SCENARIOS BY RUSSIAN EXPERTS ON ENDING THE WAR IN UKRAINE (2022)

(published in 2022)

The study is effectively a systematic model of Russia’s signals to the West, disguised as an analysis of three scenarios (“restoration”, “revolution”, “reformation”). The key point is not the scenarios themselves, but their functional purpose:

• “Restoration” — a description of an outcome undesirable for the Russian Federation (victory for the West, isolation of the Russian Federation);

• “Revolution” — a tool for exerting pressure (escalation, chaos, prolonging the war);

• “Reformation” — the Russian Federation’s target scenario (a compromise on Russian terms).

Thus, the model is constructed as a negotiating framework through raising the stakes: escalation → fear → a proposal for “compromise”.

At the Ukrainian level:

• “revolution” = turning Ukraine into a grey zone of constant conflict;

• “Reformation” = division of sovereignty (zones + spheres of influence);

• “restoration” = complete loss of control by the Russian Federation (the worst-case scenario for Moscow).

This confirms that for the Russian Federation, Ukraine is not an end in itself, but serves as:

• a bargaining chip with the West;

• an arena for the redistribution of influence;

• a pivot point for shifting the global balance.

At the global level, the study reveals another important logic:
Russia does not promote ‘multipolarity’ as an end in itself, but as a tool for dismantling Western consolidation. Particularly telling are the signals:

• the attempt to remove the US from the Ukrainian track;

• a focus on the EU as a more vulnerable player;

• working with the Global South to erode the anti-Russian front;

• the use of threats (chaos, war, escalation) as a bargaining chip.

Another important mechanism is the separation of levels of influence:

• the US — remove from the regional level;

• EU — to retain as a political and economic actor;

• Russia — consolidate military and security control.

This implies an attempt not merely to divide territories, but to structurally reformat the roles of the players.

Conclusion: The Russian scenario model is not a forecast, but a tool for strategic bargaining, where:

• “revolution” serves as a means of blackmail;

• “reformation” is the desired outcome;

• “restoration” is the scenario the Russian Federation seeks to avoid.

The Russian Federation’s key objective is not so much victory in the war as: the legitimisation of spheres of influence through a negotiation process with the West. In this model, Ukraine acts as:

• not the ultimate goal, but an operational hub in global bargaining;

• a space through which the Russian Federation is attempting to change the rules of the international system.

The main systemic conclusion: the Russian Federation is attempting to shift the conflict from the “aggression–responsibility” plane to the “balance of interests and division of spheres of influence” plane, where the very fact of negotiations already implies partial recognition of its position. Accordingly, the key factor in disrupting this logic remains
the consolidation of the West — it is this that blocks the transition from a scenario of pressure (“revolution”) to a scenario of compromise favourable to the Russian Federation (“reformation”).

INTRODUCTION

STRATEGIES IN THREE SCENARIOS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR UKRAINE (regional and local levels)

Strategies in the three scenarios Implications for Ukraine FORECASTS FOR THREE SCENARIOS REGARDING THE GLOBAL LEVEL

Regarding changes to the global order Regarding consolidation Regarding the consolidation of the Global South Regarding international organisations On globalisation On the fight against international terrorism and migration FORECASTS OF CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA

Economic consequences for the Russian Federation (sanctions) Political consequences for the Russian Federation (isolation) Consequences for the Russian Federation regarding international assets CONCLUSION 25

INTRODUCTION

Numerous warnings about Russia’s preparations for a military invasion of Ukraine had been published in the media since October 2021. Meanwhile, senior Russian officials publicly denied preparations for war with Ukraine. On 21 February 2022, Russia recognised the independence of the ‘DPR and LPR’. On the morning of 24 February, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a statement announcing the start of a ‘special military operation in Ukraine’ (‘SMO’). To justify the invasion, Vladimir Putin cited the need to protect the ‘DPR and LPR’ and Russia itself, and also used a false characterisation of Ukraine as a neo-Nazi state.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February 2022, at approximately 5 a.m. Kyiv time. Russian troops entered Ukrainian territory from Russia, Crimea and Belarus, and forces from the ‘DPR and LPR’ also joined the fighting. Russia’s actions were strongly condemned by the overwhelming majority of the international community and international organisations, which recognised Russia as the aggressor.

Leading Russian experts had warned in advance of severe consequences for Russia should military action be taken against Ukraine, but the Kremlin decided to pursue a path of aggression, which has already led to the failure of Moscow’s plans at all levels – local, regional and global.

STRATEGIES IN THREE SCENARIOS

These negative consequences are clearly evident in the forecasts of Russian experts, who identify three ‘potentially possible scenarios for the future transformation of the international system following the crisis in Ukraine’, tentatively naming them restoration, revolution and reformation[1] .

In essence, Russian experts are signalling Russia’s desire to begin negotiations with the West regarding the end of the war in Ukraine (see Fig. 1), describing their understanding of the West’s goals and actions (the ‘restoration’ scenario), outlining a scenario of Russia’s counteraction to such plans — a ‘game without rules’  (the ‘revolution’ scenario) and proposing a supposedly compromise option on Russian terms for the negotiations (the ‘reformation’ scenario), consistently describing the likely consequences for the entire international community and offering certain concessions.

Fig. 1. Projected scenarios.

If we systematise the main ideas and signals from Russian experts, we can form a picture of these three scenarios in comparative tables.

STRATEGIES IN THE THREE SCENARIOS AND CONSEQUENCES FOR UKRAINE (REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVELS)

Within the three scenarios — ‘restoration’ (the Collective West’s scenario), ‘revolution’ (Russia’s ‘no-rules game’ scenario) and ‘reformation’ (a compromise on Russia’s terms) — different logics for the development of the conflict and its consequences for Ukraine are proposed. (see Fig. 2)

The ‘restoration’ scenario envisages a resolution of the conflict on the terms of the US and its allies, followed by the long-term economic and military exhaustion of Russia. Under this model, the Russian Federation must acknowledge the loss of influence in Ukraine and withdraw from its territory. For Ukraine, this means a rapid recovery from the post-conflict economic consequences (‘economic miracle’), accelerated integration into the EU and potential NATO membership.

