THE ‘RUSSIA–AFRICA’ SUMMIT 2023

RESEARCH. THE ‘RUSSIA–AFRICA’ SUMMIT 2023

(published in 2023)

The study notes that the Russian Federation’s strategy in Africa is of a systemic-compensatory nature, where each dimension (political, economic, military) is used not as an independent instrument of expansion, but as a means of compensating for the loss of ground at the global level due to sanctions and isolation.

At the political level, Russia is attempting to alter the very architecture of the international system by promoting the concept of ‘Russian-style multipolarity’ (the division of the world into spheres of influence) and using its engagement with Africa as a resource to support this model. In doing so, it adapts its rhetoric to the region — through narratives of ‘neo-colonialism’ — in an attempt to create an ideological basis for loyalty. However, the research clearly highlights a key limitation: Africa is not interested in withdrawing from the global system, but in integrating into it, which creates a strategic gap between Russia’s offer and Africa’s demand.

At the economic level, the Russian Federation’s weakness is clearly evident:

• low trade volumes (significantly lower than China’s);

• lack of infrastructure and logistics;

• dependence on the creation of workarounds (an analogue of SWIFT, de-dollarisation).

The key point is that most initiatives exist only in a hypothetical or draft format, which means there is no resource base for their implementation. In other words, the economic strategy is not one of expansion, but an attempt to survive under constrained conditions.

At the military level, Russia has relatively stronger positions (contracts, personnel training, security), but even here the influence is piecemeal rather than systemic. The military presence serves a dual function:

1. consolidating influence in individual countries;

2. access to resources and indirect pressure (in particular through migration flows).

An important systemic element is food and fertilisers as instruments of influence. Russia is attempting to:

• monopolise supplies;

• replace Ukraine;

• use Africa’s dependence as a political resource.

This is directly linked to the Ukrainian track: Africa is viewed as a market + a tool for legitimising the Russian Federation’s position + a lever in negotiations.

Overall, the study demonstrates that all areas (politics, economy, security, narratives) are brought together under a single logic: Africa = a tool for circumventing restrictions and preserving the Russian Federation’s global status.

Conclusion: Russia’s strategy in Africa is not an expansionist one, but an adaptive strategy to maintain status in the face of resource degradation.

Key logic:

• loss of position in the global system →

• search for alternative spaces (Africa) →

• attempt to create parallel channels (economy, finance, coalitions) →

• using them for political bargaining with the West.

This creates a systemic disconnect:
Russia’s ambition is to reshape the world order through ‘spheres of influence’
vs
reality — limited resources and dependence on weak or peripheral partners.

Africa in this model:

• is not an independent centre of power for the Russian Federation;

• is unable to compensate for its global losses;

• but is used as a tool for manoeuvring, legitimisation and circumventing restrictions.

From a strategic perspective, this means that the Russian Federation is not forming a new system of influence, but is temporarily maintaining its presence through a combination of targeted levers (security, food, narratives), which does not ensure long-term dominance in the face of competition from China and the West.

PART 1-1. POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

Global level

– World order:

• Competition for influence;

• The issue of neo-colonialism;

• Multipolarity.

– The UN and the G20 – Global issues

Regional level.

– Instruments of influence:

• The search for shared values.

• Expanding diplomatic presence and simplifying visa procedures.

• The Orthodox Church.

• Education.

• Sport.

• Expanding media presence.

PART 1-2. ECONOMIC IMPACT.

Overall picture

• (Challenges facing the Russian Federation: sanctions, tools for circumventing sanctions, trade missions, investment, logistics: maritime freight transport, infrastructure development, the North-South transport corridor, air links, intra-continental rail links)

Various economic sectors

• (nuclear energy, food and fertilisers, the energy sector, diamonds, space).

PARTS 1–3. MILITARY IMPACT. SUMMIT OUTCOMES.

Military influence:

• The fight against terrorism.

• Security issues.

• Military-technical cooperation (including promotion of the defence industry).

Summit Outcomes:

• Declarations and proposals

• Spheres of influence

PART 1–4. THE UKRAINIAN ISSUE.

African Peace Initiative (10-point plan).

– Summit discussions (28 July 2023):

• The position of African countries;

• Russia’s position;

• Russia’s narratives;

• The position of some other African countries.

– Joint statement (3 August 2023).

The second ‘Russia–Africa’ summit took place at the ‘Expoforum’ in St Petersburg on 27–28 July 2023, alongside an economic and humanitarian forum. The motto was ‘For peace, security and development’. The events were organised by the Roscongress Foundation.

At the summit, Moscow devoted considerable attention to the issue of competition for influence between global players in Africa, and more specifically between the West and Russia.

PART 1-1. POLITICAL INFLUENCE.

Global level.

Due to its aggression against Ukraine, which began in 2014, escalated into a Russian military operation in 2022 and continues to this day, Russia is facing partial isolation from the West (political, economic and military). In particular, economic sanctions are making it significantly more difficult for Russia to participate fully in the global economy. This process is taking place gradually to allow other players to take Russia’s place in global supply and distribution chains, and eventually to exclude Russia from them altogether. And although this process is slow, it is inexorable. Consequently, Moscow is losing influence, primarily economic influence, at both the global and regional levels, and will therefore eventually be unable to fund its aggression and sustain its regime within its own borders.

