Review of events 7 October–12 November 2023

The study demonstrates the complexity and institutionalisation of the initial three-level model, where the crisis transitions from a conceptual scenario to practical implementation, accompanied by the emergence of constraints and contradictions.

At the global level, the key signal is the loss of control through universal institutions:

• the UN Security Council is effectively paralysed;

• the “Middle East Quartet” is not functioning;

• new formats (conferences) are only just taking shape.

This signifies a transition from institutional global governance to situational-coalitional governance.

In this situation, there is a redistribution of roles among global actors:

• The US and the West — the de facto coordinators of the process at the regional level;

• China — a cautious systemic balancer (in favour of de-escalation and participation in political settlement);

• Russia — an actor attempting to enter the process through alternative formats, but being sidelined due to its bias.

The first stage (Israel/Hamas) in the development is clearly characterised:

• this is a time-limited ‘window of opportunity’, where military action must conclude before international legitimacy is lost;

• a dilemma arises: a swift operation (results, but heavy losses) vs. a slow one (fewer losses, but the risk of losing support).

In other words, the military phase becomes not only a tool but also a finite resource (time/legitimacy).

The second stage (Gaza) is even more evident as a systemic hub of uncertainty:

• the basic principles are already in place (no Hamas, no occupation);

• but there is no clear governance mechanism.

This means that an architecture is taking shape without a central command, where responsibility must be shared among regional players, but without any guarantee of effectiveness.

The third stage (Israel/Palestine) clearly shifts to the format of a conditional political ‘asset’:

• “two states” not as an immediate goal, but as payment/compensation for accepting the results of stage 1;

• a direct link is formed:
  the elimination of Hamas ↔︎ a political settlement.

This is already the classic logic of “asset exchange” in negotiations.

Additionally, an important new element emerges — the linking of conflicts:

• Russia is attempting to integrate this crisis into broader bargaining (Syria, Ukraine);

• China is using it to expand its role in the region;

• The West is attempting to maintain control over the architecture of the process.

This means that the conflict is entering a phase of systemic bargaining between global actors.

Conclusion: Current dynamics show that the initial three-tier model is transforming into a real mechanism for reshaping the regional order, albeit with a high level of instability.

The key logic remains: war → security → political solution,
but new critical constraints are emerging:

• a shortage of time and legitimacy for the military phase;

• the absence of a ready-made model for governing Gaza;

• competition among global actors for control over the process.

The central node remains unchanged: the second stage (Gaza) determines the viability of the entire structure.

If a working model of governance and security guarantees is not established:

• the third phase (two states) will remain merely declarative;

• the results of the first stage will not be politically realised.

Key conclusion: we are witnessing not a resolution of the conflict, but an attempt to build a new regional security system through a managed crisis, where the outcome depends not on military victory, but on the ability to transform it into a governance model acceptable to all parties.

Review of events 07–24 October 2023

INTRODUCTION:
• The general essence and outline of the overall scenario for resolving the crisis, comprising three levels (stages).
STAGE 1 — ISRAEL/HAMAS:
• Negotiations with Hamas
• Influencing factors (Restraint by third countries; Hostages; Humanitarian situation)
• Methods, strategies, scenarios
• Timing and duration
STAGE 2 – ISRAEL/GAZA
• The issue of occupation
• Buffer zone
• Post-conflict governance
• Regional security guarantees
STAGE 3 – ISRAEL/PALESTINE
• Creation of two states
• UN Security Council and ICC
• Global implications
• China’s position
• Russia’s position

Review for 24 October–12 November 2023

INTRODUCTION. GLOBAL LEVEL
• Global implications
• UN Security Council
• Middle East Quartet
• Conference on Palestine
• Russia’s position
• China’s position

TRENDS
• Linking the first and third stages

STAGE 1: THE ISRAEL/HAMAS CRISIS
• The time factor
• Restraining third parties
ISRAEL’S MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST HAMAS
• The West’s stance
• Israel’s tactics
• Hostages
• Death toll
• Humanitarian situation
• War crimes
• Further action against Hamas
• Hamas’ tactics
• Palestine’s position
• The stance of regional players

STAGE 2. GOVERNANCE IN THE GAZA STRIP
• Excluding Hamas from political processes in Gaza
• Conditions for a lasting peace in Gaza
• Options for governing Gaza during the transition period

STAGE 3. THE ISRAEL-PALESTINE CONFLICT
• The question of a two-state solution
• The issue of normalising relations with Israel

Review of events 07–24 October 2023

The international community has strongly condemned Hamas’s actions in Israel and labelled its methods as terrorist. There was also a division of responsibility for what had been done between the Hamas movement and the Palestinian people. Thus, the Palestinian people were recognised, to a greater or lesser extent, as the aggrieved party in the face of Hamas’s actions and were placed outside the direct Israel/Hamas confrontation.

Several issues were identified:

• the military confrontation between Israel and Hamas militants (terrorists): Israel/Hamas;

• the security issue in the Gaza Strip (now and in the future);

• the issue of Israeli-Palestinian coexistence.

The associated consequences of an ill-considered Israeli response whilst exercising its right to self-defence during a military operation were also highlighted:

• Conflict in the Middle East could halt the implementation of the ambitious project to create an India–Middle East–Europe transport corridor. It is intended to consist of an eastern route connecting India with the Persian Gulf, and a northern route connecting the Persian Gulf with Europe.

• The radical Hamas movement has decided to launch an incursion into Israeli territory in order to undermine the process of normalising Israel’s relations with the Arab world, particularly with Saudi Arabia.

Therefore, the solutions to the crisis are combined into a single scenario comprising three stages for overcoming these problems:

• Stage 1 – ‘the Hamas scenario’ (short-term objective) – Israel’s right to self-defence (conducting a military operation to eliminate threats). Israel/Hamas.

• Stage 2 – ‘Gaza scenario’ (medium-term objective) – a set of actions and measures in Gaza following the conclusion of the military operation to eliminate threats (security guarantees). Israel/Gaza.

• Stage 3 – ‘the Palestine scenario’ (strategic objective) – a set of actions and measures to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict based on the two-state principle. Israel/Palestine.

To successfully resolve the current crisis and prevent its recurrence in the future, as well as to resolve all of Israel’s differences with the Arab world, including the ‘reconciliation’ of Israel with the Arab world (strategic objective), it is necessary to outline and develop a sequence of steps and timelines for each stage, and that all three stages are integrated into a single scenario and supported by the majority of actors at both the regional and global levels.

The diagram reflects a classic multi-stage settlement model, where each subsequent stage is only possible provided the previous one has been partially achieved, effectively forming the logic of ‘controlled escalation → stabilisation → political settlement’.

The key feature of this framework is that it begins not with a political decision, but with the legitimisation of military action. This means that the military phase is not viewed as an aberration, but as a necessary tool for creating the conditions for negotiations. At the same time, constraints are already established at the first stage (the humanitarian factor, hostages, deterrence of third parties) that prevent the conflict from escalating into an uncontrolled regional war.

The second stage is the key node of the entire structure. It is here that the military dynamics are transformed into a security architecture. The rejection of occupation whilst maintaining control over the situation in Gaza indicates an attempt to avoid long-term attrition and to shift part of the responsibility onto regional actors through a mechanism of security guarantees.

The third stage forms a strategic framework in which the local conflict is integrated into a broader regional order. The two-state principle serves not merely as a political solution, but as a tool for achieving a larger goal — the normalisation of Israel’s relations with the Arab world. In other words, the ultimate objective extends beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself.

Overall, the model demonstrates a shift from tactical responses to an attempt to build a new regional security architecture. Its weakness lies in its dependence on the second stage: if effective security guarantees acceptable to all parties are not established, the strategic level (two states and normalisation) will remain unattainable.

In short, this is not a peace plan as such, but a sequence of conditions under which peace theoretically becomes possible, where the decisive factor is the transition from military control to a mutually recognised regional security model.

It should be noted that events are currently evolving dynamically and may be subject to change. We will therefore now examine the trends that have emerged so far (as of 24 October 2023) regarding the development of events at each stage of this scenario.

STAGE 1 — ISRAEL/HAMAS

The first phase (short-term objective) involves developing the objectives, methods, means, strategy and scenarios for Israel’s military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Israel/Hamas).