The ‘revolution’ scenario envisages a protracted conflict without any agreements being reached, with a possible partial freeze and periodic, unstable ceasefires. In this case, the struggle between the Russian Federation and the Collective West for influence in Ukraine, particularly in the ‘grey zone’, continues. The consequence for Ukraine is the indefinite postponement of recovery, the delay or derailment of European integration, and the impossibility of NATO membership.

The ‘Reformation’ scenario envisages a political compromise between Russia and the US/EU, involving partial acknowledgement of the West’s responsibility and the US refraining from active confrontation with Russia in Ukraine. Under this scenario, a division of spheres of influence is possible (particularly regarding Crimea and the LPR/DPR). For Ukraine, this means partial economic and military-political influence by the Russian Federation, coordinated or parallel reconstruction involving Russia and the West, limited integration into the EU, and no prospects for NATO membership.

Fig. 2. Strategies in the three projected scenarios and implications for Ukraine.

GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS UNDER THE THREE SCENARIOS.

Within the three scenarios — ‘restoration’, ‘revolution’ and ‘reformation’ — various models of the transformation of the world order, the roles of key actors and the functioning of international institutions are proposed. (see Fig. 3)

The ‘restoration’ scenario envisages the revival of a unipolar system under US leadership with a tight consolidation of democratic nations. In this model, non-Western states integrate into the renewed order by recognising American leadership, China operates within established rules, and India acts as a champion of the liberal-democratic model. International organisations retain their positions, globalisation resumes, and the threats of terrorism and migration are gradually overcome.

The ‘revolution’ scenario entails the destruction of the norms of international law and a shift towards the logic of power. Western consolidation becomes fragmented, whilst pockets of chronic instability form in the non-Western world. The risk of escalation between the US and China, as well as between India and China, is growing. International organisations are weakening, globalisation processes are stalling, and overcoming the challenges of terrorism and migration is becoming more difficult.

The ‘Reformation’ scenario envisages the formation of a more flexible system — a soft form of bipolarity or a multipolar system. The consolidation of the West becomes situational, whilst the global political and economic system undergoes gradual reform without the formation of a united anti-Russian front. Competition between the US, China and Russia does not escalate into a fierce ideological confrontation, whilst India remains non-aligned. International organisations adapt through reform, globalisation slows down, and the level of threats from terrorism and migration decreases.

Fig. 3. Global-level consequences under three scenarios.

CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA UNDER THREE SCENARIOS

Under the three scenarios — ‘restoration’, ‘revolution’ and ‘reformation’ — the economic, political and institutional consequences for Russia are defined differently. (see Fig. 4)

The ‘restoration’ scenario envisages a long-term tightening of sanctions and virtually complete political isolation. Under these conditions, the Russian Federation’s influence in international affairs is significantly curtailed, to the point of its loss.

The ‘revolution’ scenario combines the tightening of sanctions with the parallel development of mechanisms to circumvent them. At the same time, isolation becomes total and is accompanied by rising domestic costs and risks of instability. Russia’s influence is curtailed in both non-convertible and convertible assets.

The ‘Reformation’ scenario envisages a partial lifting of sanctions and a gradual easing of isolation. In this case, there is no loss, but rather a containment of Russia’s influence in international assets, which is consistent with the logic of a compromise settlement.

Fig. 4. Consequences for Russia under three scenarios.

ASSESSMENT OF THESE SCENARIOS BY RUSSIAN EXPERTS:

‘Of the three scenarios described above for the development of the international system following the conclusion of the acute phase of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the restoration scenario remains the most dangerous and potentially the most costly for Moscow. It not only deprives the Russian Federation of any dividends from the special military operation conducted , but also condemns the country to long-term international isolation, the irreversible loss of a significant portion of its gold and foreign exchange reserves, the irreversible loss of many of the most important markets for hydrocarbons, weapons and other export goods, the persistence of strong anti-Russian sentiment in many countries around the world, and an inevitable sharp decline in the state’s status within the hierarchies of future world politics. The restoration scenario does not allow for the possibility that a significant portion of Russia’s losses on the Western front could be swiftly and adequately offset in other geographical areas of its foreign policy.

A scenario involving a revolution might seem more acceptable and even advantageous for Moscow. However, even the revolution scenario, on which some Russian analysts pin great hopes, is unlikely to serve long-term national interests — a ‘game without rules’ in a context where the country lags significantly behind its main competitors economically and technologically could lead to a strain on resources and a forced relegation to the ‘second tier’ of world politics. In many respects, Russia’s vulnerability on the world stage may prove greater than that of its adversaries. Similarly, the scenario of a revolution will not, in itself, be able to determine the future of the world order for any length of time. Rather, it will become merely an intermediate stage in global restructuring.

Thus, only a reformed world order stands a chance of functioning successfully over the long term.

A reform scenario could emerge:

• either directly as a result of the current crisis;

• or indirectly, having gone through the stages of restoration or revolution.

For Russia, whichever version of the reform scenario is realised, there will be a relatively long period of forced reduction in foreign policy activity in certain areas that were previously priorities for Moscow.

Moscow will increasingly have to act in Eurasia in the unfamiliar role of a minority shareholder, achieving its goals within coalitions involving stronger partners. In the near future, any large-scale foreign policy initiatives originating from Moscow will be viewed by a significant part of the international community with a great deal of scepticism.

Interim conclusion: The signals and implications embedded in these scenarios put forward by Russian experts are significant not only for Ukraine (at the local level) and for Europe (at the regional level), but also for the construction of a new world order (or its transformation) at the global level, and Ukraine plays a significant role in this process.

STRATEGIES IN THE THREE SCENARIOS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UKRAINE (regional and local levels)

First, let us consider the scenarios themselves and the implications they contain that relate directly to Ukraine (local and regional levels):

• strategies in the three scenarios; (see Fig. 5)

• consequences for Ukraine. (see Fig. 6)

Strategies in the three scenarios

Fig. 5 Strategies in the scenarios.

