VLADIMIR PUTIN’S ARTICLE ‘ON THE HISTORICAL UNITY OF RUSSIANS AND UKRAINIANS’ (12 JULY 2021)
RESEARCH. VLADIMIR PUTIN’S ARTICLE ‘ON THE HISTORICAL UNITY OF RUSSIANS AND UKRAINIANS’ (12 JULY 2021)
The study clearly demonstrates that V. Putin’s article is not a historical or ideological piece, but a negotiating framework for the West, constructed according to the logic of the 2021 National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation.
At the heart of this framework lies the competition between geopolitical projects concerning Ukraine, where Russia pits its ‘Historical Russia’ project (a values- and civilisation-based model + spheres of influence) against the Western ‘Anti-Russia’ project (democratic norms and international law). In this logic, Ukraine is not viewed as an independent entity, but as an object of competition between the two poles.
The key construct is an attempt to legitimise the Russian Federation’s right to a sphere of influence through:
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historical narratives (the USSR, ‘Historical Russia’, ‘historical justice’);
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replacing contemporary international law with the ‘Yalta-2’ logic (division of spheres of influence);
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appeals to a section of Western elites who accept such a model.
At the same time, the text highlights the real weakness of the Russian Federation’s position in Ukraine:
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economic influence — lost or drastically reduced;
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political influence — significantly weakened due to competing values;
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the only stable asset — control and management of the conflict (Donbas) as a tool of pressure.
This is precisely why Russia is proposing a negotiation model that essentially amounts to an exchange of “conflict freeze → recognition of the sphere of influence”:
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Crimea — excluded from the equation (not up for negotiation);
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Donbas — a bargaining chip and a tool for consolidating influence;
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the rest of Ukraine — a zone of competition with demands for Western restrictions (neutrality, ‘red lines’).
Conclusion: Putin’s article is a systematic attempt to shift the conflict surrounding Ukraine into a format of negotiations on the division of spheres of influence, where Ukraine is viewed as a space for compromise between Russia and the West.
The Russian Federation’s key logic:
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to establish itself as a separate pole;
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to secure a minimum sphere of influence (Crimea + ORDLO);
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to use it as a springboard for further expansion of influence;
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to limit the West’s presence in Ukraine through agreements.
At the same time, the text itself indirectly confirms that Russia is already losing the systemic competition in Ukraine (economically, politically, in terms of values) and is therefore shifting to a strategy of: pauses + consolidating results + bargaining through conflict.
Strategic conclusion: Russia is attempting not to restore full control over Ukraine immediately, but to institutionalise partial control as a legitimate “sphere of influence”, so that in the long term it can return to the question of fully integrating Ukraine into its geopolitical project.
RESEARCH.
Introduction.
The main points set out in the article:
• Competition between the geopolitical projects of Russia and the collective West in Ukraine.
• Historical justification of Russia’s right to a sphere of influence in Ukraine (territorial claims);
• Economic control (claims against the collective West, Russia’s capabilities)
• Political control (claims, capabilities);
• Control and management of conflicts (claims, capabilities).
Conclusion:
• Tactical (short-term) objective.
• Strategic (long-term) objective.
Building on the principles set out in Russia’s National Security Strategy of 2 July 2021, Russia has identified the following actions as priorities in addressing the threats posed by growing competition for ‘traditional’ spheres of influence (the post-Soviet space):
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deepening cooperation on a bilateral basis and within the framework of integration associations (economic control, in particular, through unions);
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facilitating the elimination and prevention of hotspots of tension and conflict in the territories of states neighbouring the Russian Federation (conflict control and management);
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providing support to the Russian Federation’s allies and partners in resolving issues related to defence and security, and neutralising attempts at external interference in their internal affairs (political control — control of the ruling authorities within allied countries);
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carrying out work aimed at developing common approaches to participation in the activities of international organisations (forming and controlling a consolidated position, favourable to the Russian Federation, on international platforms).
These priorities are assessed and extrapolated by Russia to Ukraine in President V. Putin’s article ‘On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians’ [1] dated 12 July 2021 for negotiations with the collective West regarding the competition between geopolitical projects and the division of spheres of influence in Ukraine. The article is broadly structured around the same sections as those reflected in the Russian National Security Concept:
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Competition between the geopolitical projects of Russia and the collective West in Ukraine:
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Russia: the ‘Historical Russia’ (Russian World) project — the ‘special path’, traditional ‘Russian’ values;
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The collective West: the ‘Anti-Russia’ project — international norms and laws, democratic values;
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Historical justification of Russia’s right to a sphere of influence in Ukraine (territorial claims); the nature of historical creativity.
