BRICS – RUSSIA’S ATTEMPTS TO OVERCOME THE CONSEQUENCES OF ISOLATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA 2024

(published in 2024)

The study shows that BRICS is used in Russian strategy not as an independent integration project, but as a tool to offset the consequences of isolation and sanctions pressure.

The Russian Federation’s underlying logic is an attempt to:

• institutionalise BRICS (transform it into an international organisation);

• use it as a platform for creating an alternative economic infrastructure (to circumvent sanctions);

• expand the bloc by including countries of the Global South, particularly those under sanctions.

However, the study clearly highlights the differences between Russia’s objectives and the stance of other BRICS members.

The first level of divergence concerns the vision of the world order:

• Russia promotes ‘multipolarity’ as a division of the world into spheres of influence;

• China and other Global South countries promote multilateralism, preserving globalisation and the role of the UN.

In other words, even within BRICS, the Russian model is not dominant.

The second level concerns the institutional development of BRICS:

• Russia is interested in formalising BRICS and transforming it into an organisation;

• other participants are cautious and not ready to transform under the Russian agenda.

The third level is the economic component (circumventing sanctions):

• Russia is actively promoting alternative payment systems (BRICS Bridge);

• but does not receive full support — countries are not prepared to risk their own economies.

Fourth level — BRICS expansion:

• Russia is interested in including ‘sanctioned’ partners;

• other countries — in including economically strong and stable states.

Fifth level — the China factor: China effectively positions itself as the central coordinator of BRICS, which limits Russia’s ability to dominate the alliance.

This creates a situation where:

• Russia is attempting to use BRICS as an anti-Western tool;

• but BRICS is not prepared to become such an instrument.

Conclusion: Russia’s attempt to use BRICS as a mechanism to overcome isolation and create an alternative centre of power faces structural constraints within the bloc itself.

The key problem lies in the fact that:

• the interests of the Russian Federation (an anti-Western bloc, circumventing sanctions, spheres of influence)

• do not coincide with the interests of most participants (economic development, globalisation, balance).

As a result, BRICS:

• will not transform into a fully-fledged anti-Western bloc;

• will not become a tool for implementing the Russian model of the world order;

• functions as a platform with limited coordination of interests.

Systemic conclusion: For Russia, BRICS is a compensatory tool, but not a substitute for the Western system — and it is precisely this asymmetry that limits the Russian Federation’s ability to emerge from isolation and form an alternative centre of power on its own terms.

RESEARCH.

• Focus on the world order: multipolarity as multilateralism whilst preserving globalisation

• Focus on the Russian Federation’s attempt to expand BRICS’ influence globally (transition to the status of an international organisation)

• Focus on the trend of Russia developing a system to circumvent sanctions within the BRICS framework

• Focus on the trend towards the expansion of BRICS (in light of Russia’s interest in circumventing sanctions)

• Primary sources

Russia views its confrontation with the West as a long-term one. Indeed, in an interview with the ‘AiF’ website on the eve of the BRICS summit on 19 October, Russian Foreign Minister S. Lavrov stated that regardless of the outcome of the US presidential election, Russia would remain, if not an enemy, then certainly an adversary, and in any case a competitor, to Washington. Therefore, to overcome the partial political isolation and the economic consequences of the sanctions and blockade resulting from Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine—which Moscow has no intention of halting in the short or medium term—Moscow faces several challenges, including within the BRICS framework.

Among these tasks, the following can be highlighted: attempts to raise the status (institutionalise) BRICS – to transform the BRICS grouping into an international organisation that supports Russia’s interests, with Moscow exerting a dominant influence over the Global South (GS), and which would bear the hallmarks of an anti-Western bloc. Attempts are also evident to create and implement a sanctions circumvention system (SCS) – a new autonomous BRICS payment system – and to expand the number of BRICS members in order to increase the number of partners that can be connected to such a system within the framework of this alliance. (see Fig. 1)

Fig. 1. The Russian Federation’s main objectives regarding BRICS

The structure outlined above clearly reveals Russia’s instrumental approach to BRICS as a mechanism for countering external pressure. The organisation is viewed not as an end in itself, but as a platform for overcoming sanctions and partial political isolation by expanding economic ties with countries of the Global South and creating alternative channels of interaction.