Restoration (by the West/US). Russia understands that a resolution to the conflict in Ukraine is possible (and beneficial) for the West only on the West’s terms (those of the US and its allies). The West’s main condition is the demand that the Russian Federation return to the status quo that existed prior to 24 February 2022 and acknowledge the loss of its sphere of influence in Ukraine — this entails:

• the withdrawal of troops from Ukrainian territory;

• non-recognition on the international stage of the ‘new international legal status’ of Crimea and Donbas;

• the withdrawal of all Russian demands on Ukraine, including demilitarisation, denazification, a change of government and Ukraine’s political course, etc.;

• compensation for damages caused, investigation and punishment of those guilty of war crimes, etc.

This Western strategy boils down to achieving victory over Moscow through the long-term economic exhaustion of Russia. Experts point out that to achieve this, the West will have to mobilise all its available political, military-technical and economic resources and stand up to Russia for as long as necessary – in other words, a high level of Western consolidation is required in the long term.

Revolution (Russia’s scenario – ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative)). Russia is already demonstrating a supposed readiness to take countermeasures to drag out the conflict for a long time and exacerbate the negative impact on the West of a hard-line confrontation (economic and military components) and prevent its full consolidation or undermine it in the long term (political component). Russia is implementing a scenario to counter the West’s plans — an attempt to turn Ukraine into a ‘grey zone’ of escalating confrontation — in order to force the West into negotiations on its own terms, ostensibly as a compromise between global players, believing that the West is not prepared to support Ukraine in a protracted confrontation.

Russian experts dramatically emphasise that ‘one must not underestimate the determination of the Russian leadership to bring the military special operation on Ukrainian territory to a victorious conclusion at any cost, despite any attempts by the West to prevent this’.

It is worth noting here that Russia itself is not prepared for a protracted and intense military confrontation, which is why the Russian Federation is in such a hurry to negotiate and complains that it has so far been unable to persuade Kyiv to accept its terms, whilst the West refuses to act as a mediator in such negotiations, even though Russia is very keen on precisely such mediation.

Indeed, Russia predicts that if no agreement can be reached to end the conflict in and around Ukraine — neither between Moscow and Kyiv, nor between Russia and the West — then Moscow is likely to continue the military conflict:

• The Russian Armed Forces will not withdraw from the territories they have occupied, either in the Donbas or in any other regions of Ukraine.

• There will be persistent attempts to create new ‘people’s republics’ beyond the DNR and LNR.

• At some point, the military activity of the parties will give way to an unstable and constantly violated ceasefire.

Outlining the prospects for the further development of this worst-case scenario, Russian experts point to a new escalation of the conflict due to the fact that Western countries’ military aid to Ukraine will continue to increase in volume, in order to prevent, under any circumstances, a decisive victory for Moscow and the conclusion of peace on its terms, resulting in the progressive internationalisation of the conflict, with new participants from both sides becoming involved.

Experts emphasise that Moscow is allegedly prepared for a protracted and fierce confrontation with the West over the division of spheres of influence in Ukraine and plans to continue its aggression on land, seeking to achieve results on the ground. However, experts also acknowledge that this could be disadvantageous for Russia, just as it allegedly is for the West, and that compromises must be sought, namely to divide Ukraine into spheres of influence between the West and the Russian Federation, taking Russian interests into account.

Therefore, Russian experts are proposing that the West consider a compromise scenario (on Russian terms), the essence of which effectively boils down to the very same demands that Russia put forward on the eve of the war in its SECURITY GUARANTEES. In other words, with its ‘revolution’ scenario, Russia is attempting to raise the stakes as high as possible in negotiations with the West, so that it can then move to the ‘reformation’ scenario in the bargaining process and achieve the results it originally sought.

Reformation (a compromise scenario on Russian terms). According to Russian experts, the possibility of reaching a political compromise in the near future between Moscow and Kyiv, as well as between Russia and the West, must be based on the recognition that the West—and above all the US—bears some responsibility for the events currently unfolding in Ukraine, , the initiative for a political settlement must come primarily from the US leadership.

Experts insist that a political compromise must be based on the US leadership’s understanding that Ukraine does not fall within America’s sphere of vital interests, and that Washington’s main strategic adversary is, after all, Beijing, not Moscow.

Russia is doing everything it can to remove Ukraine from the global spotlight and the sphere of interest of global players. Russia insists that Ukraine must remain within the sphere of interest of regional players, and therefore Ukraine should be ‘divided’ between Russia and the EU, rather than between Russia and the US/EU.

Russian experts then outline the main conditions for ‘Russian-style compromises’, including the following proposals:

• Division and recognition of spheres of influence in Ukraine — The US and the West recognise Russia’s claims to Ukraine as part of its sphere of influence regarding the territories of the LPR and DPR and Crimea — The changed status of Crimea and Donbas is recognised by Kyiv and Western capitals, if not de jure, then de facto (with the possible option of holding a future referendum under international supervision on the final status of the disputed territories);

• Ukraine confirms its renunciation of attempts to join NATO in exchange for legally binding multilateral security guarantees. Local society accepts the idea of neutrality (with the possibility of political cooperation with the West). A mutually acceptable agreement is reached on the parameters of Ukraine’s military capabilities and on a system of military confidence-building measures on the Russian-Ukrainian border (control of military influence).

• It is proposed to consider adopting a whole range of measures that will contribute to a qualitative change in relations between Kyiv and Brussels with a view to the former’s EU membership in the medium term; a special status for relations between the European Union and Ukraine is also possible (and even desirable in Moscow’s interests) (control of economic influence).

In other words, Russia is proposing not only to divide spheres of influence in Ukraine, but also to divide spheres of influence, allowing for partial political influence from Europe (only the EU, but not the US) in Ukraine, whilst Russia wishes to retain full control over military and economic influence in Ukraine.

Consequences for Ukraine

Fig. 6. Consequences for Ukraine.

