STRATEGIC COMPETITION BETWEEN THE WEST AND CHINA, UKRAINE’S PLACE (2024)

The study constructs a comprehensive model of the competitive strategies of the West and China, in which Ukraine occupies not a peripheral but a structural position as a balancing element within the global system.

The first key level is the West’s three-pronged strategy:

• destruction (of threats that cannot be integrated);

• containment (Russia);

• competition (China).

This means that China is not viewed as an enemy, but as a systemic competitor with whom interdependence is maintained.

The second level is the ‘red lines of balance’ mechanism (Ukraine–Taiwan):

• Ukraine is critical for the West;

• Taiwan is critical for China;

• mutual non-crossing of these “lines” allows the parties to maintain cooperation in other areas.

In effect, what is emerging is not confrontation, but managed competition with limits on escalation.

The third level — China’s behaviour towards Ukraine:

• does not allow Russia to be defeated;

• does not provide direct military aid;

• economically integrates Russia into its sphere of influence;

• is interested in a protracted or frozen conflict.

This creates the effect of:

• the weakening of Russia;

• distracting the West;

• increasing the Russian Federation’s dependence on China.

The fourth level — China’s strategy regarding the global context of the war:

• downgrading the status of the war from global to local;

• minimising the impact on the Global South;

• weakening the consolidation of the West;

• creating conditions for a long-term ‘freeze’.

The fifth level — China’s vulnerabilities:

• critical dependence on the global economy;

• interest in preserving globalisation;

• the need to avoid sharp confrontation.

This means that China acts not through overt pressure, but through
economic penetration, balancing and indirect influence.

The sixth level — Ukraine’s position:

• is situated within the global balance, not outside it;

• cannot count on direct support from China;

• must take the West’s logic into account;

• at the same time, it can exploit the contradictions between China and the West.

Conclusion: Ukraine is not merely a party to the conflict, but
an element of the global architecture of balance between the West and China,
where its role is defined through its links with Taiwan within the ‘red lines’ system.

The key logic of the system: competition without direct confrontation,
where:

• Russia is both an instrument and an object of deterrence;

• China — the beneficiary of a protracted conflict;

• The West — the balancing centre.

For Ukraine, this means:

• one should not expect China to act in Ukraine’s interests;

• China will act only within the limits of its own interests;

• the scenario that is strategically advantageous for China is to prolong or freeze the war.

The only rational strategy for Ukraine is:

• maximum consolidation with the West as the core security framework;

• at the same time, cautious engagement with China without upsetting this balance;

• using the global implications of the war (impact on food, energy and security) to ensure it remains a global issue rather than a local conflict.

Systemic conclusion: Ukraine will not win by changing China’s position, but by integrating correctly into the West’s strategy and not allowing China to diminish the global significance of the war.

There is currently much debate about how Ukraine should shape its relations with the US and, more broadly, with the West as a whole. Equally pressing is the question of what policy to pursue towards the countries of the Global South, particularly China.

The basic answer, despite the complexity and depth of the issue, is actually very simple. Ukraine needs to finally decide on its understanding of what it stands for and where it is heading. If Ukraine is firmly on the path to democratic development and seeks to join the EU and NATO, then it must take into account the interests of the US and the West, and study in detail their strategies regarding the autocracies of China and Russia. In other words, it should not ‘reinvent the wheel’, but adhere to the very standards and rules developed by the West in this regard.

At the same time, this does not mean abandoning cooperation with China. No, by no means. The West has significant cooperation with Beijing and does not wish to undermine it – merely to balance it and make it fair. This means adhering to the standards regarding competition and containing China that the West implements, or at the very least – not hindering the West from implementing them. In other words, strengthening coordination with the West on these issues.

But what are the West’s standards regarding competition and containing China? The answer to this question is, in fact, provided by the work ‘Competition Strategy and Ukraine’ (The West and China in Search of a Global Balance). Let us consider a few basic concepts.