Negotiations with Hamas

Israel has decided that a diplomatic resolution to the crisis with Hamas following the attack on the country is impossible; therefore, Israel rejects any negotiations with Hamas and has set the objective of destroying the movement. Israel has announced the launch of its own large-scale operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the aim of which is:

• overthrow the Hamas regime in Gaza;

• to destroy Hamas’s military capabilities, its infrastructure (tunnels) and enemy manpower (militants).

The US and the West have backed Israel’s objectives in Gaza.

Additional proposals (France): a proposal is being discussed regarding the possibility of forming a regional and international coalition to combat Hamas; details of such an initiative have not yet been provided.

Influencing factors

The following factors influence the development of this scenario (the conduct of a military operation to exercise the right to self-defence):

• Restraining third parties from expanding the number of participants and the geographical scope of the conflict (the factor of Iran and its satellites, threats of conflict escalation – general restraint is being exercised in the region at both the political and military levels).

• The fate of the hostages captured by Hamas (the release of hostages is significantly complicated; Egypt and Qatar play a key role in the negotiations, with attempts also being made by Turkey and Russia).

• Compliance with/ensuring humanitarian standards for the civilian population during the conflict (the movement of civilians to safe zones within Gaza is complicated; the movement of civilians out of Gaza is complicated; overcoming the humanitarian blockade is only possible via Egypt’s checkpoints).

Restraining third countries

The primary role in this area is assigned to the US and the West, which are making every effort to deter aggression in the region (including monitoring potential excessive retaliation by Israel, which could lead to a further escalation), and negotiations are underway to develop a common, coordinated position among Western and Middle Eastern countries (the ‘points of contact’ and ‘red lines’ of all parties are identified and worked through), compromises are being developed (regarding the acceptance by Middle Eastern countries of Israel’s right to self-defence and agreement to the conduct of military operations to eliminate threats), at the same time, the military presence of Western countries in the region is being strengthened to ensure more effective deterrence and control of the situation.

Hostages

The US has identified the release of hostages as the top priority of the day and has also stated that ceasefire negotiations are only possible after the hostages have been released.

Humanitarian situation

Several important agreements (‘points of contact’) have been reached between the West, the countries of the Middle East and Israel. These concern compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights. Implementation of these agreements (including the delivery of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip) is somewhat complicated, but overall there is a positive trend in this regard.

It is also worth noting the position of the countries in the region on this issue, which Israel will also have to take into account when formulating its military operation strategy in order to prevent further escalation. The main emphasis of the Middle Eastern countries is on the demand for compliance with international humanitarian law and human rights by all parties to the conflict in the Gaza Strip, and they oppose the use of collective punishment, which contravenes the 1949 Geneva Convention.

Methods, strategies, scenarios

We will now examine the signals relating directly to the strategy of Israel’s military operation in the Gaza Strip, taking into account the main influencing factors (deterrence of third parties, hostages, the humanitarian situation).

It has been reported that Israel has outlined three phases of the war. Israel is currently carrying out the first of the three anticipated phases of the conflict — conducting air strikes, followed by ground manoeuvres, with the aim of eliminating militants and destroying infrastructure.

It was also stated that the nature of the military operation (ground manoeuvres) could be altered, shifting from a full-scale offensive towards targeted strikes to achieve the set objectives.

Finally, a condition for cancelling the ground operation in the Gaza Strip was announced: if Hamas releases all prisoners and surrenders unconditionally.

The US and the West have emphasised that Israel must adhere to the rules of war, and that they are discussing Israel’s objectives and military strategy with it, as well as considering alternatives to a ground operation, leaning more towards targeted operations (including through negotiations on the release of hostages). However, the West is not yet prepared to support the idea of a ceasefire between Israel and the Gaza Strip (a freeze, a truce), upholding Israel’s right to self-defence – the possibility of carrying out a chosen ground operation scenario, which would become impossible (illegitimate) once a decision on a ceasefire is taken.

Timing and duration

The Israeli side has reported that it is considering the option of a ground operation in the Gaza Strip lasting several months, which also requires more thorough and prolonged preparation.

In turn, the West is urging Israel not to rush into launching this operation, so as to take into account the multitude of factors that could influence the success of Operation ‘ ’ and to allow time to address these factors (creating more favourable conditions for success), as well as to refine the overall three-phase scenario.

Thus, we will continue to observe how the scenarios for the ground operation of Phase 1 (the short-term objective) evolve; the objectives of this phase, as defined by Israel, are the overthrow of the Hamas regime in Gaza and the destruction of its military capabilities, infrastructure (tunnels) and so on, which will commence once all three phases of the crisis resolution have been developed.

STAGE 2 – ISRAEL/GAZA

Stage 2 (medium-term objective), developed as part of a single comprehensive crisis resolution scenario (Israel/Gaza), involves the development of a set of actions and measures following the completion of Stage 1 – the military operation to eliminate/clear Hamas from the Gaza Strip.

Phase 2 envisages a set of actions and measures in Gaza following the conclusion of Israel’s military operation, such as:

• The issue of the occupation of the Gaza Strip has been resolved – Israel has stated that it does not plan to occupy the territory.

• The issue of establishing a buffer zone with the Gaza Strip – the question of Israeli fire control over such a zone is being considered.

• Administration of the Gaza Strip following the military operation – it is envisaged that control of the Gaza Strip will be transferred to a coalition of regional players.

• Regional security guarantees – such a coalition and Israel are to guarantee conditions of mutual security.

Here are a few selected examples of signals for each of the points listed.

The issue of occupation

Israel has stated that it does not intend to continue occupying the Gaza Strip once the military operation against Hamas has concluded.

Buffer zone

The creation of a future buffer zone in Gaza is on the agenda. Its size and conditions are still under consideration and will depend on the outcome of the ground operation.

Post-conflict governance

Israel intends to sever all ties with Gaza once the military operation is over and to relinquish all responsibility for day-to-day life there. Israel also has no plans to hand over control of Gaza to Palestine, despite the fact that Israel recognises the Palestinian Authority led by President Mahmoud Abbas; however, this does not apply to the Gaza Strip.

The US has noted that it will no longer be possible to return to the previous arrangements for interaction between Israel and Gaza that existed prior to this crisis, and therefore insists on finding a new mechanism that includes security guarantees for Israel.

Regional security guarantees

Consequently, there are indications of the possibility of establishing a temporary government in the Gaza Strip with UN support and the participation of Arab countries, which could guarantee mutual security around the Gaza Strip (so-called regional security guarantees).

STAGE 3 — ISRAEL/PALESTINE

The third stage of the scenario involves the possibility of resolving the conflict based on the two-state solution, which has previously proved impossible to achieve. In other words, in order to secure the agreement of Middle Eastern countries for Israel to conduct a military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip without significant repercussions for relations between Israel and the Arab world, and to establish mutual security guarantees (reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world), the parties must reach an understanding regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict and develop a scenario for the third phase as well.

Below is a selective summary of the main points and arguments put forward by the parties during the current period.

The creation of two states

Although Israel states that now is not the best time to discuss the creation of two states, it may clearly change its position under pressure from the West and the international community, especially as there is a discernible tendency to link the first and third stages of the scenario in the proposals. ‘Victory over terrorism (the elimination of Hamas) and the creation of two states’ – how are they interlinked:

• both for Israel (if it wishes to secure general consent for a military operation without political, economic and military consequences, it must agree to a resolution of the Palestinian issue)

• and for the countries of the Middle East (if they want a resolution to the Palestinian question, they must agree to Israel’s military operation in Gaza and accept its objectives and outcomes).

In effect, one could speak of an exchange of the ‘Hamas’ asset (agreement to eliminate and prosecute this radical movement and its supporters) for a resolution of the Palestinian issue based on the creation of two states, which would subsequently lead to a reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world and a reduction in Iran’s influence in the region.

In the context of current events and their global implications, several points are worth noting:

• investigations into war crimes;

• the role of the UN Security Council, where resolutions on Phase 1 (Israel/Hamas) are being considered;

• assessment of the conflict’s impact on the global economy;

• the role of global players – China and Russia;

• proposals for Phase 3 negotiations (Israel/Palestine) in various forums, for example, holding a conference on Palestine and/or resuming the work of the Middle East Quartet.