Recovery (the Collective West and US scenario). Russian experts acknowledge that, should the West’s scenario materialise, Ukraine will manage to overcome the economic consequences of the military conflict with Moscow within a relatively short timeframe, and in the coming years the world will witness a Ukrainian ‘economic miracle’, which, in turn, will accelerate the country’s integration into the EU economy and facilitate its accession to the EU. Experts also believe that the question of Kyiv’s possible NATO membership should not be considered definitively closed.

Revolution (Russian Federation scenario – ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative)). Should the maximum negative scenario materialise, the issues of post-conflict reconstruction in the Donbas and Ukraine will be postponed indefinitely. Experts predict that the protracted conflict threatens to bring about many unpleasant consequences:

• the total destruction of Ukraine’s social and economic infrastructure,

• its further political radicalisation,

• growing risks of horizontal and vertical escalation, including the conflict escalating to a nuclear level,

• the threat of a gradual erosion of Western unity and the prospect of the global economy sliding into a new cyclical crisis

Among other things, Russian experts predict further negative consequences. For instance, experts believe that Ukraine will gradually become a staging ground for chronic armed conflict between East and West, where the parties will periodically test each other’s military capabilities. Experts also suggest that ‘post-war’ Ukraine could become a leading international hub for European right-wing radicalism, exerting a significant influence on similar forces across the continent. And as the conflict drags on and the European public gradually ‘gets used’ to it, Brussels’ willingness to offer Kyiv an exclusive mechanism for accession to the European Union will steadily decline.

This set of forecasts is aimed, rather, at influencing Ukraine so that, having realised the scale of the consequences, Kyiv becomes more accommodating in negotiations with Moscow and is pushed towards accepting compromises on Russian terms.

Reformation (a compromise scenario on Russian terms). Experts suggest that, by accepting the Russian terms of a compromise scenario, Russia and the West will be able to agree on parallel or even joint actions regarding the post-conflict reconstruction of both the Donbas and Ukraine as a whole. In other words, Russia is prepared to invest funds (share the financing) in the territories in Ukraine that it has destroyed, but only on its own terms (it should be recalled that the Russian Federation is seeking to restore its economic influence in Ukraine). According to experts, such a proposal is supposed to be of interest to the West in light of the reduction in Europe’s financial burden regarding Ukraine’s post-conflict reconstruction.

Russia seeks to weaken the West’s consolidated position by attempting to capitalise on potential friction in relations between the EU and the US (to sideline the US from regional decision-making on Ukraine), inviting the EU to play a central role regardless of the stance of the US and other allies.

Thus, to attract Europe’s attention and interest, Russian experts emphasise that ‘a demonstration of Brussels’ newfound political will would be the coordination of a mechanism for Ukraine’s accelerated integration into the EU and an agreement on the EU’s leading role in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction. This would become a new unifying goal for the European Union, allowing the ‘European project’ to find a new lease of life and revive the almost lost confidence in continental universalism.”

Experts believe that the European Union should play a central role in exerting partial political influence in Ukraine and in the country’s post-conflict reconstruction — that is, to be less dependent on the US and more accommodating towards Russia, whose main motto in building relations is: ‘interests over values’.

As noted earlier, among the leading global players, the EU occupied the weakest position (a passive player), due to its multi-stakeholder nature and greater economic vulnerability to external actors, a situation which the Russian Federation seeks to exploit in building its relations with the EU, both in its individual dealings with each member state and in its bilateral relations with the Union as a whole, as well as in global affairs. With the US, the EU shares an ideological and values-based component (shared values) and a military component (NATO), whilst with Russia and China, the EU shares an economic component.

Interim conclusion: As can be seen from the analysis by Russian experts regarding the implications for Ukraine, the most favourable outlook for Ukraine is the Western scenario, whilst the two Russian scenarios (revolution and reform) are aimed more at achieving at least some meaningful results of their own in this conflict by proposing negotiations with the West and the US, as well as at minimising the negative consequences for Russia. The consolidation of the West at regional and global levels stands in the way of Russia’s realisation of such plans.

FORECASTS IN THREE SCENARIOS AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL

The consequences of the scenarios at the global level are considered in the following areas:

• The world order; (see Fig. 7)

• Consolidation (see Fig. 8), including the influence of non-Western countries (with China and India highlighted); (see Fig. 9)

• Universal international organisations; (see Fig. 10)

• Globalisation; (see Fig. 11)

• International terrorism and migration. (see Fig. 12)

Regarding changes in the world order

Fig. 7. Changes in the world order.

Restoration (Collective West and US scenario). Unipolar world (a coalition of democratic countries against autocracies). Russian experts believe that this scenario could lead to a Western coalition, led by the US, encompassing the bulk of the non-Western world, thereby returning the international system to a ‘unipolar moment’.

According to experts, existing norms of international law will be supplemented by a ‘rules-based order’. The West, primarily in the form of the EU, will remain the main source of new international legal norms and regulatory practices, as well as the primary model for law enforcement; the rest will adapt to and comply with them.

Experts emphasise that from now on, the West will promote the values of liberal democracy and the market economy more cautiously, but also more consistently.

Revolution (Russia’s scenario – ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative)). Violation of international law (by force). Experts predict that in the maximum negative scenario, Russia will seek through its actions to render universal norms of international law effectively inoperative. As a result of such actions, only pockets of compliance with these norms will remain (for example, within individual integration groups such as the European Union or ASEAN), but competition will continue between these pockets using ‘hard power’ instruments. Accordingly, an intense arms race will continue, primarily in terms of quality; experts warn that the possibility of a significant increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction cannot be ruled out .

In the context of these forecasts, it should be noted that the ‘intense arms race’ with which the West is being frightened is, rather, a tool of the West itself to deter threats from Russia, China and other autocracies, rather than a tool of Russia, and it is Russia, unable to compete on equal terms with the West, that has an interest in reducing the intensity of this high-tech, knowledge-intensive and financially costly arms race.

In other words, experts are seriously attempting to frighten the West by suggesting that, in this scenario, Russia will seek to cause the most damaging consequences possible on a global scale and is allegedly prepared to completely destroy the existing world order, so the West is supposedly simply obliged to begin a negotiation process with Russia based on a compromise scenario on Russia’s terms, to prevent chaos from ensuing.