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Economic control (claims against the Collective West, Russia’s capabilities); a trend of significant decline.
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Political control (claims, capabilities); a trend of significant decline.
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Control and management of conflicts (claims, capabilities); stable control of positions and capabilities.
Competition between the geopolitical projects of Russia and the collective West in Ukraine.
According to Russia, the competition between geopolitical projects entered an acute phase in 2014. The main cause of the confrontation, as stated in the article: the competitive struggle between the US and Russia for influence in Europe (where the US, the EU and Russia are viewed as separate, independent poles).
Claims:
It was in the interests of the US and its individual allies in the EU (Poland, the Baltic states) to prevent full-scale cooperation between Russia and the EU.
This is allegedly the reason behind the anti-Russian sentiment in Ukraine and the implementation of the collective West’s ‘Anti-Russia’ geopolitical project (which is geared towards upholding international norms and laws, as well as democratic values): to turn Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, using ‘direct interference in internal affairs’ and ‘supporting a coup d’état’ in Ukraine (a change of government: from pro-Russian to one oriented towards the democratic West).
Opportunities:
To recognise Russia’s status as a separate, independent pole with its own distinct system of values (‘special path’, traditional ‘Russian’ values) and spheres of influence (the post-Soviet space)
On this basis, recognise – at most: the Russian Federation’s right to implement its Russian geopolitical project ‘Historical Russia’ (the Russian World) across the whole of Ukraine; at least – to divide spheres of influence within Ukraine between itself and the collective West (recognise the Russian Federation’s sphere of influence in the ORDLO, see The Doctrine of the Russian Donbas).
Historical justification of Russia’s right to a sphere of influence in Ukraine (territorial claims);
This section sets out the justification for the collective West’s right to a sphere of influence in Ukraine based on the territorial principle, in the spirit of the Yalta Agreements[2] .
Some Western representatives view the framework of previous agreements (between the USSR and the collective West) on the division of spheres of influence with understanding and consider Russia’s claims to maintain its dominant influence in the post-Soviet space to be sufficiently justified, regarding it as ‘traditional’ (legally successor). A return to such a framework seems to some Western politicians to be the most acceptable (most feasible, productive) approach to building relations with the Russian Federation.
It is precisely this segment of the collective West that the Russian side’s arguments regarding the establishment of a new multipolar order are aimed at, where Russia asserts its right to ‘spheres of influence’, positioning itself as a separate, independent pole.
The main conceptual framework (fully in line with the narratives of the Doctrine of the Rus’ Donbas (DRD) — see
more details at https://geo-analytics.com.ua/ukraina-okupirovannye-territorii/doktrina-russkij-donbass-osnovnye-zalozhennye-rossiej-narrativy/), used in this article, is aimed primarily at precisely such representatives of the collective West:
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‘Ukraine – a country of the Soviet era’ (i.e. a Russian political project);
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“historical Motherland” (the USSR with a single system of values);
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“the Russian people” (a community of Russian speakers with a specific mindset shaped by the Russian political project);
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‘historical Russia’ (the territories of the former USSR and the Russian Empire);
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‘historical injustice’ (the loss of the territories of historical Russia (or influence over them) due to the collapse of the USSR, which occurred through the fault of the collective West);
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‘historical justice’ (the restoration of influence over the territories of historical Russia in the form of nation states — Russian nation states — Ukraine and Belarus);
Claims.
The main thrust of this section (territorial claims) boils down to Russia’s attempt to justify to the collective West its right to restore so-called ‘historical justice’ (restoring dominant influence over its ‘historical territories’) by substituting modern concepts of international law with its own Cold War-era interpretation, which, incidentally, may be very familiar and understandable to some politicians in the West due to their age and prior involvement in those events.
Opportunities.
In other words, the Russian Federation effectively acknowledges its confrontation with the collective West and proposes that the West ‘play’ by the old rules of that era, which are well known to both sides.
Economic control (claims against the collective West, Russia’s capabilities)
The main conceptual framework of the article is also largely aimed at representatives of the collective West and boils down to the central thesis that Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’ should supposedly be recognised in terms of the economy within a single economic space with Russia.
