RELATIONS BETWEEN SUPERPOWERS – CHINA, RUSSIA, THE US – CONFRONTATION OR COMPETITION (2023)

The study identifies a fundamentally important shift: the international system is evolving not as a new ‘Cold War’, but as a single system with differentiated modes of interaction — competition, deterrence, cooperation.

The key lies in the functional division of roles between the actors:

1. US / West. They shape the architecture of the system through three distinct modes:

• destruction (terrorism),

• containment (Russia),

• competition (China).

This means that the West does not destroy the system, but adapts it to different types of threats, maintaining a single set of rules.

2. China. Acts as an internal competitor:

• not interested in destroying the system (due to economic dependence);

• seeks to shift the balance of influence within it;

• uses instruments of indirect influence (the EU, the economy, ‘strategic autonomy’).

In other words, China is playing the long game — strengthening its position without leaving the system.

3. Russia. Takes a fundamentally different position — that of an extra-systemic actor:

• is unable to win the competition;

• therefore, it is trying to change the rules of the game;

• it promotes a model of “spheres of influence” rather than a single order.

Thus, the Russian Federation acts as a destabilising force within the system, rather than as an equal competitor.

The key contradiction inherent in the study:

• The US → preserves the system of rules;

• China → is shifting the balance within the system;

• Russia → is attempting to destroy the system itself.

An important additional dimension is the role of Europe:

• for the US — an element of consolidation;

• for China — a point of division;

• for Russia — a target for influence aimed at dismantling Western unity.

This makes the EU a key battleground in the struggle to shape the system.

It is also critically important that: countries of the Global South do not support the Russian model, because:

• they have an interest in the global economy;

• they seek to expand their role, not to destroy the system.

Conclusion:

The international system is entering a phase of hierarchical competition within a single order, rather than a bloc-based split.

The key axis is forming not as US–Russia, but as: US–China (competition over the rules of the system), where:

• the US sets the framework;

• China attempts to change it;

• Russia attempts to break it, but lacks the resources to become an alternative centre.

Strategic implication: the future of the world order is determined not by dividing the world into spheres of influence (the Russian logic), but by
control over the rules of interaction within the global system.

In this framework, Ukraine acts as:

• a point where Russia is attempting to break the system;

• and at the same time as a factor forcing the West to strengthen consolidation and refine the rules.

Key systemic conclusion: Russia is failing as a model (destruction of the system), China is competing as an alternative within the system, and the US maintains control through the rules — and it is precisely this struggle that determines the new world order.

The events we are witnessing now are not a Cold War; they are the establishment of a new type of relationship within a single system between democracies and autocracies – this is competition.  

In Europe, the situation was initially assessed in the somewhat dramatic light of previous ‘Cold War’ experience, with the implication that a strategy of competition might be a repetition of past experience rather than a new project. Indeed, European politicians noted that the global system was supposedly under threat of fragmentation, of splitting into major blocs: one centred on the US, the other on China. This, it was claimed, would lead to the creation of two distinct technological ecosystems, with the potential danger of escalating into conflict.

This was precisely Russia’s aim – to divide the world among the major global players into zones and spheres of influence. Without competition, through agreements, and by its own rules. This is so-called polycentricity – ‘multipolarity, Russian style’ – in which the Russian Federation saw itself as a separate, independent pole of power amongst several independent pole-systems. Each of these poles has its own rules, and relations between them are built on the principle that ‘interests take precedence over values’. Such poles may not interact with one another at all, but remain autonomous and self-sufficient.

The main difference between ‘Russian-style multipolarity’ and the understanding of ‘multipolarity’ held by most countries of the Global South, including China, lies in the fact that they interpret multipolarity as multilateralism – that is, they seek to remain within a single system of rules (the UN Charter) and general cooperation, including mandatory integration into the global economy. They merely seek to increase their level of participation in these processes. In other words, they are effectively supporters of the current world order, which the Russian Federation is attempting to destroy.

Today, we can observe the implementation of three main Western strategies in the international arena: the strategy of destruction, containment and competition. Thus,

The DESTRUCTION strategy defines the concept of the ‘enemy’. This is TERRORISM – a direct asymmetric threat to security that operates outside the rules. The confrontation with the enemy continues until its complete destruction.

The CONTAINMENT strategy defines the concept of an ‘adversary’. This is RUSSIA – which grossly violates common rules by carrying out unjustified armed aggression and poses a direct military threat. The struggle against the adversary is conducted through confrontation without destruction, i.e. isolation, sanctions, restrictions and containment. Containment is complicated by the issue of strategic stability; Russia blackmails everyone with nuclear weapons – this is a global security problem. The aim of this strategy is to minimise Russia’s influence in the international arena. As an exception, its participation in resolving global humanitarian problems is partially permitted (for example, the food crisis and energy shortages, but with a price cap).

The COMPETITION strategy defines the concept of a ‘competitor’. This is CHINA — a security challenge within a single space governed by common rules. The essence of the competition strategy lies in three components: cooperation (interaction), deterrence (ensuring security), and competition (rivalry). The aim of the strategy: competition on equal/fair terms within a shared space. All negotiations revolve precisely around establishing these conditions – developing a common understanding of their equality/fairness and committing to their implementation.

The US side has set out a series of principles and commitments which it intends to adhere to in implementing its competition strategy. It was stated that the US is committed to managing relations with China responsibly and seeks to shape these relations in such a way as to prevent direct conflict or a cold war. It was noted that the US does not wish to change China’s system, nor is it attempting to hinder its development, but intends to compete with it. At the same time, the US does not support Taiwan’s independence, but expects China to behave constructively, particularly regarding the Ukrainian crisis.

The US also stated that it would work within international organisations to strip China of its developing country status – Washington views competition with Beijing as taking place on equal terms. At the same time, it was stated that the main arena of rivalry is the field of new technologies.