UN Security Council and ICC

As of 24 October 2023, three resolutions regarding the Israel/Hamas crisis were under consideration. Two of them failed to pass: one was Russian (whose main aim was to propose a ceasefire – that is, to freeze the conflict and prevent Israel from conducting a military operation), and the other was Brazilian (which condemned Hamas but made no mention of Israel’s right to self-defence or its right to conduct a military operation). The third, an American resolution, is currently under consideration by the UN Security Council and has not yet been put to a vote (as of 24 October 2023). This resolution reflects the position of Israel and the West – condemning Hamas and affirming Israel’s right to conduct a military operation (i.e. there is no call for a ceasefire).

It has also been stated at the UN and the ICC that war crimes committed in this conflict will be investigated, which should also act as a deterrent for the parties to the conflict and third parties:

Global consequences

At the start of the period, it was noted that the Israel/Hamas crisis had not affected the global economy (a conflict at the local level), but it was noted that if the crisis escalates into a large-scale and systemic conflict (a conflict at the regional level), the negative impact will be significant in the long term, especially given the problems for the global economy caused by the Russia/Ukraine conflict.

China’s position

China, which is deeply involved in and dependent on the global economy, has no interest in such a negative impact on it. Therefore, China has an interest in preventing the local Israel/Hamas conflict from escalating into a regional one; that is, it is in China’s interest, as well as that of the West, to deter third parties from entering the conflict. However, China also has an opportunity to negotiate the promotion of its own terms (or those of its allies, such as Iran) in finding compromise solutions to this crisis – resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict through the creation of two states, and, more broadly, in the Middle East to strengthen China’s own influence in the region by supporting the positions of regional players.

China’s statements contain signals regarding its support for the following approaches:

• China is opposed to the escalation of the conflict (and is keen to restrain third parties).

• The PRC supports greater involvement of the Arab League in resolving the conflict. The PRC supports the idea of developing a regional security mechanism for Israel and the Arab world (points of convergence with the objectives of Phase 2).

• The PRC supports the idea of organising a broad conference on the Palestinian issue (points of convergence with the objectives of Phase 3).

It follows that if any compromises or measures are agreed upon regarding the third stage of the general scenario (i.e. negotiations on the recognition of two states) and humanitarian law is upheld in the Gaza Strip, then China will likely agree (most likely tacitly) to Israel’s right to conduct a ground operation to eliminate Hamas and will accept its results.

Russia’s position

The Russian side, finding itself in a state of partial isolation (political, economic and military) due to its aggression in Ukraine, is attempting to use this Israel/Hamas crisis to overcome its political isolation, specifically by seeking negotiations on an equal footing with the West. Moscow is proposing to resume the work of the ‘Middle East Quartet’ (the UN, Russia, the US and the EU), which could give it the opportunity to conduct direct negotiations with the West regarding the Ukrainian crisis without Ukraine, potentially involving a trade-off between assets (Israel/Ukraine). At present, Russia does not have such an opportunity.

Russia also wishes to raise the issue of including Syria (where Russian Armed Forces are stationed at two military bases) into the mechanism of regional security guarantees in the context of resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. According to Russia’s plan, this should lead to Syria’s reconciliation with the Arab world without the conditions previously imposed on Syria for normalisation – conditions which Syria has failed to meet. In other words, Russia is seeking to preserve the results previously achieved by Syria and the full rehabilitation of the ruling regime (including the dropping of charges of war crimes against that regime) in order to have sanctions and restrictions against the country lifted by the international community. Moscow is attempting to push a similar scenario in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, demanding that the results previously achieved by Russia in Ukraine be preserved and recognised, as well as the withdrawal of accusations of war crimes, which should lead to the lifting or easing of sanctions against the Russian Federation.

Russia has also indicated that it is prepared to offer mediation services to resolve the crisis, but has emphasised that it does not currently have an independent peace initiative regarding the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; such an initiative must first be developed.

Russia’s main efforts at this stage boil down to promoting the idea of an ‘immediate ceasefire’ (i.e. to prevent Israel from carrying out any military operation to eliminate Hamas) and is calling for a meeting of the ‘Middle East Quartet’ to resolve issues, including those concerning Syria and Ukraine, on Russia’s terms.

In the context of the above, it is worth noting that China and Russia’s positions on the negotiating platforms and participants do not coincide: whilst China supports the idea of a broad conference on Palestine (expanding the range of participants to include China in the overall process), whilst Russia is promoting the idea of consultations within the ‘Middle East Quartet’ (a narrow circle of participants that excludes China).

In the US, on 23 October 2023, it was announced that the United States is not conducting negotiations on de-escalating the current tensions in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone with either Russia or China.

Thus, summarising the period from 7–24 October 2023 of the crisis between Israel and Hamas, a trend can be identified towards the formation of a single multi-stage scenario consisting of three phases:

• Stage 1 – Israel/Hamas (elimination of Hamas);

• Stage 2 – Israel/Gaza (regional security guarantees regarding Gaza);

• Stage 3 – Israel/Palestine (reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world).

All three levels are interlinked, so the development of the first level (stage) will only take place after all three stages have been worked through; these are to be implemented sequentially in the future and lead to an ambitious, comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and a reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world.

Whether new trends will emerge, or whether events will continue to unfold within the framework of the aforementioned trends, will be revealed by further observations.

Review for 24 October–12 November 2023

The framework presented shows that the Israel–Hamas conflict is in fact embedded within the broader logic of a phased settlement, where the military phase is not a deviation but a necessary element in shaping the political conditions.

The key point is that global institutions have lost their ability to act as coordinators, and the process has shifted to a format of regional governance with Western involvement. This means that the rules of the settlement are shaped not through universal mechanisms, but through situational coalitions and a balance of interests.

The first stage serves as the defining point for the entire subsequent trajectory. It is the outcome of Israel’s military operation that will determine whether a transition to the second and third stages is possible. At the same time, Israel is operating under time constraints: the longer the operation lasts and the worse the humanitarian situation becomes, the faster the international legitimacy of its actions erodes.

The second stage is a critical juncture where a new model for governing Gaza is taking shape. The preliminary consensus reached (excluding Hamas and without occupation) indicates an attempt to strike a balance between Israel’s security and preserving a political future for Palestine. At the same time, the lack of a clear decision on the governance mechanism means that this is precisely where the main risk of the entire structure collapsing lies.

The third stage is deferred and depends on two conditions: the outcome of the war and the effectiveness of post-conflict governance. The two-state principle is not presented as an immediate solution, but as a strategic horizon that can only be activated under favourable conditions.

Overall, the model reflects a transition from conflict to an attempt to build a regional security architecture, where military, humanitarian and political logics are interlinked.

Key conclusion: the viability of the entire scenario is determined not by the third (political) stage, but by the second (institutional-security) stage — unless a viable model for governing Gaza without Hamas and without occupation is established , the transition to a two-state settlement will remain unattainable.

More details follow.

INTRODUCTION. GLOBAL LEVEL

The scale and consequences of any conflict are determined by its impact on the global economy and global issues. If the consequences could cause significant harm, global-level instruments are brought to bear to resolve the conflict — platforms involving leading global players. In the case of the Israel/Hamas crisis, these platforms include the UN Security Council (permanent members: the US, France, the UK, Russia and China), the Middle East Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN), as well as the key positions of global players – the US, the EU, Russia and China.

Global implications

Experts and officials are focusing on the argument that the conflict in the Middle East will have a negative impact on global economic growth in the event of further escalation.

UN Security Council

At the global level, the UN Security Council failed to halt the crisis of the previous period. During the period under review (26 October–12 November 2023), the outcome remains the same – the UN Security Council is deadlocked, and reaching a consolidated decision that would satisfy all parties (a compromise) is currently impossible. It is worth noting that Russia has shown increased activity and made significant efforts to promote various resolutions, attempting to demonstrate its influence on the global stage and promoting itself as a significant mediator in resolving the crisis, but without success.

Nevertheless, the UN General Assembly did adopt an emergency resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone. However, such resolutions (not approved by the UN Security Council) are largely of a recommendatory nature.

The Middle East Quartet

Another international platform for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained underutilised – the Middle East Quartet (US, EU, Russia, UN). The Russian side was extremely interested in the work of this platform and had high hopes for it, given the opportunity for cooperation with key global players such as the US and the EU (including regarding the conflict in Ukraine).