Reformation (a compromise scenario on Russian terms). Bipolarity (in a mild form) or multipolarity (polycentrism). In these proposals from the Russian Federation, as articulated by experts, the same outlines of the world order that Moscow has previously sought are retained, but in milder forms.

Thus, experts propose a supposed compromise — this scenario also envisages the US abandoning the rigid opposition between ‘democratic’ and ‘authoritarian’ regimes; a new dividing line will run between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ players, and the main declared objective of Western foreign policy will be to expand the circle of the former and narrow that of the latter.

Thus, recognising that Western consolidation is intensifying precisely because of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and that this fact cannot yet be changed, experts propose altering the very approach to consolidation: moving away from ‘confrontation’ (struggle) and returning to ‘containment’ (competition).

It should be noted that prior to the outbreak of the military aggression unleashed by Russia, it was precisely the ‘containment’ (competition) approach that was the priority for Canada and the US. However, with the intensification of Russian aggression in Ukraine and the threats now facing the entire civilised world, this approach towards Russia has transformed into ‘confrontation’ (struggle), and returning it to a softer form (as it was before the war) is now unlikely to succeed without significant concessions and losses on Russia’s part – everything has its price, and the Russian Federation will have to pay it. As for China, the formulation remains unchanged for now – ‘containment’ (competition).

Experts also continue to promote the Russian scenario for the world order, with the identification of separate poles and the division of spheres of influence between them: a system based on a reform scenario could evolve towards a new hard or soft bipolarity, or a more complex, blurred multipolarity (polycentrism) with a gradually increasing role for non-state actors in global politics.

Regarding consolidation

As noted earlier, consolidation plays an important role in building a new model of the world order at the global level.

To counter threats (from China and Russia), the US requires a consolidated stance from its partners and allies — a shared political and economic position (particularly regarding sanctions policy), a shared military stance (concerning the development of NATO and other defence alliances, etc.), as well as the implementation of joint global projects.

Fig. 8 Regarding consolidation

Restoration (Collective West and US scenario). Strategic consolidation of the West. Russian experts believe that the West will emerge from the conflict more consolidated. They emphasise that the unity of Western countries will prove to be strategic rather than situational, meaning it will persist even after the acute phase of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis has ended, and will also withstand the test of the US presidential elections in November 2024.

It is also noted that the EU and NATO will work together, consistently coordinating all areas of activity. Furthermore, it is emphasised that non-aligned partners will join NATO, and concepts such as ‘neutrality’ and ‘non-aligned status’ will gradually become a thing of the past. The strategic partnership between the US and its European allies with the liberal democracies of East Asia, primarily Japan and South Korea, will also be maintained.

Revolution (Russian Federation scenario — ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative)). Fragmented consolidation. To give the Russian scenario of countering the KZ’s plans a more negative tone, experts emphasise that it will not be possible to maintain Western unity for long in this case, and very soon after the end of the active phase of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, transatlantic differences will once again come to the fore.

Experts suggest that Russia will exert significant influence over the formation of international opinion regarding the Biden administration’s failure to bring the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on terms acceptable to the West, and turning it into a permanent backdrop to European politics, will inevitably cast doubt on the reliability of US guarantees for American partners and allies in various regions of the world — from the Middle East to North-East Asia – Moscow is working on these arguments and will continue to do so most actively in order to undermine the consolidation of the Western alliance and sow doubts about its allies.

Experts suggest that the conflict with Kyiv will inevitably recede into the background of global politics amid new, potentially even larger-scale and bloody armed clashes, and against the backdrop of the general collapse of the existing world order, it will not be possible to maintain a broad anti-Russian coalition for long. This signal is most likely directed at the US, to encourage them to engage in negotiations regarding Russia’s compromise plan in the global bargaining for other assets.

Reformation (a compromise scenario on Russian terms). Situational consolidation. Western consolidation is also envisaged in the reformation scenario, but, according to experts, it is predominantly situational in nature and will not extend far beyond a reaction to the Ukrainian crisis as such.

Russian experts are making yet another concession in their proposals to Europe, asserting that the reformation scenario envisages that in the coming years the European Union, mainly thanks to the joint efforts of Germany and France, will build up its military capabilities and achieve greater strategic autonomy from the US. In other words, Russia intends to continue promoting the idea of the EU’s military strategic autonomy from the US and NATO, by influencing the flagships of the European economy – France and Germany.

Experts argue that the resolution of the Ukrainian crisis will act as a catalyst for a more active and vigorous strategy of European Union enlargement in other directions, particularly in the Western Balkans, and will also lead to a strengthening of the EU’s role in many regional crisis situations (Afghanistan, Syria, Libya, Ethiopia, Mali). It is worth noting here the specific interest of Germany and France in strengthening their influence (or restoring their influence) in these international affairs.

Experts suggest that, by accepting Russia’s terms in a compromise scenario regarding Ukraine, Europe will become stronger and more independent than before, and Russia will not only refrain from obstructing this (as it did previously) but will even facilitate it – this is precisely what Russia seeks from the EU: the division of spheres of influence in international affairs and their recognition by other global players. In order to secure recognition of its conditions regarding its sphere of influence in Ukraine, Russia is prepared to compromise on other international assets, primarily for the EU – this is a bargaining offer, primarily for France and Germany.

In other words, it can be assumed that Russia will focus its main efforts to exert influence in Europe, with the aim of persuading others to accept its compromises, precisely on these two countries – Germany and France – which will subsequently exert influence (set the tone) on the rest of the EU countries in the direction required by the Kremlin.

Regarding the consolidation of the Global South

Russian experts suggest that plans to create a stable global anti-Russian front do not appear particularly well-founded, given Moscow’s ability to influence these countries.

Let us return to this thesis, set out earlier, but consider another aspect (semantic meaning) of it: ‘Russian experts believe that the GSP scenario could lead to a Western coalition, led by the US, bringing together the bulk of the non-Western world , thereby returning the international system to a “unipolar moment”’.