Let us start by noting that we are currently witnessing the implementation of three main Western strategies in the international arena: the strategies of DESTRUCTION, CONTAINMENT and COMPETITION. (see Fig. 1)

Fig. 1. The West’s strategies

First of all, let us consider what the Strategy of Competition is. In fact, the ‘Strategy of Competition’ involves building a new type of relationship between the main global players – the US, the European Union and their allies and partners (the so-called West), on the one hand, and China, on the other. (see Fig. 2)

Fig. 2. The essence of the competition strategy

What is the ‘balance of red lines’ and why is Ukraine included? As is well known, the parties have repeatedly emphasised that Ukraine is a priority for the West, whilst Taiwan is the top priority for China. Ukraine, in relation to Taiwan, falls within the interests of the West and China in the competition strategy and plays a significant role in it – the role of a balancing factor. In the diagram, this link is marked as the ‘red lines of balance’ (for illustrative purposes). By maintaining this balance, China has the opportunity to cooperate with the West, which is of the utmost importance to everyone. Both sides, the US/West and China, have significant differences regarding their priorities concerning Taiwan and Ukraine, some of which are diametrically opposed. Both sides have drawn ‘red lines’ regarding their priorities. For instance, China has identified a ‘red line’ regarding Taiwan – the island’s declaration of independence – whilst the US/West has done so regarding Ukraine – support for the Russian Federation and the provision of military aid to it in the conflict with Ukraine.

How does this work? As we can see, China does not openly assist Russia in its war with Ukraine, but supports it economically, gradually tying Russia’s economy to its own and thereby gaining the opportunity in the future to influence Moscow’s political decisions through it. At the same time, China may agree not to resolve the Taiwan issue by force during this period, maintaining the current ‘status quo’, whilst continuing to demonstrate provocations (its military capabilities) to a greater or lesser extent. In return, the West must demonstrate that it accepts the ‘One China’ principle and guarantee that the island will not declare its independence. It is therefore believed that ‘red lines of balance’ are tacit agreements between the West and China regarding Taiwan and Ukraine concerning the observance of ‘red lines’ (unacceptable actions by each other) so that interaction on other important issues can take place in the form of dialogue, rather than purely confrontation and isolation. Beijing may be able to maintain such a balance of ‘red lines’ for quite some time. China needs breathing space to build up its own military might, which it will be able to demonstrate independently (without significant assistance from Russia), whilst simultaneously increasing its international influence and authority.

What, then, of the issue of Ukraine? At the 2023 G20 summit, all countries acknowledged that the ‘Ukrainian conflict’ is having a significant negative impact at the global level: on global food and energy security, supply chains, macro-financial stability, inflation and economic growth. Thus, the interconnection between resolving global problems and enhancing the Global South countries’ own status and involvement in global processes, through the resolution of the ‘Ukrainian conflict’ on fair terms, can be schematically illustrated in the diagram (see Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. The impact of the war in Ukraine on global issues.

Furthermore, this forum recorded two key achievements for Ukraine’s interests at the global level in its declaration (see Fig. 4):

• General recognition of the global impact of the ‘Ukrainian conflict’.

• Agreement on a common position among all countries regarding the resolution of the ‘Ukrainian conflict’ on fair terms (UN Charter).

Fig. 4. The Ukrainian conflict at the global level.

What, then, is China’s stance on Ukraine? As long as China requires Russia’s military support in its confrontation with the West under the Strategy of Competition to contain the US/West in the Indo-Pacific Region, Beijing will not allow Moscow to be definitively defeated in the confrontation with the West under the Strategy of Containment, including in the Ukrainian conflict. China may have a significant interest in the conflict in Ukraine remaining in a ‘frozen state’, as this focuses the West’s attention on keeping NATO in Europe and weakens Russia. The power imbalance within the Russia-China partnership is shifting in China’s favour, and at the same time, China wishes to use this period to expand its international influence. According to Beijing, the conflict can only be resolved through the adoption by global players of a security mechanism that incorporates China’s interests, particularly regarding the Indo-Pacific region. (see Fig. 5)

Fig. 5. Key positions of the US and China regarding the conflict in Ukraine.

Indeed, in the situation regarding Ukraine, China is pursuing only its own objectives, drawing useful lessons from it on a daily basis. As a result of the conflict, Beijing is obtaining cheap oil, gas and other resources in exchange for the ‘friendship without borders’ proclaimed in Moscow and Beijing. It is also to China’s advantage that the financial and military aid provided to Ukraine slightly weakens the West. Therefore, expecting China to make a genuine contribution and exert real efforts to resolve the ‘Ukrainian conflict’ on fair terms at present is neither rational nor likely. But it is possible if one acts appropriately, exploiting China’s vulnerabilities.

What, then, are the greatest vulnerabilities of modern China?