Conference on Palestine

Spain proposed holding an international conference in six months’ time to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. This idea was supported by the EU (on the condition that Hamas would not be involved) and China. When it became clear that work on Palestine within the UN Security Council was blocked, and that the ‘Middle East Quartet’ format was unlikely to function in the near future, Russia also expressed its agreement to such participation in an international conference. Palestine, for its part, gave its consent following Russia’s statement, but on the condition that the participants should include Russia, China, the US, the EU and others.

Russia’s position

In the current period, Russia has sought to highlight its influence over Arab countries, including the League of Arab States (LAS), as well as over Hamas, Palestine and Israel, whilst clearly siding only with Palestine and Hamas (biased mediation that promotes the interests of only one side). It should be noted that Hamas and Palestine have also expressed a desire to see Russia specifically as a mediator. Russia has declared its priority to be working within the UN Security Council to ‘lobby for the de-escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict’.

At the same time, the Russian Federation accused the US of creating a competition for influence. Specifically, the Russian Federation claimed that the US allegedly seeks to monopolise the Middle East peace process (strengthening US political influence), as well as that the US is increasing its military presence in the Middle East (strengthening US military influence).

Once it became clear that work in the UN Security Council was blocked, partly due to the destructive and aggressive actions and statements of the Russian Federation (for example, the demonstrative invitation of Hamas to Moscow for talks, or statements at the UN that Israel has no right to self-defence) and as a result of which Russia found itself sidelined from the negotiation process and mediation, Russia began to focus on the regional level. A proposal was made to hold a ministerial meeting of Middle Eastern countries with Russia on the Palestinian-Israeli settlement to ensure ‘the political and organisational unity of Palestine’.

China’s position

China is not prepared to act as an independent mediator (individual responsibility) in the crisis (Israel/Hamas) and the conflict (Israel/Palestine). China advocates a political settlement of the crisis and conflict with the assistance of the international community (collective responsibility).

Thus, the main principles of China’s position for the current period can be outlined as follows:

• Every country has the right to self-defence, which must be ensured in accordance with the norms of international law.

• The PRC advocates a ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe.

• Palestine and Israel must restore peace in accordance with the principle of two states for two peoples.

It is noted that in November, the presidency of the UN Security Council passed to China for one month. In Beijing, the focus is on the fact that the consequences of the Middle East conflict are already beginning to spread beyond the region, and therefore the UN Security Council must act more swiftly. In doing so, China is expressing dissatisfaction with the body’s inability to make decisions. Indirectly, this dissatisfaction is directed at Russia, which, whilst taking the most active stance in the UN Security Council, has blocked its work and failed to achieve results.

From the above, it can be noted that at the global level, the existing avenues for influencing the crisis (Israel/Hamas) and the conflict (Israel/Palestine) – the UN Security Council, the Middle East Quartet – have so far been exhausted (frozen/blocked), whilst new formats are currently under discussion and development for future periods – an international conference on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It is also worth noting that the positions of China and Russia are increasingly diverging. China’s position is that of an international mediator not involved in the conflict, adhering to the fundamental principles of the UN Charter, whilst Russia’s position is confrontational and consists of presenting and defending the position of only one side of the conflict (Palestine) in an attempt to maintain its influence in the region and engage in mediation. The common ground between Russia and China is the demand for a ceasefire and respect for humanitarian law in Gaza. To implement these demands, it is necessary for a corresponding resolution to be adopted by the members (permanent and non-permanent) of the UN Security Council and subsequently implemented by the parties to the conflict. However, it has not yet been possible to reach a common position among the permanent members (the US, France, the UK, Russia and China) due to the differing objectives pursued by the parties in this conflict. Consequently, decision-making is blocked.

Thus, it can be noted that the resolution of the crisis and conflict is taking place at the regional level with the active participation of the West (the US, the EU) and the countries of the region, and within the framework of trends identified as early as the first observation period.

TRENDS

Thus, when examining events in the period from 26 October to 12 November 2023 regarding the Israel/Hamas crisis in the Middle East, it can be noted that the trends of each of the three stages have developed. As noted earlier, the resolution of the crisis is linked into a single scenario consisting of three stages of overcoming the problems.

Three-tiered logic of conflict resolution:

Stage 1 (short-term):

• “The Hamas Scenario”

• Legitimisation of Israel’s right to self-defence

• conducting military operations to eliminate threats

Influencing factors:

• deterrence of third parties

• the hostage factor

• the humanitarian situation

Stage 2 (medium term):

• ‘The Gaza scenario’

• a set of measures in Gaza without direct occupation

• establishment of regional security guarantees

Stage 3 (strategic):

• “The Palestine Scenario”

• a settlement based on the two-state principle

• the ultimate goal — reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world

The diagram reflects a classic multi-stage settlement model, where each subsequent stage is only possible provided the previous one has been partially achieved, effectively forming the logic of ‘controlled escalation → stabilisation → political settlement’.

The key feature of this approach is that it begins not with a political decision, but with the legitimisation of military action. This means that the military phase is not viewed as an aberration, but as a necessary tool for creating the conditions for negotiations. At the same time, constraints are already established at the very first stage (the humanitarian factor, hostages, deterrence of third parties) that prevent the conflict from escalating into an uncontrolled regional war.

The second stage is the key linchpin of the entire structure. It is here that the military dynamics are transformed into a security architecture. The rejection of occupation whilst maintaining control over the situation in Gaza indicates an attempt to avoid long-term attrition and to shift part of the responsibility onto regional actors through a mechanism of security guarantees.

The third stage forms a strategic framework in which the local conflict is integrated into a broader regional order. The two-state principle serves not merely as a political solution, but as a tool for achieving a larger goal — the normalisation of Israel’s relations with the Arab world. In other words, the ultimate objective extends beyond the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself.

Overall, the model demonstrates a shift from tactical responses to an attempt to build a new regional security architecture. Its weakness lies in its dependence on the second stage: if effective security guarantees acceptable to all parties are not established, the strategic level (two states and normalisation) will remain unattainable.

In short:
this is not a peace plan as such, but a sequence of conditions under which peace theoretically becomes possible, where the decisive factor is the transition from military control to a mutually recognised regional security model.

Linking the first and third stages

It is worth noting that for the countries of the region, there is a peculiar link between the first and third stages. This means that if the countries of the region are interested in resolving the conflict (Israel/Palestine), they must agree to accept the results of the first stage – the resolution of the crisis (Israel/Hamas). In other words, the case for the recognition of the two states will only be activated once certain results have been achieved, provided that the countries of the region agree to the outcome of Israel’s military operation against Hamas, namely the elimination of Hamas as a political and military organisation in the Gaza Strip.

STAGE 1: ISRAEL/HAMAS CRISIS

The first stage (short-term objective) involves the development of objectives, methods, means, strategies and scenarios for Israel’s military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip (Israel/Hamas) and their implementation. Below is a selective overview of the main messages and positions of the parties during the current period.

Israel itself has outlined the circumstances that could pose difficulties for the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in an operation against the Palestinian movement Hamas in the Gaza Strip:

• the time factor,

• the risk of escalation (restraining third parties),

• the hostage situation,

• the issue of the need to comply with international law (the humanitarian aspect).

The time factor

Israel understands that it has time as long as its political support in the international arena is secured (not only at the regional level, but also globally). When carrying out a military operation that will inevitably lead to casualties and humanitarian consequences, this time may rapidly diminish and may not be sufficient to eliminate all Hamas forces.

Previously, there were forecasts that, with the most cautious operations (‘pinpoint strikes’), their implementation could take anywhere from six months to several years due to the complexity of the tasks at hand (the elimination of personnel, military capabilities and tunnels). However, with a swift and more aggressive military operation, the time required for the mop-up would be significantly shorter, but the collateral damage among the civilian population in densely populated areas, criss-crossed by an underground network of tunnels, would be considerably higher. According to experts’ estimates, such a hard-line military operation could take anywhere from a few weeks to several months (ideally, one and a half to two months). However, choosing such a hardline option requires Western support (both politically and economically – for a powerful and sustained push – and militarily – to deter third countries from entering into direct military conflict with Israel). Such Western support will wane as casualties and destruction mount and may lead to the planned timeframe being shortened.