The global economy, however, is governed precisely by those common rules that Moscow demands be changed to suit its own interests, in particular to justify its unjustified aggressive behaviour in Ukraine and to achieve its goal — the division of the world among the major global players into zones and spheres of influence without competition (through agreements) and according to its own rules, so-called polycentricity – ‘multipolarity, Russian style’ – where the Russian Federation sees itself as a separate, independent pole of power alongside its allies (zones of influence), and relations between countries and other poles are built on the principle: ‘interests come before values’.

Incidentally, countries outside the Western world, particularly those in Africa, understand multipolarity somewhat differently than in the Russian context — as multilateralism within a single system without separate poles, where each has its own rules. In other words, multipolarity is a multifaceted world which, however, operates according to rules that are the same for everyone — the UN Charter. And although the notion that ‘interests take precedence over values’ is by no means alien to such countries, they nevertheless wish to remain within a single system of rules and strive to be as fully integrated as possible into the global economy built on these rules. This is the main difference between ‘Russian-style multipolarity’ – several independent systems (poles), each with its own rules, which may or may not interact with one another – and the understanding of ‘multipolarity’ held by most countries of the Global South, specifically: many parties (countries) within a single unified system of rules and interaction (i.e. the system currently in place, which Russia is attempting to destroy or reshape).

Indeed, at the summit, the Russian side set out its key narratives on this issue (a narrative being a self-serving interpretation of events and facts that does not correspond to reality but serves one’s own interests—a convenient or advantageous distortion of reality). Russia continued to promote its understanding of ‘Russian-style multipolarity’ and confrontation with the West, but now through narratives of ‘neo-colonialism’ – which resonate more with perceptions on the African continent than Moscow’s ‘struggle’ Moscow’s struggle against the fictitious ‘Nazism’ and ‘fascism’ in Ukraine, which were intended to justify Russia’s unprovoked military aggression against Ukraine and its consequences, which have also affected African countries—responsibility for which Moscow categorically refuses to acknowledge, blaming the West for everything.

Russia’s core set of narratives boils down to the fact that Moscow traditionally blames the West and democratic values—that is, the established world order enshrined in the UN Charter—for all the problems of African countries, and promises the African continent, in return for support for Russia and its ideas of ‘Russian-style polycentrism’, what Africa needs most – ‘uncontrolled’ finance (money): ‘Russia and African countries will seek compensation for African states for the losses caused by colonialism and the return to the continent of cultural artefacts taken by the colonisers’. In doing so, Russia seeks to ‘buy’ the loyalty of African countries interested in the easiest route to obtaining funding (payment of compensation) rather than in the same funding (via the IMF and the World Bank), which is governed by established general international rules, i.e. involving oversight and accountability, whilst drawing the African countries that have agreed into its own confrontation with the West, which serves Russian interests.

Such support for the ideas of ‘Russian-style multipolarity’, from Moscow’s perspective, is intended not only to strengthen its position in the confrontation with the West, to ensure that Russia’s ‘ ’ can retain its status as a global player and impose Russian conditions on the West (in particular through its own security guarantees in the form of an ultimatum), but also, most importantly, to develop large-scale tools for circumventing sanctions (de-dollarisation – settlements in national currencies, moving away from the dollar peg, creating a SWIFT analogue, the possibility of using parallel bank cards, etc.)  – to establish parallel channels for Russia’s participation in the global economy and to continue operating on its own terms whilst preserving previously achieved results (including in Ukraine, such as the annexation of territories).

But the main problem for Russia in using the countries of the African continent for its own purposes and plans is that this continent is not represented at the global level — neither in the UN Security Council nor in the G20, and therefore has no influence at the global level and cannot help Russia maintain its positions there, let alone strengthen them. And only one African country out of 54 is personally represented in the G20 – South Africa, which, although it has influence on the continent, pursues its own interests in the G20 rather than the common interests of all countries, let alone Russia’s.

Therefore, in building ‘African loyalty’ towards itself and its position, Moscow promises every possible support in advancing Africa’s bid to secure a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Since such changes (reforms) within the UN require a unanimous decision by the current permanent members of the UN Security Council (the UK, France, the US, China and Russia), it can be assumed that Russia will vote ‘in favour’ of such a decision only when it is fully confident that its influence in Africa will be dominant compared to that of other global players there – the US, the EU and China.

Consequently, this means that Russia, whilst promising Africa every possible form of assistance, sets its own ‘price’ for this assistance — namely, the loyalty and support of representatives from across the continent for Russian narratives, even within the UN Security Council itself, to which African countries, given their generally diverse consensus, are as yet unable to agree; as Russia’s influence in Africa is currently waning (due to its economic difficulties), whilst the influence of other global players, who also advocate granting Africa a separate seat on the UN Security Council, may grow. However, a decision can only be taken if all global players are in favour. Therefore, it is likely that all global players (the US, the EU, China, Russia) will continue to support the idea of granting Africa a separate seat on the UN Security Council, but its actual implementation will be postponed.

As can be seen from the above, Russia needs to strengthen its influence in Africa before the continent begins to participate in the UN Security Council as a permanent member and is able to independently adjust the goals, objectives and instruments for addressing global problems. At this stage, Africa is facing significant challenges in areas such as climate, food security, combating epidemics, tackling poverty and global security. And Africa is turning to the Russian Federation, as a global player, for help in resolving these issues. However, in its current state, Russia is placing particular emphasis on two areas: food and security.