In the section on the ‘world order’, experts examined this thesis with an emphasis on the return of the international system to a unipolar world, but this thesis also contains implications and forecasts that concern Moscow regarding the behaviour of its partners and allies, specifically in terms of their alignment with the KZ coalition and the US, and the consequences for Russia in each scenario.

At the same time, Russian experts suggest that Moscow may, if not derail, then at least significantly complicate the implementation of the EU’s scenario by using its influence on non-Western countries.

Fig. 9. Regarding the consolidation of the Global South.

Restoration (Collective West and US scenario).

• Countries of the non-Western world.

Experts predict that Iran, Syria and Venezuela will, in one way or another, find themselves co-opted into the renewed ‘unipolar world’. Leading non-Western countries (China, India, Iran) will continue to cautiously seek ways to expand cooperation with Russia, but will not openly challenge American leadership.

• China.

Experts acknowledge that China will be forced, albeit reluctantly, to adhere generally and consistently to the rules set out by the updated ‘Washington Consensus’. Indeed, experts note, China is already demonstrating a high degree of willingness to ‘play by the rules’ and not provide the Russian leadership with the support that the Russian Federation had counted on at the start of the conflict.

• India.

According to Russian experts, India will definitively cement its position as the leading advocate for the liberal-democratic model of development in the Global South and will move towards a gradual winding down of military-technical and other cooperation with Russia.

Revolution (Russia’s scenario – ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative))

• Non-Western countries.

Russian experts predict that Russia’s efforts to undermine the existing international system could lead to the emergence of significant pockets of chronic instability in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia and other parts of the world. This sounds like a threat from Russia to open a ‘second front’ and reignite previously frozen conflicts around the world in which it has had some involvement (international assets), disrupting the established balances regarding their peaceful resolution. According to experts, this state of affairs will divert the West’s attention and significantly complicate its confrontation with Russia and its ability to provide assistance to Ukraine.

Russian experts also point out that the Russian Federation is directing its efforts towards preventing further consolidation of non-Western countries with the Western coalition. Experts emphasise that, although most countries of the Global South have condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine, many of these states have come to believe that the West is actively applying double standards in its confrontation with Moscow – these perceptions have taken hold and will continue to do so provided Russia actively promotes such narratives, especially as Russia’s main tool is the substitution of concepts.

• China.

Experts argue that the development of this scenario implies a high probability of an escalation in US-China tensions in East and South-East Asia, into which the United States’ European allies will inevitably be drawn. They conclude that Washington’s apparent reluctance to intervene directly in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine will provoke the PRC into taking more decisive steps regarding Taiwan.

• India

In this scenario, Russian experts did not make separate predictions regarding India, likely because significant pockets of chronic instability were generally anticipated for non-Western countries, and border conflicts exist between India and China that could flare up with renewed intensity. India and China are competing in the regional arena. As the Russian Federation is placing certain bets on both these countries, the experts did not single out their confrontation with one another separately.

Reformation (a compromise scenario under Russian conditions).

• Non-Western countries.

In their proposals for a compromise scenario under Russian conditions, Russian experts suggest abandoning the idea of creating a single, united anti-Russian front involving non-Western countries. Instead, they propose returning to the idea of reforming the entire system of global politics and the economy towards a more inclusive and democratic world order.

Experts believe that the confrontation between the West and Russia will not end with a compromise on Ukraine; rather, Moscow will be viewed in the US and Europe as the main challenge to international security. Therefore, the crisis should prompt the US to make further concessions in favour of China and the Global South, in order to secure at least the relative loyalty of non-Western players in global politics and the economy in Washington’s confrontation with Moscow.

Experts suggest that it is highly likely that the divergence in strategic priorities between the US and its partners among the conservative Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf will continue (particularly if Washington continues to seek a political détente in its relations with Tehran). The West will also have to seek some form of compromise with Iran in order to transform it from a regional spoiler into a responsible participant in the new system of Middle Eastern and global politics. At the same time, any compromises with Iran will create problems for the West with the Arab Gulf states, which will strive to maintain the regional balance of power and independently contain the Islamic Republic’s local activities.

Such signals regarding the reform of the entire system of world politics and the economy, as well as the struggle for a place within it, are being sent specifically to certain non-Western countries (such as China, the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, Iran, etc.), encouraging them to reject consolidation with the West against the Russian Federation on the West’s terms, prompting them to support Russian proposals for changes to the world order, offering Russia opportunities for influence at the global level (including within the UN), and pitting their interests against one another (for example, the Gulf monarchies and Iran) and with the interests of global players (the US, the EU).

• China.

Russian experts believe that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, which allegedly demonstrated the limitations of Washington’s ability to provide direct military support to Kyiv, will not lead to greater restraint on Beijing’s part regarding issues concerning Taiwan. They predict that Beijing’s policy will provoke growing irritation in Washington, where the People’s Republic’s actions will be perceived as destructive and irresponsible; however, as the experts insist, the US will allegedly have to take into account the shifting balance of power and make concessions to the Chinese side. The experts’ forecast states that Washington will be forced to conclude a compromise trade deal with Beijing (whilst China will tighten its control over Taiwan through non-military means, pressing ahead towards reunification).

Furthermore, experts believe that the balance of power between the US and China will gradually shift in the latter’s favour, and within the next 5–7 years, China will become the world’s largest economy. However, the Chinese leadership will seek to preserve the international system within its current basic parameters and will avoid heightened geopolitical risks.

Experts also emphasise that the technological race between Washington and Beijing will continue and even accelerate; however, competition between the US and China, as well as between the US and Russia, will not take on the character of an ideological Cold War-style confrontation; rather, it will be a matter of a relatively stable balance of power.

In other words, in a compromise scenario on Russia’s terms, the US is being asked to accept (come to terms with) China’s primacy and recognise its leading role on the international stage in exchange for a promise from China not to dismantle the existing world order, agreeing to its reform and to compete rather than confront. A prerequisite is for the US to shift its stance towards Russia from confrontation to containment, just as it has done with China.

In this way, Russia is sending signals not only to America regarding China, but also opening up certain prospects for China (in the form of a compromise trade agreement and recognition of the PRC’s leading role at the global level) in exchange for a guarantee of Russia’s support in implementing a compromise scenario on Russian terms, with the Russian Federation promising to stabilise the balance of power.