Thus, Israel was able to secure a ‘carte blanche’ for its time-limited actions, the outcome of which would need to achieve the maximum possible results for Israel.

Restraining third parties

If we simplify our understanding of the unfolding events as much as possible, we can say that the main sources of the threat of the conflict escalating for Israel, apart from Hamas, are Iran and its proxies: the Lebanese Shia organisation Hezbollah and the Yemeni rebel movement Ansar Allah (the Houthis). The West and other major regional players have focused their attention on containing these parties. For example, both the US and Israel have acknowledged that they have no credible evidence that Iran was directly involved in planning the attack by Hamas supporters on Israeli territory. It was also noted that the United States, Egypt and Jordan had agreed to use their influence to prevent any party from opening another front against Israel. The EU stated that China should use its capabilities and influence over Hamas and Iran to prevent the conflict from escalating. Meanwhile, the US declared that it would take any measures necessary to prevent the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from escalating and is prepared for any possible developments in the region.

It should be noted that there has been an increase in provocative actions (shelling/attacks) by Iran’s supporters against US military personnel stationed in the Middle East – in Syria, Iraq, and elsewhere. The US has so far responded to these incidents proportionately, exercising maximum restraint.

ISRAEL’S MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST HAMAS

The West’s Position

The West has refused to support a ceasefire, recognising Israel’s right to self-defence. The West has also called on Israel to respect international law during its military operation in the Gaza Strip against Hamas, which is recognised by the West as a terrorist organisation, and to contribute to improving the humanitarian situation in the Strip.

At the same time, the West has set out several important conditions:

• Israel is conducting operations in the Gaza Strip in accordance with its plans.

• The Israeli authorities are limited in the duration of their military operations in the Gaza Strip.

• No one should attempt to intervene in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

• They oppose a ceasefire in Gaza, as such a move would benefit the Palestinian movement Hamas.

• They warn the Israeli leadership that the suffering of the civilian population in the Gaza Strip is undermining support for the Israel Defence Forces’ (IDF) military operation.

• A statement has been made regarding the need to introduce humanitarian pauses amidst the ongoing hostilities in the Gaza Strip.

Israel’s tactics

Israel’s stated plans for a ground operation in the Gaza Strip (in broad terms):

• to neutralise Hamas’s capabilities, destroy its government and the movement’s personnel (at least 10,000 militants);

• rescue hostages;

• to destroy Hamas infrastructure (tunnels, warehouses, headquarters, etc.);

• to create a buffer zone to prevent further attacks from the Gaza Strip;

• to conduct the operation using its own forces – Israel does not allow the participation of military personnel from other states in its operations.

In an attempt to minimise collateral damage among the local population, whom Hamas uses as human shields, Israel called on all residents of northern Gaza to move to the southern sector and launched a military operation under a hard-line scenario from 27 to 28 October, using all types of weaponry – from the air, land and sea – but not immediately deploying a large (significant) number of its ground forces, so as not to provide a pretext for third parties to intervene in the conflict. Thus, gradually expanding its operations in the sector, Israel over a period of time gradually deployed more than 20,000 Israeli troops there, comprising at least two armoured and infantry divisions. It was reported that the engineering corps of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) had launched a large-scale operation to destroy the tunnels of the radical Palestinian group Hamas in the Gaza Strip. The Israeli side also stated that military operations could spread to other areas of the enclave, as there is evidence that Hamas has infrastructure in the south as well.

Hostages

Qatar and Egypt are acting as the main mediators in the negotiations between Hamas and Israel regarding the release of hostages (numbering over 242 people, including at least 33 children). Before the start of the military operation on 27 October, Israel proposed a ceasefire in exchange for the release of all hostages and the handover of the bodies of deceased Israelis from the Gaza Strip; however, the Palestinian movement Hamas rejected this proposal. The movement demanded a five-day ceasefire and stated that they were prepared to release all hostages from among the civilian population, but not captured Israeli soldiers; their release would require negotiations and a prisoner exchange with Israel.

The Israeli authorities stated that they were prepared to declare pauses in hostilities if the radical Palestinian movement Hamas released a significant number of hostages. A statement was also issued stating that the G7 condemns Hamas’s attacks on Israel, demands the release of all hostages and advocates for a humanitarian pause in hostilities. The US side explained that humanitarian pauses, intended for the release of hostages, would apply only to specific sections of the front line and would be ‘time-limited’.

A final agreement on the release of hostages held by the Palestinian movement Hamas in the Gaza Strip has not yet been reached. Negotiations are proving very difficult due to Hamas’s obstructive stance.

Death toll

Since the escalation between Hamas and Israel in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict zone began on 7 October and continued until 12 November, various sources in the Gaza Strip have reported the following death tolls:

• at least 295 healthcare workers;

• 99 UNRWA staff members;

• at least 31 journalists;

• the number of casualties in Israel as a result of the Hamas attack stands at around 1,200

• the number of Gaza Strip residents killed as a result of Israeli strikes has risen to 11,180, with over 28,000 injured.

US President Joe Biden has stated that he does not trust the Palestinian Authority’s figures on the number of casualties in the Gaza Strip, but has no doubt that civilians are being killed there. Indeed, the US administration believes that the health authorities in the Gaza Strip are merely a front for Hamas, and therefore the US considers that their figures on Palestinian casualties cannot be trusted. Meanwhile, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu claims that of the more than 10,000 deaths reported by the Gaza Strip’s Ministry of Health, several thousand are fighters from the Palestinian movement Hamas, and stresses that this data must be verified.

The humanitarian situation

Let us consider some of the most pressing issues that have arisen in the humanitarian situation in Gaza since the start of Israel’s military operation, and ways to address them.

• the issue of evacuating the civilian population;

• the issue of humanitarian aid and water supply;

• The issue of medical care.

The issue of evacuation. The crux of the problem lies in the fact that Israel is asking the civilian population to temporarily relocate to safer areas of the Strip for the duration of the military operation, whilst Hamas is obstructing such internal displacement, using the civilian population as a human shield.

• The US believes that the radical Palestinian movement Hamas bears responsibility for the deaths of children in the Gaza Strip. Israel insists that Palestinians displaced from the north of the Gaza Strip to the south will be able to return once hostilities have ceased. It was also emphasised that supporters of the radical Palestinian movement Hamas are obstructing the evacuation of Gaza’s civilian population to safer southern areas of the enclave. For its part, the US accused the Palestinian movement Hamas of creating obstacles for American citizens and other foreigners in the Gaza Strip who wish to leave the area of escalating conflict with Israel and head towards Egypt. The Palestinian movement Hamas accused the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) of colluding with Israel in the forced displacement of Gaza Strip residents. Nevertheless, at least 1.4 million Palestinians have moved from the northern part of the Gaza Strip to the south.

The issue of humanitarian aid: The crux of the problem lay in the ability to deliver humanitarian aid in such a way that it reached the civilian population rather than representatives of the Hamas movement. Humanitarian pauses (temporary ceasefires) are also necessary to deliver humanitarian aid and move the population to safe areas of the Strip.

• Countries in the region are forming the view that a humanitarian disaster is unfolding in the Gaza Strip, whilst the Israeli Ministry of Defence considers that the situation in the Gaza Strip is complex, but does not amount to a humanitarian crisis.

• At the start of the period under review, the population of the Gaza Strip expressed the hope that at least 100 lorries carrying humanitarian aid would arrive in the Palestinian territory every day, and the Israeli authorities promised to fulfil these requests. Subsequently, some progress has been made — around a hundred lorries carrying humanitarian aid arrive in the Gaza Strip every day, and this number is set to rise to 150 in the near future. The US authorities, however, are convinced that some of the humanitarian aid sent to the Gaza Strip will inevitably end up in the hands of the Palestinian movement Hamas, although the bulk of it will still reach the civilian population. Israel has also resumed water supplies to the Gaza Strip via the second of three water pipelines.

• In their final joint statement, the G7 foreign ministers called for the implementation of humanitarian pauses and humanitarian corridors to deliver essential aid to the Gaza Strip, as well as for the release of hostages, including foreign nationals. The French President regards the international conference on the humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip, held in Paris on 9 November, as a step towards forming a coalition aimed at providing humanitarian aid to the Palestinian population in the conflict zone.