Indeed, in Africa, it is emphasised that the Ukrainian crisis is having a serious impact on the situation on the continent, and requests are being made to facilitate the delivery of both Russian and Ukrainian grain. Russia, for its part, insists – whilst promoting its own narratives – that it is Russia that is making a significant contribution to global food security. In doing so, Moscow is attempting to secure a monopoly on food supplies to African countries, depriving Ukraine of even the slightest opportunity to participate, by withdrawing from the grain agreement and physically destroying Ukrainian food stocks and the ports from which they were shipped, under the guise of supposedly other objectives of its special military operation against Ukraine.  Furthermore, framing the issue in this way reinforces Russia’s position on the global stage, as the Russian Federation is virtually single-handedly determining the food security of an entire continent, and the world needs its involvement in resolving global challenges.

Russian narratives claim that it is the West that bears responsibility for the food crisis, and certainly not Russia, which launched an aggression against Ukraine. Russia continues to insist that problems in the global food and energy markets arose even before the events in Ukraine, attempting to absolve itself of any responsibility, shift the blame, and forcing African countries to share and support its view in exchange for promises of free grain supplies, effectively acting as a monopolist for some African countries – that is, effectively blackmailing the continent with hunger.    

In this context, the possibility of granting Africa a seat in the G20 is of interest. The question of granting Africa a seat on the UN Security Council was discussed above, but within the G20 it is quite likely that Africa may indeed soon be granted separate membership; although it accounts for only 3% of global GDP, it requires representation at the global level. Indeed, Africa is dependent on the global economy and has a vested interest in maintaining production and distribution chains. By being involved at the global level through the G20, Africa will be able to adjust the replacement of representatives in these global chains more independently, and have the opportunity to expand or replace them, which could reduce Africa’s dependence on Russian grain and fertilisers.

The security issue in Africa is extremely pressing. However, it must be recognised that Russia’s interest in increasing its military presence on the continent is by no means driven by altruistic motives to combat terrorism in general or to promote peacekeeping for the sake of global stability. A military presence allows the Russian Federation to exert its own influence in the region and control entire countries, in particular to be able to manage the migration crisis from North Africa to Europe, thereby putting pressure on the EU. And, more importantly, to control deposits and the extraction of rare minerals, rare-earth metals, uranium, etc., for the availability and use of which competition is currently growing between global players along the West–China axis (competition strategy), particularly in light of the intensifying ‘technology race’, in which Russia is significantly lagging behind.

Indeed, several declarations on global security, proposed by the Russian side, were signed at the summit, including: The Declaration of the Second Russia–Africa Summit on preventing an arms race in outer space , the Declaration of the Second Russia–Africa Summit on cooperation in the field of international information security, and the Declaration of the Second Russia–Africa Summit on strengthening cooperation in the fight against terrorism. How Moscow will be able to use these documents to strengthen its influence and presence on the continent, and whether it will be able to do so, remains to be seen.

Regional level.

It was announced that ‘one of the key objectives of Russian foreign policy is to establish a close partnership with African countries and to increase bilateral trade with them’. In other words, Russia has set itself the primary task of withstanding competition for influence on the continent. To strengthen its influence in Africa, Moscow has identified the following areas in which it plans to step up its efforts in individual countries on the continent: diplomatic presence, Orthodox Christianity, education, sport, and the media (soft power). To exert influence, understanding is required — a shared understanding is achieved through the adoption of values, language, culture, traditions, faith, and so on.

Firstly, the Russian Federation announced that Moscow is ready to reopen and establish new Russian diplomatic missions in Africa, as well as increase staffing levels at some existing embassies; furthermore, Russia will address the issue of visa-free travel with African countries.

Next, the main narrative regarding the shared values of Russia and Africa was articulated. Indeed, Putin described traditional values as the ‘foundation of existence’ and noted that adherence to them unites the people of Russia and African nations. Through this narrative centred on shared values, Russia is attempting to promote Russian Orthodoxy in Africa. It was claimed that the peoples of Africa have allegedly become disillusioned with Western churches due to their rejection of biblical moral teachings in favour of, in particular, homosexuality, and that therefore the Russian Orthodox Church can and is already becoming a bridge connecting the countries and peoples of Russia and Africa.

Education and language. It was noted that around 35,000 African students are currently studying in Russia and that Moscow plans to open branches of leading Russian universities in Africa. Learning the Russian language and obtaining a Russian education are essential for expanding Russian influence on the continent.

Sport. It was stated that cooperation with African countries in the field of sport is one of Russia’s priorities, and the Russian Ministry of Sport is ready to consider applications from African counterparts regarding the involvement of Russian specialists as coaches for national teams. Russia aims for the Russian Federation and Africa to jointly oppose the politicisation of sport. The main aim is for Russia and African countries to work together to uphold ‘equal treatment for all athletes’, which, in today’s context, specifically means Russian athletes who are being excluded from competitions due to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine – further proof that Russia has no intention of changing its destructive behaviour.

The media is Russia’s main instrument of influence. Indeed, Russian President V. Putin has called for the creation of a joint information space between Russia and Africa, within which Russian and African audiences will be presented with supposedly ‘objective information’ about world events, which in reality is based on Russian narratives and propaganda. It was announced that national and regional offices of Russian media outlets would open in Africa in the near future. Specifically, it was stated that the TASS news agency plans to expand its presence in the African media landscape and open bureaus in Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe. TASS bureaus are already operating in Egypt, Morocco and South Africa. Outcome of the forum: media outlets in Namibia, Algeria, Zimbabwe and the Republic of the Congo signed memoranda of cooperation with TASS. This is the most promising avenue for expanding Russia’s influence in Africa.

