If the Europeans do not wish to renegotiate, the United States must withdraw from NATO and develop bilateral relations with countries that are capable and willing to work with the United States in areas of their national interest in exchange for guarantees from Washington.

The White House is seeking to avoid any multilateral institutions, emphasising engagement in a bilateral format.

The US has officially announced its withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council. Previously, Washington also withdrew from UNESCO and terminated a number of international agreements, including the Paris Climate Agreement and the nuclear deal with Iran. Washington has withdrawn from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) — a trade agreement between 12 countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Negotiations on the creation of a similar economic union between the US and the EU — the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) — have been suspended.

Membership of all international organisations comes at a cost, and America almost always bears the lion’s share of the expenses involved in maintaining them. The US should not have to pay such large sums, for example, into the UN budget or make contributions to any country if America’s interests are ignored.

On the issue of access to energy sources, Trump confirms that the US is, for the first time, fully self-sufficient in this regard. It is also emphasised that the US will provide support to states that have fallen victim to energy blackmail.

Trump: ‘America will use its energy dominance to ensure that international markets remain open, and that the benefits of diversification and access to energy contribute to economic and national security.’

Asserting that the US is no longer the sole superpower but remains, as before, the dominant power, he declares the maintenance of military superiority to be the primary objective of the National Security Strategy. The Pentagon must modernise its arsenal in terms of both quantity and quality.

Donald Trump intends to make radical changes to the defence industry. Instead of companies selling their products to the state, Trump proposes that the state issue contracts to defence firms in line with new requirements, and that the industry ensures these are fulfilled.

As for the intelligence services, he adheres to the ideas of his former national security adviser, General Michael Flynn. He intends to restructure not only the US Department of Defence’s Intelligence Directorate, but all intelligence services.

The aim is not to be able to locate a particular terrorist at any given moment, but to anticipate strategic shifts among rivals, adversaries and enemies. The idea is not to rely too heavily on GPS and technological innovations, but to return to analysis.

The document also states that the US military must be prepared to operate in a wide range of conflicts involving multiple parties simultaneously. To address these challenges, the US must also utilise political and economic tools.

Peacekeeping by force. A separate section of the new strategy is devoted to Russia and China, which are viewed as ‘revisionist states’ seeking to undermine America’s prosperity.

The document states: ‘China and Russia are developing advanced weapons and capabilities capable of damaging our critical infrastructure and command architecture.’

Trump proceeds from the premise that ‘China is attempting to displace the US from the Indo-Pacific region, spread its model of state economic management, and reorganise these regions to its advantage’. However, in his view, China is becoming the world’s second-largest military power thanks to American know-how.

Russia, for its part, “is seeking to restore its status as a great power and establish a sphere of influence along its borders. To this end, it is attempting to weaken the influence of the United States in the world and sow discord with our allies and partners. It regards NATO and the European Union as a threat.”

The strategy pays particular attention to the need to protect US infrastructure from cyberattacks and to identify particularly dangerous cybercriminals. According to the doctrine, actors such as Russia use information tools to undermine the legitimacy of democracy, in particular through ‘paid social media users’ or ‘trolls’.

The document states: “Our adversaries are targeting the media, political processes, financial networks and personal data.”

Trump states the possibility of cooperation with US rivals (now identified as Russia and China), but exclusively “from a position of strength” — “Competition does not mean you cannot also cooperate.”

This is the first time an analysis of the goals and means of potential US rivals has been reported.

Document:

• Adversaries and competitors have begun to operate below the threshold of open military conflict, on the fringes of international law. Repressive, closed states and organisations, though unstable in many respects, often make decisions more quickly and use economic, military and, in particular, information tools to achieve their goals.

• They are not burdened by the laws, privacy protections inherent in democracies, or laws of armed conflict. They employ sophisticated political, economic and military campaigns integrated into a single strategy. They are patient and judiciously exploit the strategic advantages afforded by the time required for the US and its allies to respond.

• Such actions are designed to achieve maximum effect without provoking a direct military response from the US, and the accumulation of these small actions eventually becomes a new status quo.

The section on the influence of the United States discusses the end of ‘globalisation’ and the ‘American way of life’. The US will not seek to impose its way of life on others. It will be guided by the principle of equality among nations and will respect all those who adhere to international law.

A rejection of the spread of Western institutions and values across the globe. The idea of spreading Western democracy, particularly by force, lay at the heart of the non-conservative ‘Bush doctrine’ and the liberal ‘Obama doctrine’. Trump considers such a policy to be irresponsible and dangerous. It is based on the liberal ‘democratic peace theory’: dictators must be overthrown and Western democracies established, as this contributes to the pacification of the planet; democracies do not wage war against one another.

Realists have always opposed this idea, believing that all political regimes behave more or less the same in foreign policy, and therefore there is no point in seeking to spread democracy to advance one’s national interests.

Trump: ‘The legacy of Obama and Clinton’s interventions will be weakness, disappointment and chaos. We have made the Middle East more unstable and chaotic than ever before… It all began with the dangerous idea that we could transform into Western democracies countries that had neither the experience nor the interest in becoming Western-style democracies.”

To assist countries where investment is state-controlled and which wish to establish partnerships, Trump intends to offer alternatives that facilitate economic reforms.

The US will provide assistance to anyone who defends human dignity or religious freedom.

US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy doctrine does not envisage Washington acting as the ‘world’s policeman’.

Trump:

• America’s allies and partners strengthen our power and protect our shared interests. We expect them to take on greater responsibility for addressing common threats.