The issue of medical care. The crux of the problem is that Hamas militants are using hospitals as cover for military purposes, which is why a significant number of hospitals have ceased operations, both as a result of damage caused by shelling and due to a lack of medical staff, medicines and fuel, which cannot be delivered there.

• By the end of the reporting period, it was announced that 20 of the 35 hospitals in the Gaza Strip had completely ceased operations, and staff from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) could no longer access the northern Gaza Strip due to the lack of security conditions, according to the organisation’s press release.

War crimes

At the start of the period under review, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) stated that it refrained from classifying the events in Gaza as genocide, arguing that the classification of crimes must be determined by a court based on an independent investigation. The US administration considers it inappropriate to compare the situation in the Gaza Strip with countries where the US government has declared genocide, and recognises that this term is unsuitable for the Palestinian- Israeli conflict. UN Secretary-General António Guterres also stated that the decision to investigate war crimes committed by the radical Palestinian movement Hamas and Israel must be taken by the courts independently.

Following the summit in Riyadh on 11 November, leaders of Arab and Islamic countries demanded that the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) investigate “war crimes” by Israel in the Palestinian territories, stating that lawyers from these countries would gather evidence and instructing the General Secretariats of the Organisation and the League of Arab States to monitor compliance with this demand and to establish two legal monitoring units (lawyers are required to submit their report within 15 days).

Further measures regarding Hamas

Note: Hamas is recognised as a terrorist organisation by Israel and countries such as the US, Canada and Japan, as well as the European Union. However, Hamas is not included on the UN list of terrorist organisations. Russia does not consider the Hamas movement to be terrorist.

It has been stated that the international community must distinguish between the Palestinian radical movement Hamas and the State of Palestine. Israel’s position is that neutrality in the conflict with Hamas is impossible; those who have not condemned Hamas are supporters of Hamas.

The West has launched a campaign of economic pressure and asset freezes against Hamas. The US and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Oman and Saudi Arabia – held an emergency meeting of the Centre for Combating the Financing of Terrorism (CCFT) on 25 October (ahead of schedule). The US stated that it is working with GCC members to target Hamas’s investment portfolio. It was also announced that the US had expanded sanctions against individuals and that the US administration is seeking to halt funding for the Palestinian radical movement Hamas and will apply the same measures to it as it does to the terrorist groups Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. Similarly, the G7 countries are also discussing, including with regional partners, the issue of imposing sanctions on the radical Palestinian movement Hamas; the European Union is examining additional restrictive measures against the Palestinian movement Hamas, which has already been designated a terrorist organisation by the EU, and is considering imposing sanctions on Hamas representatives following the attack on Israel on 7 October.

Separately, several countries can be identified that do not recognise Hamas as a terrorist organisation:

• Palestine (does not recognise them as terrorists, but does not always agree with their actions; believes that Israel has no right to self-defence, whereas the Palestinians, including Hamas, do).

• Iran (considers the attack by the radical Hamas movement on Israel to be actions consistent with international law).

• Turkey (does not recognise them as terrorists, but this does not mean that Ankara encourages the killing of innocent people).

• Qatar (has no intention of closing the headquarters of the political bureau of the radical Palestinian movement Hamas in Doha following the attack on Israel, as this channel of communication is currently crucial for negotiations on the release of hostages held in Gaza).

• Malaysia (does not recognise the unilateral US sanctions under the law restricting international funding for Hamas and will continue to support the organisation; has called on the public not to refer to the radical Hamas movement as militants).

• Russia (does not recognise Hamas as a terrorist organisation, as it is not included on the UN Security Council’s list of international terrorists, and also because Russia wishes to maintain its position as a country with the potential to participate in the settlement process).

Hamas’ tactics

All things considered, Hamas may initially have considered several possible scenarios following its unexpected and brutal terrorist attack on Israel, for example:

• One scenario – it would lead to Hamas negotiating with Israel from a position of strength, capitalising on the confusion among both the countries of the region, the West, and the entire international community, which would restrain Israel’s military response against Hamas, channelling it into a political framework to avoid a large-scale conflict – through resolutions at the UN Security Council and pressure on Israel from international players and regional countries.

• The second scenario — this will lead to a large-scale conflict in the Middle East, as a result of which Hamas will receive military aid and support and will escalate its aggression against Israel alongside its allies on terms favourable to itself, which will again end in negotiations with Israel from a position of strength held by its enemies.

When neither of these scenarios materialised and Israel, with Western support, gradually launched a fierce military operation against Hamas, whilst the UN Security Council proved blocked from adopting resolutions to restrain Israel, the movement changed its tactics, which can be summarised by several points of their demands:

• On halting Israel’s operation: a demand that its allies and regional countries facilitate a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip (an opportunity for respite, regrouping, and a more advantageous position for the movement; the chance to begin negotiations from a stronger position; the movement’s survival) — in Hamas’s view, a ceasefire in Gaza depends on the US, which ‘is entirely in control of the war’. Hamas described the official positions of Arab and Muslim countries on the situation in the Gaza Strip as weak and demanded that they put pressure on the US to secure an ‘end to Israel’s aggression’ in the Gaza Strip.

• On mediators: Hamas wants Russia to play an important role in the Middle East and would welcome Russian mediation to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but Israel does not agree to this.

• On military pressure: Hamas expects its allies to step up military action against Israel; the movement has called on Arab and Muslim countries to strike Israel, calling this their ‘sacred duty’.

• On economic and political pressure: a demand that its allies and countries in the region exert political and economic pressure on Israel (sever diplomatic relations, cease all forms of normalisation of relations, impose sanctions, blockades, oil embargoes, etc.);

Palestine’s position

Palestine has condemned Israel’s military operation in Gaza, arguing that it will not ensure Israel’s security. It was stated that the Palestinian leadership advocates for peace and is ready for negotiations with Israel, and such negotiations regarding a Palestinian-Israeli settlement, in the Palestinian view, could take place in Moscow. Palestine asserts that Russia could become a reliable mediator in resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. It was announced that preparations were underway for a visit by Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas to Russia in November.

The Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also called on all countries to review their relations with Israel and to put pressure on the Jewish state to halt the escalation in the Gaza Strip. Palestine stated that Israel must be compelled to comply with its obligations under international law, in particular to immediately cease retaliatory actions and collective punishment, and to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid to all civilians in need of peace in the Gaza Strip. However, due to Israel blocking the issue of potential Russian mediation, and the fact that the proposal to hold an international conference on Palestine (creating a new platform) received broad support, in contrast to the lack of demand for the ‘Middle East Quartet’ format (US, EU, Russia) , UN), the visit by Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas to Moscow, scheduled for mid-November, has been postponed.

The stance of regional players

Most countries in the region strongly condemned Israel’s military operation against Hamas in the Gaza Strip, arguing that ‘Israel’s massive strikes on the Gaza Strip constitute a disproportionate response to the attack carried out by the radical Palestinian movement Hamas against the Jewish state, the destruction of the Palestinian movement Hamas will not resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict’ and demanded that the international community ‘immediately halt Israel’s military operations in the enclave’. Furthermore, to put pressure on Israel, a number of countries took diplomatic steps; for example, several countries, including Jordan, Colombia, Turkey, Chile and South Africa, recalled their ambassadors from Israel, whilst Bolivia announced the severing of diplomatic relations.

Countries in the region stated that the international community, and in particular the UN Security Council, must intervene in the situation in the Gaza Strip to immediately halt the armed conflict in the enclave. However, the UN Security Council was unable to adopt any consolidated resolution due to disagreements among the major global players – the permanent members of the Security Council – and found itself deadlocked.

Consequently, decision-making was delegated to the regional level.

Consequently, despite the sharp reaction, threats and outrage, and thanks to diplomatic efforts by US and Western representatives with these countries, the countries of the region were able to formulate a unified position of the Arab states regarding the situation surrounding the Palestinian Gaza Strip, which boils down to ‘the need for an immediate cessation of Israeli attacks, the priority of delivering humanitarian aid to the residents of the Gaza Strip, preventing the displacement of Palestinians from their lands, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state”.

At a press conference following the Arab-Islamic Summit in Riyadh on 11 November, Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan stated that the foreign ministers of influential Arab and Muslim countries, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Indonesia, Niger and Palestine, had joined a special council to devise immediate steps aimed at ending military operations in the Gaza Strip and revitalising the peace process in the region.