• India.

Experts believe that, provided a compromise scenario is implemented on Russian terms, India is guaranteed not to move closer to the US and must remain a sovereign state. Thus, they argue that the current crisis should not provoke an acceleration of India’s drift towards the US and the West in general; on the contrary, it is desirable that it should push the Indian elite towards a more independent and less Western-aligned foreign policy.

The main demand of the Russian side in this scenario is that the US must not draw India into any bilateral or multilateral military-political alliance, and the hope is expressed that the differences between the two countries on important international issues, particularly regarding Russia and Ukraine, which emerged during the conflict, will persist in the future.

Regarding international organisations

Fig. 10 Consequences for international organisations.

Restoration (Collective West and US scenario). Maintaining their positions in global politics. Russian experts believe that many international problems will be resolved within the framework of fluid ad hoc coalitions, led predominantly by the US and its partners.

Provided that American leadership is maintained, formats of multilateral cooperation will be used to address not only political but also economic challenges, for example in the production of hydrocarbons, food and mineral fertilisers — in these sectors, effective alternatives to Russian suppliers will be found, and so on.

Revolution (Russia’s scenario — ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative)). The decline of international organisations — both universal and regional — will accelerate even further. Russian experts suggest that in this scenario, Russia may attempt to bring about the complete collapse of the existing global order, including its economic, financial, military-strategic and geopolitical dimensions. They warn that the Russian-Ukrainian conflict will have a devastating impact on attempts to effectively implement the global energy transition programme. Experts emphasise that national plans to reduce carbon emissions may be revised, and traditional energy will receive additional powerful financial and geopolitical incentives (i.e. the climate agenda, which the EU had developed and supported, will lose its relevance).

Reformation (a compromise scenario under Russian conditions). In this scenario, Russian experts propose a gradual reform of existing international organisations and regimes, including the UN (with the possible expansion of the UN Security Council and attempts to limit the use of the veto by permanent members of the Security Council)

Experts suggest that the IBRD and the IMF will undergo significant institutional changes, transforming from predominantly Western to truly universal international organisations.

The international community (possibly within the framework of the G20) will establish mechanisms and procedures to ensure a substantial increase in the flow of resources from the wealthy countries of the Global North to the poorer countries of the Global South.

These signals are directed primarily at non-Western countries, outlining certain prospects for them if they support the Russian compromise scenario and do not join the West’s anti-Russian coalition (preventing or weakening consolidation).

On globalisation

Fig. 11 Globalisation.

Restoration (Collective West and US scenario). Resumption of globalisation processes. Russian experts note that the consolidation of the global West and the selective co-optation of the global South will offer hope for the resumption of globalisation processes. A new phase will begin as early as the second half of this decade and continue throughout the foreseeable future.

Revolution (Russia’s scenario – ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative)). Halting of globalisation processes. In this same negative scenario, which is being implemented by Russia’s ‘ ’, experts predict that globalisation as a complex phenomenon of social development will have to be forgotten for a long time. Its components, such as international trade, foreign direct investment and international travel, will at best stagnate and at worst tend to decline.

Signs of such negative consequences, according to experts, should prompt the Collective West to negotiate compromises with Russia.

Reformation (a compromise scenario under Russian conditions). A slowdown in globalisation processes. Experts emphasise that a return to globalisation under the reformation scenario will occur more slowly than under the restoration scenario, and will be subject to significant constraints — because the new cycle of globalisation will require the coordination of positions among a greater number of players with divergent interests and conflicting visions of the desired world order.

In other words, Russian experts suggest that the pace of globalisation in the future will depend directly on the compromises reached by the parties regarding the construction of a model for the world order.

On the fight against international terrorism and migration

Fig. 12 Regarding global issues.

Restoration (Collective West and US scenario). Comes to the fore among threats; successful overcoming of the threat. Russian experts suggest that, alongside a revanchist Russia, terrorism will become one of the main threats to international security and stability. Also, in their view, problems may arise due to migration flows, but the level of international cooperation in countering terrorism, led by the US, will generally increase.

Revolution (Russia’s scenario – ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative)). This becomes the main threat, and overcoming it is significantly complicated. Experts predict that in the negative scenario being pursued by Russia, international terrorism, alongside large-scale migration, will become a constant backdrop to life in both the North and the South. Some experts believe that Ukraine has allegedly already become a training ground for paramilitary extremist groups from across Europe, which should be a serious cause for concern for Western countries.

However, experts consider the main problem to be that fundamental differences will persist regarding what constitutes terrorism and how to counter it. These differences will hinder the formation of stable international coalitions in the fight against terrorism, as well as on other global security issues.

These arguments are constantly being put forward by Russia on the international stage: if the West fails to agree on compromises with Russia, Russia will significantly hinder or undermine any plans.

Reformation (a compromise scenario under Russian conditions). Reducing the threat. In a compromise scenario under Russian conditions, experts argue that international terrorism during the reformation is likely to remain a lesser problem than in the previous scenario, as some of the demands of the Global South will be met to a greater or lesser extent. This may, to some extent, alleviate the severity of socio-economic problems in unstable regions and reduce the number of ‘failed’ states.

FORECASTS OF CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA

Russian experts consider the main consequences of each of the three scenarios in the following areas:

• economic consequences (sanctions); (see Fig. 13)

• political consequences (isolation); (see Fig. 14)

• consequences for international assets (see Fig. 15)

Economic consequences for the Russian Federation (sanctions)

Fig. 13 Economic consequences for the Russian Federation

Recovery (the scenario envisaged by the West and the US). Experts predict that sanctions against Russia will remain in place for a long time and, moreover, will be stepped up to a new, higher level, leading to a complete breakdown in energy cooperation between Russia and the countries of the European Union.

Experts also acknowledge that the frozen assets of the Russian Central Bank will not be returned to Moscow, but will instead be used:

• towards Ukraine’s post-conflict reconstruction;

• to pay for Western military aid to Kyiv;

• compensation to European countries that have taken in the main flows of Ukrainian refugees.