Thus, in the economic section, Russia justifies its right and its claims against the collective West.
Claims.
It is emphasised that Russia’s allegedly peaceful proposal to the collective West (the US and EU countries) prior to 2014 regarding the recognition of Ukraine as a zone of Moscow’s influence (in the Ukraine-Russia-EU format) was based on long-standing (decades, centuries), deep (a single economic system prior to the dissolution of the USSR, close cooperation thereafter), and substantial (over $82 billion) economic integration in ‘Russia’s historical territories’ was rejected.
Allegedly, it was precisely for this reason (Moscow had no other choice to preserve its influence in Ukraine) that Russia was forced to resort to the use of force against Ukraine in 2014 – this is interpreted as a confrontation provoked by the collective West and the defence of Russian interests.
Russia accuses the collective West of providing support and exerting anti-Russian influence on ‘the Ukrainian authorities, oligarchs, radicals and neo-Nazis’ (nationalists), whom the Russian Federation accuses of corruption that has led Ukraine into economic decline, and whom interested external forces are allegedly using to oust Russia from Ukraine (from its ‘traditional’ sphere of influence).
A sore point for the Russian Federation is the competition between economic models and the collective West, a contest in which Russia is losing in Ukraine. Russia acknowledges that it needs Ukraine’s scientific and economic potential, as well as economic cooperation with it.
Russia had hoped to maintain (by force) economic ties with Kyiv that were advantageous to itself. The severing of these ties (on Ukraine’s initiative, with the support of the collective West) became an unpleasant and painful reality for the Russian Federation (the loss of significant political and economic influence in Ukraine), which had an impact on its own economy (including through the severing of economic links with Ukraine, and through the pressure of sanctions resulting from the aggression against Kyiv). All significant efforts by the Russian Federation are directed towards overcoming this negative effect.
Opportunities.
There is also a view that if Ukraine (voluntarily and with the consent of the collective West) returns to Russia’s sphere of influence (including in terms of economic cooperation, integration and the restoration of economic ties), then Russia will be prepared to compensate Ukraine’s financial losses to a level deemed appropriate by the Russian Federation – this could be a matter for negotiation.
Political control (claims, possibilities);
The main thrust of the set of political claims against the collective West boils down to Russia’s assertion that the implementation of the ‘Anti-Russia’ project in Ukraine consists of (successfully) ousting Russia by influencing the worldview and mindset of the Ukrainian population: a clash of value systems – democracy (the collective West) and autocracy (Russia).
Claims.
Pain points. Russia identifies the main approaches it employs in constructing its geopolitical project in the post-Soviet space, which have undergone changes in Ukraine, blaming the collective West and the official Ukrainian authorities ( ) for this (see the main narratives of the DRS and the NSDC): Russia notes that, due to the decline in the competitiveness (attractiveness) of its value system, it faces significant (bordering on insurmountable) difficulties in extending its influence within Ukraine with the aim of incorporating it into its geopolitical project.
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the status of the Russian language (decline in status);
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the substitution of the concept of nationality with that of identity (the substitution of fundamental concepts, such as legal concepts, with political constructs of ‘historical creativity’ and the like – this is counteracted by Ukrainian and international laws);
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the Church (loss of the dominant role of the Moscow Patriarchate);
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historical ‘truth’ (rejection of Russian interpretations).
Opportunities:
Russia demands that the collective West recognise its right to its own interpretations of reality (outside international law), which justify the substitution of concepts (the nature of ‘historical creativity’) and, at the same time, invokes democratic norms and laws (freedom of speech, freedom of religion, prohibition of political persecution of the opposition, etc.) with the aim of restoring its influence on Ukrainian territory (unacceptable) and regaining lost ground to overcome the negative consequences of competition with Western values.
Conflict control and management (claims, opportunities).
As noted earlier, Russia claims that Moscow was allegedly forced to resort to the use of force against Ukraine in 2014. In this way, it allegedly sought to protect its geopolitical project (‘Historical Russia’ (Russkiy Mir)) and keep the whole of Ukraine within its sphere of influence (the annexation of Crimea, the occupation of Donbas).
Russia blames the collective West for its illegal actions, claiming that the West provoked Moscow (a distortion of cause and effect) by implementing its own geopolitical project in Ukraine — the ‘Anti-Russia’ project, directed against the Russian Federation.