• We will ensure that the balance of power remains in America’s favour in key regions of the world: the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East.

It is also noted that protecting US interests requires America to be constantly engaged in the conflicts unfolding in regions across the globe. The outcomes of these conflicts will shape the political, economic and military power of the United States and its allies and partners.

To succeed, the US must bring together all the components of America’s national power — political, economic and military. US allies and partners must also demonstrate their capabilities and their resolve to stand up to common threats. Experience shows that rivals’ willingness to refrain from or abandon aggression depends on their perception of US power and the viability of such alliances.

Harry Kazianis, a fellow at the Centre for the National Interest in Washington (formerly the Nixon Center), noted that the ‘Trump doctrine’ is a strategy of maximum pressure that has taken on a global scale.

KEY POINTS AND CONCLUSIONS

The US has defined itself as a ‘national state’, and therefore, in foreign policy alliances, the balance of national interests will be the primary consideration. This implies the absence of the concept of ‘eternal enemies’, apart from ‘terrorism’ as an international concept. This axiom remains unchanged and will continue to be used as a tool and pretext for intervention and influence in the international arena.

Instead of ‘confrontation’, which by definition entails the destruction or annihilation of the opponent in the event of victory, the concept of ‘competition’ is introduced, that is, endless rivalry with the possibility of simply recognising a winner, without a destructive element, and with the possibility of reaching agreements on certain issues whilst continuing to compete on others. This broadens the diplomatic options available to the US.

A clear distinction is made between the concept of ‘partners’—those who have their own interests, but do not harm US interests and cooperate occasionally in certain limited spheres, and ‘allies’ — those with whom the US can have deep, mutually beneficial relationships that significantly serve US interests, meaning constant cooperation across many areas, primarily in the economic and military spheres.

For the US as a ‘nation-state’, the balance of power and the balance of interests signify national rationalism, which determines the direct correlation between the cost of an issue and the benefit gained from it. Hence arises a desire for bilateral interaction in the political arena and a move away from multilateral institutions in which American interests are ignored.

The rejection of globalism, however, allows the US to move towards the concept of a ‘hegemon’ on the international stage and entails competition (rivalry), where the emphasis is now on superiority — both military and economic — in the international arena among states that position themselves as equal in influence to America or aspire to be so.

China and Russia are identified as such countries, posing a threat to the security of the ‘dominant power’ – the US. China is identified as the world’s second-largest military power, having achieved this status thanks to American developments. Russia is recognised as attempting to restore its status as a great power, seeking to maintain a sphere of influence along its borders.

The US has identified two areas of rapid development for itself: economic superiority and military-industrial complex (MIC) superiority in the international arena.

The military-industrial complex is being developed by highlighting threats from China and Russia, the ‘rivals’:

• China – a potential military threat and economic competitor – is recognised on a global scale. The deterrent tool employed by the Americans: ‘trade wars’ – negotiations – proposals for cooperation;

• Russia – a military threat to ‘allies’ and ‘partners’, a threat to US influence in Europe and the post-Soviet space – is recognised to a greater extent on a regional scale. The deterrent tool used by the Americans: political and economic isolation. Real negotiations have not yet taken place due to Russia’s position.

Going forward, the plan is to develop the economy by stabilising the situation and resolving regional conflicts in areas such as Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America and so on, where the US seeks to develop trade and economic ties and expand markets for its goods and services.

Implementation involves several steps, for example: the US withdrawing from unprofitable alliances, thereby freeing up financial resources; channelling these resources into the country’s economy, particularly the defence industry, to strengthen international dominance; and the allocation of US resources to attract partners and support its allies in bilateral formats with the aim of forming regional coalitions on the ground – new alliances beneficial to the US, in which the US’s role shifts from ‘world policeman’ to ‘international arbiter’.

It is also proposed to use not only the direct threat of military force, but also analytics as a tool for simultaneous engagement across the full spectrum of conflicts in various regions involving multiple participants at the same time.

The image of an autonomous, independent ‘international arbiter’ is being cultivated by the US due to the impossibility of resolving issues in international forums, such as the UN, because their work is blocked by the ‘veto’ rights of Russia and China, and the impossibility of reforming these international institutions.

The US employs the concept of a ‘dominant state’ in instruments such as the unilateral imposition of sanctions (restrictions) and the US law on secondary sanctions (the ‘Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act’ (CAATSA)), which effectively confers international status on US unilateral sanctions. This instrument is mainly used against ‘rivals’ and their satellite allies who show signs of incapacity or unreliability in terms of fulfilling international obligations or laws, which they systematically violate.

The US also actively employs tools such as ‘trade wars’ — the renegotiation of international economic agreements regarding the disparity of trade tariffs, etc. This tool is applied to a greater extent to the US’s ‘partners’ or ‘future partners’, that is, countries that are not only capable of negotiating but also support, adhere to and fulfil international obligations or laws.

In other words, the main pressure exerted by the US in international politics is in the economic sphere. At the same time, this provokes a so-called ‘arms race’— , the military component of this pressure. ‘Rival’ countries are forced to compete with the US not only on the economic front, but also to increase their economic expenditure to meet the growing needs of the defence industry. This creates a negotiating platform for potential cooperation with the US’s ‘rivals’ ‘from a position of strength’. The same applies to ‘partners’.

This is a ‘long game’. If a rival lacks a solid economic foundation but continues to try to compete with the US, this will sooner or later lead to destabilisation within the rival’s country and make such rivalry difficult or impossible even without external (let alone military) intervention by the US, whilst also providing an opportunity to move to negotiations on terms favourable to America.