As can be seen from the above, Russia has drawn up a ‘roadmap’ for expanding/strengthening its influence in Africa as a whole and, in particular, in individual countries, pursuing its own goals and having no intention of changing its aggressive and destructive behaviour on the international stage.

Russia’s strategy towards Africa in 2023 is taking shape as an attempt to compensate for the loss of ground at the global level due to sanctions-induced isolation and restricted access to world markets. Moscow is attempting to use Africa as an alternative resource to maintain its status as a global player — both politically (support on international platforms) and economically (circumventing sanctions, establishing parallel channels for participation in the global economy). At the same time, it is promoting its own model of ‘multipolarity’, which envisages the division of the world into spheres of influence and the prioritisation of interests over rules.

However, the effectiveness of this strategy is limited by structural factors: Africa lacks sufficient representation at the global level to genuinely strengthen Russia’s position, and its own understanding of multipolarity remains tied to a single system of international rules. This creates a gap between Moscow’s expectations and the interests of African states, which are interested not in withdrawing from the global system, but in greater integration into it.

In these circumstances, Russia is shifting to a combined model of influence, combining economic instruments (food, resources), security presence and soft power (education, religion, media) with the active promotion of its own narratives. However, this model is not so much transformational as adaptive in nature: it is aimed at maintaining influence and establishing footholds in the face of diminishing resource capabilities and growing competition from other global players.

PART 1-2. ECONOMIC INFLUENCE.

The big picture.

The GDP of African countries stands at $2.7 trillion, which is less than the economies of Japan, Germany and other countries. African countries have stated their key expectations that trade issues will be the priority topic at the ‘Russia–Africa’ summit in St Petersburg. It was also emphasised that the African continent is in dire need of investment for economic development. To improve the continent’s situation, the African Free Trade Area was established at the summit in Niamey in July 2023. African representatives strongly recommended purchasing finished goods from Africa rather than raw materials.

The limited scope of Russia’s opportunities is evidenced by the volume of its trade with Africa. In 2022, it amounted to just $18 billion. Trade between the continent’s countries and China during the same period, for example, stood at $282 billion. The Russian side emphasised that the biggest obstacle for Moscow in trade with the continent is the impact of the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia due to its aggression against Ukraine — the West constantly warns African agencies and companies of the risk of falling under secondary sanctions due to business dealings with Russia.

As noted earlier, the most important thing for Russia at the moment is to try to create large-scale tools to circumvent sanctions: de-dollarisation (settlements in national currencies, moving away from the dollar peg), the creation of a SWIFT analogue, the possibility of using parallel bank cards, etc. – that is, parallel channels enabling Russia’s participation in the global economy whilst preserving previously achieved results (including in Ukraine, such as the annexation of territories).

At this stage, Moscow is focused on the possibility of creating a SWIFT analogue and on issues of de-dollarisation (settlements in national currencies).

Russia is keen to see such a mechanism for circumventing sanctions (a SWIFT analogue – an alternative to SWIFT, a separate channel inaccessible to the West and not subject to general rules) established, for example, within the BRICS framework (on the platform of the New Development Bank (NDB)), and that its participants could include the largest economies of the Global South, with all interested countries joining later. However, the BRICS countries – Brazil, India, China and South Africa – are keen to be fully integrated into the global economy, which uses SWIFT itself as the legitimate instrument for mutual settlements, and they have good reason to fear that, by creating such a parallel mechanism on the NDB platform – one that primarily benefits only Russia, which seeks to circumvent sanctions – all participating countries and the bank itself will fall under secondary sanctions from the US and the EU, and the bank’s operations will not merely be significantly hampered, but, one might say, paralysed.

Therefore, recognising the current impracticability of this initiative, Russia is proposing to establish such a mechanism independently. Indeed, it was announced at the summit that Russia and African countries are working to create infrastructure that is not controlled by the West, and are keen to step up this joint effort. Thus, Moscow promises to assist interested African countries and the continent as a whole in developing their financial infrastructure and connecting banking institutions to the financial messaging system established in Russia, which enables cross-border payments independently of certain existing Western systems that impose restrictions, and which would involve the use of the Russian rouble in mutual settlements.

It was stated that Russia and African countries plan to switch to national currencies, in particular the rouble, in commercial transactions. Put simply, the Russian Federation is proposing to set up banks in Africa, or separate channels within banks, which would be connected solely to Russian banks via a special mechanism and conduct settlements with one another that are not subject to any external control. Such manoeuvres are considered a breach of general rules and could have very serious consequences for those who agree to them.

At the same time, representatives of the New Development Bank (NDB) were present at the summit. The President of the New Development Bank (NDB), Dilma Rousseff, supported the idea of strengthening the global role of national currencies, particularly when used in mutual settlements in bilateral trade. The NDB’s development strategy up to 2026 envisages increasing the share of local currencies in the volume of funds raised to 30%. In her view, the yuan and other currencies could serve as an alternative to the dollar and the euro for these purposes. Dilma Rousseff also stated that the New BRICS Development Bank aims to expand its influence with a view to developing the countries of the Global South. She said it is crucial to pay attention to the level of debt in African countries, as well as their significant investment needs.