Russia considers the issue of the annexation of Crimea closed and sets it aside (out of the negotiations with the collective West). Regarding the conflict in Donbas (ORDLO), the position is different; here, negotiation is appropriate.
The article discusses a direct appeal to the collective West regarding Russia’s control and management of the Ukrainian conflict in the confrontation between Russia (ORDLO) and Ukraine (the collective West):
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Conflict control:
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There is no alternative to the Minsk Agreements;
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No one has initiated a review of the UN Security Council Resolution of 17 February 2015.
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Conflict management:
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The threat of the conflict potentially escalating into a hot phase at any moment (the ORDLO authorities and all their security forces are under the control of the Russian Federation), with accusations of provocations by the Ukrainian side (which is supported by the collective West).
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Ending the conflict:
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only on terms favourable to Russia (special status for Donbas, excessive guarantees for the ORDLO, etc.).
Realising that neither Kyiv (‘Kyiv does not need Donbas’) nor the collective West (‘the outcomes of both Minsk-1 and Minsk-2 contradict the entire logic of the “anti-Russia” project’) will agree to such terms for ending the conflict, and on the basis of demonstrating such complete control and management of the conflict (in the form of blackmail and strategic deterrence along Ukraine’s borders), the collective West is being offered a scenario for freezing the conflict with the division of spheres of influence within Ukraine on Russia’s terms.
Outline of the scenario (from the article):
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The issue of Crimea remains closed and outside the scope of such negotiations (not discussed by default).
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A (deep) freeze of the Ukrainian conflict is to take place without consequences for Russia (sanctions and claims), with recognition of Russia’s rights to a sphere of influence in the ORDLO.
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Russia understands that the rest of Ukraine lies within the sphere of influence of the collective West.
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Russia also demands that the collective West reach decisions (negotiations, agreements, compromises, the drawing of ‘red lines’) regarding its claims concerning events in the rest of Ukraine (the so-called zone of influence of the collective West).
The main claims regarding Ukraine (as a zone of Western influence), on which the Russian Federation demands guarantees and compromises, taking into account its own interests, including security:
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Western political control over Ukraine: direct external governance, including oversight by foreign advisers of Ukrainian authorities, security services and armed forces;
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Forceful control (NATO): military ‘development’ of Ukrainian territory; deployment of NATO infrastructure.
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Economic control: the Western orientation of the Ukrainian economy’s integration, the law on land sales, etc.;
Conclusion:
At this stage, Russia is losing out in its rivalry with the collective West for influence in Ukraine. Therefore, Russia needs a pause to preserve the results achieved so far (the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of the ORDLO), as well as to minimise future losses during the ‘transition of power’ (until 2024).
Tactical (short-term) objective:
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The division of spheres of influence between Russia and the collective West within Ukraine.
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To secure recognition from the collective West and Ukraine of Russia’s right to a sphere of influence in the ORDLO, where the Russian Federation will develop its geopolitical project of ‘historical Russia’ (Russkiy Mir) with a view to subsequently extending it across the whole of Ukraine.
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At the same time, on this same basis (a recognised sphere of influence, the existence of a recognised geopolitical project of its own), Russia will seek recognition of its status as a ‘pole’ and its attributes (a summit of the nuclear five, Yalta-2, a further, more extensive division of spheres of influence).
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To secure compromises from the collective West regarding the reduction of its direct influence over the rest of Ukraine’s territory (the Russian Federation’s demand to clearly define ‘red lines’ in the collective West’s ‘Anti-Russia’ geopolitical project in Ukraine).
Strategic (long-term) objective:
Russia challenges and will continue to challenge the collective West’s rights to a sphere of influence in Ukraine on the grounds of the right to protect ‘its historical territory’, justifying the legitimacy of such a claim to the collective West with examples of Western experience of ‘close integration and allied relations’ between neighbouring countries (the US and Canada, Germany and Austria).
To resolve contentious issues between Russia and the collective West (particularly with the EU), Ukraine, in the Russian Federation’s view, must in future:
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at a minimum: voluntarily (with the West’s consent) agree to become a nation state (the concept of neutrality);
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at most: fully enter (return to) Russia’s sphere of influence within its geopolitical project of ‘historical Russia’ (Russkiy Mir).
In such a case, Russia is prepared to offer significant and generous concessions to both the collective West and Ukraine (perhaps even in the form of reparations to Kyiv).