A key element of this strategy is the attempt to institutionalise BRICS and transform it into a more formalised international structure, which would allow new rules of interaction to be established outside the Western system. In this context, the idea of creating universal mechanisms to circumvent sanctions plays a particular role, which effectively means the formation of a parallel economic infrastructure.

Thus, in Russia’s logic, BRICS acts as an element of a broader strategy of reorientation towards the non-Western world and a gradual reduction of dependence on Western institutions, alongside an attempt to elevate its own status through participation in the formation of an alternative centre of power.

More on this below.

Focus on the world order: multipolarity as multilateralism whilst preserving globalisation

Despite the fact that the Russian Federation attempted to promote its agenda regarding so-called ‘multipolarity à la russe’, which is based on the principle of a contractual division of the world into blocs (zones and spheres of influence), the summit supported the position of China and other leading BRICS nations, which interpret multipolarity as multilateralism (preserving the current world order whilst increasing the level of representation of major economies within it) and advocates the preservation of globalisation, as well as strict adherence to the UN Charter and international law in their entirety, rather than merely key and selective laws that serve Russia’s interests.

Indeed, the BRICS Kazan Declaration ‘Strengthening Multilateralism for Equitable Global Development and Security’, published on the Kremlin’s website on 23 October 2024, states that ‘the BRICS countries reaffirmed their commitment to multilateralism and the preservation of the central role of the UN in the international system’. It also emphasises that the countries “reaffirm their commitment to multilateralism and respect for international law, including the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations (UN) as its integral and fundamental element, and to preserving the central role of the UN in the international system, in which sovereign states cooperate in the interests of maintaining international peace and security, promoting sustainable development, and advancing and protecting democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all…”.

Focus on the Russian Federation’s attempt to expand BRICS’ influence globally (transition to the status of an international organisation)

In its confrontation with the West over Ukraine, Russia is facing partial political isolation on the international stage. To raise its standing, significance and authority in the international arena, Russia requires more substantial support for its interests from its partners and is interested in the creation/existence of international organisations that, like itself, oppose the West, with the inclusion of influential Global South countries – that is, in the creation of an anti-Western bloc which, in particular, posits, in addition to political and economic confrontation with the West, a military confrontation as well. Therefore, the Russian Federation is actively promoting the idea of elevating the status of the BRICS grouping to that of an international organisation, with Russia’s fundamental interests embedded at the core of such an organisation. The countries of the Global South, however, are currently more focused on streamlining relations and systematising work within the BRICS grouping without any changes to its external status or new external tasks that might arise from such a transformation of the grouping into an international organisation. And if they are interested, it is not on Russia’s terms.

Indeed, on 25 October, following the summit, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister S. Ryabkov stated that, although the Kazan summit declaration includes a clause on member states’ commitment to ‘further advancing the institutional development of BRICS’, discussions and disputes surrounding this issue are ongoing. ‘Whether BRICS should be transformed into a full-fledged international organisation with legal personality and a charter based on an agreement that, in turn, requires ratification is a matter of debate. This issue remains open,” added Ryabkov. Russia also has to constantly reaffirm publicly that BRICS is not an anti-Western alliance, which indicates a lack of acceptance (or support) for such Russian ideas by other members of the organisation.

The focus on the trend towards creating a system to circumvent sanctions within the BRICS framework

Previously, for a long time leading up to the summit, Russia had been promoting the creation and launch of a new system designed to circumvent sanctions (SOS), which it hoped to propose to BRICS – the BRICS Bridge. The creation of such a BSS could lead not only to political bloc confrontation in the world (bipolarity or ‘Russian-style multipolarity’ + a standoff between the nuclear arsenals of autocracies and democracies), but also to the destruction of the global economy and its fragmentation into separate parts/blocks (both legal and shadow), which would significantly impact the economic development of all countries, not only the G20 nations but also Western countries and their aid and support for Ukraine. The creation and implementation of such a system are actively supported by countries that are themselves subject to Western sanctions, such as Iran, Venezuela, etc.