The Russian side has repeatedly noted that investing in Africa is a complex and risky business. At the same time, 60 to 70% of Russian investment on the continent goes towards the exploration and extraction of oil, gas, uranium, bauxite, diamonds, iron ore and other minerals. The Russian side noted that support for exports to African countries could be linked to additional investment security guarantees. The Russian Federation noted that six agreements on the promotion and mutual protection of investments have already been concluded (with Angola, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Libya, Equatorial Guinea and South Africa). Two more are currently being negotiated (with the Congo and Morocco).

The Russian side also noted that the main obstacles for exporters to Africa are insurance and financing, as any financial hedging of exports to African countries is more expensive than insuring goods in ‘developed’ markets. It was announced that insurance support for supplies to Africa is being expanded through EXIAR (the Russian Agency for Export Credit and Investment Insurance), specifically export credit insurance for supplies to 28 African countries.

Russia has stated that the country is ready to expand its network of trade missions in African countries, as well as intergovernmental commissions. There are 18 of these across 54 countries. The Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade is also discussing the creation of a company – a trading agent – to enter the African market. Russia intends to establish a leasing company on African soil.

Logistics remains another major obstacle to successful cooperation between Russia and African countries. Currently, most multinational companies, including Maersk and CMA CGM, have ceased operations in Russia and no longer accept orders for container deliveries from Russian exporters. This significantly affects logistics costs and forces Russian companies to consider options for delivering their goods to end customers in Africa via transit through friendly countries. Such mechanisms, in turn, affect both the cost and the transit times of goods, which is particularly critical when shipping perishable goods.

The Fesco Transport Group — one of Russia’s largest transport and logistics companies with assets in the port, rail and integrated logistics sectors — was the most active in the media during the summit. The group’s fleet comprises over 30 managed vessels, which primarily operate on its own shipping routes. As can be seen from the examples below, the company’s current operations can be viewed as targeted solutions in specific countries, without widespread coverage or meeting the needs of the continent.

Thus, the Fesco transport group made a series of announcements at the summit stating that by the end of this year it will begin supplying citrus fruits and avocados from Morocco to Russia; is considering the possibility of launching shipping services to ports in Algeria and is in negotiations with Tunisia; is considering the possibility of acquiring its own air fleet to carry out cargo air transport; it will begin supplying Russian-made solar panel components to Port Elizabeth (South Africa), with a direct maritime container service to South Africa already launched; and, in conjunction with the Russian-Egyptian Business Council (REBC), it will develop the group’s transport and logistics services in Egypt, among other initiatives.

The Russian side also emphasised at the summit that Russia needs to increase investment in the port infrastructure of African countries in order to further develop trade. As port infrastructure is under the control of representatives of unfriendly countries, Russia claims that ‘there is clear discrimination against Russian companies’, as it faces pressure due to the implementation of sanctions.

Another logistics project was discussed at the summit in a tentative manner, as a possibility for the future. The Russian side actively promoted the idea that the North-South International Transport Corridor would facilitate the smooth delivery of Russian goods to Africa and African products to the domestic market. Russia is seeking to ensure the corridor’s connectivity and the launch of regular shipping freight routes. The opening of a Russian transport and logistics centre in one of the ports on the African coast would be a good move, a good start to this joint effort – according to Moscow.

It was noted at the summit that Russian airlines currently operate flights to 24 countries. These are Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Venezuela, Vietnam, Georgia, Egypt, Israel, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Cuba, the Maldives, Mongolia, the UAE, the Seychelles, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Sri Lanka. It was stated that the expansion of Russian airlines’ flights to Africa is only possible if there are guarantees regarding aircraft safety, including a guarantee that aircraft will not be detained upon arrival.

That said, Russia indicated at the summit that Russian Railways (RZD) is prepared to establish transport systems and contribute its expertise to the development of Africa’s railways.

In other words, we can summarise the difficulties facing the Russian Federation on the African continent (including those caused by sanctions), which were discussed at the summit, and the ways in which Russia is seeking to overcome them:

• the low solvency of some countries (debt);

• the lack of a mechanism to circumvent sanctions – an alternative to SWIFT (the financial messaging system);

• the lack of additional investment security guarantees;

• the lack of a single company acting as a trading agent;

• insufficient number of trade offices;

• the absence of a single leasing company;

• significant logistical difficulties (both in reaching the continent and within it);

• port infrastructure is managed by representatives of unfriendly countries.

Various economic sectors.

Nuclear energy. Nuclear energy is the driving force behind Russia’s foreign policy influence on the international stage, which is why Moscow is seeking to ‘secure’ its presence and participation in potential projects on the continent for the future. Indeed, it was announced at the summit that the State Corporation ‘Rosatom’ is ready to offer African countries multilateral cooperation in the field of medicine (the production of radiopharmaceuticals and the infrastructure for treatment using them, technologies for the treatment of various materials with ionising radiation, and the establishment of centres for such work), as well as being ready to provide electricity to African countries using floating nuclear power stations. Rosatom CEO Alexei Likhachev named the African states of Burundi, Zimbabwe, Kenya and Rwanda as potential partners for the Russian nuclear industry. (For more details on the proposals to these countries, see Russia–Africa Summit: individual countries (part 2). Russia’s influence on specific African countries.)

Food and fertilisers. It was announced at the summit that the Russian Ministry of Agriculture had sent eight agricultural attachés to African countries, and that their number would be increased by 1.5 times in the near future.

• Food.