The European side has also identified technological competition with China as a priority and emphasised that the EU must end its dependence on supplies of rare-earth metals from China, among other things.

The Chinese side, meanwhile, has also taken a number of steps during this period.

For instance, China published a document setting out proposals for a Chinese global security initiative. This is an attempt to strengthen its own political influence in the region, countering Western claims of China’s inaction in this regard.

It was announced that China had decided to take active measures to establish a unified national system for responding to strategic risks, and it was stated that defence channels would remain closed for the time being. This can be seen as an attempt by China to curb US military/hard power influence and to intimidate and keep its allies on edge.

China has also actively sought to undermine or weaken the consolidation of US allies by influencing Europe, supporting its aspirations for strategic autonomy, but with China’s own interests embedded within them. In this context, attention should be drawn to the differences in the understanding of the issue of ‘strategic autonomy’ between China and Europe. The PRC places the main emphasis (and intention) in the concept of Europe’s strategic autonomy on the idea that interests must take precedence over values.

The Chinese side asserts that the development of relations with the EU is a priority for Chinese diplomacy. For China, however, Europe’s strategic autonomy means the EU’s refusal or significant weakening of political and military consolidation with its allies in favour of its own economic interests, including those with China. In this regard, the PRC has called on the EU authorities to view China as an economic alternative to the US.

At the same time, Beijing insists that Europe must supposedly ‘correctly’ assess relations between China and Russia. Noting that once the war in Ukraine ends, Europe will gain such strategic autonomy, Beijing EXPECTS that the Ukrainian conflict will be resolved ONLY after the signing of certain security guarantees for Europe and ONLY on Russian or Chinese terms. Such conditions entail a significant weakening of NATO – a reduction in US military influence over the EU, Europe as a whole and the Asia-Pacific region, against the backdrop of China’s rapid build-up of military power.

The US, however, has stated that it will be guided by principles of national security, even if this hinders potential economic growth. Consequently, the US is actively employing deterrence tools against China: sanctions and restrictions, coercive measures in the region, and the application of NATO strategy provisions.

Thus, we note the priority interim objectives of the United States and Europe for the current period in the process of building a new model of relations with China within the existing world order:

• in the US, this involves strengthening consolidation in the support and acceptance of their strategy of competition as a common global project for all allies, and stepping up measures within the ‘COMPETITION’ component of this strategy.

• In Europe, this involves overcoming dependence on China.

China’s intermediate goals, meanwhile, are to weaken Western consolidation through economic influence on Europe, which, in turn, from the PRC’s perspective, should help minimise the conditions and demands of the US within the framework of its global strategy of competition with China. At the same time, Beijing’s maximum integration into the global economy must be preserved at all costs. This is vital and of the utmost importance for China’s further development.

China is critically dependent on the development of the global economy and its integration into it, and therefore seeks to preserve the current world order and strengthen its own role and significance within it.

Thus, China’s vulnerabilities can be outlined as follows:

• political: Western consolidation regarding China;

• economic: China’s integration into the global economy, the threat of sanctions and isolation;

• military: the military containment of China, which exceeds its own capabilities.

CONCLUSION

Thus, a key transformation in the international system is clearly evident: we are not dealing with a ‘new Cold War’, but with a transition to a unified system in which competition, deterrence and cooperation coexist simultaneously.

In this system, roles are being divided among three actors:

1. Russia — an actor outside the competition (destructive model)
The Russian Federation does not integrate into the competitive system, but seeks to change it:

• it promotes a model of “poles without shared rules”,

• seeks spheres of influence rather than competition,

• operates according to the logic of “interests > values”.

In fact, the Russian Federation:

• is unable to win in competition,

• and therefore seeks to eliminate competition itself as a principle

2. The US / West — architect of the system (three-pronged strategy)
For the first time, the West clearly distinguishes between types of threats and formulates different strategies for each:

• terrorism → destruction

• Russia → containment

• China → competition

This means:

• the system is not being dismantled, but differentiated,

• the key objective is to preserve a single set of rules,

• competition with China takes place within the system, rather than through its dismantling.

It is particularly important that:

• the US is not trying to change China’s system,

• but is forcing it to play by the rules (technology, status, economy).

3. China — a systemic competitor (adaptive model)
China occupies a fundamentally different position from Russia:

• it is dependent on the global economy,

• and is therefore interested in preserving the system,

• but seeks to shift the balance of influence within it.

Its strategy:

• economically → to remain within the system

• politically → weaken Western consolidation

• security-wise → avoid direct conflict

Key instrument:

• Europe as a point of division within the West (through ‘strategic autonomy’).

KEY SYSTEMIC CONTRADICTION:

• Russia → undermines the rules-based system

• China → remains within the system but shifts the balance

• US → preserves the system and compels others to operate within it

The international system is shifting not towards a bloc confrontation, but towards a hierarchical model of interaction, where each actor occupies its own functional niche:

• The US — maintains the rules-based architecture and sets the framework;

• China — is the main competitor within this system;

• Russia — acts as a destabilising force, attempting to replace rules with bargaining and spheres of influence.

Crucially: Russia’s model of ‘multipolarity’ finds no support even among the countries of the Global South, because:

• they do not wish to withdraw from the global economy,

• and are interested not in destroying the system, but in expanding their role within it.

As a result:

• an asymmetrical system is taking shape,

• where the main axis is the US–China (competition),

• and Russia is gradually shifting into the role of a limited but useful instrument (a buffer/destabiliser), rather than an equal pole.

Key strategic implication: the future of the world order will be determined not by the division of the world (as the Russian Federation seeks), but by a struggle over the rules within a single system (US–China), where the winner will be the one who sets the terms of this competition.