Indeed, on 23 October, Russian President V. Putin stated on the sidelines of the summit that ‘the longer the BRICS countries operate under foreign rules and on foreign platforms, the longer the transition to a fairer financial system will take and the higher the risks of upheaval’. However, despite Russia’s significant efforts to promote the creation and implementation of a new payment system based on the Russian model (the BRICS Bridge system), Moscow did not receive widespread support, approval or readiness for its implementation. Following the summit, on 25 October, Nelson Wong, Vice-President of the Shanghai Centre for Strategic and International Studies, stated that the new BRICS payment system could be a ‘breakthrough’, but it would need to prove itself. He noted that the recently unveiled BRICS payment system must stand the test of time during implementation to ensure it is adopted by a larger number of participants. The expert also pointed out that, for the system to ultimately be recognised as a viable alternative to SWIFT, it will need to be reformed over time.

At the current BRICS summit, BRICS leaders agreed to explore the possibility of establishing an independent cross-border clearing and settlement infrastructure, BRICS Clear[1] , and also emphasised the call to strengthen the existing payment system, which operates on the basis of international standards. The declaration calls for “strengthening correspondent banking networks between BRICS countries and ensuring the possibility of settlements in national currencies in accordance with the BRICS Cross-Border Payment Initiative (BCBPI), which is voluntary and non-binding”, the document states.

It is also worth noting the new Russian initiative to establish a BRICS grain exchange, as a potential tool for circumventing sanctions. Indeed, in the Kazan Declaration, the BRICS leaders welcomed Russia’s initiative to establish a BRICS grain exchange and its development, particularly with regard to expanding into other sectors of the agro-industrial complex. The text of the declaration states that “we welcome the Russian side’s initiative to establish, within the framework of BRICS, a grain (commodity) trading platform (the BRICS Grain Exchange) and its further development, in particular to cover other sectors of agriculture”.

Emphasis on the trend towards BRICS expansion (in light of Russia’s interest in circumventing sanctions)

As noted above, for the implementation of the new Russian SCO, it is necessary for as many interested countries as possible to join it. Since the Russian Federation wishes to implement this system specifically within the BRICS framework, Moscow is consequently keen to expand the membership of this very alliance, particularly to include a number of Russia’s partner countries that are also subject to Western sanctions and, like Russia, are interested in circumventing these sanctions.

The leading BRICS countries, however, are more interested in the internal development of the bloc and in bringing into it precisely the strong and legitimate economies of developing nations, rather than sanctioned countries, which, one way or another, have limited capabilities that could negatively impact economic development, the bloc’s internal cooperation and, more broadly, its capacity to exert influence in the international arena in accordance with international rules and laws. It is also worth emphasising that at the summit, China clearly signalled its desire to play a leading/dominant role in the consolidation of the GCP and the promotion of an agenda common to these countries, including within the BRICS bloc. Indeed, Chinese President Xi Jinping, speaking at the BRICS summit’s ‘outreach’ session in Kazan on 24 October 2024, stated that China would always look after the countries of the Global South regardless of changes in the international situation. The Chinese President noted that Beijing would also “support the inclusion of more Global South countries in BRICS activities”. In this way, China has signalled its focus and influence both on current issues within the bloc and, in particular, on the question of BRICS expansion.

It has emerged that the heads of the BRICS member states, at the summit in Kazan, decided not to admit new members to the group for the time being, but to grant certain countries the status of ‘partners’ of the group and agreed on a list of partner states. However, Brazilian Foreign Minister Mauro Vieira stressed that BRICS requires consensus on the criteria for admitting new countries and a balance in the representation of different regions of the world, emphasising that the common position is that BRICS expansion must meet certain criteria. In other words, new members must be prepared to adhere to the criteria and undertake commitments that are already part of the group’s identity.

Following the summit, on 25 October, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov announced that BRICS countries would continue consultations on drawing up a list of states to be granted ‘partner’ status within the group. He listed the criteria for BRICS partner states, including non-participation in unilateral sanctions against members of the group (in line with Russia’s interests), maintaining good-neighbourly relations with other states, and UN membership (not in line with Russia’s interests). He stated that this matter is at a stage where all applications and all potential requests regarding this are being carefully examined and analysed, and contacts will be made with the interested countries. Then, according to him, once the negotiations are concluded, a list will be drawn up “reflecting the composition of the new category of partners, who will thereby gain the opportunity to align themselves with BRICS and participate in the work of a whole range of its mechanisms”.

In other words, it can be said that regarding the granting of ‘BRICS partner’ status to certain countries, there are also differences within BRICS between the position/interests of Moscow and those of other members of the group.