Moscow reported that Russia accounts for around 20% of African wheat imports, 18% of barley imports, and over 13% of vegetable, soya and sunflower oil imports. In the first half of 2023, Russia tripled its wheat supplies to Africa compared to the same period last year — to a record 9 million tonnes. It was noted that Rosselkhozbank cooperates with African partners both within the framework of bilateral relations and in a multilateral format. African countries account for 12% of Russia’s agricultural exports. The main consumers are Egypt and Algeria (over 60% of total supplies to African countries).

Russia acknowledged that the logistics of supplying grain to African countries is a very complex issue, but promised that it would be resolved in the coming months. It was also emphasised that lifting restrictions on the export of Russian grain and fertilisers under the grain agreement would have a positive impact on the situation in many countries, particularly in Africa.

The Russian side also stated that to overcome the region’s food crisis, it is necessary to address issues of payment demand, the development of port, transport and energy infrastructure, logistics, and training farmers in agricultural practices.

A statement was made that African countries received confirmation at the summit that Russian grain could be supplied free of charge (Chairperson of the African Union, President of the Union of the Comoros Azali Assoumani).

• Fertilisers.

Moscow stated that over the past five years, Russia has doubled its fertiliser exports to Africa — Russia’s share of this market on the continent has reached 12% — and plans to increase supplies. Among the largest partners are South Africa, Morocco, Senegal, Tanzania, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and Cameroon. According to RAPU, the largest supplier of fertilisers to the African market is PhosAgro, accounting for 33% of supplies, with EuroChem accounting for 25%, the Uralkhim-Uralkali group for 24%, and Acron for 12%. The companies mainly supply ammonium nitrate, urea, ammonium phosphate and NPK compound fertilisers to the continent. It is also noted that competition among fertiliser producers in Africa is fierce. The Russian side pointed out that a condition of the grain deal was free access for Russian fertilisers to the markets, which allegedly did not happen. Therefore, according to the Russian side, the companies, with the help of partners from other countries, have found a way to supply [fertilisers] to the markets. It was also stated that Russia is ready to increase the volume of fertiliser supplies to the African market.

Russia also expects that several large hubs for receiving mineral fertilisers will emerge on the continent in the future.

The energy sector. At the summit, the Russian side provided a detailed account of its plans for Africa’s energy sector. It was emphasised that Russia plans to supply Africa with around 18–20 million tonnes of petroleum products in 2023, compared with 8 million tonnes the previous year. It was stated that there are already projects in Africa involving Russian participation: in Algeria, Egypt, the Republic of the Congo, Cameroon and Nigeria. The companies operating in Africa are well-known: Lukoil, Rosneft, Gazprom and Zarubezhneft. Tatneft is ready to consider projects for oil and gas production with African countries, as well as the supply of petrochemical feedstock and diesel fuel to the region. The African Energy Chamber has reported significant progress in cooperation with Gazprom in recent months. Russia has stated that more than 30 promising energy projects involving Russian participation in the oil, gas and electricity sectors across 16 African countries are currently at various stages of development. Russian gas companies have also expressed their readiness to participate in projects involving both LNG supplies and the construction of gas infrastructure. However, it was also stated that Russia and the countries of the African Union ( ) are considering the possibility of concluding barter agreements in the energy sector.

The African side, meanwhile, stated that Russia and Africa need to move from discussing energy projects to concluding specific agreements in the gas sector (Ange Ayuk, Chair of the African Energy Chamber).

Another area of potential cooperation. At the summit, Moscow also stated that Russia had succeeded in fully securing the financing and insurance for maritime oil transport. It was emphasised that Russia is currently discussing the creation of a new insurance company with friendly countries, with various options under consideration. Russia reported that it is building an independent export system to reorient supplies: establishing transport, logistics and financial infrastructure.

Diamonds. It was announced at the summit that the African Diamond Producers Association (ADPA), in collaboration with the Russian company Alrosa, is developing a single standard for producers on the continent, which in the long term will significantly strengthen their position in the global market. This document is ‘still at the drafting stage’, but the association ‘wants it to be adopted’.

Space. It was announced at the summit that Roscosmos had invited African countries to participate in the creation of the ‘Grifon’ global Earth monitoring system, consisting of small spacecraft, and that Roscosmos would be able to assist certain African countries with space launches. Russia insists that telecommunications services, as well as television and communications, may prove the most attractive space-related services for African countries. However, discussions regarding the construction of a spaceport in Africa are premature until the relevant agreements have been signed.

Russia’s economic strategy towards Africa in 2023 demonstrates an attempt to offset sanctions-related restrictions by establishing alternative financial and trade mechanisms; however, its actual effectiveness remains limited. Moscow is attempting to promote de-dollarisation, the creation of SWIFT alternatives and settlements in national currencies as tools to circumvent sanctions, as well as to integrate the African direction into the logistics of the North-South international transport corridor as part of the formation of parallel trade channels. However, these initiatives do not find full support even among key partners, who are unwilling to risk their own integration into the global economy.

The practical implementation of Russia’s economic presence in Africa is fragmented: trade remains insignificant compared to other global players, investment is concentrated mainly in the raw materials sectors, and logistical, financial and institutional constraints significantly limit the scope for scaling up cooperation. Even projects related to the development of transport infrastructure and potential ‘interconnection’ with the ‘North–South’ corridor remain largely at the level of intentions, indicating the limited resource base for their implementation.

Thus, the Russian Federation’s economic model in Africa is adaptive and compensatory in nature: it is aimed not at a full-scale expansion of influence, but at creating alternative channels of interaction and targeted logistical solutions. This leads to a gradual decline in Russia’s economic influence on the continent against a backdrop of growing competition and structural constraints.