China is critically dependent on the development of the global economy and its integration into it, and therefore seeks to preserve the current world order and strengthen its role and significance within it. (see Fig. 6)

Fig. 6. China’s vulnerabilities

How will China attempt to undermine or weaken the consolidation of support regarding the Ukrainian conflict? China has proposed a peace plan in which the main condition is that the consequences of the Ukrainian conflict should cease to have a negative impact at the global level. Beijing seeks to minimise the impact of the Ukrainian conflict on the countries of the Global South, thereby reducing their interest in a just resolution. In other words, China’s objective appears to be to downgrade the status of the Ukrainian conflict from a global issue – in which case all countries of the world have an interest in resolving the conflict – to a local conflict solely between Ukraine and Russia, which does not cause significant damage to the economies of the Global South, and thus international interest in its final resolution is significantly reduced. It also means that China wants Western pressure on the Global South due to Russia’s actions in Ukraine to be reduced as well. In that case, according to China’s logic, the conflict could be frozen for decades (with Russia retaining the gains it has already made). At the same time, the threat to Europe will remain, and this in turn means that the West’s priorities will not extend to other regions to any significant extent, which again plays into the hands of China and its desire to expand its influence on the international stage.

For Ukraine to chart its course of action on the international stage correctly, it must understand the components of the Competition Strategy.

The Strategy consists of three pillars – ‘cooperation’, ‘competition’ and ‘containment’ – each comprising a range of issues. Thus, the ‘cooperation’ block includes areas of common ground/cooperation between the West and China, such as the development of the global economy, the fight against poverty (debt relief), climate, public health (the issue of coronavirus and pandemics), the fight against drug trafficking, and so on. (see Fig. 7)

Fig. 7. Issues in the ‘cooperation’ category.

The ‘competition’ section highlights issues in bilateral relations that exhibit competitive characteristics and require the establishment of a balance and fair conditions for competition. First and foremost, these include rebalancing trade relations between the US and China, and between the EU and China, as well as issues relating to investment and financing, and competition among large companies. There are also issues regarding reducing dependence on supplies of critical resources and competition in new technologies (semiconductors, microchips, etc.). Furthermore, competition in artificial intelligence, in the Arctic, in space, as well as in China’s ‘Belt and Road’ logistics project. (see Fig. 8)

Fig. 8. Issues in the ‘competition’ category.

The ‘containment’ category primarily covers issues relating to the protection of universal values (e.g. human rights violations in China), threats to national security, including interference in elections; espionage and intelligence activities, cyber threats, and security against agents of influence on social media and messaging platforms. Separately, there are threats to global security, which include issues of cooperation between defence agencies, strategic stability, and so on. The West’s tools for containing China include sanctions and NATO strategy. (see Fig. 9)

Fig. 9. Issues in the ‘deterrence’ category.

Let’s summarise

China’s intermediate objectives, which are clearly evident today, are attempts to weaken Western unity by exerting economic influence over Europe. Thus, from Beijing’s perspective, Europe must help China minimise the conditions and demands imposed by the US within the framework of global competitive strategy, as well as help maintain Beijing’s maximum involvement in the global economy within a unified system of rules and the existing model of the world order. This is vitally necessary and of the utmost importance for China’s further development. As mentioned earlier, China is also attempting to undermine or weaken Ukraine’s own consolidation with the West, so that Beijing can exert significant influence over Kyiv in its own interests, drawing its attention with purely economic benefits and the attractions of cooperation with China,  including to undermine the West’s overall consolidation and the appeal of its influence on the countries of the Global South, thereby reducing pressure on China and Russia.

Thus, having fallen within the ‘red lines’ of the ‘Competition Strategy’ balance, Ukraine can only expect such (partial) actions from China. (see Fig. 10)

Fig. 10. What Ukraine can expect from China.

At the same time, the strengthening of China’s influence in resolving global problems and regional crises, provided that a balance with the West is strictly maintained, weakens Russia’s influence on the countries of the region. This, in turn, enables Ukraine to strengthen its position in the conflict with the Russian Federation, if not through direct support from these countries, then through the intensification of their pressure on Moscow.

Ukraine should also have an interest in the development of the global economy with China’s participation, whilst minimising Russia’s involvement in it. This is because Kyiv receives financial support from the West, whose potential also depends on the development of the global economy and the inclusion of an economically prosperous China within it.

However, it is not worth counting on direct intervention or demonstrative pressure from China on Russia in Ukraine’s interests on fair terms. Beijing, as a rule, does not use such direct methods, let alone public ones. However, it can restrain Russia and compel it to take certain actions behind the scenes using instruments of economic influence (further tying the Russian economy to itself). But only on condition that this is beneficial to China itself or does not pose a serious threat to its interests.

Similarly, one should not expect any visible changes in China’s behaviour at the UN, the G20, or in regional alliances (SCO, BRICS). Abrupt public shifts are not characteristic of China. This means that China will continue to publicly demonstrate a position consolidated with Russia, but will carefully monitor and adjust this position behind the scenes.