However, the countries in the region do not yet have any answers as to how to put the decisions taken into practice.

STAGE 2. GOVERNANCE IN THE GAZA STRIP

Background: The Gaza Strip is a 40-km-long Palestinian enclave situated between Israel and Egypt on the Mediterranean coast. De jure, it is one of the two parts of the State of Palestine, alongside the West Bank. Following the Six-Day War of 1967, it came under Israeli control. In 2005, the Jewish state unilaterally withdrew its troops from the territory and forcibly evacuated all Israeli settlements from there, retaining control over the sector’s territorial waters and airspace. Control of the territory subsequently passed to the Palestinian National Authority, headed by Abbas, which also exercises partial authority in the West Bank. Meanwhile, in 2007, the radical Hamas movement came to power in the enclave, and the entire Gaza Strip remains under its control to this day.

Stage 2 – ‘the Gaza scenario’ (medium-term objective) – a set of actions and measures in Gaza following the conclusion of the military operation to eliminate threats (security guarantees). Israel/Gaza.

The main issues under consideration in the current period are outlined below:

• Exclusion of Hamas from political processes in Gaza following the conclusion of the military operation.

• Conditions for a lasting peace in Gaza following the conclusion of the military operation.

• Options for governing Gaza during the transition period.

It was stated that the future of the Gaza Strip following the end of hostilities remains uncertain and is the subject of discussions between the West, Israel and other countries in the region. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and his deputies are holding talks with colleagues in Arab countries regarding the governance model for the Gaza Strip following the conclusion of Israel’s main military operations. The West insists that the question of governance in the Gaza Strip following the end of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be resolved with the participation of Middle Eastern countries.

It should be noted that Turkey is the most active publicly among the countries of the region. It has been stated that Turkey expects more active regional involvement in resolving the conflict between Israel and Palestine, and that Ankara is working on a new security mechanism for a Palestinian-Israeli settlement and is ready to act as a security guarantor.

Russia’s position was expressed by Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, V. Nebenzia, who called for saving the present situation in the Gaza Strip rather than discussing its future after the conclusion of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

• Exclusion of Hamas from political processes in Gaza. The crux of the matter is that Israel, the West and regional players have found common ground regarding the exclusion of the Hamas movement from any future political processes in Gaza and Palestine following the end of the military operation. Palestine, whilst avoiding direct public endorsement of such a decision, has agreed to hold new presidential and parliamentary elections across all Palestinian territories (including Gaza) following the conclusion of Israel’s military operation, which may imply the exclusion of Hamas from this process due to its defeat or elimination in the future as a result of the operation’s outcome.

The United States and its allies are convinced that the Palestinian radical movement Hamas cannot participate in the governance of the Gaza Strip after the end of the conflict and cannot be a partner in negotiations to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The US has firmly stated that it will not allow a scenario in which Hamas governs the Gaza Strip following the conclusion of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as this would lead to its recurrence. The US believes that Hamas does not represent the interests of the Palestinian people and does not reflect their aspirations — Palestine is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and therefore Gaza must remain Palestinian territory.

Hamas stated that it would never accept a puppet government in the Gaza Strip that suits the US and Israel, and that the movement would continue to govern the territory. It was also emphasised that the Hamas movement is an ‘integral part of the Palestinian people’, and any talk of the Gaza Strip post-Hamas was deemed unacceptable.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that he does not agree to transfer control of the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian National Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas, as the latter has still not condemned the actions of the Hamas movement.

Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas declared his readiness to hold general presidential and parliamentary elections across all Palestinian territories, including Jerusalem. Abbas also called for international support for the Palestinian Authority’s institutions to “carry out activities in the Palestinian territories, including the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip”.

The final statement of the joint summit of the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which concluded in Riyadh on 11 November, emphasised that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) “is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people”. As noted in the statement, Palestinian factions operating in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank must unite under the auspices of the PLO.

• Conditions for a lasting peace in Gaza. The crux of the matter is that Israel, the West and regional players have found common ground in the view that Israel’s military campaign in the Gaza Strip must not lead to the enclave’s separation from a unified Palestinian state, that is, without Israeli occupation of this territory and/or its reduction — a kind of guarantee of the enclave’s territorial integrity and affiliation.

The West believes that the way to avoid a repeat of the Palestinian-Israeli crisis is to create the conditions for a lasting peace, including a ban on the forcible displacement of the population of Gaza and the occupation of the Strip; the US opposes the re-occupation of the Gaza Strip by Israel, the expulsion of the Palestinian population from there, or the reduction of the enclave’s territory.

Israel has stated that it expects its military operation in the Gaza Strip to result in the complete demilitarisation of the area and intends to retain control over security in the enclave to prevent any threat to itself in this direction — Israeli security forces will remain in the Gaza Strip after the military operation concludes. Israel has also indicated that it plans to establish security zones in Gaza, which will be off-limits (the possibility of laying mines in these zones is being considered).

Israel has also given assurances that it has no intention of resuming settlement construction in the Gaza Strip once the military operation has ended. It was stated that Israel is interested in creating new conditions under which the residents of Gaza could govern their own territory, and that international support has been secured for its reconstruction. Israel insists that it seeks neither to seize nor to occupy the Palestinian enclave, nor to govern it. However, for some time, Israel will require ‘reliable forces that, if necessary, will enter Gaza and eliminate the killers’ in order to prevent the resurgence of Hamas.

The final statement of the joint summit of the League of Arab States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, which concluded in Riyadh on 11 November, states that Israel’s military campaign in the Gaza Strip must not result in the enclave being separated from a unified Palestinian state — these territories, together with East Jerusalem, into an independent Palestinian state.

Options for the administration of Gaza during the transitional period following the end of Israel’s military operation (Israel/Hamas) and until a comprehensive resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Israel/Palestine) are also being considered, including the following options:

Control and administration by a regional coalition:

• One possible option is to grant temporary control over Gaza to countries in the Middle East region, with the support of US, British, German and French troops. Under this option, it would be desirable to discuss the presence of Arab countries, such as the UAE or Saudi Arabia.

Control and management by peacekeepers:

• The second option involves peacekeeping forces and observers (similar to those operating on the Sinai Peninsula and monitoring the situation between Egypt and Israel). It has emerged that the US does not plan to send American troops to Gaza either now or in the future, but is discussing with its partners the possibility of deploying an international peacekeeping presence on its territory once the conflict has ended. The EU has stated that various ideas are being discussed on how to achieve this, in particular through the use of international peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the UN.

UN control and administration.

• The third option is temporary administration of the Gaza Strip under UN auspices. UN Secretary-General António Guterres stated that it is premature to consider the possibility of deploying UN peacekeeping forces to the Gaza Strip at this stage.

STAGE 3. ISRAEL/PALESTINE CONFLICT

Stage 3 – “Palestine scenario” (strategic objective) – a set of actions and measures aimed at resolving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict based on the two-state solution. Israel/Palestine.

The issue of recognising two states

The United States believes that a return to the status quo in the Middle East is impossible and that efforts must be stepped up to implement a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict based on the principle of establishing two independent states. This view is shared by the majority of countries in the international community, including those in the Arab world (countries in the region). In this regard, it was stated that the US sees growing interest within the international community in resuming, after a long hiatus, the process of a final settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, involving the creation of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, adjusted to take account of territorial exchanges agreed with Israel.

It should also be noted that Iran’s position on this issue differs. The Iranian authorities support a plan to create a single state on the territory of Palestine and Israel, guaranteeing all democratic rights—including electoral rights—to the Palestinian people, whilst the Jewish population would have the right to leave or become citizens of the new state. In Iran, it is believed that following elections in such a new state, the new government should offer a choice – – to former Israeli citizens who participated in operations against the Gaza Strip and the occupation of Palestinian lands: to remain and become citizens of the new state, or to leave. The same applies to the inhabitants of former Palestine.

Israel has so far made no comment and is not participating in discussions on the concept of a two-state solution, but pressure on Israel is mounting. Indeed, complaints have been levelled at Israel regarding its actions in the West Bank.

A report on the Palestinian economy for 2023, published on the website of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), states that the 713-kilometre-long wall that Israel is building on the West Bank of the Jordan River outside recognised borders is in fact an instrument of annexation and jeopardises the implementation of the two-state solution.