As can be seen from the above, Russia has been unable to offer African countries any significant projects, major investments, etc., during the current period of its involvement. Everything is discussed in conditional terms (future periods) on the assumption that it may be possible to create instruments to circumvent sanctions – that is, at present, Moscow’s economic influence on the continent is diminishing.

PARTS 1–3. MILITARY INFLUENCE. SUMMARY OF THE SUMMIT.

At the summit in Moscow, much attention was paid to the competition for influence between global players in Africa, and more specifically between the West and Russia. Russia’s strongest positions in Africa lie precisely in the sphere of military influence – global security, the fight against terrorism and extremism. The African continent is unstable due to socio-economic problems (climatic conditions, food and energy crises, epidemics, poverty, the struggle for resources, armed conflicts, etc.), which leads to an outflow of migrants to Europe, exacerbating the migration crisis.

Russia aims to strengthen its military influence both on individual African countries, by expanding military-technical cooperation, the geographical scope and quality of its military presence, and on the continent as a whole through agreements with the African Union. Over time, this may also affect the economic dimension of influence – competition for certain resources (such as uranium, lithium, etc.) will only intensify in light of the strategic rivalry between the West and China, and Russia is seeking to strengthen its own position in this competition so as not to be left out (building up liquid assets).

Military influence.

At the summit, Russia stated that it advocates cooperation with Africa in the fight against terrorism, extremism and organised crime. The Russian side widely promoted its narrative that such cooperation between Africa and Russia entails equal partnership, supposedly ‘without interference in the internal affairs of countries, without imposing political and economic conditions’, which, as practice shows, is far from the truth (for example, instability in the CAR, Mali, Burkina Faso, etc.). For its part, the African Union (AU) stated that it looks forward to strengthening its partnership with Russia in the fight against terrorism.

The Russian side also publicly stated that Russia had held talks on international information security with virtually all African countries. It was announced at the summit that Russia is ready to cooperate with African partners in the fields of space programmes and cybersecurity.

At the summit, Moscow stated that since 2019, Russia had signed over 150 contracts with African countries worth $10 billion, and that its presence had expanded to five more countries on the continent. It was emphasised that many African countries have Soviet-era equipment in service, and that the Russian side is involved in training personnel for the security services and agencies responsible, in particular, for counter-terrorism and security. Moscow stated that the order book for arms supplies to African countries accounts for almost 20% of Rosoboronexport’s total, and the company is currently engaged in military-technical cooperation with 43 African countries. Russia is also modernising previously supplied equipment.

The Russian side noted that competition for the arms market on the African continent is intensifying. At the same time, it highlighted the existing Western sanctions against Russia, which severely hamper the Russian Federation’s military-technical cooperation in Africa. Consequently, the expansion of this sphere of Russian influence on the continent is once again hampered by Moscow’s need to establish a large-scale mechanism to circumvent sanctions, which Russia has not yet managed to put in place. Consequently, Russia can currently only strengthen its military influence in Africa in individual countries, rather than across the continent as a whole (information on individual countries can be found here: Russia–Africa Summit: Individual Countries (Part 2). Russia’s Influence on Specific African Countries).

Conclusion

Russia’s strategy in Africa in 2023 confirms that security and military components remain a priority as the primary instrument of influence. It is precisely through counter-terrorism, military-technical cooperation and personnel training that Moscow is attempting to establish itself as a significant partner for individual states on the continent, whilst simultaneously promoting the narrative of ‘equal cooperation without interference’. At the same time, this model is piecemeal in nature and does not translate into systemic influence across the entire continent due to resource constraints and the pressure of sanctions.

In parallel, Russia is attempting to institutionalise its presence through specific formats and the creation of permanent mechanisms for cooperation, hoping to draw a wider circle of Global South countries into joint initiatives, particularly in the fields of security and sanctions evasion. However, the actual implementation of these plans remains dependent on Moscow’s ability to offer effective economic and financial instruments, which are currently lacking.

Thus, the current model of Russia’s presence in Africa retains an adaptive and compensatory character: it is aimed at maintaining and partially expanding influence through the security niche and political formats, but does not provide a qualitative breakthrough in competition with other global players.

Summit outcomes.

At the end of the summit, a number of documents were adopted and announced publicly:

• Declaration of the Second Russia–Africa Summit.

• Declaration of the Second Russia–Africa Summit on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.

• Declaration of the Second Russia–Africa Summit on cooperation in the field of international information security.

• Declaration of the Second Russia–Africa Summit on Strengthening Cooperation in the Fight against Terrorism.

• Action Plan of the Russia–Africa Partnership Forum for 2023–2026.

It was also announced that from now on the Russia–Africa Summit would be held every three years, and that a dialogue partnership mechanism would operate between Russia–Africa Summits. Eritrea proposed developing a strategy for Russia’s cooperation with African countries in specific areas ahead of the next summit. Russian President Vladimir Putin supported this proposal and stated that Russia and South Africa would jointly seek to promote the Eritrean president’s proposal through the BRICS framework to enable Latin American and Asian countries to join such cooperation, as, due to sanctions and the lack of a large-scale mechanism to circumvent them, Russia will be unable to fulfil its promises and hopes that in the future it will succeed in involving countries of the Global South in the creation of such an instrument and their accession to it.