Revolution (the Russian scenario – ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative)). Western sanctions against Russia will intensify, and there will be persistent opposition to the creation of mechanisms and procedures that allow restrictions to be circumvented.

Reformation (a compromise scenario on Russian terms). In the ‘Russian-style compromise’ scenario, experts suggest that the KZ consider how US and European Union anti-Russian sanctions might be partially lifted . As the experts note, this does not mean that most of the sanctions imposed after 24 February 2022 will be lifted, but activity in this direction should gradually decrease, whilst the practice of granting various exemptions from restrictive regimes should expand.

Political consequences for the Russian Federation (isolation)

Fig. 14. Political consequences for the Russian Federation.

Restoration (Collective West and US scenario). Experts note that Russia will find itself almost completely isolated from the rest of the world (the ‘big North Korea’ scenario), although some limited areas of cooperation between the West and Moscow (for example, strategic arms control) may remain.

Experts also note that international courts will, for a number of years, continue to hear cases regarding numerous allegations against Russia of committing war crimes on Ukrainian territory during the special military operation.

The Russian leadership will remain toxic to any international interlocutors for a long time, including pre-conflict partners.

Experts emphasise that Moscow’s full reintegration into international political and economic systems will only begin during the next Russian political cycle and under the terms of the CST.

Revolution (Russia’s scenario – ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative)). Russian experts note that, over time, Russia’s costs of the conflict will inevitably rise, calling into question the preservation of socio-economic and political stability in the country. A protracted and costly conflict with Ukraine and the West, in every sense of the word, could ultimately have a negative impact on domestic political stability in Russia, which would also lead to a host of negative consequences for the stability of the international system

Reformation (a compromise scenario under Russian conditions). In a compromise scenario, experts emphasise, Russia’s long-term international isolation is not only impossible but also contrary to the West’s strategic interests.

Experts insist that the international investigation into war crimes, which will begin after the conflict ends, should not have a clearly anti-Russian bias; charges against Russia’s senior political leadership should not be brought.

Experts suggest offering Moscow assurances that, once the acute phase of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has ended, responsible politicians in the West will have to acknowledge that a change of political regime in Moscow cannot be regarded as a realistic goal for the West in the immediate future and, moreover, does not necessarily serve Western interests.

Russian experts propose, as a compromise scenario, to consider and guarantee an option whereby Russia would remain in a state of partial isolation for a certain period, but would gradually be ‘forgiven’ and return to most international organisations and regimes.

Consequences for the Russian Federation in international assets

Fig. 15. The Russian Federation’s international assets.

Restoration (Collective West and US scenario). Experts note that Russia will be forced to limit its military presence in regions such as South Ossetia or Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as to alter its relations with international partners, for example, with Syria.

They also argue that Moscow’s ability to provide substantial economic support to the ‘DPR and LPR’, as well as to other similar entities in the post-Soviet space, will also prove to be very limited, leading to a gradual political drift of these territories in the opposite direction.

Revolution (Russia’s scenario – ‘a game without rules’ (maximum negative)). Experts suggest that Russia’s main focus will, as before, remain on Ukraine, and Moscow is unlikely to be able to capitalise on the potential opportunities arising to strengthen its position in unstable regions of the world. On the contrary, a decline in its activity is predicted, for example, in the Middle East and North Africa.

Reformation (a compromise scenario under Russian conditions). In the compromise ‘Russian-style scenario’, experts note that the long-term costs of the conflict with Ukraine will constrain Moscow’s international influence for a considerable time, and claims to the role of a ‘third pole’ in world politics (alongside the US and China) will have to be put on hold for the long term.

Experts also suggest that Russia’s dependence on China will grow, despite likely attempts by the West to counter this trend. In other words, as is evident from the above, even in the ‘Reformation’ scenario (compromises, Russian-style), Russia will be unable to achieve its main strategic goal – to become a separate, independent pole of influence in the international arena.

CONCLUSION

As can be seen from the above, by launching a full-scale aggression against Ukraine, Russia is pursuing strategic objectives primarily at the global level – with the aim of reshaping the world order to suit its own interests (substitution of concepts, prioritising interests over values, division of spheres of influence). And as is evident from the analysis and forecasts of Russian experts, Moscow has so far failed to achieve its goals.

By providing aid and support to Ukraine in repelling Russia’s armed aggression, and by uniting the international community into an anti-Russian coalition, the West and the US are also pursuing strategic objectives that extend far beyond the local or regional levels – namely, the preservation of a just world order (a rules-based order, the protection of democratic values, and the containment of aggressive autocracies).

Indeed, due to Russia’s aggressive actions, Ukraine has found itself at the centre of a struggle (confrontation) between global players in their quest to shape a new world order.

But it is also becoming clear that, for Moscow, the main task today is no longer so much the achievement of its own strategic goals as the prevention of the West and the US from achieving theirs. And in this regard, the Kremlin is prepared to throw all its available forces and resources into the fray. First and foremost, this concerns the pressure on Ukraine, as it is Ukraine that Russia is using to ‘advance’ its interests vis-à-vis the West (primarily the US) at the global level.

How will events unfold and what scenarios will emerge? What changes will occur in Russia’s demands in these scenarios, both towards Ukraine and the West, and in which specific areas? How will the balance of power in the international arena shift as the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, what countermeasures will Russia take in the international arena against the actions of the West and the US, what compromises might Russia and the West agree to in light of the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine, what scenarios for forcing peace on its own terms will Russia devise and implement in Ukraine, and so on — we will continue to observe and describe these developments.

The processes associated with the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict are multi-layered and complex. The conviction that justice will be restored and that Ukraine will inevitably prevail in this war is stronger than ever, but there is also an understanding that Ukraine and its allies and partners will have to traverse a difficult and protracted path in the struggle against such an aggressive and insidious adversary as Russia.

[1]https://russiancouncil.ru/activity/workingpapers/restavratsiya-reformatsiya-revolyutsiya-stsenarii-miroustroystva-posle-rossiysko-ukrainskogo-konflik/