The West also condemns Israel’s aggressive actions. Indeed, the US administration insists that Israel hold to account Israeli settlers who commit acts of violence against Palestinians in the West Bank, as well as military personnel who fail to stop such acts. The EU has strongly condemned the increase in attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinian residents of the West Bank against the backdrop of the ongoing operation in the Gaza Strip, describing what is happening as settler terrorism. The G7 countries also consider acts of violence by Israeli settlers against the Palestinian population to be unacceptable.

The issue of normalising relations with Israel

Background: In September 2020, in Washington, the Israeli side, with US mediation, signed documents on the normalisation of relations with the UAE and Bahrain. The trilateral agreement was named the ‘Abraham Accords’. Subsequently, Sudan and Morocco announced the normalisation of relations with the Jewish state. Prior to the peace agreements with the UAE and Bahrain, Israel had diplomatic relations with only Egypt and Jordan amongst the Arab countries.

The US has stated that it intends to continue calling for the normalisation of Israel’s relations with Arab countries, believing that such an approach will benefit the entire region. Saudi Arabia has confirmed that talks on normalising relations with Israel are still on the table, despite having been put on hold due to the conflict in the Gaza Strip, but are expected to resume once it ends. It was also stated that the United Arab Emirates (UAE) plans to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, despite outrage over the rising death toll in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The UAE, however, wishes to influence Israel and protect its own interests so that, once the conflict ends, the countries can return to comprehensive dialogue.

Iran is actively seeking to shape regional opinion that Israel’s actions in the Gaza Strip confirm the inadmissibility of normalising relations with the Jewish state. Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Vasily Nebenzya, stated that the normalisation of Israel’s ties with Arab states must not come at the expense of Palestine. It should also be noted that Bahrain has indeed recalled its ambassador from Israel, the Israeli ambassador has also left Manama, and economic relations have been suspended.

So, to summarise briefly all that has been said above, —

GLOBAL LEVEL

• Global consequences: tending to worsen.

• UN Security Council: the forum is deadlocked due to the confrontation between permanent members over the differing objectives pursued by the parties to this conflict.

• Middle East Quartet: not yet in demand.

• Conference on Palestine: currently at the discussion stage regarding its establishment and future operations.

• Russia’s position: biased — representing and defending the interests of one side (Palestine/Hamas); Russia believes that Israel has no right to self-defence.

• China’s position: more balanced and detached; the PRC supports collective responsibility and adherence to the UN Charter; China believes that every country has the right to self-defence.

Thus, the resolution of the crisis (Israel/Hamas) and the conflict (Israel/Palestine) is taking place at the regional level with the active participation of the West (the US, the EU) and countries in the region, and within the framework of previously stated trends.

TRENDS: The scenario consists of three stages: Stage 1 – Israel/Hamas, Stage 2 – Israel/Gaza, Stage 3 – Israel/Palestine.

• Linking the first and third stages: the two-state solution will only be brought to the fore if the countries in the region accept the outcome of Israel’s military operation against Hamas, namely the elimination of Hamas as a political and armed (military) organisation in the Gaza Strip.

STAGE 1: ISRAEL/HAMAS CRISIS: The outcome of Israel’s military operation is influenced by: the time factor, the risk of escalation (restraint of third parties), the hostage situation, and the need to comply with international law (the humanitarian aspect).

• Time factor: Israel understands that it has time only as long as its political support in the international arena is secured. This time will rapidly diminish due to associated civilian casualties and the worsening humanitarian situation, and it may not be sufficient to eradicate all Hamas forces.

• Restraining third parties: the main sources of the threat of the conflict escalating for Israel, apart from Hamas, are Iran and its proxies: the Lebanese Shia organisation Hezbollah and the Yemeni rebel movement Ansar Allah (the Houthis). The West and other major regional players have focused their attention on containing these parties.

ISRAEL’S MILITARY OPERATION AGAINST HAMAS

• The West’s position: setting out a series of conditions for Israel, the main one being the minimisation of humanitarian problems during the military operation within a limited timeframe.

• Israel’s tactics: a hardline approach to conducting a limited military operation to free the hostages whilst inflicting maximum damage on Hamas (its military capabilities and infrastructure).

• Hostages: negotiations for their release are proving very difficult and have so far been virtually fruitless. The main negotiators are Egypt and Qatar.

• The number of Palestinian deaths and casualties is rising significantly.

• Humanitarian situation: following a serious deterioration, there are signs of an improving situation and limited stabilisation. Issues regarding evacuation, the delivery of humanitarian aid and access to medical care remain pressing.

• War crimes: only a court has the right to adjudicate on the commission and investigation of war crimes; the ICC is accepting complaints from victims on both sides – Hamas and Israel. On this issue, Turkey is the most vocal in its criticism of Israel.

• Further measures regarding Hamas: there is a trend towards expanding sanctions against Hamas and an economic blockade of transport routes by the West. Russia does not recognise Hamas as a terrorist organisation and is not participating in efforts to contain it.

• Hamas’s tactics: to achieve a ceasefire (freezing the conflict), Hamas advocates involving Russia as a mediator (Israel does not agree), demands that countries in the region exert military, economic and political pressure on Israel, and also calls for greater pressure to be exerted on the US.

• Palestine’s position: it advocates involving Russia as a mediator, but given that Israel has blocked the issue of potential Russian mediation, and given that the proposal to hold an international conference on Palestine (creating a new platform) has received broad support, in contrast to the lack of demand for the ‘Middle East Quartet’ (US, EU, Russia, UN), the Palestinian leader’s visit to Moscow, scheduled for mid-November, has been postponed.

• The position of regional players: to put pressure on Israel, a number of countries have taken diplomatic steps; for example, several countries, including Jordan, Colombia, Turkey, Chile and South Africa, have recalled their ambassadors from Israel, whilst Bolivia has announced the severing of diplomatic relations. A special council was also established to develop immediate measures aimed at ending military operations in the Gaza Strip and revitalising the peace process in the region (council members: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Indonesia, Nigeria and Palestine).

STAGE 2. GOVERNANCE IN THE GAZA STRIP

• Exclusion of Hamas from political processes in Gaza: Israel, the West and regional players have found common ground regarding the exclusion of the Hamas movement from any future political processes in Gaza and Palestine following the conclusion of the military operation. Palestine, whilst avoiding direct public support for such a decision, has agreed to hold new presidential and parliamentary elections across all Palestinian territories (including Gaza) following the conclusion of Israel’s military operation, which may imply the exclusion of Hamas from this process due to its defeat/elimination in the future as a result of the operation’s outcome.

• Conditions for a lasting peace in Gaza: Israel, the West and regional players have found common ground on the fact that Israel’s military campaign in the Gaza Strip must not lead to the enclave’s separation from a unified Palestinian state, i.e. without Israeli occupation of this territory and/or its reduction — a kind of guarantee of the enclave’s territorial integrity and affiliation.

• Options under discussion for the administration of Gaza during the transitional period (security guarantees): Control and administration by a regional coalition; Control and administration by peacekeepers; Control and administration by the UN.

STAGE 3. ISRAEL/PALESTINE CONFLICT

• The issue of two-state recognition: there has been growing interest within the international community in resuming the process of a final settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict – the two-state solution, which is supported by a significant number of international actors (including the US, the EU, China and Russia) and regional countries. Iran advocates the creation and recognition of a single state, followed by the expulsion of those who disagree.

• The issue of normalising relations with Israel: this issue has been temporarily put on hold until the conclusion of Israel’s military operation against Hamas and will be revisited following the outcome of this operation and Israel’s actions in implementing the second and third stages of the Israel-Palestine conflict resolution (the issue of post-conflict governance of Gaza with mutual security guarantees and progress on the two-state solution).

As can be seen from the above, events are unfolding at the regional level in line with the trends of a three-tier scenario, with the greatest activity taking place at the first level (the Israel/Hamas military operation) whilst the main parties are largely agreeing on the terms of the second level (post-war governance of Gaza) and drawing attention to the discussions and concrete outcomes at the third level (Israel/Palestine) – the recognition of two states and the reconciliation of Israel with the Arab world.

Further observations will reveal whether new trends will emerge or whether events will continue to unfold within the framework of the trends outlined.