At the conclusion of the summit, it was also announced that Russia and African countries plan to establish a new permanent mechanism to address security issues and the most pressing topics.

Russia’s spheres of influence in Africa and their assessment following the summit.

Summing up the event as a whole, it can be said that the previous assessment of Russia’s influence in Africa[1] remains relevant, but Russia is attempting to take certain measures to turn the situation to its advantage. To what extent Russia’s tentative promises will be transformed into concrete actions – we shall see in the near future.

Fig. 1. Russia’s spheres of influence in Africa

Overall, Russia’s strategy towards Africa in 2023 is being shaped as part of a broader model of adaptation to the constraints of the global system caused by sanctions pressure and confrontation with the West. Moscow is attempting to compensate for the loss of ground through a combination of military influence, political activism and a limited economic presence, whilst simultaneously promoting its own vision of multipolarity and ‘anti-colonialism’ narratives. Within this logic, the African dimension functions not as a self-sufficient centre of influence, but as a tool for expanding foreign policy manoeuvrability and forming alternative coalitions.

At the same time, the effectiveness of this strategy remains structurally limited: the economic basis of influence is weak, institutional mechanisms are still taking shape, and the military presence is largely limited to specific locations. Reliance on narratives and declarative initiatives does not compensate for the lack of resources to implement the announced projects on a large scale, creating a gap between political ambitions and practical capabilities.

Thus, Russia’s presence in Africa takes on the characteristics of an instrumental and compensatory policy: it allows Russia to maintain a limited influence and uphold its status as a global player, but does not provide a solid foundation for long-term dominance in the face of growing competition from the West, China and other actors.

PART 1–4. THE UKRAINIAN QUESTION.

At the ‘Russia–Africa’ summit in 2023, the Russian side continued to repeat justifying narratives regarding its aggression against Ukraine (a narrative is one’s own interpretation of events and facts that does not correspond to reality but serves one’s own interests — a convenient/advantageous distortion of reality).

Thus, the Russian Federation continues to deny its responsibility for the illegal aggression against Ukraine and the violation of the UN Charter, whilst demanding negotiations with the US and NATO regarding the consideration and adoption of security guarantees on Russian terms — an ultimatum that Moscow presented to the West in December 2021 and which envisages a contractual division into zones (territories — including Ukraine) and spheres of influence (political, economic, military — including in Ukraine) within the international space between Russia and the West. Such narratives from Russia were openly supported at the summit by representatives from Zimbabwe, Eritrea and Burkina Faso.

The main arguments of the representatives of the African Peace Initiative boiled down to the recognition that the Ukrainian conflict (the Russian Federation’s military operation against Ukraine) has led to economic consequences that have a serious impact on the economies of African countries and international security. The distinctive feature of Africa’s position was also highlighted, which is based on the moderation of the views held by the African side – upholding Africa’s interests. It was emphasised that issues of funding and Russian support for African countries are of paramount importance here. At the same time, the African side stressed the need to uphold the UN Charter.

In other words, Africa is primarily concerned with the renewal of the grain agreement – the delivery of food and fertilisers to the continent. At present, Africa’s position on food security depends on Russia. However, Africa will only be able to address issues that are truly important for resolving the Ukrainian conflict once this matter has been definitively resolved (satisfied), in particular by exerting pressure on Russia. This is because Russia is also dependent on food supplies to Africa. For Moscow, this means preserving its market and maintaining its role in addressing the global problem of hunger, which Russia seeks to retain in order to remain engaged at the global level (maintaining its status as a global player) and integrated into the global economy (overcoming isolation). Therefore, the pressure from African countries on Russia to renew the grain agreement could also be more than significant.

It is also worth noting that the meeting took place on 28 July, whilst the joint statement was only published on 3 August – the parties needed time to agree on the text. As expected, the statement focuses primarily on the call to renew the grain deal and sets out the conditions under which Russia might return to it (a signal).

As a side note: if Africa manages to diversify its food and fertiliser supplies and reduce its dependence on Russia, the continent could well play a significant role in resolving the Ukrainian conflict, as Africa positions itself as committed to upholding international law and the UN Charter, which Russia is violating in Ukraine, and as Africa is keen to integrate into the global economy, which will make it harder for Russia to establish large-scale mechanisms to circumvent sanctions and draw the continent into them.

Conclusions

The Ukrainian issue within the framework of the 2023 Russia–Africa Summit demonstrates Moscow’s use of the African platform to promote its own justifying narratives and legitimise its position regarding the war against Ukraine. Russia is attempting to cement the interpretation of the conflict as part of a broader confrontation with the West and is promoting the idea of negotiations on terms that involve a review of spheres of influence, which effectively entails a redistribution of the international space. At the same time, support for these approaches from individual African states is limited and sporadic.

The position of African countries remains pragmatic and economically driven: the key factor is food security, in particular the renewal of the grain deal, which directly affects their economies. This creates a mutual dependency — Africa depends on Russian supplies, whilst Russia is interested in maintaining its export market and its role in addressing global food issues as a means of upholding its status as a global player. In this context, the potential for African influence on Russia is directly linked to the possibility of diversifying supply sources.

Thus, Africa’s role in the Ukrainian issue remains conditional and indirect: the continent does not act as an independent political arbiter, but could gain greater agency provided its economic dependence on Russia is reduced. In such a scenario, Africa has the potential to strengthen the factor of compliance with international law in conflict resolution, which would limit the Russian Federation’s ability to manoeuvre under sanctions and international isolation.